Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics

It has been hypothesized that illusory agency detection is at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and paranormal beliefs. In the present study a biological motion perception task was used to study illusory agency detection in a group of skeptics and a group of paranormal believers. Participants were required to detect the presence or absence of a human agent in a point-light display. It was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was due to a response bias to ‘yes’ for stimuli in which no agent was present. The relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory agency detection held only for stimuli with low to intermediate ambiguity, but for stimuli with a high number of visual distractors responses of believers and skeptics were at the same level. Furthermore, it was found that illusory agency detection was unrelated to traditional religious belief and belief in witchcraft, whereas paranormal beliefs (i.e. Psi, spiritualism, precognition, superstition) were strongly related to illusory agency detection. These findings qualify the relation between illusory pattern perception and supernatural and paranormal beliefs and suggest that paranormal beliefs are strongly related to agency detection biases.     

The self-attribution bias and paranormal beliefs

The present study investigated the relation between paranormal beliefs, illusory control and the self-attribution bias, i.e., the motivated tendency to attribute positive outcomes to oneself while negative outcomes are externalized. Visitors of a psychic fair played a card guessing game and indicated their perceived control over randomly selected cards as a function of the congruency and valence of the card. A stronger self-attribution bias was observed for paranormal believers compared to skeptics and this bias was specifically related to traditional religious beliefs and belief in superstition. No relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory control was found. Self-report measures indicated that paranormal beliefs were associated to being raised in a spiritual family and to anomalous experiences during childhood. Thereby this study suggests that paranormal beliefs are related to specific cognitive biases that in turn are shaped by socio-cultural factors.     

Paranormal belief and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

Numerous studies have shown paranormal believers misperceive randomness and are poor at judging probability. Despite the obvious relevance to many types of alleged paranormal phenomena, no one has examined whether believers are more susceptible to the ‘conjunction fallacy’; that is to misperceiving co‐occurring (conjunct) events as being more likely than singular (constituent) events alone. The present study examines believer vs. non‐believer differences in conjunction errors for both paranormal and non‐paranormal events presented as either a probability or a frequency estimation task. As expected, believers made more conjunction errors than non‐believers. This was true for both event types, with both groups making fewer errors for paranormal than for non‐paranormal events. Surprisingly, the response format (probability vs. frequency) had little impact. Results are discussed in relation to paranormal believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and more generally, to their propensity for probabilistic reasoning biases. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implicit learning of sequential bias in a guessing task: failure to demonstrate effects of dopamine administration and paranormal belief

Previous research suggests that implicit sequence learning (ISL) is superior for believers in the paranormal and individuals with increased cerebral dopamine. Thirty-five healthy participants performed feedback-guided anticipations of four arrow directions. A 100-trial random sequence preceded two 100-trial biased sequences in which visual targets (arrows) on trial t tended to be displaced 90 degrees clockwise (CW) or counter-clockwise (CCW) from those on t - 1. ISL was defined as a positive change during the course of the biased run in the difference between pro-bias and counter-bias responses. It was hypothesized that this difference would be greater for believers in the paranormal than for skeptics, for those who received dopamine than for those who received placebo, and for believers who received dopamine than for the other groups. None of the hypotheses were supported by the data. It is suggested that a simple binary guessing task with a focus on prediction accuracy during early trials should be considered for future explorations.     

Diverse Supernatural Portfolios: Certitude,Exclusivity, and the Curvilinear Relationship Between Religiosity and Paranormal Beliefs

Studies have attempted to understand the association between more conventional supernatural (religious) beliefs and practices and less conventional “paranormal” supernatural beliefs. Some have posited that the two comprise incompatible cultural spheres and belief systems, while others have argued that supernatural religious beliefs are “small steps” toward less conventional paranormal views (such as belief in astrology and telekinesis). We build upon recent scholarship outlining a more nuanced, nonlinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs by identifying a specific niche of believers who are particularly likely to dabble in unconventional supernatural beliefs. Strong believers in the paranormal tend to be characterized by a nonexclusive spiritualist worldview, as opposed to materialist or exclusive religious outlooks. Paranormal believers tend to be characterized by moderate levels of religious belief and practice, and low levels of ideological exclusivity. In general, the relationship between more conventional religiosity and paranormal beliefs is best conceptualized as curvilinear.     

Being Watched by Anthropomorphized Objects Affects Charitable Donation in Religious People

This study assessed the effect of bottom‐up visual cues—the cues of being watched—from anthropomorphized (face‐like) everyday objects on religious people's prosocial behavior. As religious people are more likely than less‐religious people to perceive faces in everyday objects and as perception of face‐like objects promotes prosociality, it was expected that religious people would become more prosocial when they perceived face‐like objects. To test the hypothesis, the study replicated a past finding in a Japanese sample in which religious people tended to perceive a face in everyday objects. Next, results showed that the decision to donate in religious people (compared to less‐religious people) was increased when a face‐like object was displayed with charitable appeals. This effect was not observed with a non‐face‐like object. The current study indicates that interaction with the surrounding environment plays an important role in motivating prosocial behavior among religious people.     

