Addicted to answers: Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy theories offer simple answers to complex problems by providing explanations for uncertain situations. Thus, they should be attractive to individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty and seek cognitive closure. We hypothesized that need for cognitive closure (NFCC) should foster conspiracy beliefs about events that lack clear official explanations, especially when conspiracy theories are temporarily salient. In Experiment 1, NFCC positively predicted the endorsement of a conspiracy theory behind the refugee crisis, especially when conspiratorial explanations were made salient. Experiment 2 showed that when conspiratorial explanations were made salient, NFCC positively predicted beliefs in conspiracies behind a mysterious plane crash. However, the link between NFCC and beliefs in conspiratorial explanations was reversed in the case of a plane crash with an official, non‐conspiratorial, explanation for the accident. In conclusion, people high (vs. low) in NFCC seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations are situationally accessible.     

In search of an imaginary enemy: Catholic collective narcissism and the endorsement of gender conspiracy beliefs

ABSTRACT

Gender studies have often been criticized for undermining family and religious values. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms exhibit the characteristics of conspiracy theories. We define gender conspiracy beliefs as convictions that gender studies and gender-equality activists represent an ideology secretly designed to harm traditional values and social arrangements. In two studies conducted among Catholics in Poland (Study 1 N= 1019; Study 2 N= 223), we examined the prevalence of gender conspiracy beliefs and their psychological concomitants. We hypothesized that gender conspiracy beliefs should be associated with a defensive identification with one’s religious group, captured by religious collective narcissism. In both studies, Catholic collective narcissism was demonstrated to be a robust predictor of gender conspiracy beliefs. We additionally demonstrated that Catholic collective narcissism predicted outgroup hostility, and this effect was mediated by gender conspiracy beliefs. We discuss the implications for gender-based prejudice.     

Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.     

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

Education and conspiracy beliefs: A replication of van Prooijen (2017)

The main aim of the study was to replicate and extend van Prooijen's findings on how education and its outcomes (cognitive complexity, subjective social standing, self-esteem, a feeling of control and powerlessness, cognitive reflection, epistemic curiosity and scientific reasoning) predict conspiracy beliefs. In two studies (Study 1: N = 497, M_age = 49.06, SD_age = 14.92; Study 2: N = 482, M_age = 47.45, SD_age = 15.87), subjective socioeconomic status and cognitive reflection (Study 1) and a feeling of powerlessness and scientific reasoning (Study 2) contributed to the negative relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. These results showed the connection of education to socioeconomic status, a feeling of control and analytic thinking (cognitive reflection, scientific reasoning) and their power to reduce conspiracy beliefs.     

Reception and willingness to share pseudo‐profound bullshit and their relation to other epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive ability in Slovakia and Romania

Propensity to judge randomly generated, syntactically correct (i.e., bullshit) statements as profound is associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style and supernatural beliefs). Besides generalizing these findings to a different cultural setting, we examined the relationships to sharing the bullshit on social media. Rating nonsense as profound was associated with a lower cognitive ability; a stronger belief in the paranormal, alternative medicine, and conspiracies; and ontological confusion. The more profound a statement was rated to be, the more likely it was to be shared, and propensity for sharing bullshit was predicted by ontological confusion and religious beliefs. Bullshit receptivity and sharing may be closely related to several dimensions of epistemically suspect beliefs; people with these propensities are relatively open to vague statements resembling New Age spirituality.     

Multinational data show that conspiracy beliefs are associated with the perception (and reality) of poor national economic performance

While a great deal is known about the individual difference factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, much less is known about the country-level factors that shape people's willingness to believe conspiracy theories. In the current article we discuss the possibility that willingness to believe conspiracy theories might be shaped by the perception (and reality) of poor economic performance at the national level. To test this notion, we surveyed 6723 participants from 36 countries. In line with predictions, propensity to believe conspiracy theories was negatively associated with perceptions of current and future national economic vitality. Furthermore, countries with higher GDP per capita tended to have lower belief in conspiracy theories. The data suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not just caused by intrapsychic factors but are also shaped by difficult economic circumstances for which distrust might have a rational basis.     

