阿格妮丝·赫勒的道德理论诉求

阿格妮丝·赫勒在其道德三部曲中,立足于后现代的视角,揭示了现代社会中"好人存在,但好人何以存在"这一中心问题.纵观赫勒的整个道德理论,道德经历了两次结构性变化:作为内部权威的实践智慧(良心)的出现以及如今正在经历的伦理规则内部的具体规则和抽象规则之间的张力,现代偶然性存在的人所依赖的各种道德规则以及实践智慧等方面成为赫勒所强调的重点问题.与康德的先验道德论相比,赫勒的道德理论沿着马克思思想中所蕴含的道德路径前行,其最终诉求在于期待现代社会中个性道德的生成.     

反思、互动和希望

自2005年9月出版"临床决策论坛版"以来.已经过去了3年6个月,共编辑出版了43期.在出版的43期中,我们共发表了1300多篇文章,其中有9名两院院士发表了13篇文章,也有一大批全国知名的临床学科带头人和专家撰写的大量文章.应该说,正是有了这些高水平专家的高质量文章,才能保证杂志的质量,也使杂志的水平不断地提高,影响力不断地扩大.     

Reason,Recognition, and Internal Critique

Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique . It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched.     

Pierre Kerszberg,Critique and Totality

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Pragmatism, Relativism, and the Critique of Philosophy

The relativist strain in Rorty's work should be distinguished from the Davidsonian strain. The latter may be exploited in support of Rorty's critique of philosophy but it is at odds with his use of "solidarity" and "ethnocentrism"as explanatory concepts. Once this is recognized, there remains in Rorty's work a consistent challenge to the search for general philosophical theories of truth, objectivity, and rationality (of which relativism itself is an example). On this reading, however, Rorty's pragmatism is not a theory that offers answers to questions about the authority of beliefs and practices but rather a critical tool used to open detailed, concrete, and critical investigation into particular questions about the establishment and viability of the beliefs and practices we have.     

Autonomy, Slavery, and Mill's Critique of Paternalism

Critics have charged that John Stuart Mill's discussion as of paternalism in On Liberty is internally inconsistent, noting, for example, the numerous instances in which Mill explicitly endorses examples of paternalistic coercion. Similarly, commentators have noted an apparent contradiction between Mill's political liberalism – according to which the state should be neutral among competing conceptions of the good – and Mill's condemnation of non-autonomous ways of life, such as that of a servile wife. More generally, critics have argued that while Mill professes an allegiance to utilitarianism, he actually abandons it in favor of a view that values personal autonomy as the greatest intrinsic good. This paper presents an interpretation of Mill that provides a viable and consistent treatment of paternalism, thereby refuting each of the aforementioned critiques. Mill's views, it argues, are consistently utilitarian. Moreover, the interpretation accounts for all of Mill's departures from his otherwise blanket prohibition of paternalistic legislation. In particular, it explains his most notorious example, the condemnation of voluntary contracts for slavery. The interpretation emphasizes Mill's conceptual linkage between autonomy and utility, noting his implicit use of at least three different senses of the notion of autonomy.     

阿格妮丝·赫勒的生存选择理论及当代意义

阿格妮丝.赫勒在其道德理论三部曲《一般伦理学》、《道德哲学》和《个性伦理学》中,沿着克尔凯郭尔提出的"生存三境界"及其选择理论,进一步将生存的选择本身区分为差异性范畴下生存的选择和普遍性范畴下生存的选择,从而为现代社会中"好人存在,好人何以存在?"这一道德中心问题的回答提供了坚实基础。赫勒的生存的选择理论对于生活在今天的每个人如何面对现代性困境和对道德缺失问题的解决无疑有着很重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

Deconstructing Agnes – externalization in systemic supervision

Externalization is seen in this paper as a valid and useful part of the process of clinical supervision in systemic family therapy training. We offer a discussion on the use of externalization based on an example from a supervision group on a London M.Sc. in Family Therapy. Externalizing practices are located in the context of a postmodern perspective and narrative ideas within systemic family therapy. We explore the use of narrative ideas and the recursive relationship between theory, practice and the subjective experience of the trainee, within the practice of systemic supervision.     

Mysticism,Reality, Illusion,and the Freudian Critique of Religion

Freud's critique of religion cannot be fully understood if his ontogenetic perspective is explored outside of his phylogenetic perspective. The former allows for illusionistic thought processes that are orthogonal to reality claims. The latter requires consideration of empirical claims to truth within a social psychological perspective. It is only the phylogenetic perspective that allows Freud to maintain that religion is delusional, whether or not it is also illusional. Freud's rejection of "as if" philosophies as exemplified by Vaihinger is based upon his refusal to allow religious truth claims to escape their empirical, social foundations. Recent efforts to revive psychological theories of religion rooted only in illusionistic thought, as exemplified in the use of Winnicott's conceptualization, must confront social psychological issues similar to those articulated within Freud's phylogenetic view. A mystical reading of Freud is suggested in which claims to truth within psychoanalysis, science, and religion can be confronted in an empirical and inherently social manner.     

Tradition,Authority, and Immanent Critique in Comparative Ethics

Drawing on resources from pragmatist thought allows religious ethicists to take account of the central role traditions play in the formation and development of moral concepts without thereby espousing moral relativism or becoming traditionalists. After giving an account of this understanding of the concept of tradition, I examine the ways in which understandings of tradition play out in two contemporary examples of tradition‐based ethics: works in comparative ethics of war by James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay. I argue that a pragmatist approach to tradition‐based ethics allows for a nuanced and flexible understanding of moral traditions, and one that holds great promise for international consensus‐building around shared ethical norms for the use of armed force.     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.