Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.     

Cultural background influences implicit but not explicit sense of agency for the production of musical tones

The sense of agency is suggested to occur at both low and high levels by the involvement of sensorimotor processes and the contribution of retrospective inferences based on contextual cues. In the current study, we recruited western and non-western participants and examined the effect of pleasantness of action outcomes on both feeling of control ratings and intentional binding which refers to the perceived compression of the temporal delay between actions and outcomes. We found that both western and non-western groups showed greater feeling of control ratings for the consonant (pleasant) compared to dissonant (unpleasant) outcomes. The intentional binding effect, on the other hand, was stronger for the consonant compared to dissonant outcomes in the western group only. We discuss the results in relation to how cultural background might differentially influence the effect of outcome pleasantness on low and high levels of the sense of agency.     

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.     

The relationship between human agency and embodiment

Humans regularly feel a sense of agency (SoA) over events where the causal link between action and outcome is extremely indirect. We have investigated how intermediate (here, a robotic hand) events that intervene between action and outcome may alter SoA, using intentional binding measures. The robotic hand either performed the same movement as the participant (active congruent), or performed a similar movement with another finger (active incongruent). Binding was significantly reduced in the active incongruent relative to the active congruent condition, suggesting that altered embodiment influences SoA. However, binding effects were comparable between a condition where the robot hand made a congruent movement, and conditions where no robot hand was involved, suggesting that intermediate and embodied events do not reduce SoA. We suggest that human sense of agency involves both statistical associations between intentions and arbitrary outcomes, and an effector-specific matching of sensorimotor means used to achieve the outcome.     

The evolving sense of agency: Context recency and quality modulate the interaction between prospective and retrospective processes

Humans acquire a sense of agency through their interactions with the world and their sensory consequences. Previous studies have highlighted stable agency-related phenomena like intentional binding, which depend on both prospective, context-dependent and retrospective, outcome-dependent processes. In the current study, we investigated the interaction between prospective and retrospective processes underlying the adaptation of an ongoing sense of agency. The results showed that prospective intentional binding developed during a temporal window of up to 20 prior events was independent of the nature of the ongoing event. By contrast, the characteristics of the ongoing event retrospectively influenced prospective intentional binding developed during a temporal window narrower than 6 prior events. These findings characterize the interaction between prospective and retrospective mechanisms as a fundamental process to continuously update the sense of agency through sensorimotor learning. High psychosis-like experience traits weakened this interaction, suggesting that reduced adaption to the context contributes to altered self-experience.     

Musical expertise affects the sense of agency: Intentional binding in expert pianists

Intentional Binding (IB), a subjective compression of the time interval between a voluntary action and its consequence, is an implicit measure of the sense of agency (the feeling of controlling one's own actions and their outcomes). The sense of agency is influenced by experience, e.g. learning, development, or learned contingency. The present study aimed at analyzing expertise – an expert competence acquired through experience alone – as a possible means to affect the sense of agency. We compared performance of expert pianists and non-musicians within the IB paradigm with two types of sensory outcome – a piano note and an electronic sound. Pianists showed significantly greater outcome binding and composite binding for both types of stimuli. Therefore, musical expertise might influence the sense of agency, possibly due to continuous exposure to action-outcome associations during the musical training. Additionally, such effect might extend beyond the specific expertise to the other types of auditory outcomes.     

Emotional valence,sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding

We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked – and therefore predictable – we found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually occur. This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting a distancing effect.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

Social exclusion reduces the sense of agency: Evidence from intentional binding

Social exclusion is known to induce an immediate threat to one’s perceived sense of control. The sense of agency is an important human experience, strongly associated with volitional action. Healthy participants perceive the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its effect to be shorter than the same interval when it separates an involuntary action and effect. This temporal illusion is known as intentional binding and is used experimentally to index the implicit sense of agency. The current study investigated whether activating memories of social exclusion alters intentional binding. Results show that action-effect interval estimates are significantly longer after remembering an episode of social exclusion than after remembering an episode of social inclusion, or a no priming baseline condition. This study is the first to demonstrate the link between feelings of social exclusion and the pre-reflective sense of agency.     

Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.     

Power to the will: How exerting physical effort boosts the sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to the experience of being in control of one’s actions and their consequences. The 19th century French philosopher Maine de Biran proposed that the sensation of effort might provide an internal cue for distinguishing self-caused from other changes in the environment. The present study is the first to empirically test the philosophical idea that effort promotes self-agency. We used intentional binding, which refers to the subjective temporal attraction between an action and its sensory consequences, as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. Effort was manipulated independent of the primary task by requiring participants to pull stretch bands of varying resistance levels. We found that intentional binding was enhanced under conditions of increased effort. This suggests not only that the experience of effort directly contributes to the sense of agency, but also that the integration of effort as an agency cue is non-specific to the effort requirement of the action itself.     

Uncovering effects of self-control and stimulus-driven action selection on the sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to feelings of causing one’s own action and resulting effect. Previous research indicates that voluntary action selection is an important factor in shaping the sense of agency. Whereas the volitional nature of the sense of agency is well documented, the present study examined whether agency is modulated when action selection shifts from self-control to a more automatic stimulus-driven process. Seventy-two participants performed an auditory Simon task including congruent and incongruent trials to generate automatic stimulus-driven vs. more self-control driven action, respectively. Responses in the Simon task produced a tone and agency was assessed with the intentional binding task – an implicit measure of agency. Results showed a Simon effect and temporal binding effect. However, temporal binding was independent of congruency. These findings suggest that temporal binding, a window to the sense of agency, emerges for both automatic stimulus-driven actions and self-controlled actions.     

