The Deliberative Pulpit? The Democratic Norms and Practices of the PCUSA

In contrast to typical approaches that view religion as problematic or benign, thicker conceptions of religion's place in promoting and sustaining democratic politics are possible. This includes religious organizations modeling democratic practices and engaging in debate on common terms. We initiate this program of inquiry with data from a survey of Presbyterian Church, USA clergy gathered during the late summer and fall of 2009. We asked explicitly about clergy commitment to democratic norms and practices as reflected in their public speech and small group activities in their congregations. We use this article to explain variance in the results, looking especially to see if democratic commitments fall at the expense of religious competition, organizational maintenance, and personal preference and increased conservatism.     

Religious Pathways from Adolescence to Adulthood

Prior research suggests the significance of religion for development and well‐being in adolescence and beyond. Further, new developments and applications of statistical methods have led to ways of better accounting for the multidimensional nature of religiosity (e.g., latent class analysis), as well as the dynamic aspects of religiosity (e.g., latent growth curve models). Yet, rarely, if ever, are both features of religiosity incorporated and examined together. Therefore, we propose and conduct a latent class analysis using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) to identify seven distinct pathways of religiosity that involve independently changing levels of religious affiliation, religious service attendance, personal importance of religion, and prayer from adolescence to adulthood. We also show how individuals’ religious pathways are related to gender, race, parents’ education, their own education, and family formation experiences in the transition to adulthood. Our findings inform the study of how multiple dimensions of religiosity take shape across adolescence and the transition to adulthood, and suggest a new way for measuring the dynamics of religiosity in studies of the impact of religion across the life course.     

Measuring Five Dimensions of Religiosity Across Adolescence

This paper theorizes and tests a latent variable model of adolescent religiosity in which five dimensions of religiosity are interrelated: religious beliefs, religious exclusivity, external practice, private practice, and religious salience. Research often theorizes overlapping and independent influences of single items or dimensions of religiosity on outcomes such as adolescent sexual behavior, but rarely operationalizes the dimensions in a measurement model accounting for their associations with each other and across time. We use longitudinal structural equation modeling with latent variables to analyze data from two waves of the National Study of Youth and Religion. We test our hypothesized measurement model as compared to four alternate measurement models and find that our proposed model maintains superior fit. We then discuss the associations between the five dimensions of religiosity we measure and how these change over time. Our findings suggest how future research might better operationalize multiple dimensions of religiosity in studies of the influence of religion in adolescence.     

Religion as Cultural Models: Developing an Emic Measure of Religiosity

Despite a century's worth of work, lacunae remain in our understanding of the religion‐health relationship. Scholars in this field have called for increasingly sophisticated conceptualizations of religiosity that refine its connection to well‐being, accounting for both positive and negative associations, while being sensitive to the cultural variations in the experience of religion. This article argues that cognitive anthropological methods provide a novel approach to these issues by conceptualizing aspects of religion as culturally shared “styles of life.” Specifically, the combined approaches of cultural consensus and cultural consonance provide an emically valid measure of religiosity that is then linked to health through the psychosocial stress paradigm. Utilizing research among Brazilian Pentecostals within the state of São Paulo, this intrareligious study evaluates the predictive power of religious cultural consonance relative to widely used and established religiosity scales. Religious consonance is found to have a stronger correlation with psychological well‐being than comparable measures, suggesting that existing standardized measures miss important dimensions of the religion‐health relationship. As such, this article outlines an important area of collaboration between anthropologists and other religion‐health researchers.     

Religion and Political Decision Making

Influential political theorists suggest that religious differences in political life may be overcome through shared commitment to political processes. In this article, I subject the underlying assumptions of this proposition to empirical inquiry. When faced with substantive conflict over policy outcomes, do religious persons defer to a political process for resolution? And if so, to which political process do they defer? Through a novel interview exercise with 61 respondents from a variety of religious backgrounds, I find a general willingness to defer to a legitimate political process, even if it results in an undesirable outcome that violates religious (or other) political preferences. However, I also find that a political process need not be democratic to be seen as legitimate, and that process preferences do not map onto religious differences.     

