The Making of Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-dialectical View

In ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience.

     

Begging the Question: A Qualified Defense

This discussion examines two of the central notions at work in Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality: question-beggingness, and the notion of a rational requirement. I point out that, against certain unreasonable positions, begging the question is a perfectly reasonable option. I also argue that if we use the sense of “rational requirement” that philosophers ought (and tend) to have in mind when defending the idea that morality is rationally required, then Sterba has not succeed in defending this idea. Rather, he has at most demonstrated the rational preferability of morality over two other positions: an extreme egoism, and a very particular form of altruism. But another position exists: one that holds altruistic reasons to exist, and to be capable of justifying sacrifices, but that also holds that they do not require us to sacrifice our interests in the way that morality sometimes does require.     

Reasonable Partiality to Domestic Animals

The paper deals with partiality flowing from special relationships. Two main problems are discussed. The first concerns the relationship between partiality and genuine moral obligations. If partiality can bring about such obligations only if it is reasonable, what requirements should it meet in order to be reasonable? The second problem is one of animal ethics. Can the concept of reasonable partiality help us articulate what is morally at stake in a current discussion about the treatment of domestic animals, viz. the European discussion about the castration of pigs?     

On Using Ethical Theories to Teach Engineering Ethics

Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian.     

Reasonable Partiality in Professional Ethics: The Moral Division of Labour

Attention is given to a background idea that is often invoked in discussions about reasonable partiality: the idea of a moral division of labour. It is not only a right, but also a duty for professionals to attend (almost) exclusively to the interests of their own clients, because their partial activities are part of an impartial scheme providing for an allocation of professional help to all clients. To clarify that idea, a difference is made between two kinds of division of labour, a technical one and a social one. In order to assess the applicability of the idea of a moral division of labour to professional ethics, journalism is contrasted with other professions.     

Toward a cosmopolitan ethos

There has been a rising trend in cosmopolitan moral theory to seriously take into consideration the human's rootedness in, and partiality toward, particular cultures, places, peoples and traditions. This essay suggests that reframing our theorizing on cosmopolitanism from one that primarily addresses an ethico-political set of questions to one that addresses questions related to moral psychology, personal and collective identity formation and the ways in which civilizations and cultural communities cultivate an ethos may assist in the task of generating a rooted form of cosmopolitanism. Conceptualizing cosmopolitanism as an ethos entails a shift from considering our moral obligations to distant others toward a focus on the types of dispositions and character traits necessary to forge a sense of intercultural solidarity. Through an analysis of the ideas of ‘diaspora’, ‘proximity’, ‘partiality' and the ‘foreign’, it will be suggested that through our rootedness in particularity, and our ability to be partial to particular persons and identify with particular cultures, we are capable of fostering a sense of world citizenship that can serve as a foundation upon which we can secure a tenable global ethic for our pluralistic society.     

Aquinas and modern consequentialism

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories.     

Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy

With the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analytic philosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, I will identify several undeniable features of analytic philosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are reducible to other notions, Ross appears to have been right: ‘right’ and ‘good’ are irreducible notions. The classical analytic metaethicists, who based their entire research programme on the promise of finding suitable reductive semantic analyses of ‘right’ and ‘good’, were wrong. These results, I believe, suffice to secure W. D. Ross a high place in the history of analytic philosophy.     

The name of the Piggle: Reconsidering Winnicott's classic case in light of some conversations with the adult ‘Gabrielle’

On the 40th anniversary of its publication, the author re‐reads Winnicott's The Piggle – a case of ‘on demand analysis’ with a child suffering from psychotic night terrors – in light of new information about the patient. Conversations between the author and ‘Gabrielle’ explore two areas not regarded as priorities by Winnicott: the transgenerational transmission of pathology/trauma, and the ways that language, in general – and given names, in particular – organize individual subjectivity. The question raised is to what degree Winnicott – who described the treatment as “psychoanalysis partagé [shared]” due to the parents’ involvement – thought of the pathology itself as ‘shared.’ The goal is not to supplant but to expand Winnicott's understanding of the case, borrowing insights from the work of Lacan and others.     

