Noreen Herzfeld Technology and Religion: Remaining Human in a Co-created World

ABSTRACT

Astrotheology, not simply a theology of space sciences, is necessary because astrobiology effects a conceptual shift in how we ask the question “Why do we exist?” Here I suggest characterizing that shift in terms of the intra-action of living systems and habitable environments, which has serious implications for approaches to doctrinal theology. I consider this in terms of the imago Dei and what implications a transdisciplinary approach to astrotheology might in turn have for reframing SETI and METI endeavors as a quest for an Extraterrestrial imago Dei (SETiD or METiD).     

ASTROTHEOLOGY: ON EXOPLANETS,CHRISTIAN CONCERNS,AND HUMAN HOPES

Are there planets beyond our solar system? What may appear quite plausible now had only been a hypothesis until about twenty years ago. The search for exoplanets is driven by the interest in the “habitable” ones among them. Could such planets one day in the far future provide resources or even shelter for humankind? Will we find one day a habitable planet that is even inhabited? These kinds of imaginative speculations drive public interest in the subject. Imagining alien intelligent life in the universe is not at all new. When Ted Peters called for establishing the field of “astrotheology,” he was certainly thinking less of historical precedents than of something analogous to the emerging field of astrobiology. Will astrotheology result in the decentering of humanity in cosmic dimensions? One could also conclude that we are alone, at least for all practical purposes.     

The Meaningfulness of Meaning Questions

Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein's anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we abandon the questions that philosophers have traditionally addressed and that we replace them with more appropriate ones, to which constructive answers are forthcoming. However, though quietism is not the only alternative to reductionism, the rejection of reductionism does oblige us seriously to revise our sense of what constructive philosophy can achieve.     

ASTROTHEOLOGY: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL

As we envision constructive undertakings in the field of religion and science for the next decade, the emerging agenda of astrotheology is opening up a new theater for enquiry. Astrotheology provides a critical theological response to the field of astrobiology while critically assessing exciting new research on life in our solar system and the discovery of exoplanets. This article proposes four tasks for the astrotheologian: deliberate on (1) the scope of creation: is God's creation Earth‐centric or does it include the entire cosmos? (2) the question whether a single divine incarnation on Earth suffices for the cosmos or whether multiple incarnations—one for each inhabited planet—is required; (3) whether astrobiologists and other space scientists are sticking to their science or smuggling in ideology; and (4) readying terrestrial life for contact with extraterrestrial life by enumerating issues to be taken up by astroethics.     

Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein.     

A Tale of Two Tales

Cromwell's Being Human: Human Being (2010) covers a broad array of theoretical and practical arenas that can impact how we all—but psychologists in particular—conceptualize the nature and function of human mentation. In this article, I will abstract an overarching theme from the book that explains how (and even why) humans evolve as storytellers—first to serve intrapersonal goals, but eventually to social ends (which themselves reflect back onto intrapersonal purposes). The tale begins with each person's own private invention of time, space, and self via the constructed linkage between separate stimuli, and continues through the concoction and communication of complex theoretical frameworks. Each step of this journey involves the human being constructing a bridge between events; in other words, composing a story. Finally, the theme of “human being as storyteller” will be applied reflexively to Cromwell's decision to and action of authoring Being Human: Human Being.     

Neuroethics,confidentiality, and a cultural imperative in early onset Alzheimer disease: a case study with a First Nation population

The meaningful consideration of cultural practices, values and beliefs is a necessary component in the effective translation of advancements in neuroscience to clinical practice and public discourse. Society’s immense investment in biomedical science and technology, in conjunction with an increasingly diverse socio-cultural landscape, necessitates the study of how potential discoveries in neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer disease are perceived and utilized across cultures. Building on the work of neuroscientists, ethicists and philosophers, we argue that the growing field of neuroethics provides a pragmatic and constructive pathway to guide advancements in neuroscience in a manner that is culturally nuanced and relevant. Here we review a case study of one issue in culturally oriented neuroscience research where it is evident that traditional research ethics must be broadened and the values and needs of diverse populations considered for meaningful and relevant research practices. A global approach to neuroethics has the potential to furnish critical engagement with cultural considerations of advancements in neuroscience.     

