Sequencing of vocational development stages: Further studies

This paper reports two studies which support the prediction derived from Hershenson's (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1968, 15, 23–30) life-stage vocational development model that average scores on Self-differentiation (worker self-concept and motivation) would exceed those on Competence (work habits, skills, and interpersonal relations), which in turn would exceed those on Independence (appropriateness and crystallization of vocational goals). The first study involved ratings by project staff on an inner city, socially disadvantaged population, and the second study involved self-ratings by individuals who had changed occupations in midcareer. Findings are consistent with those reported by Hershenson and Langbauer (Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1973, 20, 519–521) on a population of deaf clients.     

Sequential analysis of visual habituation in preschool children

The study breaks down the data from a preschool (mean age of students, 63 months) visual habituation experiment using a second-by-second analysis of the entire process, including fixation time and onsets for habituation and recovery trials and for each intertrial interval. The results parallel those suggested by Cohen, DeLoach, and Rissman (Child Development, 1975, 46, 611–617), for infants and are described using a two-process model of visual attention.     

Is it just reading?: Comments on the papers by Mann,Morrison, and Wolford and Fowler

Comments on the stimulating papers by V. A. Mann (Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15), F. Morrison (Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47), and G. Wolford and C. A. Fowler (Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35) come under four headings. First, their differences with respect to the organizing themes are identified. Second, the central difficulty, for theories of reading disability, posed by the high correlation between reading and IQ, and ways of dealing with this difficulty, are discussed. In the third and fourth sections, comments on the individual papers and a summary of the main lessons to be learned from this collection are presented.     

Measured interests versus expressed interests as predictors of long-term occupational membership

This study compared the predictive accuracy of measured versus expressed interests over a 21-year period using as a criterion occupational membership at age 36. Subjects were 83 males whose measured and expressed interests were elicited at ages 15, 18, and 25. The Strong Vocational Interest Blank was used to determine measured interests while expressed interests were determined through a combination of questionnaires and interviews. C. McArthur's (Journal of Applied Psychology, 1954, 38, 346–353) method was employed to determine the predictive validity of subjects' measured interests. The predictive validity of expressed interests was determined by using A. Roe's (The psychology of occupations. New York: Wiley, 1956; Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1957, 4, 212–217) scheme for occupational classification to code occupational preferences and compare them to age 36 occupations. Results indicated that at each point in the study expressed interests were slightly better predictors of age 36 occupational membership than measured interests. Supplementary analyses revealed no relationship between the extent to which subjects' measured or expressed interests corresponded to age 36 occupations and either overall job or career satisfaction.     

Developmental aspects of the generation effect

Children from Grades 2, 3, 5, and 7 (7.6, 9, 11, and 13 years of age, respectively) were required to generate or study exemplars of semantic categories (semantic orientation) or rhymes to stimulus words (phonetic orientation). Each child then participated in one of three retention tests: free recall, standard recognition, and rhyme recognition. The results indicated that the developmental emergence of the “generation effect” (C. E. McFarland, Jr., T. J. Frey, & D. D. Rhodes, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1980, 19, 210–225; N. J. Slamecka & P. Graf, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1978, 4, 592–604) was dependent on both encoding orientation and the type of retention task employed. A substantial generation effect first emerged (7-year-olds) for standard recognition in the semantic condition. A similar effect for recall was evident for 9-year olds, but not for younger children. Internal stimulus generation became a strong memory facilitator for phonetically encoded items at age 11 for standard recognition, but not until age 13 for recall. The results of the rhyme recognition test indicated that internal generation facilitated “transfer-appropriate processing” (C. D. Morris, J. D. Bransford, & J. J. Franks, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1977, 16, 519–533) only for seventh graders (age 13). The processes underlying this developmental pattern were discussed.     

An experimental and theoretical investigation of the constant-ratio rule and other models of visual letter confusion

The constant-ratio rule (CRR) and four interpretations of R. D. Luce's (In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1963) similarity choice model (SCM) were tested using an alphabetic confusion paradigm. Four stimulus conditions were employed that varied in set size (three, four or five stimulus elements) and set constituency (block letters: A, E, X; F, H, X; A, E, F, H; A, E, F, H, X), and were presented to each subject in independent blocks. The four interpretations of the SCM were generated by constraining one, both, or neither of its similarity and bias parameter sets to be invariant in across-stimulus set model predictions. The strictest interpretation of the SCM (both the similarity and bias parameters constrained), shown to be a special case of the CRR, and the CRR produced nearly equivalent across-set predictions that provided a reasonable first approximation to the data. However, they proved inferior to the least strict SCM (neither the similarity nor bias parameters were constrained; the common interpretation of the SCM in visual confusion). Additionally, the least strict SCM was compared to J. T. Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50, 449–454) overlap model, the all-or-none model (J. T. Townsend, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 18, 25–38), and a modified version of L. H. Nakatani's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 104–127) confusion-choice model. Both the least strict SCM and confusion-choice models produced nearly equivalent within stimulus set predictions that were superior to the overlap and all-or-none within-set predictions. Measurement conditions related to model structure and equivalence relations among the models, many of them new, were examined and compared with the statistical fit results of the investigation.     

