Reasoning Dialogues

When people argue with others in conversation, they make a variety of conversational moves: They make claims, ask for justification of others' claims, attack claims, and attack claims' justifications. The arrangement of these moves gives argumentation its characteristic shape. This article illustrates a proposed format for conversations of this type, and it reviews some findings about the way people understand and evaluate these conversations. The findings suggest that judgments of the arguers' burden depend not only on the content of their claims, but also on the conversation's structure. In addition, judgments of the strength of a justification—an arguer's evidence or explanation—are a function of the argument's setting.     

Reasoning about evidence

Bayesians understand the notion of evidential support in terms of probability raising. Little is known about the logic of the evidential support relation, thus understood. We investigate a number of prima facie plausible candidate logical principles for the evidential support relation and show which of these principles the Bayesian evidential support relation does and which it does not obey. We also consider the question which of these principles hold for a stronger notion of evidential support.     

Reasoning with uncertain categories

Five experiments investigated how people use categories to make inductions about objects whose categorisation is uncertain. Normatively, they should consider all the categories the object might be in and use a weighted combination of information from all the categories: bet-hedging. The experiments presented people with simple, artificial categories and asked them to make an induction about a new object that was most likely in one category but possibly in another. The results showed that the majority of people focused on the most likely category in making inductions, although there was a group of consistently normative responders who used information from both categories (about 25% of our college population). Across experiments the overall pattern of results suggests that performance in the task is improved not by understanding the underlying principles of bet-hedging but by increasing the likelihood that multiple categories are in working memory at the time of the induction. We discuss implications for improving everyday inductions.     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

Belief bias in the perception of sample size adequacy

In two experiments participants were instructed to set aside their own, complete knowledge of a statistical population parameter and to take the perspective of an agent whose knowledge was limited to a random sample. Participants rated the appropriateness of the agent's conclusion about the adequacy of the sample size (which, objectively, was more than adequate). They also rated the agent's intelligence. Whereas previous work suggests that unbelievable statistical conclusions impact reasoning by provoking critical thought which enhances the detection of research flaws, the present studies presented participants an unflawed scenario designed to assess effects of believability on bias. The results included the finding that participants’ complete knowledge did indeed bias their perceptions not only of the adequacy of the sample size, but also of the rationality of the agent drawing the conclusion from the sample. The findings were interpreted in the context of research on belief bias, social attribution, and Theory of Mind.     

Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

Reasoning with conditionals: a test of formal models of four theories

The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking &Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.     

The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions

A new theory explains how people make hypothetical inferences from a premise consistent with several alternatives to a conclusion consistent with several alternatives. The key proposal is that people rely on a heuristic that identifies compatible possibilities. It is tested in 7 experiments that examine inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Participants accepted inferences between conditionals and inclusive disjunctions when a compatible possibility was immediately available, in their binary judgments that a conclusion followed or not (Experiment 1a) and ternary judgments that included it was not possible to know (Experiment 1b). The compatibility effect was amplified when compatible possibilities were more readily available, e.g., for ‘A only if B’ conditionals (Experiment 2). It was eliminated when compatible possibilities were not available, e.g., for ‘if and only if A B’ bi-conditionals and exclusive disjunctions (Experiment 3). The compatibility heuristic occurs even for inferences based on implicit negation e.g., ‘A or B, therefore if C D’ (Experiment 4), and between universals ‘All A’s are B’s’ and disjunctions (Experiment 5a) and universals and conditionals (Experiment 5b). The implications of the results for alternative theories of the cognitive processes underlying hypothetical deductions are discussed.     

It's in the sample: the effects of sample size and sample diversity on the breadth of inductive generalization

Developmental studies have provided mixed evidence with regard to the question of whether children consider sample size and sample diversity in their inductive generalizations. Results from four experiments with 105 undergraduates, 105 school-age children (M = 7.2 years), and 105 preschoolers (M = 4.9 years) showed that preschoolers made a higher rate of projections from large samples than from small samples when samples were diverse (Experiments 1 and 3) but not when samples were homogeneous (Experiment 4) and not when the task required a choice between two samples (Experiment 2). Furthermore, when a property occurred in large and diverse samples, preschoolers exhibited a broad pattern of projection, generalizing the property to items from categories not represented in the evidence. In contrast, adults followed a normative pattern of induction and never attributed properties to items from categories not represented in the evidence. School-age children showed a mixed pattern of results.     