Kant on the original synthesis of understanding and sensibility

In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times – which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant’s primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160–1n – and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the ‘original’ synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselves – it is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts.     

Points of View

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification.     

‘Translation’ and ‘transformation’ in the analytic situation: Freud – Bion – Laplanche

Following a short introduction to the core theses of Jean Laplanche’s theory of a ‘general seduction’ the author presents the resultant clinical position of the analyst. In the same way that an adult sends ‘enigmatic messages’ to the child, it is the analyst’s task to reopen this primal situation so that the patient can find new ‘translations’ for these messages. Laplanche distinguishes between the function of the analytic frame – which represents and supports attachment – and the ‘sexual’– which is the repressed and constitutes the unconscious. Only the focus on this unconscious facilitates the deconstruction of ‘incorrect’ translations. Accordingly, the analyst, says Laplanche, should not take part in construction – this is a self‐construction of the patient – but only in reconstruction. The author compares this clinical model with Freud’s notions and the ‘transformation processes’ through the alpha function as described by Bion. She illustrates Laplanche’s model and the interpretation strategy with case material.     

Reading On Certainty through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism,Dogmatism and the ‘Groundlessness of our Believing’

Abstract

While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On Certainty, or so it seems, the only right response to someone with different certainties is a reproach like ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’. This article aims to show that On Certainty need not be taken to prove Cavell wrong. It explains that Wittgenstein, in line with the first two parts of The Claim of Reason, does not reject scepticism out of hand but rather questions the sceptic’s self-understanding. Using arguments from Part Three of The Claim, the article moreover argues that a confrontation with divergence calls for self-examination rather than self-righteousness. Precisely because Wittgenstein acknowledges ‘the groundlessness of our believing’ or, in Cavellian terms, ‘the truth of skepticism’, he is not the authoritarian thinker that some have taken him to be.     

Proclaiming and cultivating ‘childlikeness’: a subversive thread in Christian anthropology

If contemporary public discourse struggles with truncated notions of what it means to be human, nowhere is this more obvious than in our discussion and treatment of children. By and large, in our public discourse, we treat children as ‘little adults’ – as consumers, objects of beauty and fashion, career aspirants and sometimes even as sexual beings. By contrast, Jesus put children – as children – at the centre of his project in proclaiming the kingdom of God. He preserved a special place for children in his ministry, and in all three synoptics, he called his followers to ‘childlikeness’. This paper examines a subversive thread in historic theological anthropology. The nature of ‘childlikeness’ is explored and possible ways to cultivate childlikeness for adults are discussed. The notion of childlikeness has been rediscovered in recent times by the ‘Child Theology Movement’, but, in this paper, I wish to examine three linked authors who wrote on ‘childlikeness’ in the 19th and 20th centuries, predating the Child Theology Movement by some decades: George MacDonald, Baron Friedrich von Hügel and Gwendolen Greene.     

Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle

This article offers a straightforward reading of Hume's ‘narrow circle’ – the boundary employed to define those with whom we sympathize in assessing an agent's moral character – that follows from a more careful look at his account of virtue. Hume employs a principle that can be understood as a virtue ethical equivalent of associative obligation, which thereby delimits the boundaries of this circle. This reading avoids concerns about unjustified partiality, moral blind spots, and demandingness, and shows a clear path for reaching uniform moral judgments; it also offers a new perspective on virtue of interest for contemporary virtue ethics.     

‘It's not really us discriminating against immigrants,it's more telling people how to fit in’: Constructing the nation in immigration talk in New Zealand

Previous research has demonstrated that talk about immigration can function to produce, reproduce and stabilize racism (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008 ). In New Zealand (NZ), changes in immigration policy have seen a rapid increase in diverse groups of migrants with varied cultural backgrounds entering the country in the past two decades. Given its unique colonial history and ‘settler nationality in a bicultural nation’ (Bell, 2009 ), we explored how young NZ adults talk about and produce meanings and understandings of immigration, immigrants and cultural diversity. Appealing to notions of NZ as ‘one society’, as English speaking, and as English looking participants constructed NZ, NZ national identity and the NZ economy in particular ways. This constituted a nationalist rhetoric that was taken up in common‐sense ways by participants to legitimize racist talk whilst simultaneously acting to locate participants themselves as reasonable and moral individuals. It is concluded that nationalist discourses function to reinforce patterns of social dominance and perpetuate the notion of New Zealanders as largely white, European‐looking and English‐speaking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'?