The effectiveness of a scientific reasoning intervention for conspiracy theory beliefs

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs have become an important policy-relevant research area since the events of the COVID-19 pandemic. Increasing interest has been directed towards strategies that might reduce people's susceptibility to conspiratorial beliefs. In this study, we examined whether encouraging a stronger orientation towards critical scientific appraisal of conspiratorial accounts could reduce CT acceptance. After completing baseline measures of COVID-19 related beliefs and analytical and scientific reasoning abilities, a total of 700 adults were randomly allocated to a control or scientific reasoning manipulation. People assigned to the scientific reasoning condition were found to display significantly lower CT belief endorsement post-intervention as compared to the control group. As well as having implications for the design of future intervention studies, the results of this study encourage a greater focus on specific reasoning skills that may be amenable to a psychoeducation approach, in order to further develop methods to prevent CT beliefs.     

Conspiracy suspicions as a proxy for beliefs in conspiracy theories: Implications for theory and measurement

Research on the psychology of conspiracy theories has shown recent steps towards a standardization of measures. The present article seeks to continue that trend by presenting the Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions (FICS), a questionnaire template that can be adapted to measure suspicions of a conspiracy around nearly any topic of public interest. Compared to conspiracy belief measures that ask about specific theories on a given topic, the FICS is worded in such a way as to provide relatively stable validity across time and cultural context. Using a hybrid approach incorporating classical test theory and Rasch scaling, three questionnaire studies on Mechanical Turk demonstrate the validity of the FICS in measuring conspiracy suspicions regarding 9/11, vaccine safety, and US elections, with good psychometric properties in most situations. However, the utility of the FICS is limited in the case of climate change due to the existence of two opposing conspiracy theories that share essentially no common assumptions (‘climate change is a hoax’ vs. ‘there is a conspiracy to make people believe that climate change is a hoax’). The results indicate that the FICS is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracy suspicions within certain parameters, and suggest a three‐level model that differentiates general conspiracist ideation, relatively vague conspiracy suspicions, and relatively specific conspiracy beliefs.     

Unravelling the relationship between populism and belief in conspiracy theories: The role of cynicism,powerlessness and zero-sum thinking

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.     

Paranormal beliefs: their dimensionality and correlates

Lack of conceptual clarity and multivariate empirical studies has troubled research on superstitious, magical and paranormal beliefs. We defined paranormal beliefs as beliefs in physical, biological or psychological phenomena that feature core ontological properties of another ontological category. The aim was to bring together a range of beliefs and their potential correlates, to analyse whether the beliefs form independent subsets, and to test a structural model of the beliefs and their potential correlates. The results (N = 3261) showed that the beliefs could be best described by one higher‐order factor. There were also four lower‐order factors of paranormal beliefs but their explanatory power was low. Magico‐religious beliefs were best explained by high intuitive thinking, a humanistic world view and low analytical thinking. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing the bidirectional relationship between belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and psychological distress: A five-wave longitudinal study

Previous studies have primarily focused on understanding why people believe conspiracy theories, especially during societal crises (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic). The investigation of how such conspiracy beliefs would influence people's mental well-being has just begun recently. The present research aims to address this crucial question by testing the relationships between psychological distress and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs with a five-wave longitudinal study. On the one hand, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs could be more appealing to people with heightened distress, as these theories apparently help people to make sense of the uncertainty and life-threatening disease outbreak. On the other hand, conspiracy theories could be a source of existential threat and thus, would induce rather than reduce psychological distress. We tested these possibilities empirically by a series of cross-lagged model analyses. Using the random intercept cross-lagged panel model analysis, we only found a between-person association but not a cross-lagged within-person relationship between the two. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was predicted by being more politically conservative. These findings were further corroborated by the supplementary latent growth curve analyses. Overall, our findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs may not induce or reduce psychological distress in the context of COVID-19.     