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.     

Paranormal Believers' Susceptibility to Confirmatory Versus Disconfirmatory Conjunctions

This study examines paranormal believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy for confirmatory versus non‐confirmatory conjunctive events. Members of the UK public (N = 207) read 16 hypothetical vignettes before judging the likelihood that each constituent and their conjunction would (co) occur. Event type (paranormal versus non‐paranormal), outcome type (confirming versus disconfirming) and level of paranormal belief (in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life after death)—plus relevant interaction terms—were entered into a linear mixed model analysis. As hypothesised, paranormal belief was associated with more conjunction errors regardless of event type with, in general, more errors made for confirmatory over disconfirmatory conjunctions. These trends existed for extrasensory perception and psychokinesis believers with those for life after death believers approaching significance. Consistent with Crupi and Tentori's Confirmation–Theoretical Framework, current findings suggest that paranormal believers are prone to a generic and confirmatory conjunction fallacy. Theoretical implications, methodological limitations and future research ideas are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paranormal belief and the conjunction fallacy: Controlling for temporal relatedness and potential surprise differentials in component events

Recent research suggests paranormal believers are especially prone to the ‘conjunction fallacy’. The current study extends this work by presenting believers and non‐believers with eight paranormal plus eight non‐paranormal scenarios. Participants were given either a paranormal or virtually identical non‐paranormal version of each scenario. Of these, half incorporated component events which were (virtually) co‐occurring with half including components which were temporally disjointed. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA; controlling for gender and maths/stats/psychology qualifications) found believers made more conjunction errors than non‐believers. Neither event type (paranormal vs. non‐paranormal) nor components' temporal relationship (co‐occurring vs. disjointed) had a significant effect on conjunction biases. Believers' tendency to produce larger conjunctive estimates was unrelated to group differences in component probability estimates (surprise values) and further, could not be attributed to group differences in the perceived functional relationship between component and conjunctive events. Possible explanations are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probabilistic reasoning,affirmative bias and belief in precognitive dreams

Three hundred and eighty‐six participants were interviewed about their experience of dreams that seem to predict an event in the future, and their belief about whether such dreams can be explained naturally or paranormally. For those without university education, participants who had had a dream that seemed to predict the future (termed experiencers) and believers in paranormal explanations for such dreams (termed believers) made more errors on a probabilistic reasoning task about a lottery. Contrary to the chance baseline shift hypothesis experiencers and believers did not give lower estimates than non‐experiencers and non‐believers for the frequency with which others would answer three simple personal questions affirmatively. However, they were more likely to answer the three simple personal questions affirmatively about themselves than were non‐experiencers and non‐believers, which suggests an affirmative bias. This affirmative bias either affects paranormal experience and belief, or is a confound in the methods used in assessing experience and belief. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Superstitious,magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model

Lack of conceptual clarity has hampered theory formation and research on superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs. This study offers a conceptual framework where these concepts are differentiated from other unfounded beliefs and defined identically as a confusion of core knowledge about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena. When testing this definition with questionnaire items (N = 239), the results showed that superstitious individuals accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions than skeptics did and that ontological confusions discriminated believers from skeptics better than intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability. The findings justify the present conceptualization of superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs, and offer new theoretical propositions for the familiar everyday beliefs that are yet scientifically so poorly understood.     

Skepticism: Genuine unbelief or implicit beliefs in the supernatural?

We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N = 57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics’ (or believers’) afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1 = 33, n2 = 31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect “supernatural” with “imaginary”. Study 3 (N = 63) investigated whether participants’ supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics’ ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.     

The impact of event vividness,event severity,and prior paranormal belief on attributions towards a depicted remarkable coincidence experience: Two studies examining the misattribution hypothesis

Two studies examine the impact event vividness, event severity, and prior paranormal belief has on causal attributions for a depicted remarkable coincidence experience. In Study 1, respondents (n = 179) read a hypothetical vignette in which a fictional character accurately predicts a plane crash 1 day before it occurs. The crash was described in either vivid or pallid terms with the final outcome being either severe (fatal) or non‐severe (non‐fatal). Respondents completed 29 causal attribution items, one attribution confidence item, nine scenario perception items, a popular paranormal belief scale, and a standard demographics questionnaire. Principal axis factoring reduced the 29 attribution items to four attribution factors which were then subjected to a 2 (event vividness) × 2 (event severity) × 2 (paranormal belief) MANCOVA controlling for respondent gender. As expected, paranormal believers attributed the accurate crash prediction less to coincidence and more to both paranormal and transcendental knowing than did paranormal sceptics. Furthermore, paranormal (psychokinesis) believers deemed the prediction more reflective of paranormal knowing to both (1) a vivid/non‐fatal and (2) a pallid/fatal crash depiction. Vividness, severity, and paranormal belief types had no impact on attribution confidence. In Study 2, respondents (also n = 179) generated data that were a moderately good fit to the previous factor structure and replicated several differences across attributional pairings albeit for paranormal non‐believers only. Corresponding effects for event severity and paranormal belief were not replicated. Findings are discussed in terms of their support for the paranormal misattribution hypothesis and the impact of availability biases in the form of both vividness and severity effects. Methodological issues and future research ideas are also discussed.     

