Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time

Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments.     

Behavioural Investigative Advice: Assistance to Investigative Decision‐making in Difficult‐to‐detect Murder

This paper considers the role of a Behavioural Investigative Adviser (BIA) in assisting with the decision‐making of a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) in difficult‐to‐detect murder investigations. It outlines the need for transparent evidence‐based decision‐making from both the SIO and the BIA. The paper then details a piece of relevant, applied research that can assist in this end. The research utilised a pragmatic psychology approach to analyse 312 detected murder cases from the Serious Crime Analysis Section database. Some significant patterns relating what is known about the offence at different stages of an investigation and inferences regarding the offender were found, indicating that certain offence information can lead to some reliable predictions and these can be refined as more information becomes available. However, the findings also indicate that base rate frequencies and a ‘best‐guess’ methodology may be as, if not more, useful than more complex statistical techniques when providing advice to investigations. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Angry Juror: Sentencing Decisions in First‐Degree Murder

A great deal of research in legal decision making has overlooked the influence of affect on the decision‐making process. The present study measured the fluctuation of emotions across five time points of a capital trial and tested the overall relationship between changes in emotion and sentencing decisions. The results showed that across all participants, anger initially increased and then decreased during the course of a capital punishment trial. Most importantly, the more individual mock jurors' anger increased during any stage of the trial, the more likely they were to assign a death sentence. Furthermore, when jurors' anger increased, they rated mitigating factors presented by the defense as weaker and the weaker mitigation mediated the relationship between change in anger and sentencing. The paper ends with a discussion of theoretical explanations and policy implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Thin‐Slice Judgments in Consumer Psychology

This article examines the potential theoretical and practical contributions that thin‐slice judgments may offer to consumer psychology. We begin by exploring thin‐slice judgments in the context of existing consumer information processing research. Then, we discuss the antecedents of thin‐slice judgments, the type of processing that may underlie and impact thin‐slice judgment formation. Finally, we review the potential consequences of thin‐slice judgments and investigate applications within the consumer domain.     

Judgments about forces in described interactions between objects

In 4 experiments, participants made judgments about forces exerted and resistances put up by objects involved in described interactions. Two competing hypotheses were tested: (1) that judgments are derived from the same knowledge base that is thought to be the source of perceptual impressions of forces that occur with visual stimuli, and (2) that judgments are generated using simple models or heuristics for deriving force judgments from kinematic information. The results show some similarities with perceptual impression research, particularly that an active object is judged to exert more force on an inactive object than the latter exerts on the former. However, most of the available kinematic information had little or no effect on judgment, supporting the hypothesis that force judgments are generated according to simple rules. Presentation of information about damage to the objects resulted in use of all available kinds of information; this could reflect greater imageability of damage information than kinematic information.     

Judgments about collision in younger and older drivers

To travel safely, drivers must detect imminent collisions. Older drivers have more accidents per miles driven than younger drivers, potentially reflecting age differences in judgments about collision. Prior studies measured age differences in judgments about when a collision would occur (time to contact). Older adults made greater underestimations, but this would lower their risk for accidents. Judgments about when a collision would occur must be preceded by judgments about whether a collision would occur (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (2001) Minneapolis). Results of the present study indicated that judgments about potential collision were less accurate for older drivers compared with younger drivers. This would increase their risk for accidents. Age differences in driver performance may be associated more with age differences in judgments about whether a collision would occur than with age differences in judgments about when a collision would occur. Age differences in judgments about potential collision suggest a new avenue to pursue in an account of differential accident rates in older and younger drivers.     

Judgments about the duration of brief stimuli

Visual duration discrimination data for durations between 70 and 1,020 msec are presented. A model for duration discrimination proposed by Allan, Kristofferson, and Wiens (1972) is elaborated, and the data are discussed in terms of the model. The data axe in agreement with the basic assumptions of the model. Differences between our data and duration discrimination data presented by others are discussed.     

Retrospective Frequency Formats Promote Consistent Experience‐Based Bayesian Judgments

On the basis of their experiences with pregnant patients in their practice, obstetrician/gynecologists estimated the posterior probability of Down syndrome given a positive screening result. They also estimated the base rate of Down syndrome in their practice, along with the hit and false alarm rates for the screening test; for each subject, these numbers were combined to calculate a posterior probability to which the initial estimated posterior probability could be compared. Physicians gave highly consistent estimates when asked to think about their past experiences in terms of event frequencies. However, those told to respond using single event probabilities or to use past experiences to predict prospective frequencies gave inconsistent Bayesian estimates. Thus, when making Bayesian judgments based on real life experience, natural frequency formats only lead to better judgments, compared with single event probability formats, if people think retrospectively, not when using past experiences to make prospective predictions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

Hindsight Distortion: “I knew-it-all along and I was sure about it”1

Hindsight distortion was examined in the context of the 1982 Hawaiian gubernatorial election by obtaining estimates from 474 persons either prior or after the election. Two motivational factors (global self-esteem and political involvement) were also measured. Despite the accuracy of subjects in foresight, hindsight distortion was demonstrated. The most pronounced effect was exhibited in the subjects' degree of confidence which was significantly (p < .0001) higher in hindsight than in foresight. There was no mediation by global self-esteem or by political involvement. The findings support that hindsight distortion occurs because of biases in information processing, rather than through mediation by motivational factors.     

