Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Experimental Studies of Children's Learning

This article compares John Dewey's theory of inquiry with Jean Piaget's analysis of the mechanisms implied in the increase of knowledge. The sources for this paper are Dewey's studies on logic and the theory of inquiry and Piaget's historical-critical and psychogenetic investigations. Three major conclusions result from the comparison: first, there are significant convergences between the two theories; second, Piaget's developmental analysis makes explicit what is programmatic in Dewey's investigations; and, finally, Piaget is incorrect in characterizing Dewey's pragmatism as a method that does not meet the criteria of intelligent activity.     

From qualitative differences to a continuum of development: commentary on Leslie Smith's epistemological principles for developmental psychology

In his article Epistemological principles for developmental psychology Leslie Smith helps to re-open some of the key issues Piaget explored through his genetic epistemology. Smith shows the important parallels between logician Gottlieb Frege's understanding of rational thought, and the way in which Piaget developed such notions in his own theory. But while Frege's theory helps set the parameters for whether thought can be judged as rational, or if it even should be judged as rational, it also shows the logicians' disdain for exploring anything resembling development of rationality. Thus Frege might have an important, but necessarily mediated impact on the field of human development. Piaget's carefully crafted theory of epistemological development potentially serves as such a mediating device. It can be argued that Piaget crafted together arguments of logicians such as Frege, and epistemologists such as Lévy-Bruhl, to develop his extraordinary achievement of a genetic epistemology that leads to an understanding of the human condition. One of Piaget's accomplishments was to develop a continuum out of the logicians' dichotomy between non-logical and logical in which the non-rational flows into the rational.     

Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: a coherentist approach

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

Epistemic needs and learned helplessness

This study assesses the impact of non-specific epistemic needs—the need for structure and the fear of invalidity—on expectancy of control and performance following unsolvable problems. Subjects answered a questionnaire tapping their non-specific epistemic needs and were exposed to either no feedback or failure in unsolvable problems. Then their expectancies of control and performance were assessed. The results showed that a high need for structure was associated with a transfer of the expectancy of uncontrollability and worse performance following failure. The results are discussed in terms of Kruglanski's lay epistemic theory.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs

Recent rejections of epistemic consequentialism, like those from Firth, Jenkins, Berker, and Greaves, have argued that consequentialism is committed to objectionable trade-offs and suggest that consequentialism's propensity for trade-offs hints at a larger problem. Here I argue that sanctioning trade-offs isn't a fault of a theory of epistemic normativity, because there are permissible epistemic trade-offs. I give examples of permissible epistemic trade-offs in pedagogy, in changes of worldview, and in indirect epistemic decisions. I also show that views that sanction trade-offs have an easier time than their rivals in explaining both why we ought to be open-minded and how arguments with suppositions get their argumentative force. These considerations don't eliminate the consequentialist's burden to respond to the objectionable cases, but they do undermine the idea that no correct theory of epistemic normativity properly sanctions trade-offs.     

Rethinking Epistemic Relativism

“Relativism” is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing—they have features that might be tempting if they weren't thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. The aim of this paper is to rethink both our attitude to epistemic relativism and the basic features of the view itself. The paper discusses four objections and uses them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. It then sketches out a view that meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, socially informed picture of justification that accounts for the many different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its appealing benefits without incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views.     

New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals

Recent debate over the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals has focused on intuitions about cross-contextual truth-value assessments. In this paper, we advocate a different approach to evaluating theories of epistemic modals. Our strategy focuses on judgments of the incompatibility of two different epistemic possibility claims, or two different truth value assessments of a single epistemic possibility claim. We subject the predictions of existing theories to empirical scrutiny, and argue that existing contextualist and relativist theories are unable to account for the full pattern of observed judgments. As a way of illustrating the theoretical upshot of these results, we conclude by developing a novel theory of epistemic modals that is able to predict the results.     

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non‐epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*

Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This approach has undeniable attractions. But examining different versions of the approach uncovers problems. The problems help reveal why epistemic rationality is an indispensable part of understanding rationality—not only of beliefs, but of actions. We may or may not end up wanting to make a place, in our theories of epistemic rationality, for factors such as the practical or moral consequences of having beliefs. But a purely pragmatic notion of rationality—one that’s stripped of any component of distinctively epistemic evaluation—cannot do all the work that we need done.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it.

     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

The Frequency with which a Group of Unselected College Students Experience Colored Dreaming and Colored Hearing

The principal aim of this report has been to clear the air with regard to number development theory and research. We began with a brief overview of the status of the number concept in pure mathematics and psychology. It was argued that although there are clear methological differences between pure mathematical and psychological approaches to the study of number, the two approaches are substantively complementary. Both are attempts to found the number concept on underlying psychological processes.

