Who can catch a liar?

The ability to detect lying was evaluated in 509 people including law-enforcement personnel, such as members of the U.S. Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, California police and judges, as well as psychiatrists, college students, and working adults. A videotape showed 10 people who were either lying or telling the truth in describing their feelings. Only the Secret Service performed better than chance, and they were significantly more accurate than all of the other groups. When occupational group was disregarded, it was found that those who were accurate apparently used different behavioral clues and had different skills than those who were inaccurate.     

Why don't you believe me? Detecting deception in messages written by nonnative and native speakers

Detecting lies is crucial in numerous contexts, including situations in which individuals do not interact in their native language. Previous research suggests that individuals are perceived as less credible when they communicate in a nonnative compared with native language. The current study was the first to test this effect in truthful and fabricated messages written by native and nonnative English speakers. One hundred native English speakers judged the veracity of these messages, and overall, they proved less likely to believe and to correctly classify nonnative speakers' messages; differences in verbal cues between native and nonnative speakers' messages partly explained the differences in the judgments. Given the increased use of nonnative languages in a globalized world, the discrimination against nonnative speakers in veracity judgments is problematic. Further research should more thoroughly investigate the role of verbal cues in written and spoken nonnative language to enable the development of effective interventions.     

Does everybody like a liker?

The primary hypothesis examined was that people giving positive evaluations are themselves regarded as more attractive than when they give negative evaluations. This research tests whether this holds when reciprocity is not at issue. Subjects in six experiments were presented with stimulus persons who varied in the proportion of positive to negative evaluations they gave of various attitude objects (political figures, cafeteria workers, cities, movies, and college courses). Giving predominantly positive evaluations did in fact lead to greater liking of the stimulus person in each experiment. This finding held over (1) audio or written interviews with the stimulus persons, (2) a variety of classes of attitude objects, and (3) both within-subject and between-subject designs. Greater liking for likers occurred even controlling for attitude similarity.     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Environmentalism and Political Participation: Toward a New System of Social Beliefs and Values?

This study examines the social beliefs and values of the Spanish population with regard to environmentalism. A questionnaire on environmental beliefs was produced and administered to two sample groups. The first group, to be called "activists" (comprising 86 subjects), is characterized by belonging to one or other environmental organization. The other, termed "nonactivists" (comprising 410 subjects), is composed of people not belonging to any environmentalist organization. We conclude that, as in other Western countries, environmentalism has moved from being a set of beliefs held by a small group of people to becoming a central element in the system of beliefs characterizing our society. In other words, the beliefs of the environmentalist movement are being gradually built into a new ideology. However, we found differences between activists and nonactivists, which we interpret both in terms of Milbrath's theoretical model and as contradictions of postmodernist culture.     

What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal...     

Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time

Does the language you speak affect how you think about the world? This question is taken up in three experiments. English and Mandarin talk about time differently--English predominantly talks about time as if it were horizontal, while Mandarin also commonly describes time as vertical. This difference between the two languages is reflected in the way their speakers think about time. In one study, Mandarin speakers tended to think about time vertically even when they were thinking for English (Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English speakers). Another study showed that the extent to which Mandarin-English bilinguals think about time vertically is related to how old they were when they first began to learn English. In another experiment native English speakers were taught to talk about time using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to Mandarin. On a subsequent test, this group of English speakers showed the same bias to think about time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. It is concluded that (1) language is a powerful tool in shaping thought about abstract domains and (2) one's native language plays an important role in shaping habitual thought (e.g., how one tends to think about time) but does not entirely determine one's thinking in the strong Whorfian sense.     

Who Believes in a Male God? Ideological Beliefs and Gendered Conceptualizations of God

Recent studies have explored whether certain conceptualizations of God are associated with various attitudes and beliefs. In the current study, we examined the relationship between gendered God concepts and the belief that God is involved in one’s life and religious-related rigid ideologies (i.e., religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism [RWA]). Across two studies, one conducted with religious students at a Jesuit university and the other with a national sample, we found that individuals who believed God to be male were more likely to believe that God had more control and involvement in their life, had higher levels of religious fundamentalism and higher levels of RWA-Aggression (Study 1 and 2), RWA–Submission (Study 1 and 2), and RWA–Conventionalism (Study 2) than individuals with other gendered or nongendered conceptualizations of God. Implications of the broader impact that gendered God concepts have on social and political domains are explored. Last, limitations and future research directions are discussed.     