Meaningfulness as Contribution

This article aims to offer a refined way of understanding what we mean by the concepts of meaningfulness and meaning in life. The first step is to separate worthwhileness, as the broadest evaluation of life taking all types of values into account, from meaningfulness, which is seen as one type of intrinsic value along with, for example, well‐being, moral praiseworthiness, and authenticity, which I argue are also separate types of intrinsic value. After discussing why we should not settle with the currently popular fitting attitudes analysis of meaningfulness, I argue that the meaningfulness of a life should be seen to be about the positive contribution beyond itself that this particular life is able to make. I show how this analysis is different from previous similar accounts and how it is able to avoid a number of challenges that have troubled these previous accounts, such as the pleasure machine challenge, the results machine challenge, and the doing good unintentionally challenge. I also demonstrate how it is able to account for prototypical examples of meaningful and meaningless lives and how it is compatible with subjectivism, supernaturalism, and objective naturalism, which is seen as a merit. Finally, I conclude with some notes about what could make life meaningful, given the current analysis of meaningfulness itself.     

Intra‐active refractions

Responding to the analyses that Andreas Losch and Lucas John Mix offer regarding Living with Tiny Aliens: The Image of God for the Anthropocene, this article begins to address how their respective concerns regarding ratiocentric and anthropocentric ideas haunt the construction of a planetary account of the imago Dei. The article then introduces a subsequent line of critique not mentioned by Losch or Mix related to decentering the human individual from accounts of the imago Dei in order to highlight an ongoing challenge for transdisciplinary theological projects that involve astrobiology.     

Destructive Criticism Revisited: Appraisals,Task Outcomes,and the Moderating Role of Competitiveness

Destructive criticism is negative feedback that is inconsiderate in style and content, which exists at the intersection of performance feedback and interpersonal mistreatment. The current research integrates these literatures with an investigation of the effects of destructive versus constructive criticism from a co‐worker on recipients' relational appraisals, emotions, and task outcomes. Drawing from theorising about cognitive appraisals after personal affronts, we first propose that those who experience destructive criticism are more likely than those who experience constructive criticism to (a) perceive that the feedback‐giver intended to harm them, (b) blame the feedback‐giver, (c) distrust the feedback‐giver, and (d) feel anger. Second, with regard to task‐related outcomes, we extend research on trait moderators of feedback responses to the study of destructive criticism. We draw from feedback intervention theory ( Kluger & DeNisi, 1996 ) regarding how feedback may alter the locus of attention to be either self‐ or task‐focused, and investigate a trait that may shift one's attention to the self after destructive criticism. Specifically, we proposed that trait competitiveness—i.e. a desire to win over others—interacts with type of criticism to predict task‐related outcomes. The results of two experiments—a scenario study and a behavioral experiment—provide support for our arguments.     

Promoting responsible conduct: Striving for change rather than consensus

I believe that the ASBMB and the SFN, as well as many scientific, engineering, and other professional societies have taken the right first step. They have taken some responsibility for providing guidelines to their members and others working in related areas. This is how it should be. If professional guidelines are to be meaningful, they must be defined in large part by the practitioners. Yet, having agreed that we need professional societies to become involved, we now must determine the nature of that involvement. I hope that a comparison of the ASBMB and SFN documents will serve to illustrate the differences between two approaches. I cannot be sure that one is better than the other. But I do believe that we should not, cannot, avoid the details. I also believe that to affect change one needs to capture the attention of the audience and to promote active thought—discussion if possible, controversy if necessary. And change is what we need.     

On the Petite Phrase of Proust and the Experience of Empathy: Exploring the Rhythmical Structure of Music

How does music (as Proust tells us) have the power to speak to us as if it were a living being, endowed with subjectivity? Do we empathize with music? Ordinarily we consider our perception of subjects as subjects, through empathy, to pertain to flesh-and-blood persons; this article asks how it is possible for us to empathize with the ordered movement of aural sensations in time. Drawing upon Edith Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy together with Edmund Husserl’s work on Querintentionalität and Längsintentionalität in Husserliana X, I show, first of all, how the temporal structure of inner time-consciousness pertains to the ordered structure of musical expression; secondly, I investigate how the other as other is given with respect to retention and protention. My claim is that musical expression, insofar as it partakes of the potentiality of protention in particular, is creative and opens the possibility for that which is other-than-myself.     

DANCING WITH THE SACRED: EXCERPTS

Abstract. In excerpts from my Dancing with the Sacred (2002), I use ideas from modern science, our world's religions, and my own experience to highlight three themes of the book. First, working within the framework of a scientific worldview, I develop a concept of the sacred (or God) as the creative activity of nature, human history, and individual life. Second, I offer a relational understanding of human nature that I call our social‐ecological selves and suggest some general considerations about what it means to live meaningfully and morally in an evolutionary world. Third, I explore how we might be at home in a universe that is constantly changing and in which suffering and death are interwoven with life and new creation.     

Integration versus conflict between schools of dream theory and dreamwork: integrating the psychological core qualities of dreams with the contemporary knowledge of the dreaming brain

The various ways schools of psychotherapy relate to dreams have been marked by isolationism and mutual conflict rather than self-examination and then integrating the discoveries and methods of other schools. Jung’s method was in opposition to Freud’s psychoanalysis. Existential psychology was dismissive of Freud’s and Jung’s discoveries, while cognitive dream interpretation and cognitive therapy sought other roads entirely. In addition, scientific and neuropsychological dream research has been only insignificantly tied to the psychotherapeutic dream theories. These conflicts and the lack of a comprehensive dream theory has made it convenient for the current rationalist collective consciousness and treatment systems to reject the often times challenging knowledge about ourselves that dreams can provide. This paper describes how contemporary theories of complex cybernetic information networks can create an overriding, constructive framework for uncovering common traits within the above-mentioned branches of dream research and dreamwork. Within this framework, ten core qualities are delineated, supported by both therapeutic knowledge as well as scientific research: 1) Dreams deal with matters important to us; 2) Dreams symbolize; 3) Dreams personify; 4) Dreams are trial runs in a safe place; 5) Dreams are online to unconscious intelligence; 6) Dreams are pattern recognition; 7) Dreams are high level communication; 8) Dreams are condensed information; 9) Dreams are experiences of wholeness; 10) Dreams are psychological energy landscapes. For each core quality I describe short dreamwork sequences from my own practice and a schematic image of how I perceive the overriding interaction between systems in the dreaming brain. For each core quality recommendations for practical dreamwork are provided. Finally, I draw attention to dreams as a huge psychological resource for humankind.     

Which Is in Front of Chinese People,Past or Future? The Effect of Language and Culture on Temporal Gestures and Spatial Conceptions of Time

The temporal‐focus hypothesis claims that whether people conceptualize the past or the future as in front of them depends on their cultural attitudes toward time; such conceptualizations can be independent from the space–time metaphors expressed through language. In this paper, we study how Chinese people conceptualize time on the sagittal axis to find out the respective influences of language and culture on mental space–time mappings. An examination of Mandarin speakers' co‐speech gestures shows that some Chinese spontaneously perform past‐in‐front/future‐at‐back (besides future‐in‐front/past‐at‐back) gestures, especially when gestures are accompanying past‐in‐front/future‐at‐back space–time metaphors (Exp. 1). Using a temporal performance task, the study confirms that Chinese can conceptualize the future as behind and the past as in front of them, and that such space–time mappings are affected by the different expressions of Mandarin space–time metaphors (Exp. 2). Additionally, a survey on cultural attitudes toward time shows that Chinese tend to focus slightly more on the future than on the past (Exp. 3). Within the Chinese sample, we did not find evidence for the effect of participants' cultural temporal attitudes on space–time mappings, but a cross‐cultural comparison of space–time mappings between Chinese, Moroccans, and Spaniards provides strong support for the temporal‐focus hypothesis. Furthermore, the results of Exp. 2 are replicated even after controlling for factors such as cultural temporal attitudes and age (Exp. 3), which implies that linguistic sagittal temporal metaphors can indeed influence Mandarin speakers' space–time mappings. The findings not only contribute to a better understanding of Chinese people's sagittal temporal orientation, but also have additional implications for theories on the mental space–time mappings and the relationship between language and thought.     

