Do You See What I See? Patient and Clinician Perceptions of Underlying Dimensions of Suicidality

The clinical suicidology literature strongly emphasizes the importance of risk assessment. However, limited empirical data are available about the assessment process. The present study investigated the ways in which clinicians and patients perceive several theoretical dimensions related to suicide: psychological pain, external pressures/stressors, agitation/emotional upsetness, self-regard, and hopelessness. Data from the current sample suggest that clinicians and parasuicidal patients independently perceived most of these dimensions similarly, with the exception of agitation/emotional upsetness (perturbation). The implications of these findings are discussed.     

See the devil and tame him

Born in 1921, professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw and art theory in the Polish Academy of Sciences; has published twelve books and more than three hundred articles (bibliography in volume 14 of A. Mercier (ed.).Philosophers on Their Own Work. Bern: 1990) ranging over the history of aesthetics, Marxist and Soviet aesthetics, and issues related to the status of the arts in contemporary Western culture.     

On What We See

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).     

As Others See Us

ABSTRACT— Discrepancies are often found between self-reports and reports by others regarding psychopathology. Both the person being assessed and various informants may contribute crucial data concerning a person's functioning. Comprehensive assessment requires data from multiple informants. Such data can be easily obtained with parallel self-report and collateral-report forms. The multi-informant data can be compared, aggregated, and used in many ways. Optimal use of multi-source data is essential for clinical assessment and for discovering causes and cures of psychopathology.     

To See or Not to See: Blinded by Guilt: Reply to Commentary

In response to Annabella Bushra's discussion and her focus on what is missing in the clinical material, the author speculates about the repetition of the historical trauma of purifying mixed race in the face of its complexity—trying to neatly package race despite it not so neatly fitting into any one category—and losing the individual by overly focusing on skin color. The author considers the silence, secrecy, and transgression in the treatment and, in this context, a few of Bushra's key points are addressed—sorting out the nature of hate in relation to Susan, passing as transgression, and White guilt. A distinction is made between a malevolent, destructive hate and a loving hate, and White guilt is considered as a defense against recognition of the other.     

We See in the Dark

Do we need light to see? I argue that the black experience of a man in a perfectly dark cave is a representation of an absence of light, not an absence of representation. There is certainly a difference between his perceptual knowledge and that of his blind companion. Only the sighted man can tell whether the cave is dark just by looking. But perhaps he is merely inferring darkness from his failure to see. To get an unambiguous answer, I switch the focus from perceptual knowledge to non‐epistemic seeing. My conclusion is that we see even in the limiting case of absolute darkness – regardless of whether we believe we are seeing. We see little of pratical interest. But in terms of basic information, we see about as much as we do when the lights are on. Depending on what has gone before and after, we may even see ordinary objects.     

On Whether we Can See Intentions

Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.