Three influential mathematical theories of number and three metamathematical criteria by which such theories are judged (consistency, completeness, categoricalness) then were summarized. The first theory, originally proposed by Peano (30) and von Neumann (49), postulates that the number concept may be reduced to a wholistic property of the natural numbers: viz., their inherent ordering. It was found that Peano-von Neumann's ordinal theory allows one to construct natural numbers without contradiction (consistency) and to construct all the natural numbers (completeness). However, the ordinal theory is not only a theory of number; it is a theory of all ordered progressions. The second theory, originally proposed by Russell (39, 40, 41, 42, 51, 52) and Frege (15), postulates that the number concept may be reduced to an atomistic property of the natural numbers: viz., the fact that each natural number is a class which includes all classes containing a particular number of elements. It was found that Russell-Frege's class theory does not allow one either to construct natural numbers without contradiction (inconsistency) or to construct all the natural numbers (incompleteness). The third theory, originally proposed by Piaget (31, 32), is a combination of the Peano-von Neumann and Russell-Frege theories; i.e., it founds number simultaneously on the wholistic property of order and the atomistic property of class. Piaget's theory was found to be contradictory (inconsistent) and to contain a superfluous undefined concept. A comparative analysis of the three theories revealed that although none of them is universally accepted as an ultimate theory of number, Peano-von Neumann's ordinal theory is by far the most satisfactory of the three by metamathematical criteria.

Each of the mathematical theories of number was translated into a cognitive developmental theory by substituting “developmental priority” of “mathematical priority.” The first theory postulated that children's number concepts derive from a prior understanding of the quantification of ordinal relations (ordination). The second theory postulated that children's number concepts derive from a prior understanding of the quantification of classes (cardination). The third theory postulated that children's number concepts derive from a prior understanding of both ordination and cardination. Published research which pertains to the postulates of each of these theories was reviewed (2, 8, 9, 10, 23, 33, 45, 46). Because of incomplete data analyses and poor operational definitions, it was concluded that the existing evidence does not clearly support any of the three theories.

Behavioral methods of assessing ordination, cardination, and natural number competence in children's thinking then were constructed. Care was taken to insure that each behavioral test was the most obvious counterpart of the mathematical definition of the notion that the test was designed to measure. It was argued in this regard that scrupulously precise operational definitions—as opposed to the loose operational definitions that characterize Piaget's (33) original studies of number development—are essential if we hope to decide which of the competing theories of number development is the most tenable. Two developmental studies were reported. In the first study, there were three principal findings: (a) Ordination was found to emerge in three stages (no ordering, spatial ordering, ordination). (b) Cardination was found to emerge in three stages (no correspondence, one-to-many and many-to-one correspondence, one-to-one correspondence). (c) Ordination was found to emerge long before cardination. In the second study, there were three principal findings: (a) The major findings of the first study were replicated. (b) Ordination was found to emerge prior to natural number competence. (c) Cardination was not found to emerge prior to natural number competence. It was concluded that the theory of number development which corresponds to the most satisfactory of the three mathematical theories—namely, the ordinal theory—is consistently supported by the developmental findings.

Possible explanations of the cognitive-developmental sequences reported in the two studies were considered. It was suggested that Flavell's (14) notion of item structure probably accounts for all the sequences. Flavell's notion of item structure specifies that a developmental sequence of the form X₁ → X₂ obtains between two cognitive items when the use of X₂ logically presupposes the use of X₁. It was argued in this regard that the sequences reported in the two studies each reflect logical relationships mentioned in the earlier review of mathematical number theories. Finally, the epistemological question of why such a close relationship exists between logical priorities and cognitive-developmental sequences was considered. It was concluded that there must be at least some structural isomorphism between the domains of cognition and pure mathematics.     

Updating the Baldwin effect : The biological levels behind Piaget's new theory

In 1964, Conrad Waddington (1905–1975) presented a paper in Geneva that led to an internal reassessment of the biological underpinnings of Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) theory. This in turn resulted in an overhaul of the theoretical framework upon which his stage theory of child development had been based, including his appeals to James Mark Baldwin's (1861–1934) “circular reaction.” In addition to leading to the emergence of what has elsewhere been called “Piaget's new theory,” this renovation also resulted in the update of the famous “Baldwin Effect.” Because aspects of the subsequent framework are of contemporary significance, this essay will review some of the work leading up to those updates. In reaching behind the translations to trace the sources of the arguments to which Piaget appealed, the resulting examination fills some of the gaps found in the secondary literature without quibbling over the “correct” English interpretation of translated French terms. We also go beyond how Piaget's writings have been understood in English and extract some useful additional ideas from his sources, including how to conceive of the social context in which development takes place. We see as a result how Waddington and his colleagues, including Paul Weiss (1898–1989), provided a constructive “existence proof” for the formal hierarchy of levels that Piaget had come to by other means.     

Harré on Piaget's Sociological Studies

Piaget's Sociological Studies is largely taken up with questions of sociology, epistemology, moral, political and legal theory. Roughly, these are by-passed in Harré's (2000, this journal) interpretation of Piaget's social account. Our critique is in two parts. In the first part, we explain the basis of our disagreement with Harré's interpretation of six specific issues. These are Piaget's model of social exchange, sociology, concept of egocentrism, response to Wallon, psycho-social parallelism, distinction between the concrete and the abstract. In the second part, we challenge two central theses invoked in Harré's review, namely (A) all psychological activity is a joint activity, and (B) any society is based on irreducible differences in psychological activity. We have tried to set the record straight as far as Piaget's social account is concerned. Harré's review shows a general lack of acquaintance with Piaget's account and our aim has been to compensate for this.