Do groups lie more than individuals? Honesty and deception as a function of strategic self-interest

An experiment tested whether groups lie more than individuals. Groups lied more than individuals when deception was guaranteed to maximize economic outcomes, but lied relatively less than individuals when honesty could be used strategically. These results suggest that groups are more strategic than individuals in that they will adopt whatever course of action best serves their economic interest.     

Is obesity treated like a contagious disease?

The behavioral avoidance of people with obesity is well documented, but its psychological basis is poorly understood. Based upon a disease avoidance account of stigmatization, we tested whether a person with obesity triggers equivalent self-reported emotional and avoidant-based responses as a contagious disease (i.e., influenza). Two hundred and sixty-four participants rated images depicting real disease signs (i.e., person with influenza), false alarms (i.e., person with obesity), person with facial bruising (i.e., negative control), and a healthy control for induced emotion and willingness for contact along increasing levels of physical proximity. Consistent with our prediction, as the prospect for contact became more intimate, self-reported avoidance was equivalent in the influenza and obese target conditions, with both significantly exceeding reactions to the negative and healthy controls. In addition, participants reported greatest levels of disgust toward the obese and influenza target conditions. These results are consistent with an evolved predisposition to avoid individuals with disease signs. Implicit avoidance occurs even when participants know explicitly that such signs—here, obese body form—result from a noncontagious condition. Our findings provide important evidence for a disease avoidance explanation of the stigmatization of people with obesity.     

Does happiness function like a motivational state?

According to Brehm's intensity of emotion theory, if an emotion has motivational properties, its intensity should be non-monotonically affected by factors similar to those determining the intensity of motivational states. These factors are called deterrents. In the case of emotion, one category of deterrents consists of factors that can potentially interfere with feeling the emotion, such as reasons for not feeling the emotion. Two experiments were carried out to examine whether happiness is a motivational state and, thus, if its intensity is non-monotonically determined by the importance of reasons for not feeling happy. We expected happiness to be reduced by a low importance reason for not feeling happy, to remain high in the presence of a moderately important reason, and to be reduced or eliminated by a very important reason. Both experiments supported the cubic function that results from these expectations, and when the results of the two studies were combined, each of the individual legs of the cubic function was found to be reliable along with the cubic function itself. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?

ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject-based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically.     

Episodic recollection in animals: “If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck…”

In humans, episodic memory is most commonly defined as the subjective experience of recollection, presenting a major challenge to the identification of episodic memory in animals. Here we take the position that episodic memory also has several other distinctive qualities that can be assessed objectively in animals, as well as humans, and the examination of these properties provides insights into underlying mechanisms of episodic memory. We focus on recent evidence accumulated in this laboratory indicating that recognition in rats involves a threshold retrieval process, similar to that observed in human episodic recall. Also, rats can remember the temporal order of unique events, characteristic of the replay of vivid episodic memories in humans. Furthermore, rats combine elements of “when” and “where” events occur, as well as the flow of events within a memory, to distinguish memories that share overlapping features, also characteristic of human episodic memory. Finally, all of these capacities are dependent on the hippocampus, which also plays a critical role in human episodic memory. This combination of findings strongly suggests that animals have the same fundamental information processing functions that underlie episodic recall in humans.     