Fear of Rejection versus Religious Commitment as Predictors of Adjustment Among Reformed and Evangelical College Students in Canada

The contradictory findings about the (positive or negative) associations between religion and adjustment suggest that different aspects of religion might have different effects. A total of 160 men and 283 women attending two faith-affirming colleges in Canada completed measures of fear of rejection (by God and church members), religiosity, prosocial attitudes, social adjustment (work orientation, school attitudes), and personal adjustment (life satisfaction, self-esteem). Fear of rejection was found to be predictive of lower religious commitment and of poor social and personal adjustment. In contrast, religious commitment was found to be predictive of prosocial attitudes and of good adjustment. Religious commitment had much higher correlations with prosocial values and adjustment among men than among women. Regression analyses indicated that fear of rejection was a strong predictor of poor adjustment among religious persons.     

Religion and politics: examining the impact of faith on political participation

This study examines the relationship between religion and political activity. It theorises religious influences on political activity and tests the impact of various religious factors on political participation in a large cross-national sample (1981–2014). This study integrates longitudinal data from the aggregated World Values Survey with country-level data in the hierarchical multilevel analysis that allows teasing out the individual-level religious influences, including membership in religious organisations, religiosity and self-identification with various religious denominations, and the country-level impacts. The temporal and spatial coverage of the data used in the study includes more than 65% of the world’s population. The seven types of political participation examined in the study include signing petitions, joining in boycotts, participating in demonstrations, taking part in unofficial strikes, occupying buildings and factories, voting and membership in political parties. We find that religion matters but not always in the expected ways. Religiosity, by itself, often serves as a deterrent rather than mobilising force for political engagement, regardless the denominational differences. It is the membership in religious organisations and other voluntary associations of a secular nature that make individuals more likely to engage in political activity.     

Religiosity and Tolerance in the United States and Poland

Survey research shows important links between religion and tolerance in the United States. Yet it is not known to what extent its findings have broader, cross-national relevance. This article compares religious influences on political tolerance in the United States and Poland. Despite the marked political and cultural differences between their national contexts, data from the NORC GSS and Polish GSS reveal similar patterns of religious influences. Both in the United States and Poland, intolerance appears to be linked primarily to theocratic beliefs, that is, to a political correlate of religiosity rather than to its essential components, such as religious commitment and participation that have weak direct effects only on tolerance of atheists, and weak indirect effects on other dimensions of tolerance.     

Reflections on religious belief and prosociality: Comment on Galen (2012)

Luke Galen (2012) offers a timely analysis of associations between religiosity and prosocial and antisocial attitudes and behaviors. After identifying 10 points of agreement, I raise 8 questions for further reflection and research: (1) Is ingroup giving and volunteerism not prosocial? (2) Are religion-related prosocial norms part of the religious factor? (3) Is social support also appropriately considered part of the religious factor? (4) Are self-report data from more and less religious people invalid? (5) How should we disentangle gender and religiosity? (6) How might we resolve "the religious engagement paradox"? (7) Does religion serve an adaptive, evolutionary function? And (8) Might research further explore religiosity, in its varieties, and prosociality? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Where Men Appear More Religious Than Women: Turning a Gender Lens on Religion in Israel

Past research, typically focused on Christians in Christian nations, has found that women tend to be more religious than men. This study uses original nationally representative data (N = 5,601) with strategic oversamples of minority groups to examine variation in how religion and gender intersect across ethnoreligious identities in Israel. We demonstrate that Israel diverges from the typical pattern of women appearing more religious than men. In fact, Israeli men are consistently more religious than Israeli women on commonly used measures and frequently more religious on a broader set of questions specific to Judaism and Israel. Subgroup analyses highlight the intersectional nature of gender and religion, showing that men's greater religiosity in Israel is limited to Jews, and, more specifically, nonsecular Jews. We suggest that gender gaps arise, at least in part, because religions are gendered institutions with gendered norms, expectations, and incentives, and that these norms, expectations, and incentives vary from religion to religion.     