Christians in the West often have become so accustomed to naming the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’ – or at least to associating the Holy Spirit particularly with these two dynamisms – that it can come as a surprise that Scripture nowhere explicitly names the Holy Spirit either ‘love’ or ‘gift’. Indeed, as Hans Urs von Balthasar points out, the Spirit is much more clearly associated with truth, knowledge and power. How then does Augustine arrive at the view that the Holy Spirit should be named ‘Love’ and ‘Gift'? I examine and evaluate the complex exegetical steps by which Augustine draws out these names.     

On Sublimation

Although it encapsulates the Freudian theory of art, the theory of sublimation has become outmoded. What is more, since its inception there has always been something ill‐defined about it. Does it use sexualized or de‐sexualized drive energy? Is it a defence or an alternative to defence? Does it serve Eros or Thanatos? Is it useful in clinical work or is it unusable? The only, albeit uncertain, aid to a definition relies on the extrinsic criterion of concrete artistic realization. My aim here to revisit and possibly ‘reinvent’ sublimation in the light of certain principles of the pre‐Romantic aesthetics of the sublime. Both are theories of spiritual elevation, in other words, elevation that moves towards abstract thinking, and of man's ‘moral’ achievement; and both attempt to explain the mystery of aesthetic experience. On the one hand, the aesthetics of the sublime offers a modern myth that helps us articulate a series of factors occasionally referred to by various authors as constitutive of sublimation but which have not been incorporated into a single organic framework: loss and early mourning work; the earlier existence of a catastrophic factor – to be regarded, depending on the situation, as either traumatic or simply ‘negative’; the correspondence with a process of somatopsychic categorization which coincides with subjectivity. On the other hand, it also helps us grasp the experience of negative pleasure empathically, living it ‘from the inside’.     

Psychotherapy in a neoliberal world

The neoliberal regime has significant consequences for the psychotherapies. In particular, the idea that individuals is deserving of support from society and government when they need it – for example in managing the inevitable stresses of the life cycle – is being displaced by an ideology of total individual responsibility. Psychotherapies framed around relational conceptions of the self find themselves particularly out of key with this dominant way of thinking. Governmental approaches to developmental needs become more instrumental, measurement-oriented and ‘disciplinary’ in this situation. Market incentives and disciplinary sanctions are introduced to ensure that institutions and their personnel conform to governmental directives. There is pressure on psychotherapists to adapt to this instrumentalised environment to survive. However, ‘expressive individualisation’ was also stimulated by the cultural liberation of the 1960s, and survives alongside the ‘possessive individualism’ of neoliberalism. This alternative culture has not been entirely suppressed, and therapies continue to be sought which offer the possibility of self-understanding and growth, although the pressure is for such therapies to become luxury goods. What is at risk under neoliberalism is the idea that society should support the self-development and self-understanding of all its citizens, as an aspect of a modern kind of democratic citizenship.     

Anaxagoras’s Qualitative Gunk

Are there atoms in the constitution of things? Or is everything made of atomless ‘gunk’ whose proper parts have proper parts? Anaxagoras (fifth-century BC) is the first gunk lover in the history of metaphysics. For him gunk is not only a theoretical possibility that cannot be ruled out in principle (as it is for modern gunk lovers). Rather, it is a view that follows cogently from his metaphysical analysis of the physical world of our experience. What is distinctive about Anaxagoras’s take on gunk is not only what motives the view, but also the particular type of gunk that he develops. It is qualitative gunk, rather than material gunk. Anaxagoras’s ontology was developed before matter was ‘invented’. It includes quality tropes only; they are gunky. The resulting metaphysical view – a world of qualitative gunk – is new, in the sense of being hitherto unexplored; and yet, it is derived from Anaxagoras’s writings. Drawing on Anaxagoras’s insights, this paper offers a sketch of what qualitative gunk ontology looks like; it explores what motives it; and it highlights the differences of qualitative gunk from material gunk.