Pacifism: Equipment or Accessory of War?

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars.     

Pacifism—Fifty Years Later

I suppose I’m writing this because of my 1965 paper on Pacifism. In that essay I argued that pacifism is self-contradictory. That’s a strong charge, and also not entirely clear. Let’s start by trying to clarify the charge and related ones. Pacifism has traditionally been understood as total opposition to violence, even the use of it in defense of oneself when under attack. I earlier maintained (in my well-known “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis” (Narveson, Ethics, 75:4, 259–271, 1965)) that this position is contradictory, if it is intended to mean that one has no right to use violence. While that is perhaps going too far, pacifism as so characterized is surely, as I have later argued, self-defeating in an obvious sense of that expression. But in any case, contemporary theorists who describe their views as pacifist profess to hold no such doctrine—they regard that familiar characterization of pacifism as a caricature. They do express strong opposition to war, but even that is not unlimited. If the chips are genuinely down, they will approve going to war-level self-defense—but they deny that it ever is really necessary, or at least that it is necessary nearly as often as actual war-making behavior among nations would suggest. In this it is not clear that we have a purely philosophical disagreement. How much opposition to war qualifies a view as “pacifist”? That is now very hard to say. After all, all decently liberal thinkers are against violence as a standardly available way of pursuing one’s ends. We all agree that if violence is to be justified, it takes something special. It should be a “last resort,” Just War theorists have classically said, and while ‘last’ is very difficult to pin down, at least, violence should be very far from the first thing a responsible nation thinks of. What’s more, the “something special” is not just that one’s ends are so important. It has to be that the violence would be employed in defense, of self or of other innocent parties under threat. So if there is genuine disagreement, it must be along this line: that we are morally required to make very substantial sacrifices in the pursuits of our otherwise legitimate interests, including our interests in security, in order to avoid using the violence of war. Is this reasonable? I think not. We should, of course, be reasonable, and that includes refraining from violence—except when the violence is necessary to counter the aggressive violence of others. For we reason, on practical matters, in terms of benefits and costs. Agents, especially political agents, can, alas, benefit from violence where that violence is unilateral. Thus it is rational to see to it that it won’t be unilateral. And when it is not unilateral, then the balance is in favor—strongly in favor—of peace. It remains that we must, alas, be able to make war in the possible case that we can’t have peace. When everybody shares the preference for peace, then we can scale down and hopefully even eliminate war-making capability. (Contemporary nations have already scaled down considerably—there have been few wars in the classic sense of military exchanges between states as such in recent times.) But until the scaling down is universal and includes a genuine renunciation of the use of warlike methods to achieve ends other than genuine self-defense, what most of us think of as “pacifism” is a non-option in the near run.     

Pacifism and Care

I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attach-ments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too hith.     

‘The Process Concept of God and Pacifism’

In this article I argue for the superiority of the neoclassical (or process) concept of God to the classical concept of God as static, especially as the former relates to the moral superiority of pacifism to just war theory. However, the two main proponents of neoclassical or process theism—Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne—failed to see the full ramifications of their improved concept of God in that they tended to stop short of pacifism by maintaining an uneasy alliance with the violence often associated with classical theism.     

I. On the alleged inconsistency,moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism

All the standard and some esoteric objections to pacifism are refuted, either directly or (as with the charge of impracticality) in outline. Familiar arguments to the inconsistency and irresponsibility of pacifism are shown to turn upon illegitimately construing pacifist activities such as resisting, preventing, and defending as involving violence. Several arguments against pacifism from violence as a lesser evil turn out to be fallacious; some involve the erroneous assumption that violence is the only evil, but some lead into what pacifism can simply concede, moral dilemmas. It is argued that pacifism is not a form of fanaticism, is not morally insensitive, does not imply anarchism, or vegetarianism, is not completely impractical, and can be positively underpinned. In the course of the arguments various types of pacifism are classified, pacifism is distinguished from nonviolent action, and pacifism and, differently, pacificity are disassociated from passivity: The question of a more general characterization of violence (which is different from force) emerges as a crucial issue, along with the problem of integrating pacifism into a more comprehensive moral position.     

Bonhoeffer's Non‐Commitment to Nonviolence: A Response to Stanley Hauerwas

Stanley Hauerwas's claim that Bonhoeffer had a “commitment to nonviolence” runs aground on Bonhoeffer's own statements about peace, war, violence, and nonviolence. The fact that Hauerwas and others have asserted Bonhoeffer's commitment to nonviolence despite abundant evidence to the contrary reveals a blind spot that develops from reading Bonhoeffer's thinking in general and his statements about peace in particular as if they were part of an Anabaptist theological framework rather than his own Lutheran one. This essay shows that Bonhoeffer's understanding of peace as “concrete commandment” and “order of preservation” relies on Lutheran concepts and is articulated with explicit contrast to an Anabaptist account of peace. The interpretation developed here can account for the range of statements Bonhoeffer makes about peace, war, violence, and nonviolence, many of which must be misconstrued or ignored to claim his “commitment to nonviolence.”     

