Framework for formal ontology

The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented.     

Propositional attitudes and formal ontology

This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.I am deeply indebted to Edward Zalta for many helpful comments and suggestions.     

Designing the human stress ontology: A formal framework to capture and represent knowledge about human stress

A large number of papers have been published on the topic of human stress. There is a need to organise this knowledge under a unifying framework, linking and analysing it in mutual combinations so that new knowledge can emerge. Ontology is an enriched conceptual model for representing domain knowledge. An ontology can be designed to provide a framework for knowledge about human stress. This agreed knowledge model will facilitate knowledge sharing and communications. Additionally, ontologies are machine‐readable and can enable automated programs such as data mining to intelligently access and analyse information. The purpose of this paper is to discuss and explain some of the common stress‐related terms, their definitions, classifications and possible interrelations between them. A top‐layer of the human stress ontology (HSO) model is presented, which will continue to evolve as more research contributions and knowledge become available. It is believed that this framework can be used to build powerful tools to assist researchers and therapists in evaluating stress and facilitating their communication in both research and clinical spaces.     

A model-theoretic criterion of ontology

Conclusion My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory.Earlier versions of parts of this paper were read at New York University, at the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and at the University of Sydney. I am very grateful to William Barrett, Keith Campbell, Gregory Currie, Kenneth Gemes, Toomas Karmo, and Stephen Read for comments and criticisms.     

A proposal for a minimalist ontology

Synthese - This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is a minimal set of entities that form an ontology of the natural world, given our well-established physical theories? The...     

A formal ideal-based account of typicality

Inspired by Barsalou’s (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11, 629–654, 1985) proposal that categories can be represented by ideals, we develop and test a computational model, the ideal dimension model (IDM). The IDM is tested in its account of the typicality gradient for 11 superordinate natural language concepts and, using Bayesian model evaluation, contrasted with a standard exemplar model and a central prototype model. The IDM is found to capture typicality better than do the exemplar model and the central tendency prototype model, in terms of both goodness of fit and generalizability. The present findings challenge the dominant view that exemplar representations are most successful and present compelling evidence that superordinate natural language categories can be represented using an abstract summary, in the form of ideal representations. Supplemental appendices for this article can be downloaded from .     

A formal account of Socratic-style argumentation

In traditional mathematical models of argumentation an argument often consists of a chain of rules or reasons, beginning with premisses and leading to a conclusion that is endorsed by the party that put forward the argument. In informal reasoning, however, one often encounters a specific class of counterarguments that until now has received little attention in argumentation formalisms. The idea is that instead of starting with the premisses, the argument starts with the propositions put forward by the counterparty, of which the absurdity is illustrated by showing their (defeasible) consequences. This way of argumentation (which we call S-arguments) is very akin to Socratic dialogues and critical interviews; it also has applications in modern philosophy. In this paper, various examples of S-arguments are provided, as well as a treatment of the problems that occur when trying to formalize them in existing formalisms. We also provide general guidelines that can serve as a basis for implementing S-arguments into various existing formalisms. In particular, we show how S-arguments can be implemented in Pollock's formalism, how they fit into Dung's abstract argumentation approach and how they are related to the issue of self-defeating arguments.     

A modal ontology of properties for quantum mechanics

Our purpose in this paper is to delineate an ontology for quantum mechanics that results adequate to the formalism of the theory. We will restrict our aim to the search of an ontology that expresses the conceptual content of the recently proposed modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, according to which the domain referred to by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is an ontology of properties. The usual strategy in the literature has been to focus on only one of the interpretive problems of the theory and to design an interpretation to solve it, leaving aside the remaining difficulties. On the contrary, our aim in the present work is to formulate a “global” solution, according to which different problems can be adequately tackled in terms of a single ontology populated of properties, in which systems are bundles of properties. In particular, we will conceive indistinguishability between bundles as a relation derived from indistinguishability between properties, and we will show that states, when operating on combinations of indistinguishable bundles, act as if they were symmetric with no need of a symmetrization postulate.     

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

The paper proposes a process-based model for an ontology that encompasses the emergence of process systems generated by increasingly complex levels of organization. Starting with a division of processes into those that are persistent and those that are fleeting, the model builds through a series of exclusive and exhaustive disjunctions. The crucial distinction is between those persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from-equilibrium. The latter are necessarily open; they can persist only by interaction with their environments. Further distinctions, developed by means of the notions of self-maintenance and error detection, lead to the identification of complex biological organisms that are flexible learners, some of which are self-conscious and form themselves into social institutions. This model provides a non-reductive model for understanding human beings as both embodied and yet emergent. In particular, it provides a way of characterizing action as ‘metaphysically deep’, not an ontological embarrassment within an otherwise physicalist world.     

A formal framework for quantum non-individuality

H. Post's conception of quantal particles as non-individuals is set in a formal logico-mathematical framework. By means of this approach certain metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics can be further explored.The authors would like to thank Prof. Newton C. A. da Costa and the anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. S. French would also to thank his colleagues at Southeast Missouri State University for their support during the preparation of this work.