Interactive insight problem solving

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed.     

Testing two cognitive theories of insight

Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve a problem and then--"aha!"--there is a sudden realization how to solve it. Two contemporary theories have been proposed to explain insight. The representational change theory (e.g., G. Knoblich, S. Ohlsson, & G. E. Rainey, 2001) proposes that insight occurs through relaxing self-imposed constraints on a problem and by decomposing chunked items in the problem. The progress monitoring theory (e.g., J. N. MacGregor, T. C. Ormerod, & E. P. Chronicle, 2001) proposes that insight is only sought once it becomes apparent that the distance to the goal is unachievable in the moves remaining. These 2 theories are tested in an unlimited move problem, to which neither theory has previously been applied. The results lend support to both, but experimental manipulations to the problem suggest that the representational change theory is the better indicator of performance. The findings suggest that testable opposing predictions can be made to examine theories of insight and that the use of eye movement data is a fruitful method of both examining insight and testing theories of insight.     

Lessons from a Faraway land: The effect of spatial distance on creative cognition

Recent research [Förster, J., Friedman, R. S., & Liberman, N. (2004). Temporal construal effects on abstract and concrete thinking: Consequences for insight and creative cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 177-189] has identified temporal distance as a situational moderator of creativity. According to Construal Level Theory [Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological Distance. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: A handbook of basic principles (pp. 353-381). New York: Guilford Press], temporal distance is just one case of the broader construct of psychological distance. In the present research, we investigated the effect of another dimension of psychological distance, namely, spatial distance, on creative cognition and insight problem solving. In two studies, we demonstrate that when the creative task is portrayed as originating from a far rather than close location, participants provide more creative responses (Study 1) and perform better on a problem solving task that requires creative insight (Study 2). Both theoretical and practical implications of this finding are discussed.     

Both-edges representation of letter position in reading

The representations that underlie our ability to read must encode not only the identities of the letters in a word, but also their relative positions. In recent years, many new proposals have been advanced concerning the representation of letter position in reading, but the available data do not distinguish among the competing proposals; multiple theories, each positing a different letter position representation scheme, are compatible with the evidence. In this article, we report two experiments that used the illusory word paradigm (e.g., Davis & Bowers, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 30: 923–941, 2004) to distinguish among alternative schemes for representing letter position in reading. The results support a scheme that uses both the beginning and the end of a word as anchoring points. This both-edges scheme has been implicated in letter position representation in spelling (Fischer-Baum, McCloskey, & Rapp, Cognition, 115: 466–490, 2010), as well as in position representation in verbal working memory (Henson, Memory & Cognition, 27: 915–927, 1999), suggesting that it may be a domain-general scheme for representing position in a sequence.     

两步火柴棍算术问题解决中的顿悟认知成分分析*

选取68名大学生,随机分为口语报告组和非口语报告组,解决数值型、混合型、分解型、符号型和连等型等五种类型在内的8个两步火柴棍算术问题,以探讨不同难度的两步火柴棍算术问题解决过程中的顿悟认知成分。研究结果:(1)在两步火柴棍算术问题解决过程中,口语报告不存在口语遮蔽效应;(2)两步火柴棍算术问题的难度水平不完全取决于不正确表征;(3)五种题型中都存在失败、僵局和重构三种顿悟认知成分,且都存在自下而上和自上而下两种重构类型。本研究验证了难度水平不同的两步火柴棍算术问题解决过程是一个从分析到顿悟的连续体,即难度较大的连等型和符号型包含的顿悟认知成分较多,更接近顿悟性问题一端,分解型居中,难度较小的混合型、数值型包含的顿悟认知成分较少,更接近分析性问题一端;且自下而上的重构更多存在于顿悟性问题一端。     

A colorful walk on the mental number line: Striving for the right direction

Verguts and Van Opstal [Verguts, T., & Van Opstal, F. (2008). A colorful walk, but is it on the mental number line? Reply to Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik, Cognition, 106, 558-563] cleverly explained the results of Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, and Henik [Cohen Kadosh, R., Tzelgov, J., & Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the mental number line: The size effect, Cognition, 106, 548-557] as a result of different association strength between the size of a number and its color in synesthesia. Here we present three challenges to their alternative explanation, and support our original suggestion.     

