Gender and the prerogatives of dating and marriage: An experimental assessment of a sample of college students

Experimental data were used to study the amount of support men and women have to pursue nonsexual and sexual activities without their partner in the contexts of dating and marriage. Attention was also focused on whether a partner's independent behavior would be seen as less acceptable in marriage than in dating. The results showed that marriage did reduce a partner's right to engage in outside involvements. However, only males saw marriage as more restrictive than dating. Moreover, these restrictions were not directed at women primarily, but were directed at both male and female target persons. Where differences were found between male and female prerogatives in marriage and dating, they appeared to favor females, providing evidence that among college students some of the structures associated with intimate relationships supported women's interests over men's.Thanks go to Barry Markovsky and Lorraine Dorfman for their helpful comments.     

Human and peoples' rights: social representations among Cameroonian students

Social representations of human and peoples' rights were studied among Cameroonian university students (N = 666) with a questionnaire based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and Duties. The respondents were asked how important and how well realized they regarded the 39 human and peoples' rights to be. A 13-factor model provided the best fit with Cameroonian students' perceptions of human and peoples' rights. Taken as a whole, our results are in line with previous quantitative studies on human rights, confirming structural similarity but also country-specific variation in the aggregation of specific rights. Moreover, our data showed that Cameroonian students value human and peoples' rights highly (M = 6.18), whereas their fulfillment is not regarded as highly (M = 5.09). Same law for all, equality and freedom, and right to work and living were highly appreciated but lowly realized rights. Higher than average in importance and realization were right to education and self-fulfillment, right to marriage and property, peoples' social and political basic rights and right to life and safety. Low in importance and realization were peoples' right to their country's natural resources and independence, right to meetings, and right to express opinion. Women appreciated the rights more than men and thought of their rights as better realized compared to men. We suggest that when women say that their rights are better fulfilled than men do, it is in comparison with the older generation, who are still very dependent on men. Nowadays, thanks to education and urbanization, young women have wider choices or opportunities for marriage and jobs. Men may feel frustrated in the context of political liberalization because the freedoms are more theoretical than fulfilled; the economic crises and cultural changes have hindered their economic domination and their prerogatives.     

Cosmopolitan ethics and global legalism

This article analyses the legal and ethical dimensions of the wide gap between commitments to universal human rights and the reality of their widespread and systematic abuse, particularly as related to poverty and inequality. The argument put forward is that, properly conceived, global legalism, that is, the quest to apply the rule of law across and among states and societies, and cosmopolitan ethics, both support restricting harms imposed on weak and vulnerable individuals worldwide by an unjust institutional order. Therefore, those who have tended to value either a global rule of law or cosmopolitan ethics independently have good reason to pursue their requirements together. The article also considers the problem of legalism and cosmopolitanism being used by powerful agents in global politics to enhance their prerogatives and their freedoms from legal and ethical restraints.     

Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Reply to Doris Schroeder

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights.     

DOES HE PULL IT OFF? A THEISTIC GROUNDING OF NATURAL INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS?

This paper focuses on two key issues in Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs . It argues that Wolterstorff's theistic grounding of inherent rights is not successful. It also argues that Wolterstorff does not provide adequate criteria for determining what exactly these natural inherent rights are or criteria that can help us to evaluate competing and contradictory claims about these rights. However, most of Wolterstorff's book is not concerned with the theistic grounding of inherent rights. Instead, it is devoted to a detailed and rigorous articulation of the meaning and defense of a theory of justice as consisting of inherent rights and with showing why this theory of justice is superior to the alternative right order theories that Wolterstorff criticizes. The paper concludes that these accomplishments are not diminished even if Wolterstorff has failed to provide us with a satisfactory theistic grounding of his theory.     

Belief, motivational, and ideological correlates of human rights attitudes

Many people believe that an informed and thoughtful citizenry is essential to the maintenance of democratic ideals within the United States and the spread of those ideals abroad. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the evidence that Americans consider issues of human dignity and rights when making judgments about the U.S. government's war on terror has been mixed. In our study, we assessed the relative contributions of ideological, belief, and cognitive-motivational factors to the prediction of human rights and civil liberties attitudes. Individuals scoring high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and the belief that the structure of knowledge is simple were the most likely to support restrictions on human rights and civil liberties as part of the war on terror. In a subsequent regression analysis, individuals scoring higher on personal need for structure or exhibiting lower levels of epistemological belief complexity tended to score higher on RWA. Additionally, men were generally more likely to support restrictions on rights and liberties and to score higher on RWA than were women.     

ORGANISATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL INTERNAL IMPEDIMENTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

Our psychoanalytic discipline originated, has evolved and is still located within a congregational network that blends and binds together, in an inextricable and contradictory way, the missionary mandates and commendations of a 'movement' and a 'cause' with the inherent prerogatives and functions of academic professions and sciences. In this paper the author explores the consequential past and present impedimenta of this organisational and educational syncretism, for six fundamental dimensions of action for psychoanalysis. Subsequently, the nature of a proposition is delineated, suggesting a reorganisation, local and international, to address what the author visualises as five of our most pressing contemporary challenges: a) an autonomous university educational model, freed from regressive societal-political inertias, enabling us to abandon our seclusive monasticism; b) the consolidation of an epistemological frame of reference, idiographic and nomothetically substantiated against our cumulative inductivism, which is the seedbed of our sectarianism, cross-sterilisation and pseudo-ecumenism; c) local and external educational and professional systems of accreditation and certification, independent from affiliation and membership privileges of our supraordinate ecclesia; d) social relevance and community presence, moving away from our meaningless organisational and educational cloistering; and e) a local and international functional and interdependent reorganisation, in the context of sovereignty and integrity, in contrast to our prevalently crusading and indoctrinating homogamous pathological co-dependency. The author concludes that only a harmonisation of objectives and administrative structure might loosen the talons of faith that keep us retrogressively tied to our past.     

Moral rights: Conflicts and valid claims

Most of us have certain intuitions about moral rights, at least partially captured by the ideas that: (A) rights carry special weight in moral argument; (B) persons retain their rights even when they are legitimately infringed; although (C) rights undoubtedly do conflict with one another, and are sometimes overridden as well by nonrights considerations. I show that Dworkin's remarks about rights allow us to affirm (A), (B), and (C), yet those remarks are extremely vague. I then argue that Feinberg's more comprehensive and precise theory, designed to do justice to all three theses, cannot assure us of (A), that rights are not merely one consideration to be weighed in the balance with heterogeneous others. I show how Feinberg accepts (C) despite being drawn toward an alternative absolutist theory of rights and commits himself to (B) through his rejection of prima facie rights. But his promising distinction between recognition and enforcement of a right, which helps give some sense to (B) despite its tension with (C), undermines the force of rights in moral argument apparently intended by (A). We thus learn that Feinberg's and Dworkin's accounts of rights are incompatible, though each is correct in important ways. Contrasting their views allows us to clarify the implications and consistency of alternative theses about rights, one step toward meeting the challenge of developing a theory which shows more adequately how respect for rights is to be combined with other intuitions about rights and their relation to other values.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1986 Pacific Division American Philosophical Association Meetings. Partial support for this research was provided by a Research Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. I am grateful for that funding and am indebted to Earl Conee, Leon Galis, Jean Hampton, Peter Markie, Rex Martin, Terrance McConnell, James Nickel, Laurence Thomas and especially George Sher and Judith Thomson for insightful comments on drafts of this paper.     

Book Discussion Section: COMPARATIVE ETHICS,ISLAM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: Internal Pluralism and the Possible Development of Tradition

Dialogue with three major Muslim authors shows that Islam can take a positive stance toward human rights while also presenting differing interpretations of the meaning and scope of rights. Because of their subordination of norms reached through reason to those drawn from faith, as well as negative experiences of the impact of Western colonization of parts of the Muslim world, Abul A‘la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb place significant restrictions on rights of conscience. 'Abdolkarim Soroush's positive support for the role of reason in Islamic faith and his less‐negative assessment of the West lead him to more vigorous support for the human rights agenda. This study raises the question of whether the humility needed in comparative ethics and the respect for others at the root of human rights are necessarily linked.     

Cultural appropriation and the intimacy of groups

Philosophical Studies - What could ground normative restrictions concerning cultural appropriation in cases where they are not grounded by independent considerations such as property rights or...     

Evolutionary ethics and moral theory

Conclusion This example, like the others, demands further discussion. My conclusion must therefore remain modest: an agent-neutral theory of our moral competence is not biologically implausible. Agent-centered rules like tit-for-tat, prerogatives, special obligations, and duties not to harm others might be best regarded as belonging to the theory of moral performance rather than the theory of moral competence. For biologists who may think otherwise, the general argument of this essay is that any claims to the contrary must be based on more empirically well-developed theories of our moral competence and moral performance.More adequate theories of both kinds are worth developing, even if by themselves they determine nothing about how we ought to live our lives. Biology may help us understand the broad taxonomical categories of moral performance. It may also explain why, at the deepest levels of our moral thinking, we so easily slide into agent-neutral ways of reasoning. But how we ought to live our lives is something that must be determined by social experiment and moral argumentation. Discoveries regarding the empirical nature of morality cannot be made independently of the actual workings of our moral competence, which is itself only one factor in broader social and psychological processes that are capable of leading human beings down any number of more or less morally laudable paths.

