Logic,art, and understanding in the philosophy of Nelson Goodman

This paper contains a reconstruction and discussion of some central subjects in Nelson Goodman's philosophical work. Goodman's creative symbol‐constructional philosophy concerns fundamental aspects of human cognition and practice. It is argued that this provides us with the intellectual tools for constructing a genuine relationship between logic, knowledge, art, and understanding. This is shown by focusing on subjects ranging from the projectibility of predicates and nominalistic mereology to constructive relativity, ways of worldmaking and a general theory of symbols.     

More Thinking About Gender: A Response to Julie A. Nelson

Nelson argues the best we can hope for in a nonsexist society is to revalue those feminine qualities that have previously been devalued. I argue that those qualities are the result of a sexist construction of gender categories, and that a nonsexist society would have no reason to preserve them.     

Methods of assessing craving to gamble: A narrative review

Although the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV) does not explicitly list craving as a diagnostic criterion for pathological gambling, theories of disordered gambling and research on relapse precipitants suggest that cravings-among other factors-provoke and maintain episodes of gambling. Assessment of craving to gamble is complicated by questions regarding (a) the emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and physiological components of such craving; (b) the degree to which craving is viewed as an acute and fluctuating experience or as a relatively stable preoccupation with or inclination to gamble; (c) the threshold separating mild desire from pathological craving to gamble; and (d) the degree to which disordered gamblers are aware of, and able to report on, their experience of craving. Our literature search revealed various self-report methods that could be used to assess craving to gamble, including single-item rating scales, multi-item questionnaires, and application of the think-aloud procedure. In addition, psychophysiological reactivity (e.g., heart rate, brain activation) to gambling-related stimuli and reaction time (RT) tasks (e.g., gambling Stroop, Lexical Salience Task) may serve as proxy measures of subjective craving to gamble. Although researchers have assessed elements of reliability and validity of many measures, most require additional evaluation to examine their predictive and construct validity and their utility across different modes of gambling. The field would also benefit from further research to develop and evaluate additional self-report and proxy measures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

The Goodman Paradox: Three Different Problems and a Naturalistic Solution to Two of Them

It is now more than 50 years that the Goodman paradox has been discussed, and many different solutions have been proposed. But so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution to the paradox. In this paper, I present the naturalistic solutions to the paradox that were proposed in Quine (1969, 1974), Quine and Ullian (1970/1978), and Stemmer (1971). At the same time, I introduce a number of modifications and improvements that are needed for overcoming shortcomings of the solutions. The discussion of this improved version suggests that the Goodman paradox actually embodies three different problems; yet, one of them is not Goodman’s but Hume’s problem. The discussion also suggests that the naturalistic approach is probably the best for basing on it a theory of confirmation. Finally, I analyze one of Hume’s insights that seems to have been largely ignored. This insight shows a surprising similarity to a central feature of the naturalistic solutions.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

A matter of facts

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level.     

From pregnancy to motherhood: The structure of representative and narrative change

The aim of this work was to identify ways of objectifying the course of mothers' represen tations of their babies and themselves as mothers during pregnancy and the postpartum period. A sample of 51 women attending a Family Guidance Clinic for psychoprophylaxis courses was studied using semistruc tured interviews that were administered in the 7th month of pregnancy and on the 5th day and in the 4th month postpartum. This paper describes a method for classifiying themes identified in the mothers' representations of the baby and of the self-as-mother as wish-organized, defense-organized, fear-organized, or disorganized. This classification derives from the presumed clinical function of the narrative themes in the mothers' representational world. Themes about the baby and about the self-as-mother were primarily fear-organized at the 7th month of pregnancy. On the 5th day postpartum, there was no prevailing thematic organization. At 4 months postpartum, representations of the baby were primarily fear-organized and almost never disorganized. We speculate that themes about the baby and the self-as-mother that are disorganized may have negative prognostic significance.     

The flow of narrative in the mind unmoored: An account of narrative processing

Verbal narratives provide incomplete information and can be very long, yet readers and hearers often effortlessly fill in the gaps and make connections across long stretches of text, sometimes even finding this immersive. How is this done? In the last few decades, event-indexing situation modeling and complementary accounts of narrative emotion have suggested answers. Despite this progress, comparisons between real-life perception and narrative experience might underplay the way narrative processing modifies our world model, as well as the role of the emotions that do not relate to characters. I reframe narrative experience in predictive processing and neural networks, capturing continuity between fiction, perception, and states like dreaming and imagination, enabled by the flexible instantiation of concepts. In this framework, narrative experience is more clearly revealed as a creative experience that can share some of the phenomenology of dreams.