汉字字谜任务中限制解除的电生理机制

尽管“限制解除”作为一种顿悟问题解决的关键途径早在上世纪90年代就被德国心理学者Knoblich及其同事提出, 但学界对于“限制解除”所包含的信息加工程序、阶段以及相应的脑认知过程却并未有进一步的探讨和细化。本文从“限制解除”的理论角度出发, 以答案提示催化的“诱发式”字谜解决顿悟为例, 首次提出了一个关于“诱发式”限制解除过程的信息加工阶段初步构想。该构想认为：顿悟问题解决中的“诱发式”限制解除过程包含3个不同的信息加工阶段。第一阶段是以早期注意参与为特征的冲突信息的预警或预处理过程; 第二阶段是以新旧思路交替为特征的关键限制解除过程, 鉴于这个过程以基本问题表征空间的拓展为特征, 因此我们推测右脑的活动很有可能在这个过程中占据主导地位; 第三阶段是以自上而下的控制加工为特征的重新整合过程。脑电研究数据部分地支持了本研究的假设, 发现了上述第一阶段在脑电变化上体现为顿悟性限制解除所伴随的N100/P200复合体; 第二阶段体现为P300在300~400 ms的时间窗内的地形图分布及差异波; 而第三阶段则体现为N400在400~800 ms内的变化。脑电结果还证实：在第二阶段也就是限制解除的关键阶段, 右脑的活动明显强于左脑, 提示基本问题空间的拓展可能更多地依赖于右脑, 而在第三阶段也就是信息的重新整合阶段则表现出相反的半球偏侧化倾向。上述发现有可能为进一步认识和理解顿悟中“限制解除”的脑认知机理提供了新的见解。     

Using a Fork as a Hairbrush: Investigating Dual Routes to Release from Functional Fixedness

Functional fixedness involves difficulty with conceptualizing creative object uses. When it obstructs problem‐solving, individuals must reframe their approach. We examined how different training techniques—chunk decomposition (i.e., considering an object’s basic parts and physical properties) and constraint relaxation (i.e., considering an object’s different functions)—might rely upon different routes to creative reframing. Additionally, we investigated how different forms of cognitive load interact with these dual routes. Participants learned one of three techniques. Chunk decomposition participants created object breakdown diagrams; constraint relaxation participants created object functions lists; and free association (control) participants wrote a word that they associated with each of several concrete nouns. After training, participants attempted to solve five functional fixedness problems. E1 investigated how increasing germane cognitive load via either direct or indirect prompting affected training transfer. Experiment 2 investigated how reducing extraneous cognitive load by providing no transfer instructions and using an eye‐closure strategy. Across both experiments, results supported differences in accuracy and response latency by training. However, chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation did not follow the same pattern, suggesting different mechanisms of the effect. We discuss possible applications to increase innovation in real‐world domains such as education, business, and engineering.     

Covert shifts of attention function as an implicit aid to insight

Previous research shows that directed actions can unconsciously influence higher-order cognitive processing, helping learners to retain knowledge and guiding problem solvers to useful insights (e.g. Cook, S. W., Mitchell, Z., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2008). Gesturing makes learning last. Cognition, 106, 1047-1058; Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: on the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 663-668). We examined whether overt physical movement is necessary for these embodied effects on cognition, or whether covert shifts of attention are sufficient to influence cognition. We asked participants to try to solve Duncker’s radiation problem while occasionally directing them, via an unrelated digit-tracking task, to shift their attention (while keeping their eyes fixed) in a pattern related to the problem’s solution, to move their eyes in this pattern, or to keep their eyes and their attention fixed in the center of the display. Although they reported being unaware of any relationship between the digit-tracking task and the radiation problem, participants in both the eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who maintained fixation. Our results show that by shifting attention in a pattern compatible with a problem’s solution, we can aid participants’ insight even in the absence of overt physical movements.     

More than words: A reply to Malt and Sloman

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one.     