The Swedes and the Paranormal

The hypothesis that Church and Science have lost some of their former standing in Sweden and made way for deviant beliefs is examined in two empirical studies which show a widespread belief in paranormal phenomena. The paper also discusses how believers in the paranormal relate to institutionalised religious beliefs and how problematic the interpretation of religious self-assessment items are.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Framing Effects and Belief in the Paranormal: A Further Evaluation

Studies exploring relationships between belief in the paranormal and vulnerability to cognitive bias suggest that believers are liable to misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy. Research investigating misperception of chance has produced consistent findings, whilst work on conjunction fallacy is less compelling. Evidence indicates also that framing biases within a paranormal context can increase believers' susceptibility. The present study, using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling, examined the contribution of each bias to belief in the paranormal and assessed the merits of previous research. Alongside, the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, participants completed standard and paranormal framed perception of randomness and conjunction problems. Perception of randomness was more strongly associated with belief in the paranormal than conjunction fallacy. Inherent methodological issues limited the usefulness of framing manipulations; presenting problems within a paranormal context weakened their predictive power.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Belief in the paranormal and suggestion in the seance room

In Experiment 1, participants took part in a fake seance. An actor suggested that a table was levitating when, in fact, it remained stationary. After the seance, approximately one third of participants incorrectly reported that the table had moved. Results also showed a significant relationship between the reported movement of the table and belief in the paranormal, with a greater percentage of believers than disbelievers, reporting that the table had moved. Experiment 2 varied whether the suggestion was consistent, or inconsistent, with participants' belief in the paranormal. Results again showed that believers were more susceptible to suggestion than disbelievers, but only when the suggestion was consistent with their belief in the paranormal. Approximately one fifth of participants believed that the fake seances contained genuine paranormal phenomena.     

面孔认知的四个层面及FFA在其中的作用

面孔具有明显不同于其他刺激物的特点,面孔认知的目的也因此与其他物体认知的目的大相径庭。依据面孔认知的目的,本文将面孔认知划分为四个层面：将面孔区别于一般物体的第一层面,对面孔物理属性进行识别的第二层面,对面孔的生物属性进行识别的第三层面和对面孔的社会属性进行识别的第四层面。FFA是面孔加工的一个重要脑区,通过论述它对面孔认知各层面的作用,FFA在面孔加工中的作用被进一步明确。     

Expert face coding: Configural and component coding of own-race and other-race faces

Configural and holistic coding are hallmarks of face perception. Although recent studies have shown that own-race faces are coded more holistically than other-race faces, the evidence for better configural coding of own-race faces is equivocal. We directly measured configural and component coding of own- and other-race male faces in Caucasian and Chinese participants. We manipulated individual features (components) or their spatial relations (configurations) using a novel morphing method to vary difficulty parametrically and tested sensitivity to these changes in a sequential matching task. Both configural and component coding were better for upright own-race than for upright other-race faces. Inversion impaired detection of configural changes more than it did detection of component changes, but also impaired performance more for easier discriminations,independent of type of change. These results challenge explanations of face expertise that rely solely on configural and holistic processing, and also call into question the widespread interpretation of large inversion decrements as diagnostic of configural coding.     

Paranormal beliefs and religiosity: Chinese version of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale

This paper reports an initial study investigating the relations of paranormal beliefs with religiosity in a Chinese sample, as well as the development of a Chinese version of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and a test of its psychometric properties with 310 college students (5.5% Christians, 21.3% Buddhists, 61% believers in traditional Chinese religions, and 12% atheists). The reliability and validity of the Chinese version were satisfactory. In general, traditional Chinese religious believers had higher scores on paranormal belief than did Christians and atheists, and the mean total score of the Chinese participants was higher than previously reported in a Western sample. It was concluded that the greater involvement of practitioners of traditional Chinese religions in activities emphasizing paranormal experiences might contribute to their greater paranormal belief, especially as compared to the minority Christian group. The results are consistent with the idea that Christianity may offer the least support for paranormal belief.     

The own‐age face recognition bias is task dependent

The own‐age bias (OAB) in face recognition (more accurate recognition of own‐age than other‐age faces) is robust among young adults but not older adults. We investigated the OAB under two different task conditions. In Experiment 1 young and older adults (who reported more recent experience with own than other‐age faces) completed a match‐to‐sample task with young and older adult faces; only young adults showed an OAB. In Experiment 2 young and older adults completed an identity detection task in which we manipulated the identity strength of target and distracter identities by morphing each face with an average face in 20% steps. Accuracy increased with identity strength and facial age influenced older adults' (but not younger adults') strategy, but there was no evidence of an OAB. Collectively, these results suggest that the OAB depends on task demands and may be absent when searching for one identity.