“Never Again War”

This essay addresses the complexities of the Roman Catholic position on war by evaluating recent documentary evidence, attending to the contemporary challenges of terrorism and humanitarian interventions. It presents two arguments. First, attending to traditional Catholic resources for assessing war, papal criticism of recent military action, and debates about a recent shift in Catholic just war logic, this essay argues that Catholic teaching on war has undergone a repositioning in a pacifist direction. Second, it contends that recent critiques of this shift in position by scholars such as George Weigel and James Turner Johnson, however, are wrong to categorize this a “functional pacifism.” Though a development from within just war theory and pacifist reasoning, the Church's new stance does not operate as a type of pacifism, allowing too many possibilities for justified armed conflict to be labeled as “functional” pacifism. The essay concludes by examining the traditional Catholic theological commitments that place limits on any movement toward pacifism, precluding even a functionally pacifist position.     

Deliberating Just War

This essay responds to James Turner Johnson's critiques of my argument in “‘Never Again War’: Recent Shifts in the Roman Catholic Just War Tradition and the Question of ‘Functional Pacifism.’” (2014). It attends specifically to three of Johnson's objections and offers accounts of the meaning and use of the term “functional pacifism,” an understanding of classic just war thought as a tradition, and the concepts of peace and authority within just war and pacifist thought. It argues that my analysis of the Catholic Church's movement toward pacifism but ultimate theological inability to embrace a functional pacifism still stands in spite of Johnson's critiques. In addition, it suggests that Johnson offers a thin pacifistic conception of peace and promotes a restricted notion of ecclesial authority and democratic government.     

Caring and Violence

I reply to Laura Duhan Kaplan that I do not suggest women's political choices concerning pacifism are determined by biology. Although I contend the practice of mothering does not imply a pacifist commitment, this does not imply that the practice of mothering is inconsistent with such a commitment. Further, because the practice of mothering is not limited to women, even if it is inconsistent with pacifist commitment, this does not limit choices based on biology.     

Pacifism, Just War, and Self-Defense

This essay distinguishes two main forms of pacifism, personal pacifism and political pacifism. It then contrasts the views on self-defense of political pacifism and just war theory, paying special attention to notions of the state and sovereignty.     

Cosmopolitan Pacifism

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections.     

JUST WAR THEORIES RECONSIDERED: Problems with Prima Facie Duties and the Need for a Political Ethic

This essay challenges a “meta‐theory” in just war analysis that purports to bridge the divide between just war and pacifism. According to the meta‐theory, just war and pacifism share a common presumption against killing that can be overridden only under conditions stipulated by the just war criteria. Proponents of this meta‐theory purport that their interpretation leads to ecumenical consensus between “just warriors” and pacifists, and makes the just war theory more effective in reducing recourse to war. Engagement with the new meta‐theory reveals, however, that these purported advantages are illusory, made possible only by ignoring fundamental questions about the nature and function of political authority that are crucial to all moral reflection on the problem of war.     

The Case for Pacifism

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in 'just war'theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war.
Despite the strength of the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism.     

The Feminist Pacifism of William James and Mary Whiton Calkins

In this paper, I accompany William James (1842–1910) and Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) in the steps each takes toward his or her respective proposal of a moral equivalent of war. I demonstrate the influence of James upon Calkins, suggesting that the two share overlapping formulations of the problem and offer closely related—but significantly different—solutions. I suggest that Calkins's pacifistic proposal is an extension of that of her teacher—a feminist interpretation of his psychological and moral thought as brought to bear on the problem of war. Calkins's brand of pacifism widens the scope of James's “moral equivalent of war” in a way that is consonant with feminist ideals of inclusiveness and social justice. I conclude by commenting on how James's and Calkins's pacifism can continue to be extended fruitfully in contemporary feminist pacifist theory and practice.     

Morally Heterogeneous Wars

According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability to confidently distinguish just from unjust wars lies in how we evaluate “morally heterogeneous” wars—i.e., wars with just and unjust aims. Specifically, the practice of reaching a univocal evaluation of a morally heterogeneous war as a whole by aggregating the evaluations of that war’s just and unjust aims is wrongheaded, because it undermines the action-guiding character of jus ad bellum. We ought instead to adopt what I call the “disaggregate approach” to jus ad bellum, according to which we evaluate the various aims of a war individually, without aggregating them into an evaluation of the war as a whole. Adopting this approach will eliminate a source of our disagreement over which wars have been just, and will ipso fact eliminate a basis for epistemic-based contingent pacifism.     