Just world beliefs, causal beliefs, and acquaintance: Associations with stigma toward eating disorders and obesity

The current study investigated the relationship between just world beliefs and stigmatizing attitudes toward eating disorders and obesity. Further, the associations between stigma and causal beliefs, and between stigma and acquaintance with these conditions, were examined. Participants (n = 447) read four vignettes describing an individual with anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, binge eating disorder, or obesity. After each vignette, participants completed questionnaires assessing stigmatizing attitudes, just world beliefs, causal beliefs, and acquaintance with the condition depicted in the vignette. Stronger just world beliefs were associated with greater stigma toward all three eating disorders, as well as obesity (rs ranging from −.11 to −.18). More stigmatizing attitudes were associated with greater attribution of individual responsibility for the development of the disorder. However, participants with personal experience or who knew someone with the depicted problem did not have lower stigma scores than those who did not. The current study suggests that justification ideologies such as just world beliefs and controllability beliefs may underlie the stigmatization of eating disorders and obesity. These findings provide support for stigma reduction efforts aimed at targeting justification ideologies and altering causal beliefs.     

Conspiracist beliefs,intuitive thinking,and schizotypal facets: A further evaluation

This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK-based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O-Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy-belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential-based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy-conspiracist beliefs relationship.     

Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)—such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural—stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a “proof of concept” for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.     

Once (but not twice) upon a time: Narrative inoculation against conjunction errors indirectly reduces conspiracy beliefs and improves truth discernment

Psychological inoculation has proven effective at reducing susceptibility to misinformation. We present a novel storytelling approach to inoculation against susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (d_{meta-analysis} = 0.82), a known cognitive predictor of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (Pilot; N = 161), a narrative inoculation (vs. control) reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and in turn, conspiracy beliefs regarding government malfeasance. In Study 2 (main experiment; N = 141; pre-registered), two separate narrative inoculations (vs. control) directly reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and indirectly reduced conspiracy beliefs regarding extra-terrestrial cover-ups. In addition, the inoculation messages improved detection of both real and fake news (‘truth discernment’). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, including the use of inoculation to induce critical thinking styles, and tailoring inoculations that may suit storytelling mediums.     

Worldviews and individual vulnerability to suicide: The role of social axioms

Research investigating the role of generalized beliefs about the world or worldviews is relatively scarce in the suicide literature. Two studies, using Hong Kong Chinese samples, examined how worldviews, as assessed by the Social Axioms Survey (SAS), were linked with individual vulnerability to suicide. In Study 1, we investigated the relationships of social axioms with various suicide indicators in cognitive, emotional and interpersonal domains, viz., suicidal ideation, negative self‐esteem, psychache, burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. Results from canonical correlation analysis showed that beliefs along the axiom dimensions of social cynicism, reward for application, and social complexity were linked to these suicide indicators. In Study 2, we tested the interplay of worldviews and personality traits in the prediction of suicidal thoughts. Hierarchical regression results demonstrated the predictive power of social axioms over and above that provided by the Big Five personality dimensions. Moreover, a significant interaction was observed between belief in reward for application and negative life events in predicting suicidal ideation, showing that reward for application buffered the effect of negative life events on suicidal ideation. Based on these results, we discussed the significance of worldviews as a consideration in suicide research and their implications for clinical assessment and intervention. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Generalized Dispositional Distrust as the Common Core of Populism and Conspiracy Mentality

Populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories fuel societal division as both rely on a Manichean us-versus-them, good-versus-evil narrative. However, whether both constructs have the same dispositional roots is essentially unknown. Across three studies conducted in two different countries and using diverse samples (total N = 1,888), we show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a strong common core as evidenced using bifactor modeling. This common core was uniquely linked to (aversive) personality, namely the Dark Factor of Personality (D), beyond basic personality traits from the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure. The association between D and the common core, in turn, was fully accounted for by distrust-related beliefs as captured in cynicism, dangerous and competitive social worldviews, sensitivity to befallen injustice, and (low) trust propensity. Taken together, the results show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a shared psychological basis that is well described as a sociopolitically flavored manifestation of generalized dispositional distrust. The findings thus underscore the value of generalized trust for societal functioning and suggest that increasing trust may simultaneously combat both populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories.     

Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural

A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.