HOW FAR SHOULD WE GENERALIZE?

Abstract— A conceptual model based on staffing theory was applied to previously collected survey data from a representative sample of American workers The model links organizational size, workload, work experience variables (felt responsibility and involvement, assessments of work associates), and work outcomes (job satisfaction, work self-esteem, stress symptoms) Path analyses indicated that the model fit data from all waged and salaried workers relatively well When the model was applied to subsamples of new and established employees and of employees from two contrasting occupational groups (professional-technical workers and operative workers), somewhat different patterns emerged The study illustrates the benefits of applying psychological theories across subdisciplines, as well as the limitations of generalizing research findings across different categories of workers We suggest that localized theories and fine-grained analyses of workplace events could help to make research more applicable to work settings     

SHOULD WE FEAR QUANTUM TORMENT?

The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1     

SHOULD WE DE‐MORALIZE ETHICAL THEORY?

Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti‐social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.     

SHOULD WE SAY THAT THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL HAS FAILED?

Forty years after the end of the Second Vatican Council, contrasting opinions dispute the range of its reception and its real effects as the Catholic Church struggles in a changing world of secularization and pluralism. The present paper tries to throw new light on the historical significance of that event, mobilizing different methods and applying some new ‘hermeneutical lenses’. Four topics will serve for this task: the ‘neo‐Enlightened’ mood that affected a fair amount of its reception; the evolutive process of variations and selections associated with it; the forms of ‘rationalization’ and ‘expansion’, which the Council promoted; and the theological challenge of discerning the ‘signs of the time’. In conclusion, the historical judgment on the Council should keep in mind the complexity of the entire process of modernization it assumed.     

HOW SHOULD WE BEHAVE? A REVIEW OF REASONS AND PERSONS BY DEREK PARFIT

In this book Parfit attempts to develop a rational, non-religious ethics. Instead of asking, “What does God tell us to do?” he asks, “What does reason tell us to do?” Given a set of simple assumptions, he considers whether it is possible to be consistently selfish or consistently good. Analyses of personal dilemmas (problems of self-control) and moral dilemmas (problems of social cooperation) show that neither consistent selfishness nor consistent goodness is logically possible. Instead, a fine balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, our immediate versus long-term good and, on the other, our own good versus that of other people. Ultimately Parfit fails to develop a formula by which such a balance may be struck. Parfit''s analysis is consistent with behavioral analysis in its reductionistic view of the self and the parallel it draws between relations with other people and relations with oneself at other times. Parfit''s analysis is inconsistent with behaviorism in its view of the mind as internal, available to introspection, and able to cause behavior. His nonfunctional mentalism leads Parfit to inconsistencies and blocks the path to a consistent ethics. Teleological behaviorism''s view of the mind in terms of patterns of overt behavior is not hampered by these inconsistencies and may lead to a functional rather than purely rational ethics.     

SHOULD KANTIANS BE CONSEQUENTIALISTS?

Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. ¹     

WHAT EPISTEMIC VALUES SHOULD WE RECLAIM FOR RELIGION AND SCIENCE? A RESPONSE TO J. WESLEY ROBBINS

Abstract. Postmodernism in science rejects and deconstructs the cultural dominance of especially the natural sciences in our time. Although it presents the debate between religion and science with a promising epistemological holism, it also seriously challenges attempts to develop a meaningful relationship between science and religion. A neopragmatist perspective on religion and science is part of this important challenge and eminently reveals the problems and reduction that arise when pragmatist criteria alone are used to construct a holism that renounces any demarcation between different areas of rationality. In this pragmatist vision for a holist culture, the cognitive resources of rationality are bypassed in such a way that a meaningful interaction between theology and science becomes impossible.     

SHOULD SIGNIFICANCE TESTS BE BANNED?

