BETWEEN MT. MORIAH AND MT. GOLGOTHA: How Is Christian Ethics Possible?

In this paper, I explore a new way of understanding Christian ethics by critically interconnecting the theological meanings of the Aqedah (“binding”) narrative of Mt. Moriah and the Passion story of Mt. Golgotha. Through an in‐depth critical‐theological investigation of the relation between these two biblical events, I argue that Christian ethics is possible not so much as a moralization or as a literalistic divine command theory, but rather as a “covenantal‐existential” response to God's will in the impossible love on Mt. Moriah as well as in the Son's willing embrace of God's will on Mt. Golgotha.     

Speaking of Possibilities: The Theistic Actualism of Anselm's Divine Locutio

In his Monologion, Anselm represents God's knowledge of his creative possibilities, not in the intellectualist and Platonic terms of Augustine's divine ideas, but in the linguistic, poetic, and semi‐Stoic terms of a divine “utterance” or “expression” (locutio). Through his shift in theological metaphor, Anselm makes a subtle yet significant departure from the prevailing, “possibilist” model of divine possibility in western theology—according to which God's possibilities are known prior to and independently of any act or intention to create—towards a radically alternate, analogical and “actualist” appreciation of God as the sovereign speaker and inventor of his own possibilities.     

Cur deus caro: Jesus and the Cosmos Story

Abstract

There seems to be a vast gulf between the grand-scale story of the world of creation, cosmic in scope and pitiless in its operations, and the small-scale story of Jesus as embodying divine empathy. The concept of deep incarnation offers a bridge by arguing that God's own Logos or Wisdom, when assuming the particular life story of Jesus, also conjoins the material conditions of God's world of creation at large (“all flesh”), shares the fate of all biological life forms (“grass and lilies”), and experiences the pains of all sentient creatures (“sparrows and foxes”). Incarnation is thus the story of God's reach into the very tissue of material and biological existence. In the embodied Logos, the “flesh” of Jesus Christ is co-extensive with his divinity. Otherwise, the incarnation would be skin deep, confined to a historical figure of the past, or merely an external appendix to divine life.     

FOREKNOWLEDGE, FREEDOM, AND OBLIGATION

Abstract: A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt‐type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility‐undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue that divine foreknowledge is irreconcilable with moral obligation if such foreknowledge eliminates alternatives.     

Can the Created Co‐Creator Be Lutheran?A Response to Svend Andersen

Abstract : The author responds to Svend Andersen's article in this journal 43: 4(Winter 2004) 312–23, “Can Bioethics Be Lutheran?” in which Andersen criticizes the concept of humans as created co‐creators, particularly because it asserts an equality between God and humans; he recommends in its place Luther's concept of humans as God's co‐operators or co‐workers. It is argued here that the created co‐creator meets the critique offered. The concept can be both theologized and secularized, which Andersen overlooks. The concept can be integrated into the Christian theology of divine creation, but it introduces irony into theological formulation which is necessary, and which the idea of “God's co‐operators” fails to do. Finally, the chief and most difficult theological issues are framed: Why does God create co‐creators? and How can they receive grace within a Lutheran framework?     

The Causality Distinction,Kenosis, and a Middle Way: Aquinas and Polkinghorne on Divine Action

This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion considering divine action in the work of Thomas Aquinas and John Polkinghorne. Aquinas argues that God employs both primary and secondary causality, in that God causes some events directly by divine power and others by means of secondary causes. Polkinghorne argues that this approach makes God the author of evil and opts instead for a “kenotic approach” to divine action, wherein God chooses to “empty” God's self of complete divine control. We think that these views can complement each other and need not represent mutually exclusive alternatives.     

DIVINE ACTION: IS IT CREDIBLE?

Abstract. The concept of God's acting in the world has been seen to be problematic in light of the claims of scientific knowledge that the regularity of a law like universe rules out divine action. There are resources in both scientific knowledge and religion that can render meaningful and credible divine action. The new physics, chaos theory, cognitive psychology, and the concept of top-down causation are used to understand how God acts in the world. God's action is not an intervention, but is understood on the model of how the mind influences the brain in a downward causative manner. Suggestions for imagining God's actions are discussed.     

The “Strange Acts of God:”The Hermeneutics of Concealment and Revelation in Luther and Shakespeare

Abstract: Martin Luther called himself “God's court‐jester”. He saw history as one of the “masks of God,” and he understood God as hiding Godself often behind the mask of the Devil. Luther developed a paradoxical theology, a theology of the cross, that is surprisingly compatible in certain respects with the paradoxical artistic vision of Shakespeare, especially in Hamlet, King Lear and Measure for Measure. Crucial motifs of Luther's theology—the hidden God, indirect revelation, revelation by concealment, revelation under the opposite, the “strange acts of God,” God's “rearward parts”(posteriora), and suffering (Anfechtungen and melancholy)—resonate with certain latent, even if at times blasphemeous, theological motifs and themes in Shakespeare. They also resonate with the experience of the Lutheran church in Hungary both in its past under communism and today in post‐communist Hungary.     

Is Isaac without Ishmael complete? A nineteenth‐century debate re‐visited

Biblical passages which Christians have traditionally applied to Islam, predicting the rise of false prophets and of false Christs, inform negative judgements. The theory of one nineteenth‐century writer, Charles Forster (1787–1871) is examined as possibly offering a sympathetic Biblical‐key in its interpretation of God's promise to Abraham that he would bless Ishmael and make him father of a great nation. Islam, Forster argued, fulfilled this promise: permitted to exist by God, Islam's eventual “bringing in” to the Kingdom would be by divine not human action. This raises questions about the propriety of proselytizing Muslims and suggests that theological disputation might yield to mutual striving to “do good works” or to obey God's will (Q.5:48; Matt 7:21).     