A high implicit affiliation motive does not always make you happy: A corresponding explicit motive and corresponding behavior are further needed

Satisfaction of the implicit affiliation motive is known to be positively related to emotional well-being, whereas the frustration of the implicit affiliation motive leads to impairment of well-being. In the present research we specified two conditions that are responsible for the satisfaction and frustration of the implicit motive. Referring to research on the congruence of implicit and explicit motives, we assumed that a corresponding explicit affiliation motive leads to satisfaction of the implicit motive. Corresponding affiliation behavior constitutes the second condition. Three studies confirmed the hypothesis that both conditions must be fulfilled in order to positively connect the implicit affiliation motive to emotional well-being. Participants with high implicit and explicit affiliation motives and who additionally showed a large amount of affiliation behavior reported the lowest negative affectivity and the highest life satisfaction compared to participants who lacked one of the conditions.

Social anxiety and evaluation of social crowds: explicit and implicit measures

To investigate whether social anxiety disorder is indeed characterized by a biased negative evaluation of facial expressions, 25 highly socially anxious (SA) participants and 30 non-anxious controls (NACs) were asked to respond to different ratios of neutral-angry or happy-angry face combinations (crowds). In an indirect Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT), participants used a joystick to pull the crowds towards themselves (approach) or push them away (avoidance). SAs showed faster avoidance of neutral-angry crowds when the number of angry faces in the crowd increased. The happy-angry crowds were generally avoided, independent of the ratio of the two emotions. NACs did not show any specific response tendency. When directly rating the friendliness of the crowds, the two groups did not differ.     

Environmental control and psychosis-relevant traits modulate the prospective sense of agency in non-clinical individuals

The sense of agency concerns the experience of being the source of one’s own actions and their consequences. An altered sense of agency can occur due to task automation and in psychosis. We tested in a non-clinical sample the hypothesis that reducing voluntary task control diminishes intentional binding as an implicit indicator of the sense of agency, possibly interacting with psychosis-relevant personality traits. Agent-device interactions were manipulated obtaining positive-control (voluntary interaction), no-control (automation), and negative-control (device-commanded interaction) groups. The main results showed reduced prospective intentional binding (predictive coding of action consequences) in the no-control and negative-control groups, compared to the positive-control group. Psychosis-like experiences covaried positively with intentional binding in the no-control group, but negatively in the negative-control group. Moreover, positive-social traits were associated with increased intentional binding in the positive-control group. These findings demonstrate the interplay between environmental and individual differences variables in establishing the implicit sense of agency.     

Double dissociation between implicit and explicit affiliative motives: A closer look at socializing behavior in dyadic interactions

In the present research, we followed two objectives. First, we aimed to replicate the classic finding by McAdams, Jackson, and Kirshnit (1984) that strong implicit affiliative motives predict high levels of nonverbal socializing behavior (eye contact, laughing, smiling) in dyadic interactions with an unacquainted person. Second, we applied a dual-motives perspective and hypothesized a double dissociation between implicit and explicit motives. Whereas implicit motives were supposed to predict nonverbal socializing, the corresponding explicit motives were supposed to predict verbal socializing (i.e., self-disclosure). Using observational data from 123 university students in ostensibly casual conversations, the findings by McAdams et al. were replicated, and the double-dissociation hypothesis was confirmed. These results corroborate dual-motives theory in the domain of affiliative motivation.     

Sense of agency over speech and proneness to auditory hallucinations: The reality-monitoring paradigm

This study investigated the effects of imagining speaking aloud, sensorimotor feedback, and auditory feedback on respondents' reports of having spoken aloud and examined the relationship between responses to “spoken aloud” in the reality-monitoring task and the sense of agency over speech. After speaking aloud, lip-synching, or imagining speaking, participants were asked whether each word had actually been spoken. The number of endorsements of “spoken aloud” was higher for words spoken aloud than for those lip-synched and higher for words lip-synched than for those imagined as having been spoken aloud. When participants were prevented by white noise from receiving auditory feedback, the discriminability of words spoken aloud decreased, and when auditory feedback was altered, reports of having spoken aloud decreased even though participants had actually done so. It was also found that those who have had auditory hallucination-like experiences were less able than were those without such experiences to discriminate the words spoken aloud, suggesting that endorsements of having “spoken aloud” in the reality-monitoring task reflected a sense of agency over speech. These results were explained in terms of the source-monitoring framework, and we proposed a revised forward model of speech in order to investigate auditory hallucinations.     

Together we are strong: Explicit and implicit paranormal beliefs predict performance in a knowledge test of paranormal phenomena better than explicit beliefs alone

The belief in paranormal phenomena is a frequently studied topic. Studies predominantly assess explicit (i.e., conscious) parts of paranormal belief (PB) using questionnaire-based self-report measures which are prone to impression management and social desirability tendencies. In order to investigate the usefulness of measuring implicit (i.e., automatic) PB, we developed a PB Implicit Association Test (PB-IAT). Implicit PB was uncorrelated with explicit PB, but moderated the relationship between explicit PB and participants’ knowledge of paranormal phenomena. Participants with a weak implicit PB did not differ in their knowledge scores regardless of whether they had strong or weak explicit PB. But participants with strong implicit PB had higher scores when they also had strong explicit PB compared to participants with weak explicit PB. These results suggest that discrepant configurations of PB impair performance in a knowledge test about paranormal phenomena.     

Sense of agency over thought: external misattribution of thought in a memory task and proneness to auditory hallucination

Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased and that scores of AHES-17 predicted the rate of false memory of critical lures. Furthermore, we revealed that the relationship between AHES-17 scores and the rates of false alarms to critical lures was strictly linear. Therefore, it might be said that individual differences in auditory hallucination-like experiences are highly related to the external misattribution of thought. We discussed these results from the perspective of the sense of agency over thought.