NOTES ON THE ALLEGED CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. I interpret several key events in the history of the relationship between Christianity and science and conclude that there is no reason for assuming a fundamental conflict between science and religion. Christian theologians should feel confident in using the science of our day to retell the story of God's creation of the world.     

ON THE BUDDHIST TRUTHS AND THE PARADOXES IN POPULATION ETHICS

Starting point The starting point of this paper is the following citation concerning the state of contemporary population ethics:

Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations ‘is better than’ and ‘is as good as’. This field has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. (Arrhenius 2004, 201)

Type of problem The best known and most discussed example shattering our intuitions is Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. This paper explores the potential of the Buddhist Truths to answer the following questions: What is at the source of the Mere Addition Paradox? and Why are paradoxes unavoidable in population ethics?

Results The comparison of classical utilitarian and Buddhist intuitions demonstrates the close tie between intuitions and interests. The perplexing Buddhist intuition about non-existence can be explained (except for metaphysical reasons) by a radically different priority given to survival. The method of measuring the quality of life is not decisive for the existence of paradoxes; the Buddhist axiology changes but does not remove counter-intuitive combinations. If the conflict of interest (quantity versus quality) is described within a two-parameter model, it causes conflicting intuitions; in axiologies that favour quantity (utilitarianism) or quality (perfectionism), the conflicting intuitions inevitably lead to paradoxes. In order to find a compromise, one would have to find a universal interest and a corresponding universal intuition; the obvious candidate to meet this request is sympathy but, since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Breaking out of the two-parameter model and accepting the incommensurability of certain qualities threatens the normative claim of population ethics.     

RESULTS OF SOME EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON NAMING

Résultats de quelques recherches expérimentales sur la dénomination. — L'auteur présente les résultats d'une série d'expériences qu'il a consacrées à la dénomination. Dans les recherches qui étudient directement ce processus, les référents, bien que ne correspondant à aucun mot fixé dans la langue, ont néanmoins une signification, ce qui permet de mettre en évidence un certain nombre de caractères spécifiques du processus qui n'apparaissent pas dans les recherches traditionnelles qui utilisent des référents sans signification. Dans une seconde série d'expériences, L'auteur modifie la méthode classique d'utilisation des langues naturelles dans L'étude du « symbolisme phonétique », qui consiste à faire deviner des mots empruntés à des langues non familières. II utilise des variantes à partir de onze langues différentes, avec des sujets représentant onze langues différentes; des expériences inter-linguistiques ant également été réalisées. Ces divers modes d'approche permettent de considérer les résultats sous plusieurs angles. En s'appuyant sur les données expérimentales et les observations qu'il tire de ses propres recherches aussi bien que de celles d'autres chercheurs, L'auteur conclut, que dans les conditions expérimentales, le processus de dénomination apparaît régi par des lois, que le vocabulaire des langues naturelles doit avoir été formé par un processus de dénomination qui est régi par des lois et que les particularités psychologiques du processus telles qu'elles apparaissent dans des conditions expérimentales doivent être également celles du processus naturel.     

TWO APPARENT PARADOXES ABOUT JUSTICE AND THE SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT

The idea of Mitigation incorporates the conviction that though the amount or severity of punishment is primarily to be determined by reference to the General Aim, yet Justice requires that those who have special difficulties to face in keeping the law which they have broken should be punished less.     

DEDUCTIVE CLOSURE,SCEPTICISM AND THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION1

To undermine much of what we ordinarily claim to know, sceptics have often appealed to a principle (known as the principle of closure) according to which knowledge (justification) is closed under known entailment. In this paper after expounding the views of Stein, Klein and others, I shall argue that they all fail to take note of different contexts in which the principle of closure is applied. The relevance of the principle of closure for scepticism is then analyzed in the light of, what I call, the ‘infectious’ character of epistemic contexts. I shall also highlight the similarities in the behaviour of the concepts of justification and confirmation and appeal to certain solutions to the paradoxes of confirmation to provide a comprehensive account of the different instances of the principle of closure.