Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that (a) knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and (b) knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus, knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.     

Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.     

Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth

Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).     

Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.     

Correspondence truth and scientific realism

I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face of these difficulties, as a claim about the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by realists and antirealists.     

Reading is believing: the truth effect and source credibility

Five experiments explored how source reliability influences people’s tendency to rate statements as more credible when they were encountered earlier (the truth effect). Undergraduates read statements from one reliable source and one unreliable source. Statements read multiple times were perceived as more valid and were more often correctly identified on a general knowledge test than statements read once or not at all. This occurred at varying retention intervals whether the statements originated from a reliable or unreliable source, when people had little memory for the statements themselves or their source, and when the discrediting information about the sources came either before or after reading the facts. While repetition aided recognition and source accuracy, both were unaffected by the reliability of the source. Consistent with the source monitoring framework, familiarity may create an illusion of truth for statements when people lack source-specifying cues, especially cues regarding the reliability of the source.     

Between conflict and reconciliation: the hard truth

In the context of the fairly recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), I examine phenomenologically the nature of truth as the essential condition for overcoming social and political conflicts, and as an instrument for enforcing so-called “transitional justice” periods and promoting reconciliation. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth’s possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and its appeal to an “intelligence of emotions” do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. Though not expounding Schutz’s and Husserl’s contributions, and meditating on phenomena they did not deal with, I carry out this reflection inspired by their work and methodological approach. The case study used as an intuitive illustration is the recent Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Knowledge and credit

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.

Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations

Five experiments (N?=?1710) demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people act based on statistical evidence, known as “the Wells effect”. We found that knowledge attributions, but not certainty attributions, mediate this effect on decision making.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Fluency and positivity as possible causes of the truth effect

Statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation.     

Children's knowledge of the relation between intentional action and pretending

Two experiments investigated preschoolers’ understanding of the relation between pretending and intentional action. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year olds recognized that characters whose actions were intended as pretense were pretending. However, children also judged that characters whose actions gave them the appearance of an entity unintentionally were pretending to be that entity. In Experiment 2, 3-year olds reliably chose a character whose pretense actions were intentional as pretending over a character whose actions were guided by another intention. These data suggest that preschoolers have some understanding of the role of intentional action in pretense.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Validation d’une version francophone de l’inventaire de la Théorie de l’Esprit (ToMI-vf)

Introduction and objectiveThis article presents the translation method, in French, of the ‘Theory of Mind Inventory’ questionnaire (ToMI, Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2012) assessing adults’ perception about children’ abilities in Theory of Mind.MethodIt reports results of three validation studies of the French-version of ToMI (ToMI-vf) filled by parents of preschoolers.ResultsThe study 1 (n = 107) shows a very high internal consistency and a structure in three factors. The study 2 (n = 54) confirms criterion-related validity. The study 3 (n = 45) shows a good temporal stability of parental answers.ConclusionThe three studies indicate that the ToMI-vf has psychometric properties comparable with those reported by authors about the initial ToMI.     

Five-year-olds' handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation

Children's concurrent success on false belief tasks and their handling of two labels for one object (e.g., bunny/rabbit) has been interpreted as demonstrating understanding about the essential features of representation. Three experiments reveal the limitations in 5-year-olds' understanding for both mental and linguistic representations. We report relatively poor performance on a task involving two labels for one object (e.g., dice/eraser) which required children to treat another's knowledge as representing only some of the feature of its real referent: Dice but not eraser. Five year olds who made errors also had difficulty handling the fact that a written word 'dice' referring to such a dice/eraser, can also be applied to a standard dice but not to a standard eraser. These children lacked metalinguistic awareness of words as entities that both refer and describe.     

Destination memory and cognitive theory of mind in normal ageing

Destination memory is the ability to remember the destination to which a piece of information has been addressed (e.g., “Did I tell you about the promotion?”). This ability is found to be impaired in normal ageing. Our work aimed to link this deterioration to the decline in theory of mind. Forty younger adults (M age = 23.13 years, SD = 4.00) and 36 older adults (M age = 69.53 years, SD = 8.93) performed a destination memory task. They also performed the False-belief test addressing cognitive theory of mind and the Reading the mind in the eyes test addressing affective theory of mind. Results showed significant deterioration in destination memory, cognitive theory of mind and affective theory of mind in the older adults. The older adults’ performance on destination memory was significantly correlated with and predicted by their performance on cognitive theory of mind. Difficulties in the ability to interpret and predict others’ mental states are related to destination memory decline in older adults.     

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.     

Actors and actions: The role of agent behavior in infants' attribution of goals

Twelve-month-old infants attribute goals to both familiar, human agents and unfamiliar, non-human agents. They also attribute goal-directedness to both familiar actions and unfamiliar ones. Four conditions examined information 12-month-olds use to determine which actions of an unfamiliar agent are goal-directed. Infants who witnessed the agent interact contingently with a human confederate encoded the agent's actions as goal-directed; infants who saw a human confederate model an intentional stance toward the agent without the agent's participation, did not. Infants who witnessed the agent align itself with one of two potential targets before approaching that target encoded the approach as goal-directed; infants who did not observe the self-alignment did not encode the approach as goal-directed. A possible common underpinning of these two seemingly independent sources of information is discussed.