Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

Working memory affects false memory production for emotional events

Whereas a link between working memory (WM) and memory distortions has been demonstrated, its influence on emotional false memories is unclear. In two experiments, a verbal WM task and a false memory paradigm for negative, positive or neutral events were employed. In Experiment 1, we investigated individual differences in verbal WM and found that the interaction between valence and WM predicted false recognition, with negative and positive material protecting high WM individuals against false remembering; the beneficial effect of negative material disappeared in low WM participants. In Experiment 2, we lowered the WM capacity of half of the participants with a double task request, which led to an overall increase in false memories; furthermore, consistent with Experiment 1, the increase in negative false memories was larger than that of neutral or positive ones. It is concluded that WM plays a critical role in determining false memory production, specifically influencing the processing of negative material.     

Psychopathic personality traits are linked to reduced false memories for negative events

Individuals scoring high on psychopathic personality traits process emotional material to a different extent than individuals with few psychopathic traits. Evidence exists that these individuals have impaired emotional memory. The question arises whether this emotional memory impairment has ramifications for the production of emotional false memories. In the present study, we investigated the production of false and true memories for emotional events in a community sample (N = 120) of individuals varying in psychopathic traits (evaluated with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory–Revised [PPI-R] questionnaire). The fearless dominance (FD) component of psychopathy interacted with the emotional impact of to-be-remembered events in the production of false memories, showing fewer negative false memories with increasing levels of FD. At the subjective level, negative false memories were not perceived as vivid memory experiences in high FD individuals. Concerning true memories, higher scores in cold-heartedness were related to fewer true memories for neutral and negative (but not positive) events. These results show that individuals with high psychopathy traits – in particular, FD – do not have a general emotional memory impairment but they process negative material in a different way than individuals with low psychopathic traits and thus are less susceptible to producing false memories for negative events.     

Not lost in translation: writing auditorily presented words at study increases correct recognition “at no cost”

Previous studies have reported a translation effect in memory, whereby encoding tasks that involve translating between processing domains produce a memory advantage relative to tasks that involve a single domain. We investigated the effects of translation on true and false memories using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure [Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17–22; Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 21, 803–814]. Translation between modalities enhanced correct recognition but had no effect on false recognition. Results are consistent with previous research showing that correct memory can be enhanced “at no cost” in terms of accuracy. Findings are discussed in terms of understanding the relationship between true and false memories produced by the DRM procedure.     

Using story contexts to bias children’s true and false memories

The effects of embedding standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists into stories whose context biased interpretation either toward or away from the overall themes of the DRM lists on both true and false recognition were investigated with 7- and 11-year-olds. These biased story contexts were compared with the same children’s susceptibility to false memory illusions using the standard DRM list presentation paradigm. The results showed the usual age effects for true and false memories in the standard DRM list paradigm, where 11-year-olds exhibited higher rates of both true and false recognition compared with the 7-year-olds. Importantly, when DRM lists were embedded in stories, these age effects disappeared for true recognition. For false recognition, although developmental differences were attenuated, older children were still more susceptible to false memory illusions than younger children. These findings are discussed in terms of current theories of children’s false memories as well as the role of themes and elaboration in children’s memory development.     

The role of associative strength in children's false memory illusions

The effects of associative strength on rates of 7- and 11-year-old children's true and false memories were examined when category and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were used to cue the same critical lure. Backward associative strength (BAS) was varied such that the category and DRM lists had the same strength (DRM=category), DRM lists had more BAS (DRM>category), or category lists had more BAS (DRM<category). If BAS drives children's false memories then BAS, not the type of relation across items in a list, should determine false memory production. The results confirmed this prediction using both recall and recognition measures: (1) both true and false memories increased with age, (2) true memory was better for category than DRM lists but there were no differences for false memory, and (3) at all ages, false memories varied predictably with changes in BAS but were unaffected by list-type manipulations. These findings are discussed in the context of models of false memory development.     

Eliciting false memories on implicit and explicit memory tests after incidental learning

Abstract: In a false memory experiment, lists of semantic associates (e.g., newspaper, letter, book, etc.) were presented to three groups of participants to induce false memories for critical nonpresented (CN) words (e.g., read) in an incidental learning task. The control group simply estimated the frequency rate in everyday Japanese discourse of each word on a list. The imagery instruction group received an additional instruction to imagine a thematically related converging word from the target words on a list. Participants in the imagery plus writing group received the same instructions as those in the imagery instruction group, but were also required to write down the word they imagined for each list. The results from the implicit and explicit memory tests given after the incidental learning episode showed that the level of priming for CN words was equivalent to that for actually presented target words for all three groups on the implicit test, whereas explicit memory results showed that participants explicitly recognized more target words than CN words. The implications for implicit associative response and fuzzy‐trace theories of false memory, as well as implicit priming, are discussed.     

The role of kinematic mental simulation in creating false memories

Our investigation focuses on memory for scenes depicted in photos. According to the mental model theory, the observation of a static scene depicted in a photo which portrays an actor near to perform an action can trigger a kinematic mental simulation of that action unfolding in time. The deriving prediction is that such a kinematic mental model supports the creation of a false memory of the actor performing an advanced phase of the action. We test this prediction in three experiments in which participants are presented with static scenes of actions, and after three days they perform a recognition task in which they assess recognition of old and novel static scenes depicting actions. The results confirm that false memories occur for actions that represent the unfolding over time of the static action initially observed. Our theoretical framework can accommodate also several previous findings in the literature on false memories.     

Cortisol response and psychological distress predict susceptibility to false memories for a trauma film

For eyewitness testimony to be considered reliable, it is important to ensure memory remains accurate following the event. As many testimonies involve traumatic, as opposed to neutral, events, it is important to consider the role of distress in susceptibility to false memories. The aim of this study was to investigate whether cortisol response following a stressor would be associated with susceptibility to false memories. Psychological distress responses were also investigated, specifically, dissociation, intrusions, and avoidance. Participants were allocated to one of three conditions: those who viewed a neutral film (N?=?35), those who viewed a real trauma film (N?=?35), and a trauma “reappraisal” group where participants were told the film was not real (N?=?35). All received misinformation about the film in the form of a narrative. Participants provided saliva samples (to assess cortisol) and completed distress and memory questionnaires. Cortisol response was a significant predictor of the misinformation effect. Dissociation and avoidance were related to confabulations. In conclusion, following a stressor an individual may differ with regard to their psychological response to the event, and also whether they experience a cortisol increase. This may affect whether they are more distressed later on, and also whether they remember the event accurately.     

Inducing and reducing false memories: a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

Participants tend to falsely remember a nonpresented critical word after having studied a list of the word's primary associates. We present here a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, which provides a tractable method of experimentally inducing and investigating such illusory memories. In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that the constructed stimulus material induced highly reliable false-recall and false-recognition effects, and, moreover, that veridical and false memories were associated with a similar phenomenological experience of remembering. The results from Experiment 2 indicated that the susceptibility to false recognition can be substantially reduced when participants are explicitly required to monitor the sources of their memories. These findings are consistent with predictions derived from the source-monitoring framework.     

Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Photographs Create False Memories

ABSTRACT— Photographs help people illustrate the stories of their lives and the significant stories of their society. However, photographs can do more than illustrate events; in this article, we show that photographs can distort memory for them. We describe the course of our "false-memory implantation" research, and review recent work showing that photographs can sometimes increase—while other times decrease—false memories. First, we discuss research showing that a doctored photo, showing subjects taking a completely fictitious hot-air-balloon ride, can cultivate false memories for that experience. We hypothesize that the photograph helps subjects to imagine details about the event that they later confuse with reality. Second, we show that although photographs are indeed powerful sources of influence on memory, they are not necessarily as powerful as narrative. In fact, in certain circumstances, photographs might constrain imagination. Third, we discuss research showing that true photographs can also cultivate false memories. Finally, we present recent work showing that photographs can create false memories for current events.     