Hindsight bias in gustatory judgments

Being in hindsight, people tend to overestimate what they had known in foresight. This phenomenon has been studied for a wide variety of knowledge domains (e.g., episodes with uncertain outcomes, or solutions to almanac questions). As a result of these studies, hindsight bias turned out to be a robust phenomenon. In this paper, we present two experiments that successfully extended the domain of hindsight bias to gustatory judgments. Participants tasted different food items and were asked to estimate the quantity of a certain ingredient, for example, the residual sugar in a white wine. Judgments in both experiments were systematically biased towards previously presented low or high values that were labeled as the true quantities. Thus, hindsight bias can be considered a phenomenon that extends well beyond the judgment domains studied so far.     

The 30‐Sec Sale: Using Thin‐Slice Judgments to Evaluate Sales Effectiveness

A successful sale depends on a customer's perception of the salesperson's personality, motivations, trustworthiness, and affect. Person perception research has shown that consistent and accurate assessments of these traits can be made based on very brief observations, or “thin slices.” Thus, examining impressions based on thin slices offers an effective approach to study how perceptions of salespeople translate into real‐world results, such as sales performance and customer satisfaction. The literature on the accuracy of thin‐slice judgments is briefly reviewed. Then, 2 studies are presented that investigated the predictive validity of judgments of salespeople based on thin slices of the vocal channel. Participants rated 20‐sec audio clips extracted from interviews with a sample of sales managers, on variables gauging interpersonal skills, task‐related skills, and anxiety. Results supported the hypothesis that observability of the rated variable is a key determinant in the criterion validity of thin‐slice judgments. Implications for the use of thin‐slice judgments in salesperson selection and customer satisfaction are discussed.     

Hindsight bias in political elections

Two studies on political hindsight bias were conducted on the occasions of the German parliament election in 1998 and the Nordrhein-Westfalen state parliament election in 2000. In both studies, participants predicted the percentage of votes for several political parties and recalled these predictions after the election. The observed hindsight effects were stronger than those found in any prior study on political elections (using percentage of votes as the dependent variable). We argue that the length of the retention interval between original judgement and recollection is mainly responsible for this difference. In our second study, we investigated possible artifacts in political hindsight biases using a control-group design where half of the participants recalled their predictions shortly before or after the election. Hindsight bias was preserved, reinforcing the results of earlier studies with non-control-group designs. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the hindsight experience (in political judgement and in general) actually consists of three different, partly independent components.     

Distinguishing between emotion and nonemotion: Judgments about experience

The conceptual distinction between emotion and nonemotion subjective states was investigated in a series of three studies. Three questions were addressed. First, is there high agreement among people in identifying labels for subjective states as either emotion or nonemotion? Second, in judgments of the similarity of subjective states is the emotion-nonemotion distinction more or less salient than other properties of experience? Third, what criteria are used to distinguish conceptually between emotion and nonemotion states? Results indicated that, for many feeling states, there is no substantial agreement as to whether the state should be considered emotion or nonemotion, that the affective dimension of experience is not as salient as are other specific properties of experience (physiological arousal, activity level, valence), and that, in general, people express their individual judgment of emotion-nonemotion on the basis of some nonspecific combination of physiological arousal and character of cognitive state.     

Gangsta’ Rap and a Murder in Bakersfield1

The present study explores the biasing effects of gangsta’ rap lyrics on subject perceptions of a murder trial defendant's personality. The lyrics were those actually authored by a defendant in a murder trial on which the present author was a psychological consultant for the defense. Results strongly indicate that the defendant was seen as more likely to have committed a murder than had he not been presented as authoring such lyrics. Surprisingly, results also show that the writing of such rap lyrics was more damning in terms of adjudged personality characteristics than was the fact of being charged with murder.     

The Impact of Hybrid Dispute‐Resolution Procedures on Constituent Fairness Judgments1

The authors investigated the effects of hybrid third‐party procedures on constituents' procedural and distributive fairness judgments. In Experiment 1, three independent variables were manipulated: third‐party procedure (Med–Arb vs. Arb–Med), concession making during mediation (concessions vs. no concessions), and role (labor vs. management). Participants viewed Med–Arb as fairer than Arb–Med. In Experiment 2, three factors were again manipulated: third‐party procedure (Med–Arb vs. Arb–Med), whether confidential information was revealed during mediation (confidential information revealed vs. not revealed), and arbitration outcomes (winning vs. losing). Results suggest that when no confidential information was revealed, Med–Arb was significantly fairer than Arb–Med, but if confidential information was revealed, then both procedures were equally fair. Results are discussed in terms of procedural design.     

Alternative Lens Model Equations for Dichotomous Judgments about Dichotomous Criteria

The Brunswik lens model typically represents a judge's accuracy using parameters derived from linear regression. This is not optimal if the judgment or the ecological criterion is dichotomous. Alternative approaches, modeling dichotomies using logistic regression, or linearizing judgments with confidence ratings, have not been compared with the same data. Four techniques for deriving lens model equation parameters were compared: (i) linear and (ii) logistic regression applied to dichotomous patient outcomes and judgments; (iii) linear regression with confidence‐adjusted judgments but dichotomous patient outcomes; and (iv) a hybrid with a linear model of the confidence‐adjusted judgments and a logistic model of the patient outcomes. Judgment accuracy (r_a) was slightly higher with confidence adjustment of the categorical judgments. The logistic lens model accounted for a higher proportion of r_a than the linear lens model; the confident‐linear and hybrid lens models were intermediate. For up to a quarter of participants, different methods identified different cues as most important. Display condition differences in achievement r_a and in lens model components are similar with all lens model methods. Each of the three alternative lens model equation methods improves on the linear lens model equation's decomposition of the accuracy of dichotomous judgments. Confidence adjustment improves achievement although it requires additional work from the subjects. The logistic lens model equation explains the highest proportion of achievement, but with a small stimulus set, it is more vulnerable to cue intercorrelations than either the linear or the confident linear lens model equation. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.