Commitment and the perpetration of relationship violence

We employed the investment model of commitment (Rusbult, 1983) to examine the independent effects of commitment and relationship duration on the perpetration of common couple violence (i.e., instances of physical violence that occasionally arise in conflict situations; Johnson, 1995). Data are from self-administered questionnaires completed by 722 “currently dating” adolescents in the 8th and 9th grades in a rural public school district in North Carolina. Roughly 10% of the adolescents reported using violence (i.e., hitting, pushing, shoving, kicking, or assaulting with a weapon) against their current partner that was not used as self-defense. The majority of the violent relationships involved the reciprocal use of violence by both partners. Both commitment and duration exerted independent effects upon the perpetration of common couple violence. Consistent with the relationship violence literature, relationship members became more likely to use violence against their partner as the duration of the relationship increased. However, consistent with research that indicates that commitment leads individuals to forgo immediate-self interest and to instead maximize the needs of the relationship, relationship members became less likely to use violence as their commitment to the relationship increased. Furthermore, a gender difference was found in terms of the relationship between violence and variables that promote commitment. Although decreased relationship satisfaction increased the use of violence for both males and females, the increased quality of alternative relationships also increased the use of violence for males. The current findings are consistent with the idea that, whereas relationship duration simply makes partners more accessible to one another, commitment promotes cooperative strategies for conflict resolution.     

Science, Ethics and War: A Pacifist’s Perspective

This article considers the ethical aspects of the question: should a scientist engage in war-related research, particularly use-inspired or applied research directed at the development of the means for the better waging of war? Because scientists are simultaneously professionals, citizens of a particular country, and human beings, they are subject to conflicting moral and practical demands. There are three major philosophical views concerning the morality of war that are relevant to this discussion: realism, just war theory and pacifism. In addition, the requirements of professional codes of ethics and common morality contribute to an ethical analysis of the involvement of scientists and engineers in war-related research and technology. Because modern total warfare, which is facilitated by the work of scientists and engineers, results in the inevitable killing of innocents, it follows that most, if not all, war-related research should be considered at least as morally suspect and probably as morally prohibited.     

Making Pacifism Plausible

The ethics of war is a minefield. It is a morass of conceptual unclarity, contentious assumptions, impassioned arguments, unexploded myths, and the injured defenders of indistinct positions. My aim is to help to make the minefield (conceptually) safe, and to assist that most vulnerable party to the dispute, the pacifist. In this paper I explore the possibility that, farfrom being naïve or outlandish, pacifism might follow from a widely-held and fundamental intuition about the moral status of persons [hereafter MSP]. In Section 1 I describe MSP, and suggest how we might draw implications from it about the ethics of war. In Section 2, I argue that a ‘presumption of war-ism’ has distorted debate in the ethics of war: to arrive at a balanced view, we need distinguish two sets of moral questions. First, can the development and maintenance of the means to make war be justified? Second, can the use of those means ever be justified? I sketch some strategies which might be developed in addressing the first question, concentrating on what MSP suggests might be wrong with setting up a war-machine, and with being or employing a soldier. In Section 3 I argue that even if considerations from Section 2 are insufficient to establish that we must dismantle our war-machines, facts about war which conflict with MSP do establish that we must never use them.     

Putting in Work: The Application of Identity Theory to Gang Violence and Commitment

ABSTRACT

Research has seldom examined how identity mechanisms facilitate violence among gang members. Relying on life history interviews with self-identified former gang members, we use identity theory to explore the relationship between commitment to the gang identity and violence. Results indicate that the relationship between commitment and violence is complex. Specifically, for individuals with a high degree of cognitive commitment to the gang identity, violence will be used to achieve positive and confirming reflected appraisals. However, once gang members have achieved congruence between reflected appraisals and identity standards, a threshold is reached where violence is no longer required.     

The spiritual meaning of war in the philosophy of the Russian silver age

The First World War forced the Russian intelligentsia to rethink its values—values that had been constructed in the nineteenth century. Distancing itself from pacifism and cultural relativism, it began to search for a moral meaning to the war that broke out in 1914—i.e. to defend the war as morally right and having a higher spiritual purpose. Russian philosophers were central to these debates, as they tried to interpret the war, and the relationship between war and peace, from a metaphysical point of view. The paper will look at philosophical, ethical and religious aspects of these debates, and some of the philosophers who participated in them.