Suicide and Religion: New Evidence on the Differences Between Protestantism and Catholicism

Suicide has remained a persistent social phenomenon and now accounts for more deaths than motor vehicle accidents. There has been much debate, however, over which religious constructs might best explain the variation in suicide rates. Our empirical analysis reveals that even though theological and social differences between Catholicism and Protestantism have decreased, Catholics are still less likely than Protestants to commit or accept suicide. This difference holds even after we control for such confounding factors as social and religious networks. In addition, although religious networks do mitigate suicides among Protestants, the influence of church attendance is more dominant among Catholics. Our analysis also indicates that alternative concepts such as religious commitment and religiosity strongly reduce suicide acceptance.     

Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel

Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model. According to the former, sometimes called a demand-side theory, economic development reduces religious participation and beliefs. According to the latter, described as a supply-side theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism. We assess the theories by using survey information for 68 countries over the last 20 years, measuring attendance at formal religious services, religious beliefs, and self-identification as religious. In accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development—represented by per capita GDP—tends to reduce religiosity. Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. The presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the subsidies that flow to organized religion. However, in accordance with the religion-market model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market and Communist suppression. Greater religious pluralism raises attendance at formal services but has no significant effects on religious beliefs or self-identification as religious. Although religiosity declines overall with economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development. For example, religiosity is positively related to education and the presence of children and negatively related to urbanization.     

Religion and health relationships: A review

This review examines various studies showing the relation between religiosity (religious beliefs and/or practices) and health. It also includes church attendance and its relation to drug use. The role of the church in health promotion is discussed, with examples of church intervention model programs. Several attempts have been made to measure religiosity and religious commitment, but as yet little has been done to identify specific dimensions of religion as they relate to health behaviors. Even though the literature indicates that religion is generally associated with health behaviors, health status, and longevity, further research on the specifics of this relationship is needed.He has been doing research on the relation between religion and health for the past five years.     

The Relationship Between the Constructs of Religiousness and Prejudice: A Structural Equation Model Analysis

Research examining the connection between religiousness and prejudice has used scales exclusively as proxies for the underlying constructs. Scholars in the psychology of religion, however, are ultimately concerned about the nature of religious constructs and their relationships with other variables, and the use of scales provides only indirect information concerning these constructs. To overcome this limitation, structural equation modeling (SEM) allows researchers to gather information about the relationship among constructs directly. The present study used SEM to examine the relationship between religion and prejudice using four of the most important and heavily researched constructs in the psychology of religion: religious commitment, orthodoxy, fundamentalism, and openness, as well as their relationships with three types of prejudice: racial, sexual orientation, and religious. The strongest results revealed that religious commitment, orthodoxy, and fundamentalism were linked positively with sexual orientation prejudice, whereas religious openness was linked negatively with that type of prejudice. Other religiousness–prejudice relationships were weaker and also more complex.     

An Examination of the Relationship Between Characteristics of Sect-Like Religiosity and Community Volunteering Among U.S. Churchgoers

Previous research indicates a robust relationship between religious participation and volunteering. However, religion is a multidimensional phenomenon and relatively few studies have examined the effects that different types of religiosity have on the likelihood of volunteering. In this article I extend our understanding of the link between religion and volunteering by examining the effect that several characteristics associated with sect-like religiosity have on the likelihood of community volunteering among U.S. churchgoers. My findings indicate a more nuanced relationship between volunteering and religious belonging, practice, and experience than previous studies have shown. Density of congregational friendship networks and frequency of evangelism are found to increase the likelihood of volunteering through and for religious congregations while supernatural experiences and frequency of evangelism are found to increase the likelihood of volunteering outside of the congregation. Religious strictness is found to decrease the likelihood of volunteering outside of the congregation. Implications for our understanding of the link between religion and volunteering are discussed as well as directions for future research.     