Abstract— Significance testing of null hypotheses is the standard epistemologicat method for advancing scientific knowledge in psychology, even though a has drawbacks and it leads to common inferential mistakes These mistakes include accepting the null hypothesis when it fails to be rejected, automatically interpreting rejected null hypotheses as theoretically meaningful, and failing to consider the likelihood of Type II errors Although these mistakes have been discussed repeatedly for decades, there is no evidence that the academic discussion has had an impact A group of methodologists is proposing a new approach simply ban significance tests in psychology journals The impact of a similar ban in public-health and epidemiology journals is reported     

DO PEOPLE REALLY ADAPT TO MARRIAGE?

Although cross-sectional studies have shown a reliable association between marital status and subjective well-being, a recent longitudinal study [Lucas et al. 2003, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 84(3), pp.␣527–539] found no support for the idea that happiness increases after marriage. Instead, participants who got married reported short-term increases followed by complete adaptation back to baseline levels of well-being. However, researchers have criticized this study on two grounds. First, these results contradict cohort-based analyses from a nationally representative sample. Second, these analyses do not control for pre-marriage cohabitation, which could potentially inflate baseline levels of well-being. The original data (plus four additional waves) are reanalyzed to address these concerns. Results confirm that individuals do not get a lasting boost in life satisfaction following marriage.The data used in this paper were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). This research was supported by a grant from the Anthony Marchionne Foundation.     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

LARGE-GROUP IDENTITY,WHO ARE WE NOW? LEADER–FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIPS AND SOCIETAL–POLITICAL DIVISIONS

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This paper aims to explore severe societal–political divisions and interferences with democratic processes and human rights issues in many locations...     

SHOULD A CHRISTIAN ADOPT METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM?

It has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism (MN), a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian practice of this method, arguing that a Christian's practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences (instead of MN), with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of MN can be particularly problematic for Christianity.     

SHOULD INSTITUTIONS PRIORITIZE RECTIFICATION OVER AID?

Should an institutional scheme prioritize the rectification or compensation of harms it has wrongfully caused over provision of aid to persons it has not harmed? Some who think so rely on an analogy with the view that persons should give higher priority to rectification than to aid. Inference from the personal view to the institutional view would be warranted if either (i) the correct moral principles for institutional assessment are nearest possible equivalents of the correct personal moral principles, or (ii) the moral principles which ground the personal view also ground the institutional view. Neither claim can be justified. I briefly assess some alternative ways of defending the view that institutions should prioritize rectification over aid.     

WHO IS HAPPY?

A flood of new studies explores people's subjective well-being (SWB) Frequent positive affect, infrequent negative affect and a global sense of satisfaction with life define high SWB These studies reveal that happiness and life satisfaction are similarly available to the young and the old, women and men, blacks and whites, the rich and the working-class. Better clues to well-being come from knowing about a person's traits, close relationships, work experiences, culture, and religiosity. We present the elements of an appraisal-based theory of happiness that recognizes the importance of adaptation, cultural world view, and personal goals     

WHY SHOULD IDEAL REASONERS BECOME EVIL COMPUTERS?

In his article on ‘Technophobic themes in pre-1990 computer films’, Anton Karl Kozlovic provides an insightful analysis of the theme of ‘evil computers’ in many popular culture films (Kozlovic, 2003). Kozlovic’s focus is on finding the broad, negative categories such as ‘humanity’s rivals’ and ‘humanity’s dominators’ which reappear throughout computer films (p. 4). Kozlovic urges science educators to become aware of the history of these negative pop culture images and engage in ‘consciousness raising activities’ with the aim of correcting fictional excesses and perhaps influencing future depictions of computers in a more positive, engaging direction. Interestingly enough, Kozlovic points out that despite the very negative and unflattering portrayal of robotics and AI, computer films are nevertheless ‘enthusiastically enjoyed by real world professionals in the computer, robotics, and AI fields...’ and cites several sources to document this point (p. 3). Kozlovic says that for these professionals the film is a form of ‘waking dream fueling the desire for the power of imagination and the act of construction’ (p. 3).