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IF MEN COULD GET PREGNANT: BETH SINGER AND CAROL GILLIGAN ON ABORTION

Abstract: I argue here that Beth Singer's analysis of rights as operative social norms allows us to make sense of the personal and political complexities of the abortion debate. In particular, I argue that it is only by means of Singer's analysis that we, as feminists, can reconcile our conviction that Carol Gilligan's celebration of empathy and partiality gestures toward something definitive of our moral experience with the need to avail ourselves of the politically efficacious language of rights.     

Regulating the Private Relations of Adults with Mental Disabilities: Old Laws,New Policies,Hollow Hopes

Recent legislative reforms have aimed to help people with mental disabilities pursue more “normal” lives. Yet, current laws regulating the mentally disableds' private relations continue to disenable them. Social scientists have asserted that people with mental disabilities vary widely in their individual competencies. Yet, laws tend to forgo an individualized approach to the mentally disabled in favor of broad restrictions on their rights to engage in sexual, marital, and parental relationships. Reviews of cases also show that when they challenge these restrictions, the mentally disabled tend to be required to demonstrate a higher level of morality and functioning than non-disabled. Reforming these restrictive legal rules requires an unlikely, but possible, concordance between social science and the law.     

Beyond Sectarianism? On David Miller’s Theory of Human Rights

In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an account of human rights grounded on the idea of basic human needs. Miller argues that his account can overcome what he regards as a central problem for human rights theory: the need to provide a ‘non-sectarian’ justification for human rights, one that does not rely on reasons that people from non-liberal societies should find objectionable. The list of human rights that Miller’s account generates is, however, minimal when compared to those found in human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues that contrary to what Miller claims, his account is ‘sectarian’, since it relies on reasons that some non-liberals should find objectionable given their divergent values. It goes on to question whether ‘sectarianism’, as Miller defines it, is, in any case, a problem for human rights theory. The article concludes that Miller provides us with no reason to abandon commitment to a more extensive list of human rights.     

Parental Rights

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the philosophical foundations of parental rights. Some commonly held accounts are rejected. The question of whether parental rights are property rights is examined. It is argued that there are useful analogies with property rights which help us to see that the ultimate justification of parental rights lies in the special value of parenthood in human life. It is further argued that the idea of generation is essential to our understanding of parenthood as having special value and that parental rights properly belong, in the first instance, to natural parents.     

Animal Rights and the Problem of r-Strategists

Wild animal reproduction poses an important moral problem for animal rights theorists. Many wild animals give birth to large numbers of uncared-for offspring, and thus child mortality rates are far higher in nature than they are among human beings. In light of this reproductive strategy – traditionally referred to as the ‘r-strategy’ – does concern for the interests of wild animals require us to intervene in nature? In this paper, I argue that animal rights theorists should embrace fallibility-constrained interventionism: the view that intervention in nature is desirable but should be constrained by our ignorance of the inner workings of ecosystems. Though authors sometimes assume that large-scale intervention requires turning nature into an enormous zoo, I suggest an alternative. With sufficient research, a new form of gene editing called CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) promises to one day give us the capacity to intervene without perpetually interfering with wild animals’ liberties.     

Evaluating ‘Bioethical Approaches’ to Human Rights

In recent years there has been growing scholarly interest in the relationship between bioethics and human rights. The majority of this work has proposed that the normative and institutional frameworks of human rights can usefully be employed to address those bioethical controversies that have a global reach: in particular, to the genetic modification of human beings, and to the issue of access to healthcare. In response, a number of critics have urged for a degree of caution about applying human rights to such controversies. In particular, they have claimed that human rights have unresolved distributive and foundational problems. Interestingly, however, some of these critics have gone on to suggest that it might be possible to draw on certain bioethical insights to remedy these problems with human rights. This paper evaluates these recent attempts to apply insights from bioethics to the theory and practice of human rights. It argues that while these insights do not constitute an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they do force human rights scholars and campaigners to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the prevalent idea that human rights are always ‘inviolable trumps’. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the ‘fairness’ of the institutions we charge with determining our concrete rights. And finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the notion that human rights are held exclusively by members of the human species.     

Grounding Rights in Social Practices: A Defence

This paper defends a social practiceconception of moral rights possession againstwhat many of its critics take to be a decisiveobjection, namely that such a conceptionprevents us from using moral rights forcritical purposes.     

Governing therapy choices: Power/Knowledge in the treatment of progressive renal failure

This article outlines the struggle between the power of the health care professional and the rights of the individual to choose freely a modality of treatment. Nurses are instrumental in assisting patients in making the best decision for a therapy they will have to assume for the rest of their lives. In guiding patients' decision, nurses must take into account these unavoidable contingencies: changes in lifestyle, nutritional restrictions, level of acceptance, compliance issues, ease of training and availability of support/facilities. Ensuring that the patient makes an informed decision is therefore an ongoing challenge for nurses as they are taking part in a delicate balancing act between not directly influencing the patient's decision while making sure the patient is accurately informed.