Aquinas and the Virtues of Hope: Theological and Democratic

A prominent political historian has recently identified unwarranted optimism and unwarranted pessimism as democracy's “dual dangers.” While this historical analysis highlights the difficulties that accompany democratic hope, our prevailing conceptual vocabulary obscures the resources needed to address them. This essay attempts to recover these resources by excavating insights from Thomas Aquinas, who supplies one of the most systematic accounts of hope in the history of religious and political thought. By appropriating the conceptual structure of Thomas's theological virtue of hope, this essay reconstructs a democratic virtue that perfects acts of hoping in fellow citizens to achieve democratic goods and thereby enables citizens to respond properly to difficulties that tempt presumption and despair.     

Survey Experiments on Candidate Religiosity,Political Attitudes,and Vote Choice

Because identification with and affect toward social groups is a primary heuristic for citizens, the social group profiles of candidates are important for electoral behavior. We focus on an increasingly important element of candidates’ social characteristics: their levels of religiosity and secularism. We argue that as religious groups and identities become structured less by what religion they are and more by how religious they are (or are not), candidate religiosity and secularism should condition the impact of political orientations such as partisanship and cultural policy attitudes on vote choice. Highly religious candidates should attract more support from Republicans and from cultural conservatives, while overtly secular candidates should appeal more to Democrats and cultural liberals. Using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate a state legislative candidate with varying levels of religiosity and secularism, we find strong support for our argument.     

The religion paradox: if religion makes people happy, why are so many dropping out?

As we estimate here, 68% of human beings--4.6 billion people--would say that religion is important in their daily lives. Past studies have found that the religious, on average, have higher subjective well-being (SWB). Yet, people are rapidly leaving organized religion in economically developed nations where religious freedom is high. Why would people leave religion if it enhances their happiness? After controlling for circumstances in both the United States and world samples, we found that religiosity is associated with slightly higher SWB, and similarly so across four major world religions. The associations of religiosity and SWB were mediated by social support, feeling respected, and purpose or meaning in life. However, there was an interaction underlying the general trend such that the association of religion and well-being is conditional on societal circumstances. Nations and states with more difficult life conditions (e.g., widespread hunger and low life expectancy) were much more likely to be highly religious. In these nations, religiosity was associated with greater social support, respect, purpose or meaning, and all three types of SWB. In societies with more favorable circumstances, religiosity is less prevalent and religious and nonreligious individuals experience similar levels of SWB. There was also a person-culture fit effect such that religious people had higher SWB in religious nations but not in nonreligious nations. Thus, it appears that the benefits of religion for social relationships and SWB depend on the characteristics of the society.     

Why Virginity Pledges Succeed or Fail: The Moderating Effect of Religious Commitment Versus Religious Participation

Over the past two decades, virginity pledges have proliferated in the US, despite mixed results regarding their effectiveness. Few studies have examined possible mechanisms that may shed light on why pledges work for some individuals but not others. Using a sample of emerging-adults aged 18–24 years old (n = 1,380), we examine the influence of religiosity on pledge signing and adherence, specifically whether the effectiveness of pledges is moderated by religiosity. Findings show that while religious participation is positively associated with signing a pledge, there is a moderating effect of religious commitment. That is, when religious commitment is high, adherence to the pledge is greater. However, for pledge signers with low religious commitment, there are unintended negative consequences with regard to increased participation in risky sexual behaviors, whether compared to other people who signed the pledge who are equally committed to their religion or to individuals who have never taken such a pledge. Implications for research and policy are discussed.     

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHARED POLITICAL IDENTITY IMPOSSIBLE? NECESSARY? SUFFICIENT?

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity.