Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.     

Make it real: Belief in occurrence within episodic future thought

While the cognitive and neural bases of episodic future thinking are well documented, questions remain as to what gives the sense that an imagined event belongs to one’s personal future. Capitalizing on previous research on metacognitive appraisals in autobiographical remembering, we propose that episodic future thinking involves, in varying degrees, a subjective belief in the potential occurrence of imagined future events and we explore the nature and determinants of such belief. To this aim, participants provided justifications for belief in occurrence for a series of past and future events. For each event, they also assessed their subjective feelings (belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy) and rated various characteristics of mental representations that might contribute to these feelings. Results showed that belief in the occurrence of future events mostly related to their integration in a broader autobiographical context, especially their relevance to personal goals and their personal plausibility. We also found that belief in occurrence, autonoetic experience, and belief in accuracy represented distinct subjective appraisals of future events, which depended in part on different determinants. Based on these findings, we propose a new theoretical model of subjective feelings associated with episodic future thinking that conceives of belief in occurrence as arising from metacognitive appraisals that shape the sense that imagined events belong to one’s personal future.     

Monitoring the future: object and source memory for real and imagined events

In these experiments a memory‐monitoring decision is made, whereby subjects must decide not only whether or not to‐be‐learned stimuli will be remembered—the focus of all of the past research into the Judgement of Learning (JOL)—but also whether they will be able to assess the source of those stimuli, as assessed by a new measure, Judgement of Source (JOS). In Experiment 1 subjects had to judge whether they would remember the occurrence and the source of items that were either seen or imagined. Although seen items were better remembered and sourced than imagined, subjects were unable to predict this outcome: they underestimated their ability to recall seen items and overestimated their ability to recall imagined items. In Experiment 2 subjects had to discriminate between self‐performed or other‐performed enacted or imagined events. We expected that the motor cues associated with overt performance should provide more sensory information than had the visual input in Experiment 1, and this should help subjects to discriminate between real and imagined items. As predicted, JOL magnitude showed that subjects were now able to predict accurately that they would recall more enacted events than imagined events. JOS magnitude showed that subjects incorrectly predicted that self‐enactment would assist source memory compared to imagination. However, it was the source of other‐focused events which was more accurately remembered. The results are discussed in terms of Koriat's (1997) view about cue utility in making JOLs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The organization of prospective thinking: Evidence of event clusters in freely generated future thoughts

Recent research suggests that many imagined future events are not represented in isolation, but instead are embedded in broader event sequences—referred to as event clusters. It remains unclear, however, whether the production of event clusters reflects the underlying organizational structure of prospective thinking or whether it is an artifact of the event-cuing task in which participants are explicitly required to provide chains of associated future events. To address this issue, the present study examined whether the occurrence of event clusters in prospective thought is apparent when people are left to think freely about events that might happen in their personal future. The results showed that the succession of events participants spontaneously produced when envisioning their future frequently included event clusters. This finding provides more compelling evidence that prospective thinking involves higher-order autobiographical knowledge structures that organize imagined events in coherent themes and sequences.     

Enhancing the Imagined Contact Effect

ABSTRACT

Recent research has found that mentally simulating positive out-group contact experiences can promote tolerance and more positive intergroup perceptions. We investigated two ways of enhancing this imagined contact effect. In Study 1 we found that asking participants to generate more detail in their imagined encounter led to expectations of their having a greater number of out-group acquaintances in the future. In Study 2 we found that instructing participants to close their eyes during an imagined encounter led to heightened intentions to engage in future actual contact. These findings add further support to the notion that imagining intergroup contact may be a valuable addition to existing interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

The need to belong can motivate belief in God

The need to belong can motivate belief in God. In Study 1, 40 undergraduates read bogus astrophysics articles "proving" God's existence or not offering proof. Participants in the proof-for-God condition reported higher belief in God (compared to control) when they chronically imagined God as accepting but lower belief in God when they imagined God as rejecting. Additionally, in Study 2 (72 undergraduates), these effects did not occur when participants' belongingness need was satisfied by priming close others. Study 3 manipulated 79 Internet participants' image of God. Chronic believers in the God-is-rejecting condition reported lower religious behavioral intentions than chronic believers in the God-is-accepting condition, and this effect was mediated by lower desires for closeness with God. In Study 4 (106 Internet participants), chronic believers with an accepting image of God reported that their belief in God is motivated by belongingness needs.     

Beliefs m Realistic and Unrealistic Control: Assessment and Implications

ABSTRACT Scales were constructed to measure perceived control over controllable events (realistic control) and perceived control over uncontrollable events (unrealistic control). Internal reliability, test-retest reliability, and discriminant validity of both scales were adequate. Study 1 measured perceived personal control over hassles that judges rated on general controllability. For hassles very high in controllability, perceived personal control was related to belief in realistic control but not to belief in unrealistic control; for hassles very low in controllability, perceived personal control was related to belief in unrealistic control but not to belief in realistic control. Study 2 showed that participants high in unrealistic control belief (but not those high in realistic control belief) persevered more on a task that was in part uncontrollable. Study 3 showed that the combination of low realistic control belief and high unrealistic control belief predicted poorer future health, particularly for participants who have reported the experience of many negative events and/or hassles. The conditions under which unrealistic control results in maladaptive outcomes are discussed.     

Where,O death,is thy sting? The meaning-providing function of beliefs in literal immortality

Terror management theory suggests that humans invest in cultural worldviews that allay mortality-related anxiety by promising death transcendence. Many religious individuals adhere to belief in literal immortality – believing that one will live on after death. Across two studies (n?=?1137), we explored the terror management function of such beliefs by exploring whether these beliefs are associated with lower death anxiety and greater meaning among individuals of varying religiousness. In both Study 1 (n?=?236) and Study 2 (n?=?901), belief in literal immortality was related to lower death anxiety only among intrinsically religious participants. Moreover, meaning in life mediated the relationship between belief in literal immortality and death anxiety. Study 2 clarified that this mediational relationship was only present for intrinsically religious individuals. We discuss the importance of particular religious beliefs in the provision of meaning in order to manage existential concerns.     

Enhancing the imagined contact effect

Recent research has found that mentally simulating positive out-group contact experiences can promote tolerance and more positive intergroup perceptions. We investigated two ways of enhancing this imagined contact effect. In Study 1 we found that asking participants to generate more detail in their imagined encounter led to expectations of their having a greater number of out-group acquaintances in the future. In Study 2 we found that instructing participants to close their eyes during an imagined encounter led to heightened intentions to engage in future actual contact. These findings add further support to the notion that imagining intergroup contact may be a valuable addition to existing interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations.     

Imagined contact in high conflict settings: The role of ethnic group identification and the perspective of minority group members

Recent contact literature has shown that imagining a positive intergroup encounter improves intergroup attitudes and behaviors, yet less is known about the effects of imagined contact in high conflict settings. We conducted three studies to understand the potential effects of imagined intergroup contact among ethnic Turks (majority status) and ethnic Kurds (minority status) in the Turkish‐Kurdish interethnic conflict setting. Study 1 (N = 47, Turkish) tested standard imagined contact effects (neutral vs. standard imagined contact condition) among majority Turks and showed that imagined contact was effective on outgroup attitudes, perceived threat, intergroup anxiety, and support for multiculturalism only among participants with higher ethnic identification. Study 2 (N = 107, Turkish) examined how ethnic identification of the contact partner would influence the effectiveness of the standard imagined contact scenario (neutral vs. standard vs. ethnic identification condition) and demonstrated that imagined contact effects were more negative when the contact partner identified with his/her ethnic group during imagined contact. Study 3 (N = 55, Kurdish) investigated imagined contact effects (neutral vs. standard imagined contact condition) among an ethnic minority group and showed that imagined contact did not improve minority group members' outgroup attitudes, but did decrease intergroup anxiety and perceived discrimination (marginally significantly) and increased perceived positive attitudes from the majority group. Practical implications of the use of imagined intergroup contact strategy in conflict‐ridden settings were discussed.     

Unwilling,but not unaffected—Imagined contact effects for authoritarians and social dominators

According to a dual process model perspective, intergroup contact should be particularly effective for people high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), but not for those high in social dominance orientation (SDO), because of different underlying motivational goals. In the present studies, we tested the hypothesis that imagined contact, that is, the mental representation of a positive intergroup encounter, improves intergroup relations for high RWAs. In two experimental studies, we showed that high RWAs, compared with low RWAs, show less negative emotions toward Turks (Study 1; N = 120) and more willingness to engage in future contact with Romani people (Study 2; N = 85) after imagined contact. As expected, people high in SDO did not benefit from imagined contact. Instead, people low in SDO showed less negative emotions after imagined contact in Study 1, but this effect was not replicated in the second study. Theoretical implications and the role of imagined contact as a possible intervention for highly biased individuals will be discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Not all gifts are good: The potential practical costs of motivated gifts

People rely on support from others to accomplish mundane and momentous tasks. When asking for assistance, is it beneficial to incentivize a helper by offering a motivated gift (i.e., a gift with the hope of getting support in return)? Six studies (N > 2,500) examine the frequency and potential costs of motivated gifts. In Study 1, a third of Americans indicated that they had given a motivated gift at least once, while nearly two‐thirds believed they had received one. In Studies 2a–d, most participants who imagined receiving a motivated gift before a favor request reported lower willingness to help and anticipated satisfaction from helping than participants who imagined simply being asked for a favor. Finally, Study 3 replicates these findings with actual help provided among friends in a laboratory setting. Findings suggest that motivated gifts are relatively common but may sometimes undermine the assistance that people hope to receive.     

Imagining the near and far future: The role of location familiarity

Plausible personal events envisioned as occurring in the near future tend to be reported as more vivid than those set in the far future. Why is this? The present set of three experiments identified one’s familiarity with the location in which the event is placed as critical in this regard. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that amongst a wide range of phenomenological characteristics, clarity of location appears to drive the overall difference in vividness between events imagined to take place in the near and the far future. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to further elucidate this finding. Experiment 2 demonstrated that near future events are more likely than far future events to be imagined in familiar locations. Experiment 3 showed that future events set in familiar locations tend to be imagined with greater clarity than those set in unfamiliar locations. The results of all three experiments converge on the conclusion that the difference in vividness of events imagined as occurring in the near and far future is mediated by one’s familiarity with the location in which the event is imagined to occur.     

Making Americans Feel Great Again? Personal Significance Predicts Political Intentions of Losers and Winners of the 2016 U.S. Election

Reactions of losers and winners of political elections have important consequences for the political system during times of power transition. In four studies conducted immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, we investigated how personal significance induced by success or failure of one's candidate is related to hostile versus benevolent intentions toward political adversaries. We found that the less significant supporters of Hillary Clinton and supporters of Donald Trump felt after an imagined (Study 1A) or actual (Study 2) electoral failure the more they were willing to engage in peaceful actions against the elected president and the less they were willing to accept the results of the elections. However, while significance gain due to an imagined or actual electoral success was related to more benevolent intentions among Clinton supporters (Study 1B), it was related to more hostile intentions among Trump supporters (Studies 1B, 2, and 3).     

个人目标相关性对非临床抑郁者未来想象的影响

通过两个实验考查了非临床抑郁者未来想象的异常是否受到个人目标相关性的调节。实验1采用未来想象任务, 实验2采用可能性评估范式, 两个实验一致发现, 抑郁倾向者想象未来积极事件的异常, 受到了与个人目标相关性的调节：相对于非抑郁倾向者, 抑郁倾向者对未来与个人目标相关的积极事件的预期减弱, 而对未来与个人目标无关的积极事件的预期则没有表现出异常; 同时还发现, 抑郁倾向者表现出了对未来消极预期的普遍增强, 不受与个人目标相关性的影响。     

When inclusion hurts: The role of valence in moderating the effects of being in the loop

We explored conditions under which being in the loop may be an undesirable experience. We tested whether information valence moderates the effects of being in versus out of the loop in four studies. In a pilot study, participants imagined positive and negative events and indicated the degree to which they would like to know this information. In Study 1, participants imagined being in or out of the loop on positive or negative information and indicated how they would feel. In Study 2, participants relived an actual experience when they were in or out of the loop on positive or negative information. In Study 3, participants were in or out of the loop on positive or negative information needed for an upcoming task. These studies provide evidence that being in the loop on negative information can be an unenjoyable experience, threatening fundamental needs and increasing negative affect.