Divine Immutability,Divine Action and the God–World Relation

In his thought‐provoking critique of classical Christian theism, Isaak Dorner argues that a traditional understanding of God's immutability precludes any diversity in God's action and presence in the world. Dorner reasons that the view of God developed in scholastic thought entails a ‘uniform’ divine causality in which God cannot act in new and distinct ways according to the various circumstances of his creatures. This sort of critique elicits the question of whether God's immutability, if taken to include his pure actuality, flattens out his action such that he is no longer truly engaged in the lives of his creatures. In this article, I propose that a development of the virtual distinction found in scholastic theology proper will enable us to integrate (1) the pure actuality of God and (2) what we may call the formal and temporal diversity of God's action pro nobis that confirms his authentic involvement in the world. Unfolding the explanatory power of the virtual distinction will require considering its relationship to the concept of God's pure actuality and analyzing different aspects of divine action in which the diversity of that action might be located.     

DIVINE PURPOSE AND EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES

When Darwin's theory of natural selection threatened to put Paley's Designer out of a job, one response was to reemploy God as the author of the evolutionary process itself. This idea requires an account of how God might be understood to act in biological history. I approach this question in two stages: first, by considering God's action as creator of the world as a whole, and second, by exploring the idea of particular divine action in the course of evolution. As creator ex nihilo God acts directly in every event as its sustaining ground. Because God structures the world as a lawful order of natural causes, God also acts indirectly by means of creatures. More controversially, God might act directly within the world to affect the course of events; this action need not take the form of a miraculous intervention, if the natural order includes the right sort of indeterministic chance. In each of these ways God's purposes can shape evolutionary processes.     

THE CASTRATION OF SIGNS: CONVERSING WITH AUGUSTINE ON CREATION, LANGUAGE AND TRUTH

This article takes as its starting point Nicholas Lash's use of the Buberian distinction between the basic words “I‐It” and “I‐You” to address the question of how the difference between God and creation is “displayed” within the world. Drawing on a rather different discourse—the semiotics developed by Augustine in the distinctions he makes between sign and thing, use and enjoyment—it seeks to explore the concrete shape that might be taken by practices that foster the speaking of the basic word “I‐You”, and which thereby manifest God's redemptive activity within the world, focusing specifically on practices of debate and argument. “What might a redeemed practice of debate look like?” is the question that this article seeks to answer.     

Simplicity and Language: Bonaventure's Semiotic Asymptoticism

Luy engages in a close reading of Bonaventure's doctrine of divine simplicity. He offers this reading in light of a keen awareness of contemporary critiques of the doctrine, especially from philosophers of religion who suggest that divine simplicity either means that our human words really cannot say anything intelligible about God, or that divine properties that are surely distinct (such as justice and goodness) are in fact absolutely identical. In sum, Luy recognizes that the doctrine of simplicity challenges the intelligibility of religious language. He points out that medieval thinkers, too, recognized this challenge, but they regarded it as a salutary reminder that God is ultimately incomprehensible to finite minds, even though we can speak true things about God. In expositing divine simplicity according to Bonaventure, Luy shows that Bonaventure expects that creation itself is designed to reveal God's limitless self‐communication. Divine simplicity, then, serves to affirm divine perfection, in a manner limited by the effort of finite words to express the infinite; but divine simplicity also reflects the “semiotic universe” that allows for, and exalts in, the wondrous expression of the divine plenitude.     

Launching the Ian G. Barbour Lectureship in Religion and Modernity

Over the last twenty years, the Divine Action Project has produced various theories of God's activity in the world. Increasingly, however, there has been a movement to think about divine action in christological and eschatological perspective, with the resurrection of Jesus as the major case linking the present age with that of the world to come. However, the introduction of such trinitarian data invites a rethinking of the idea of divine action in pneumatological perspective. This essay attempts to further the discussion via proposing a pneumatological theology of divine action informed by the Pentecostal-charismatic experience of God's activity in the world.     

The Action of God in the World—A Synthesis of Process Thought in Science and Theology

A foundational belief of monotheistic religions is that God acts in the world. In this paper, the case is made that divine action has its origins in the molecular world. Within a metaphysical framework of process thought, a hypothesis is constructed in which God's action in the world, God's ‘initial aim’ for all actualities, is divine motivation of chemical becoming.     

Evolution and Providence: Discovering Creation as Carmen Dei

Abstract

Bonaventure describes the natural world as carmen Dei (song of God) that humanity should be able to detect through philosophical wisdom. Many contemporary evolutionary biologists, however, present the natural world as an argument against God's existence. Evolution is deemed incompatible with Providence and natural causes competitively exclusive of divine ones. These arguments against God are not proper to science, but to scientism. This purported conflict between evolution and faith is overcome by respecting the epistemological boundaries among science, philosophy, and theology, understanding creation as ontological dependence, and having a non-contrastive divine transcendence, in which God's transcendence does not oppose God's immanence.     

Kierkegaard’s Notion of a Divine Name and the Feasibility of Universal Love

Kierkegaard's well‐known analysis of the self, in the first part of his work The Sickness unto Death (1849), presents, even if only in passing, the somewhat enigmatic notion of “divine name.” In this article I offer an interpretation of Kierkegaard's analysis and suggest that the notion of a divine name be understood as expressing the conception of human beings as possessing (what I call) “individual essence.” I further demonstrate that it is this quality that makes a human being a self, namely, the individual that he or she is. In addition to defending the exegetical and substantial plausibility of this conception, I show how it opens the way to affirming the feasibility of universal love.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.