Why Reading? Because it's there

Three papers (V. A. Mann, Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15; G. Wolford & C. A. Fowler, Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35; F. J. Morrison, Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47) are critiqued from the standpoint of their adequacy in advancing our understanding of a problem as complex as reading disability. Experimenters should be explicit about their guiding theoretical assumptions, and should think through the relations, if any, between their laboratory tasks and the actual processes of reading. The reading protocol of a dyslexic child is provided, and is interpreted within the frameworks of the Mann, Wolford and Fowler, and Morrison viewpoints.     

On mediation

The mediation-nonmediation dichotomy proposed by the Kendlers (Psychological Review, 1962, 69, 1–16) and subscribed to by Cole and Medin (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1973, 15, 352–355) is reviewed and critiqued. It is proposed that the appropriate question for research is how children mediate, not when they mediate.     

“A Big Piece of News”: Théodule Ribot and the Founding of the Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger

This paper describes the founding of the Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger by Théodule Ribot (1839–1916) in 1876. Like the English journal Mind, which was launched the same year, this journal introduced the new scientific psychology to France. Its founding increased Ribot's scientific credibility in psychology and led him to be regarded as the most distinguished French specialist in the field. First, we review the state of French philosophy at the time of the journal's founding, focusing on the three main French schools of thought in philosophy and on their relations with psychology. Second, after analyzing the preface written by Ribot in the first issue of the Revue Philosophique, we examine how the journal was received in French philosophical circles. Finally, we discuss its subsequent history, highlighting its founder's promotion of new ideas in psychology.     

A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

Moral judgment: Theory and research on differences between males and females

That men and women differ in their moral orientations is a commonly held stereotype. The view that men are morally superior can be found in the writings of philosophers and psychologists (most notably Freud). Recently, Carol Gilligan (Harvard Educational Review, 1977, 47, 431–517) has entered this discussion bringing to it what she calls a “different [woman's] voice.” In this paper, the theory of an ethic of care is described and contrasted with Kohlberg's morality of justice. The empirical support for Gilligan's claim that men and women differ in their moral orientations is examined and a discussion of Gilligan's contribution to an integrated theory of morality is offered.     

Maximum likelihood estimation for Luce's choice model

A terminology for general choice models based on the choice axiom is given. It applies to all kinds of choice experiments, such as confusion choice experiments, paired comparisons, triadic comparisons, directional rankings, scores on binary test items, and others. Maximum likelihood estimation for such general choice models is considered. Conditions for the uniqueness of maximum likelihood estimates are given, and it is shown that the estimates can be derived by iterative proportional fitting. This offers the opportunity of a general test of the choice axiom for all kinds of choice experiments using the likelihood ratio. The estimation and testing procedure is applied to data from a form recognition experiment, reported by W. A. Wagenaar (Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 1968, 23, 96–108).     

Schizophrenic speech,slips of the tongue,and jargonaphasia: A reply to Fromkin and to Lecours and Vanier-Clément

Chaika (1974, Brain & Language, 1, 257–276) raised the possibility that speech judged “schizophrenic” by researchers results from an intermittent, cyclical aphasia. Fromkin (1975, Brain and Language, 2, 498–503) judged such speech as no different from normal error and even as proof of intactness of linguistic competence. These claims are examined. Lecours and Vanier-Clément (1976, Brain and Language, 3, 516–565), on the other hand, found it not normal, but different from jargonaphasia, a claim not wholly substantiated. Schizophrenic speech is found to be different from that of normals on both formal and intuitive grounds, contributing to new understanding of the differences between normal, pathological, and artistic language.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

Why additive utility models fail as descriptions of choice behavior

This experiment sought to determine whether previously found metric violations of additive expectancy-value models C.F. J. C. Shanteau, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 103, 680–691; J. G. Lynch and J. L. Cohen, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 1138–1151) were attributable to the inappropriateness of these models or to nonlinearities in the relationship between numerical ratings and underlying psychological impressions. Undergraduate participants performed two tasks employing the same experimental stimuli. In the first task, they rated the subjective values of hypothetical bets, judged separately and in combination. In the second task, they made pairwise comparisons of the same bets in terms of preference. The use of the same experimental stimuli in both tasks allowed a test of alternative models of utility judgment through application of the criterion of scale convergence (M. H. Birnbaum & C. T. Veit, Perception and Psychophysics, 1974, 15, 7–15). Results suggested that the additive expectancy-value model of judgments of the utilities of combinations of outcomes should be replaced by a weighted averaging rule in which the weight given to the value of each outcome in the averaging process is greater when this value is negative and extreme than when it is neutral.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

On aspiring to present a developmental theory of occupational aspirations: A reader's guide to Gottfredson

L. S. Gottfredson's preceding comment (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 203–212)is characterized by undocumented and arbitrary assertions. Moreover, we still maintain and cite further evidence that the features of the stages she describes represent an implausible account of development. We conclude that there is nothing in either L. S. Gottfredson's original (Journal of Counseling Psychology 1981, 28, 545–579) article or her preceding paper that leads us to alter our belief that the views we present in our own article (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 179–212) will be useful for the future development of vocational theory and intervention.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.