Hearing Spaces

In this paper I argue that empty space can be heard. This position contrasts with the generally held view that the only things that can be heard are sounds, their properties, echoes, and perhaps sound sources. Specifically, I suggest that when sounds reverberate in enclosed environments we auditorily represent the volume of space surrounding us. Clearly, we can learn the approximate size of an enclosed space through hearing a sound reverberate within it, and so any account that denies that we hear empty space must instead show how beliefs about volumes of space can be derived indirectly from what is heard. That is, if space is not auditorily represented when we hear sounds reverberate, what is? I consider whether hearing reverberation can be thought of as hearing a distinct sound, hearing echoes, or hearing a property of a sound. I argue that experiences of reverberation cannot be reduced to the perception of any of these types and that therefore empty space is represented in auditory perceptual content. In the final section I outline two ways in which space might be represented.     

Part II: The Chicago Course

ABSTRACT

Part II offers an understanding of how unusual, creative, and meaningful the course taught at the Chicago Institute is. Chapter 1 explains how the course came into existence and outlines its structure, along with giving a syllabus for the course. Chapter 2 is probably the essence of this issue of the journal, as it gives detailed student responses to the analysts’ presentations. Chapter 3 details the student responses to one class in particular, a special class on Allen Siegel’s book, Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of the Self, at Allen’s house in which he addresses questions raised by the students about the book in particular and self psychology in general.     

‘CREATIONISM’ AND THE CONTINGENT A PRIORI

Williamson (1986) presents a troublesome example of the contingent a priori; troublesome, because it does not involve indexicals, and hence cannot be defused via the usual two‐dimensional strategies. Here I explore how the example works, via an examination of crucial belief‐forming method M, partly in response to Hawthorne (2002) and the questions there raised for ‘hyperreliable’ belief‐forming methods. I suggest that, when used to form a belief, M does its special work through creating a verifying state of affairs which guarantees the truth of the belief thus formed. This creative link can be said to account for the knowledge‐conferring status of M. But it also provides us with a way to defuse the purported example of the contingent a priori. The knowledge at issue is only a priori in virtue of this creative link, an importantly different epistemic achievement from standard cases of a priori knowledge. One important moral to be drawn is that the a priori/a posteriori distinction does not appear to be slicing the epistemological beast at its joints.     

Three Reviews of For Life Abundant: Practical Theology,Theological Education,and Christian Ministry,edited by Dorothy C. Bass and Craig Dykstra, 2008

For Life Abundant, the fruit of sustained reflection among systematic theologians, practical theologians, and pastors, is an important new work that deserves attention. The volume provokes creative and critical thinking about practical theology. Its contributors conceptualize the field as a disciplined practice of imagination and skill residing at the confluence of Christian tradition and living ecclesial communities, and ask what such a construal of practical theology might mean for theological education. Given the significance of For Life Abundant, Teaching Theology and Religion asked three theological educators who are located in different regions, types of institutions, and fields, to review and respond to it. Rebecca Slough describes the volume's central questions and organization, and considers how it might contribute to the deliberations of a seminary faculty regarding a school's curriculum. Martha Stortz shows how the process and structure of For Life Abundant are in themselves illustrative of the conceptualization of practical theology for which it argues. Kwok Pui‐lan notes the volumes strengths and goes on to probe its lacunae, particularly with regard to global, gender, and multi‐cultural considerations relevant to a robust construal of pastoral theology in our time. While the authors of these three reviews and responses to the volume did not interact as they wrote them, together they comprise a conversation that should be on‐going. TTR invites further responses to the volume.     

Geographies of Meaningful Living

Because it is significantly unclear what ‘meaningful’ does or should pick out when applied to a life, any account of meaningful living will be constructive and not merely clarificatory. Where in our conceptual geography is ‘meaningful’ best located? What conceptual work do we want the concept to do? What I call agent‐independent and agent‐independent‐plus conceptions of meaningfulness locate ‘meaningful’ within the conceptual geography of agent‐independent evaluative standards and assign ‘meaningful’ the work of commending lives. I argue that the not wholly welcome implications of these more dominant approaches to meaningfulness make it plausible to locate ‘meaningful’ on an alternative conceptual geography — that of agents as end‐setters and of agent‐dependent value assessments — and to assign it the work of picking out lives whose time‐expenditures are intelligible to the agent. I respond to the challenge confronting any subjectivist conception of meaningfulness that it is overly permissive.