Comparison of neural activity that leads to true memories,false memories,and forgetting: An fMRI study of the misinformation effect

False memories can occur when people are exposed to misinformation about a past event. Of interest here are the neural mechanisms of this type of memory failure. In the present study, participants viewed photographic vignettes of common activities during an original event phase (OEP), while we monitored their brain activity using fMRI. Later, in a misinformation phase, participants viewed sentences describing the studied photographs, some of which contained information conflicting with that depicted in the photographs. One day later, participants returned for a surprise item memory recognition test for the content of the photographs. Results showed reliable creation of false memories, in that participants reported information that had been presented in the verbal misinformation but not in the photographs. Several regions were more active during the OEP for later accurate memory than for forgetting, but they were also more active for later false memories, indicating that false memories in this paradigm are not simply caused by failure to encode the original event. There was greater activation in the ventral visual stream for subsequent true memories than for subsequent false memories, however, suggesting that differences in encoding may contribute to later susceptibility to misinformation.     

边缘刺激条件下错误记忆的实验研究

随着研究的深入,研究者越来越关注错误记忆中的无意识成分。本研究试图采用边缘刺激这一方法研究错误记忆中的意识-无意识机制。结果发现,边缘刺激会引发错误记忆,但它不受刺激知觉时的意识-无意识水平限制;而且这种错误记忆-经发生便很稳定,不随测量时间间隔的延长而改变。另外。研究还发现材料这一因素往往会和其他因素交融在一起共同作用于错误记忆。     

错误记忆的自我参照效应：易化的作用

采用DRM范式,设置三种参照对象条件（自我、他人和中性参照）,考察错误记忆是否存在自我参照效应。结果发现：（1）与正确记忆一样,错误记忆中亦存在自我参照效应;（2）无论是正确记忆还是错误记忆,自我参照条件下的回忆成分均显著多于他人参照和中性参照,但熟悉性成分在三种不同参照对象条件下没有显著差异;（3）当词表中学习项目由分组呈现变为随机呈现时,错误记忆的自我参照效应仍稳定存在。结果揭示,自我参照效在促进正确记忆的同时,亦可易化错误记忆效应。     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reinstatement of odour context cues veridical memories but not false memories

ABSTRACT

The sense of smell has made a recent return to the forefront of research on episodic memory. Odour context cues can reactivate recently encoded memories during sleep-dependent memory consolidation [e.g., Rasch, B., Buchel, C., Gais, S., & Born, J. (2007). Odor cues during slow-wave sleep prompt declarative memory consolidation. Science, 315, 1426–1429], and reinstating the odour experienced during encoding at test results in superior recall and recognition [e.g., Isarida, T., Sakai, T., Kubota, T., Koga, M., Katayama, Y., & Isarida, T. K. (2014). Odor-context effects in free recall after a short retention interval: A new methodology for controlling adaptation. Memory & Cognition, 42, 421–433]. However, whether the impact of odour cues is restricted to the specific memories studied in the presence of the odour, or whether reinstating the odour also cues unstudied memories that are semantically related to the studied memories (i.e., false memories) is unknown. We used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm to quantify the impact of odour cues on both veridical memory and false memory. Reinstating the odour presented during the study of the DRM word lists at the test phase resulted in better free recall of the studied words, but had no statistically significant impact on the number of false memories produced. We argue that odour cues influence recall of the memories they co-occurred with during study but potentially not semantically related memories.     

Variations in processing resources and resistance to false memories in younger and older adults

The influence of available processing resources on the resistance to false memories (FMs) for lists of semantically related items associated with a non-presented critical lure was examined in younger and older adults. Reducing the available resources at encoding in younger adults (Experiments 1 and 2) led to a performance similar to that of older adults (i.e., higher rates of FMs in addition to reduced rates of correct recall). However, increasing the available resources (Experiments 2 and 3) led to improvements in the rates of correct recall in both age groups and decreased the probability of FMs in younger adults, although warnings had to be added in older adults to obtain similar effects on FMs. Parallel influences on a post-recall test asking participants to report items that they had thought of but did not recall were also found. The influence of available cognitive resources for memory accuracy is also discussed with respect to activation-monitoring (e.g., McDermott & Watson, 2001) and fuzzy-trace (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) accounts of age-related increased in false memories.