Why is a verb like an inanimate object? Grammatical category and semantic category deficits

Semantic category effects, such as difficulties in naming animate things relative to inanimate objects, have been explained in terms of the relative weightings of perceptual and functional features within the semantic representations of these concepts. We argue that grammatical category deficits, such as difficulties in naming nouns relative to verbs, can be explained within the same framework. We hypothesize that verb concepts are richer in functional than sensory features and present a model of the semantic representations of animate nouns, inanimate nouns, and verbs. The model demonstrates that sensory feature damage results in a deficit for naming living things but spares verb naming, and functional feature damage results in a deficit for naming inanimate objects and verbs. We then report the assessment results of two patient groups. In accordance with the model's predictions, the "verb spared" patients were consistently worse at naming living things than inanimate objects, and their definitions of both living and nonliving items were lacking in sensory information. We conclude that damage to sensory features in semantic representations causes difficulties in naming concrete nouns relative to action verbs, and within the grammatical category of nouns, animate items will be more severely affected. Imageability was shown to be a strong predictor of naming performance in the "verb deficit" patients, and when this variable was controlled no class effect remained. Production of definitions revealed no differential damage to sensory or functional features, and no consistent effect of animacy in naming was shown. While the model suggests that verb deficits might occur in patients for whom functional features are damaged relative to sensory features, we conclude that the "verb deficit" shown in our patients (and potentially in many previously reported cases) was an artifact of the lower imageability of verbs in confrontation naming tasks.     

Executive control within strategic deception: a window on early cognitive development?

Recently it has been claimed that the difficulty young children have with tests of strategic deception may be due to limitations in executive control rather than lack of insight into mental concepts. In the studies reported here we asked how reducing the executive demands of one measure of strategic deception, the windows task (J. Russell, N. Mauthner, S. Sharpe, & T. Tidswell, 1991), would affect performance. Study 1 demonstrated that both providing an artificial response medium and having children play in partnership enabled 3-year-olds to adopt a successful strategy. Study 2 examined whether social or executive factors accounted for the good performance of children when they played in partnership. Study 3 ruled out the possibility that the effectiveness of the artificial media was a result of reducing social intimidation-the manipulations were effective even in the presence the opponent. These results argue for executive factors playing a substantial role in the development of strategic deception.     

Anxiety and Drinking: Are Personal Beliefs Regarding Control and Unpredictability Relevant?

Abstract

Anxiety and drinking problems are fairly common, and it is important to know what factors affect these issues. Previous studies document that control beliefs are associated with anxiety and drinking. Unpredictability beliefs correlate with anxiety, yet whether they relate to drinking is unknown. The present study explored these relationships in a sample of adults (N?=?150; 40.0% female; M?=?34.4?years old) and in a sample of college students (N?=?182; 74.7% female; M?=?18.9 years old). Among adults, unpredictability beliefs correlated with anxiety and control beliefs, but not drinking. Similarly, control beliefs correlated with anxiety but not drinking. Furthermore, anxiety and drinking were uncorrelated. Among undergraduates, unpredictability and control beliefs predicted anxiety, whereas unpredictability (pertaining to the self and others) and internality predicted frequency of drinking. Personal unpredictability beliefs emerged as having the strongest association with anxiety across both samples. Future research and treatment should take into account unpredictability beliefs when addressing anxiety problems.     

Children's questions about interparent conflict and violence: what's a mother to say?

This research examined the relation between mothers' responses to children's questions about interparent conflict and children's adjustment. Participants were 134 mothers and their children (70 boys, 64 girls), aged 7 to 10. In each family, an act of intimate-partner violence (IPV) had recently occurred. Mothers' responses to children's questions about interparent conflict were assessed via a semistructured interview coded to reflect the extent to which the mothers' responses addressed the content of the children's questions. Mothers and children reported on physical IPV. Mothers also reported on interparent conflict, parent-child aggression, and maternal warmth. Children's adjustment was assessed via mothers' and children's reports at two time points 6 months apart. The extent to which mothers' responses addressed the content of the children's questions about interparent conflict was negatively associated with children's adjustment problems, after accounting for the frequency of physical IPV, frequency of interparent conflict, parent-child aggression, and maternal warmth. These associations emerged cross-sectionally and prospectively. However, in those prospective analyses that accounted for children's baseline levels of adjustment, maternal responsiveness was not associated with later children's adjustment problems.