Unconscious semantic categorization and mask interactions: An elaborate response to Kunde et al. (2005)

In their original report [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] maintain that “unconscious stimuli [do not] owe their impact […] to automatic semantic categorization” (p.223), and instead propose the action-trigger theory of unconscious priming. In a reply to our paper [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2005). On the masking and disclosure of unconscious semantic processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts (2005). Cognition], the authors adopt a reconcilist position, and propose that both theories may be valid depending on the experimental situation. We discuss the evidence in favor of this position. [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2005). On the masking and disclosure of unconscious semantic processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts (2005). Cognition] also propose an alternative account of our mask-type blocking hypothesis. We report an experiment that distinguishes between our original and their alternative hypothesis.     

Investigating the causes of wrap-up effects: Evidence from eye movements and E-Z Reader

Wrap-up effects in reading have traditionally been thought to reflect increased processing associated with intra- and inter-clause integration (Just, M. A. & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). A theory of reading: From eye fixations to comprehension. Psychological Review,87(4), 329-354; Rayner, K., Kambe, G., & Duffy, S. A. (2000). The effect of clause wrap-up on eye movements during reading. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,53A(4), 1061-1080; cf. Hirotani, M., Frazier, L., & Rayner, K. (2006). Punctuation and intonation effects on clause and sentence wrap-up: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language,54, 425-443). We report an eye-tracking experiment with a strong manipulation of integrative complexity at a critical word that was either sentence-final, ended a comma-marked clause, or was not comma-marked. Although both complexity and punctuation had reliable effects, they did not interact in any eye-movement measure. These results as well as simulations using the E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control (Reichle, E. D., Warren, T., & McConnell, K. (2009). Using E-Z Reader to model the effects of higher-level language processing on eye movements during reading. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,16(1), 1-20) suggest that traditional accounts of clause wrap-up are incomplete.     

Constructions as categories of language

What causes children to categorize distinct utterances they hear into a constructional generalization? That is, what makes subjects create a constructional category instead of treating each utterance as a distinct unrelated idiom? One simple factor that encourages the learning of abstract categories is shared concrete similarity. When instances share concrete attributes, learners are more likely to categorize them together, and moreover are more likely to attend to their abstract commonalities [Gentner, D., & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development rules. Cognition, 66, 236-297; Markman, A.B., & Gentner D. (1993). Splitting the difference: A structural alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 517-535]. This paper reports results that confirm the prediction that presentation of items with concrete shared similarity early in training enhances language learning in adults.     

Associative symmetry of the memory for object-location associations as revealed by the testing effect

The nature of episodic associations has been subject to a long standing debate, where the two opposing positions postulate associations as either a holistic representation of the constituent elements or as independently modifiable pointers between them. In spite of a history of inconsistent findings, evidence in favour of the theory of symmetric associations has accumulated, yet only for verbal memory [Caplan, J. B., Glaholt, M. G., & McIntosh, A. R. (2006). Linking associative and serial list memory: Pairs versus triples. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(6), 1244-1265; Kahana, M. J. (2002). Associative symmetry and memory theory. Memory and Cognition, 30(6), 823-840]. Although object-location associations differ in several fundamental characteristics from verbal paired-associates, we recently found associative symmetry in the memory for this class of associations as well [Sommer, T., Rose, M., & Büchel, C. (2007). Associative symmetry vs. independent associations in the memory for object-location associations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(1), 90-106]. Due to the inconsistencies in the verbal literature, we felt it to be pertinent to confirm this finding using another experimental approach. Based on recent advances in understanding the effects of successive testing, we were able to make use of this knowledge and introduce this effect as an experimental manipulation in the study of associative symmetry. In particular, we investigated whether the influence of a prior memory test on a subsequent memory test differs when the same or opposite constituent element of an object-location paired-associate cues the retrieval on each test. We observed an identical testing effect for both conditions, which was exclusively driven by reminiscence, the recovery of previously inaccessible information. This finding lends strong support in favour of holistically or symmetrically represented object-location associations and suggests, given the verbal memory literature, a general principle of associative symmetry [Asch, S. E., & Ebenholtz, S. M. (1962). The principle of associative symmetry. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106, 135-163].     

Storage and retrieval processes in unlearning

Memory & Cognition - A revised interference theory interpretation of unlearning is presented which is based on an explicit storage-retrieval model. The theory holds that the first and second...     