问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响

本研究以240名大学生为被试,探讨了问题类型和情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响。结果表明：(1)问题类型对贝叶斯推理有影响;(2)情绪状态对贝叶斯推理有影响;(3)问题类型与情绪状态对贝叶斯推理的影响存在交互作用。具体地,在经典乳癌问题中,被试在消极情绪状态下比在积极情绪状态下做出更高的概率估计,而在中彩问题中,被试在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下概率估计更高。     

Use of the mathematical principle of inversion in young children

An important issue in the development of mathematical cognition is the extent to which children use and understand fundamental mathematical concepts. We examined whether young children successfully use the principle of inversion and, if so, whether they do so based on qualitative identity, length, or quantity. Twenty-four preschool children and 24 children in Grade 1 were presented with three-term inversion problems (e.g., 3+2-2) and standard problems of similar magnitude (e.g., 2+4-3). Problems were presented in three conditions to determine whether children used inversion at all and, if so, whether their decisions were based on quantitative or nonquantitative features of the problems. Both preschool and Grade 1 children showed evidence of using inversion in a fully quantitative manner, indicating that this principle is available in some form prior to extensive formal instruction in arithmetic.     

因果信息在贝叶斯推理中的作用:问题情境的调节

以大学生为被试,考察因果信息在不同贝叶斯推理问题中的作用。结果表明:(1)问题情境的主效应显著(F(1,122)=16.33,p0.05,η~2=0.120),因果信息的主效应不显著((F(1,122)=1.161,p=0.283,η~2=0.01),但问题类型和因果信息的交互作用显著(F(1,122)=4.757,p0.05,η~2=0.038)。(2)不同类型的问题上因果信息的作用是不同的。具体表现为,在乳癌问题中,增加了因果信息,被试的正确率明显提高(χ~2(1)=6.759,p0.05,V=0.607),而在中彩问题中没有因果信息的推理成绩反而更好(χ~2(1)=1.864,p=0.221,V=0.167)。     

分类活动对归纳推理多样性效应的影响

归纳推理多样性效应被证实为普遍存在的,然而研究者Heit和Medin却对多样性效应的普遍性存在分歧。本文通过三个实验针对两位学者的分歧展开研究。结果发现:1.两位学者之间的分歧是由不同的分类活动引起的。当分类活动为外显时,被试的推理结果既不支持Medin,也不支持Heit;当分类活动内隐时,被试的推理结果支持Heit的观点。2.人们在日常生活及现实情境中,往往是根据直觉对事物进行分类及多样性推理。     

Reasoning from transitive premises: An EEG study

Neuroimaging studies have contributed to a major advance in understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning deductive reasoning. However, the dynamics of cognitive events associated with inference making have been largely neglected. Using electroencephalography, the present study aims at describing the rapid sequence of processes involved in performing transitive inference (A B; B C therefore “A C”; with AB meaning “A is to the left of B”). The results indicate that when the second premise can be integrated into the first one (e.g. A B; B C) its processing elicits a P3b component. In contrast, when the second premise cannot be integrated into the first premise (e.g. A B; D C), a P600-like components is elicited. These ERP components are discussed with respect to cognitive expectations.     

Facts and Possibilities: A Model‐Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning

This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals (if) and disjunctions (or), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic possibilities that hold in default of information to the contrary. Various factors such as general knowledge can modulate these interpretations. New information can always override sentential inferences; that is, reasoning in daily life is defeasible (or nonmonotonic). The theory is a dual process one: It distinguishes between intuitive inferences (based on system 1) and deliberative inferences (based on system 2). The article describes a computer implementation of the theory, including its two systems of reasoning, and it shows how the program simulates crucial predictions that evidence corroborates. It concludes with a discussion of how the theory contrasts with those based on logic or on probabilities.     

Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.     

Effects of test anxiety,ego stress,and attentional skills training on arithmetic reasoning: An experimental evaluation of a brief counseling strategy

Abstract

Two hundred forty high school students (120 male and 120 female) in India performed a moderately difficult multiple choice Arithmetic Reasoning task after undergoing short-term (40 minutes) cognitive treatment in the form of Attentional Skills Training. A 2 × 2 × 2 (Test Anxiety x Attentional Skills Training x Stress) design with separate analysis for boys and girls indicated these results: with intervention the high anxiety subjects under ego stress conditions, compared to their high-anxious control, low-anxious ego stress, or low-anxious control counterparts, reported the maximum significant improvement in performance on the Arithmetic Reasoning test. The low-anxiety subjects performed consistently well with or without treatment or stress conditions. The findings shed new light on the attentional theory of test anxiety, and it was reasoned that long-term effects of cognitive treatment be studied by using varied performance tasks (difficulty level controlled) on different gender and age groups across cultures.