An atheological argument from evil natural laws

I should like to thank Keith Chrzan, P.G. McGrath, Susan Ament Smith and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I should also like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for extensive and brilliant criticisms of an earlier and very different version of this paper; many of the improvements in the present version were motivated by their criticisms.     

Historical perspectives on the morality of virtue

I would like to thank Patrick Grim, Lee Miller, and Dennis Rohatyn for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Skepticism and legal interpretation

For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.     

Individualism,causal powers,and explanation

Versions of this paper were presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June 1991, at Cornell University in October 1991, and at Queen's University in January 1992; I thank Terence Horgan and Carl Ginet, respectively, for their comments on the first two of these occasions. I would also like to thank Terence Irwin, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob Stalnaker, Ed Stein, and J. D. Trout for comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Joe Moore, Dave Robb and Sergio Sismondo for useful discussion.     

Ethical egoism and the moral point of view

I thank Peter Winch and Robert Stecker for their critical comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Vagueness and incoherence: A reply to Burns

I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant.     

The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

Moral education: An act-utilitarian view1

In this essay, I distinguish two significant act-utilitarian theories of moral education: the traditional rule of thumb view and the Harian intuition view. I argue that there are problems with the traditional view and that an act-utilitarian ought to adopt a version of the Harian view. I then explain and respond to a major objection to the intuition view given by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that the system of moral thought which the Harian view advocates we teach is inherently unstable and is certain to undermine itself. I argue that there is reason to expect a great deal of stability in this system.I wish to thank Richard Brandt, William Frankena and R.M. Hare for their conversation on this and other topics and for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Association for the Philosophy of Education and the Northwest Philosophy conference for the opportunity to read and discuss versions of the essay.     

Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment

In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.I am indebted John G. Bennett and Henry E. Kyburg. jr. for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I thank the referees forErkenntnis who, apart from giving extended comments and suggestions, provided me with some hard-to-find relevant material. I also thank Prashanta Bandyopadhyay, Norman Foo, Maurice Pagnucco, Hans Rott and Mary-Anne Williams for their suggestions. The errors that remain are, of course, mine.     

Causation and the flow of energy

Causation has traditionally been analyzed either as a relation of nomic dependence or as a relation of counterfactual dependence. I argue for a third program, a physicalistic reduction of the causal relation to one of energy-momentum transference in the technical sense of physics. This physicalistic analysis is argued to have the virtues of easily handling the standard counterexamples to the nomic and counterfactual analyses, offering a plausible epistemology for our knowledge of causes, and elucidating the nature of the relation between causation and physical science.The development of this paper owes a great deal to the critical acumen of my colleagues. I want to thank especially Adam Morton, Ernest Loevinsohn, and Jon Levinson. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Carl G. Hempel for kindly commenting on a draft of this paper which led to numerous improvements. But most especially of all I want to thank David Lewis, whose indefatigable insistence on philosophical clarity saved this paper from many turbidities and falsehoods manifest in earlier drafts. I also wish to thank my students, Mark Folsom and Ken Waters, for spotting a serious inaccuracy.     

The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.     

Is space-time discrete or continuous? — An empirical question

In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time is discrete, I then turn to some possible empirical evidence, which we do not yet have. This evidence is based on some slight differences between commonly occurring differential equations and their discrete analogs.I would like to express my thanks to John McKie with whom I have had several inspiring conversations about discrete space. I would also like to thank the audience of a paper on this topic which I read in October 1991 at the College Park campus of the University of Maryland. Finally I would like to thank the referees ofSynthese for their comments. One of them, in particular, should be thanked especially for help in improving Appendix Two.     

Spacetime theory as physical geometry

Discussions of the metaphysical status of spacetime assume that a spacetime theory offers a causal explanation of phenomena of relative motion, and that the fundamental philosophical question is whether the inference to that explanation is warranted. I argue that those assumptions are mistaken, because they ignore the essential character of spacetime theory as a kind of physical geometry. As such, a spacetime theory does notcausally explain phenomena of motion, but uses them to construct physicaldefinitions of basic geometrical structures by coordinating them with dynamical laws. I suggest that this view of spacetime theories leads to a clearer view of the philosophical foundations of general relativity and its place in the historical evolution of spacetime theory. I also argue that this view provides a much clearer and more defensible account of what is entailed by realism concerning spacetime.I would like to thank William Demopoulos and Michael Friedman for their comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the anonymous referees forErkenntnis for their suggestions. Work on this paper was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership

I would like to thank Donna Haraway, Barrie Thome, Daniel Scripture and, especially, Peter Euben for their many helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Thelma Francis for her generous support and encouragement.     

Towards an epistemology of religious traditions

Summary Starting from the acceptance of the Egalitarian Principle I exhibited a version which I considered too lax (BEP) and one I considered too strict (NEP), arriving at a version (MEP) which allows that there can be tolerance-limiting reasons for adhering to traditions but only if they are based on unreasoned knowledge claims. In fact, I hold that the situation most of us find ourselves in restricts such claims on religious topics to very general ones. Hence the choice between NEP and MEP is not significant. It follows that we should take up one of two positions concerning religious traditions: either we argue from the shared assumptions of a variety of traditions without genuine participation in any of them; or we justify participation in one of them by noting various marks of reliability, such as serendipitous understanding. A version of this paper was read at the Faith and Reason Conference held at the Catholic Institute in Strathfield, October 5 and 6, 1996. I would like to thank all who participated in the discussion of my paper on that occasion. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for Sophia for their helpful comments.     

Zeno's paradoxes and the cosmological argument

I want to thank Professor José Benardete, Professor Panayot Butchvarov, and Professor David E. Johnson for their very kindly viewing earlier versions of this paper.     

Geometry, intuition and experience: From kant to husserl

I take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at ZiF for their very helpful comments and criticisms during the academic year. For the preparation of this paper, I am especially indepted to Michael Hallett, who not only improved my English but also saved me from a number of errors.     

Academic on a mission: Run and run and run

Challenges the distinctions we make between research/scholarship and practice. Recognizes and values the complimentarity of teaching, research, practice, and public policy. Tells how I have tried to approach creating opportunities to integrate those activities in my role as a community psychologist in an academic setting. Describes some of the lessons I have learned from my two decades of practice. This article is a very close approximation to my Distinguished Contribution to Practice in Community Psychology award address at APA in Toronto, August 1996. That talk included numerous overheads, which reason demands I omit. I thank Jim Sorenson and George Albee who, each in their own way, showed me that university professors can be passionate about their work and extend their reach beyond the perimeters of the campus. I thank Heather Barton, Krista Hopkins, Jennifer Heigel, and Anne Salassi for being such good ambassadors and for my most meaningful source of professional satisfaction: turning students on to careers as community psychologists and preventionists. I thank the Virginia prevention community for two decades of working together toward a common mission and the College of William and Mary for supporting my life’s work. Finally I thank John Morgan for his friendship and his affirming introduction, State Michaels for her help with the original talk, and Beverly Peterson for always being there. I am deeply honored.