Working memory components that predict word problem solving: Is it merely a function of reading,calculation, and fluid intelligence?

The purpose of this study was to assess whether the differential effects of working memory (WM) components (the central executive, phonological loop, and visual–spatial sketchpad) on math word problem-solving accuracy in children (N?=?413, ages 6–10) are completely mediated by reading, calculation, and fluid intelligence. The results indicated that all three WM components predicted word problem solving in the nonmediated model, but only the storage component of WM yielded a significant direct path to word problem-solving accuracy in the fully mediated model. Fluid intelligence was found to moderate the relationship between WM and word problem solving, whereas reading, calculation, and related skills (naming speed, domain-specific knowledge) completely mediated the influence of the executive system on problem-solving accuracy. Our results are consistent with findings suggesting that storage eliminates the predictive contribution of executive WM to various measures Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih (Memory & Cognition, 34: 158-171, 2006). The findings suggest that the storage component of WM, rather than the executive component, has a direct path to higher-order processing in children.     

Vocabulary teaching strategies and conceptual representations of words in L2 in children: Evidence with novice learners

A controversial issue in bilingual research is whether in the early stages of L2 learning, access to the conceptual system involves mediation of L1 lexical representations [Kroll, J. F., & Stewart, E. (1994). Category interference in translation and picture naming: Evidence for asymmetric connections between bilingual memory representations. Journal of Memory and Language, 33, 149-174] or a direct route from the L2 word [Altarriba, J., & Mathis, K. M. (1997). Conceptual and lexical development in second language acquisition. Journal of Memory and Language, 36, 550-568; Finkbeiner, M., & Nicol, J. (2003). Semantic category effects in second language word learning. Applied Psycholinguistics, 24, 369-383]. The main goal of this paper is to study, in a child population, whether the creation of conceptual representations for L2 words is possible, even after only one session of learning of the L2 vocabulary. Furthermore, we do so by examining the efficacy of two different L2 learning methods: L2-L1 association learning vs. L2-picture association learning. A translation recognition task was employed to test whether there was a difference between a semantically related pair and an unrelated pair across conditions (i.e., a semantic interference effect). Results showed a significant semantic interference effect—a conceptual effect—in children after just one vocabulary learning session. Importantly, the L2-picture method produced a greater semantic interference effect than the L2-L1 method. The implications of these findings for models of bilingual memory are examined.     

Inhibition and young children’s performance on the Tower of London task

Young children, when performing problem solving tasks, show a tendency to break task rules and produce incomplete solutions. We propose that this tendency can be explained by understanding problem solving within the context of the development of “executive functions” – general cognitive control functions, which serve to regulate the operation of the cognitive system. This proposal is supported by the construction of two computational models that simulate separately the performance of 3–4 year old and 5–6 year old children on the Tower of London planning task. We seek in particular to capture the emerging role of inhibition in the older group. The basic framework within which the models are developed is derived from Fox and Das’ Domino model [Fox, J., & Das, S. (2000). Safe and sound: Artificial intelligence in hazardous applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] and Norman and Shallice’s [Norman, D.A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behaviour. In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and Self Regulation (Vol. 4). New York: Plenum] theory of willed and automatic action. Two strategies and a simple perceptual bias are implemented within the models and comparisons between model and child performance reveal a good fit for the key dependent measures (number of rule breaks and percentage of incomplete solutions) of the two groups.     

Mental models and problem solving: Three challenges to a theory of restructuring and insight

The Gestalt psychologists' view of restructuring and the associated phenomenon of insight is discussed and related to findings in modern cognitive psychology. In line with Ohlsson (1984b) it is assumed that search in semantic memory is an indispensable part of restructuring. However, in contrast to Ohlsson's (1984b) information processing theory of restructuring and insight the present paper focuses on the role of mental models. It is asserted that the Gestalt approach to problem solving is compatible with the idea that a mental model is manipulated. The paper discusses three assumptions of restructuring and insight, all of which are related to mental models: (a) restructuring involves manipulating a mental model; (b) the experience of insight is based on "seeing" something in a mental model; (c) restructuring aims at realizing structural balance in a mental model. To assess the validity of these three assumptions is seen as a challenge to future research on human problem solving.     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.