DO THE BSRI AND PAQ MEASURE THE SAME OR DIFFERENT CONCEPTS?

The present article assesses Frable's (1989) contention that the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) measures only desirable instrumental and expressive characteristics, whereas the Bem Sex Role inventory (BSRI) measures gender schema and related gender concepts. Comparison of the two instruments indicates, first, that they are similar in content and that the parallel M and F scales are substantially correlated. Further, the results obtained with the two instruments in three areas (self-esteem, sex-role attitudes, and gender-schematic processing) suggest that both are valid measures of desirable instrumental and expressive traits. Sexrole attitudes, however, tend to have small and typically nonsignificant relationships with both sets of scales, whereas few studies of gender schematic processing have produced replicable results even with the BSRI. However, Bem and her associates have reported positive results using other designs that have yet to be replicated using either the BSRI or the PAQ. Thus, in response to Frable's (1989) assertion, it seems at best premature to come to any conclusion about whether one, both, or neither of the questionnaires measure broad gender constructs.     

DO PEOPLE MAKE THE PLACE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ATTRACTION-SELECTION-ATTRITION HYPOTHESIS

This study tests the hypotheses that (1) congruence between internal need states and external environments drives the organizational-choice process and (2) those attracted to particular organizations are more homogeneous than the applicant pool in general. Subjects were evaluated on 14 needs using the Jackson Personality Research Form. They then viewed two video-taped segments of simulated campus interviews to gain information about two distinct types of organizational reward systems. The interview segments entered the discussion in progress to avoid any reference to a particular job that might introduce an occupational confound. Subjects received job offers from both organizations and were asked to indicate which of the two organizations they found more attractive by accepting one of the offers. Analysis of variance results indicated only weak support for the congruency hypothesis. Differences were observed in nAch between the groups of subjects attracted to each organization. No differences were found for any of the other need strength measures. This suggests that the subjects attracted to the different organizations were substantially similar. Hierarchial factor analysis of the PRF has suggested a six-factor structure that appears consistent with the second-order factors from other respectable personality measures. This suggests that the second-order solution may be a parsimonious mapping of the personality domain and may therefore be more relevant in testing these hypotheses. The analysis was repeated using these dimensions. The results suggest that work force homogeneity may be more complex than originally considered. Implications for the homogeneity hypothesis are discussed, and suggestions for further study of this concept are offered.     

WHY DO ASSESSMENT CENTERS WORK? THE PUZZLE OF ASSESSMENT CENTER VALIDITY

The finding that assessment centers are successful in making valid predictions of managerial success is well established in the literature. Unfortunately, it is not clearly understood why assessment centers work. For example, construct validity of assessment center dimensions is rarely obtained. In this paper we affirm the evidence for predictive validity of assessment centers and conclude that assessment centers can work for a variety of purposes and in numerous contexts. But we also assert that we do not know why they work. The bulk of the paper goes on to raise possible explanations for the predictive validity observed in assessment centers and raises implications for practice and guidance of future research.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
     

WORLDS OR WORDS APART? WITTGENSTEIN ON UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

In this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible – either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a ‘doctrineless’ form of life. I offer a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the ‘content’ from religious belief and renders the religious form of life ‘incommensurable’ with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.     

DO CONDITIONAL REINFORCERS COUNT?

Six pigeons were trained on a procedure in which seven components arranged different food-delivery ratios on concurrent variable-interval schedules each session. The components were unsignaled, lasted for 10 food deliveries, and occurred in random order with a 60-s blackout between components. The schedules were arranged using a switching-key procedure in which two responses on a center key changed the schedules and associated stimuli on two side keys. In Experiment 1, over five conditions, an increasing proportion of food deliveries accompanied by a magazine light was replaced with the presentation of the magazine light only. Local analyses of preference showed preference pulses toward the alternative that had just produced either a food-plus-magazine-light or magazine-light-only presentation, but pulses after food deliveries were always greater than those after magazine lights. Increasing proportions of magazine lights did not change the size of preference pulses after food or magazine-light presentations. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of correlations between food ratios and magazine-light ratios: In Condition 6, magazine-light ratios in components were inversely correlated (-1.0) with food ratios, and in Condition 7, magazine-light ratios were uncorrelated with food ratios. In Conditions 8 and 9, pecks also produced occasional 2.5-s flashes of a green keylight. In Condition 8, food and magazine-light ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and green-key ratios were correlated -1.0. In Condition 9, food and green-key ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and magazine-light ratios were correlated -1.0. Preference pulses toward alternatives after magazine lights and green keys depended on the correlation between these event ratios and the food ratios: If the ratios were correlated +1.0, positive preference pulses resulted; if the correlation was -1.0, preference pulses were negative. These results suggest that the Law of Effect has more to do with events signaling consequences than with strengthening responses.     

DO FEMINIST IDENTITY STYLES MODERATE THE RELATION BETWEEN PERCEIVED SEXIST EVENTS AND DISORDERED EATING?

Feminist consciousness is theorized to be a powerful resource against the detrimental effects of sexism. The present study examined whether feminist identity styles moderated the relation of perceived lifetime and recent sexist events to disordered eating for 256 college women. Using hierarchical moderated regression, we found two styles of feminist identity (i.e., synthesis and active commitment) buffered the relation between perceived sexist events and disordered eating; the three remaining styles of feminist identity did not moderate this relationship. For women low on synthesis and active commitment, both perceived lifetime and recent sexist events positively predicted disordered eating. In contrast, for women high on synthesis and active commitment, neither perceived lifetime nor recent sexist events predicted disordered eating. Our results substantiate extant theory that sexist events contribute more to the psychological distress of nonfeminist women than of feminist women.     

HOW WELL DO JURORS REASON?

Significant individual variation IS observed m how people reason as jurors At the saUsficing end of a continuum we identify, the juror draws on evi-dence selectively to construct a single story of what happened, with no acknowledgment of discrepant evidence or alternative possibilities A contrasting theory-evidence coordination mode of processing entails construction of multiple theories (story-verdict constellations)that are evaluated against the evidence and against alternatives Individual differences Influence task outcome, the satisficing mode being associated with more extreme verdict choices and very high certainty     

DO ELEPHANTS EVER FORGET?1

Three adult female elephants (Elephas maximus) were tested on a light-dark discrimination problem with an 8-yr intertrial interval. The first subject took only 6 min to reach criterion and made only two errors, suggesting remarkable retention. The other two subjects were found to have visual anomalies that would have gone undetected without this research.     

WHY “DO NO HARM”?

Edmund Pellegrino has argued that the dramatic changes in American health care call for critical reflection on the traditional norms governing the therapeutic relationship. This paper offers such reflection on the obligation to “do no harm.” Drawing on work by Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, I argue that the libertarian model of medical ethics offered by Engelhardt cannot adequately sustain an obligation to “do no harm.” Because the obligation to “do no harm” is not based simply on a negative duty of nonmaleficence but also on a positive duty of beneficence, I argue that it is best understood to derive from the fiduciary nature of the healing relationship.     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

DO PEOPLE REALLY ADAPT TO MARRIAGE?

Although cross-sectional studies have shown a reliable association between marital status and subjective well-being, a recent longitudinal study [Lucas et al. 2003, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 84(3), pp.␣527–539] found no support for the idea that happiness increases after marriage. Instead, participants who got married reported short-term increases followed by complete adaptation back to baseline levels of well-being. However, researchers have criticized this study on two grounds. First, these results contradict cohort-based analyses from a nationally representative sample. Second, these analyses do not control for pre-marriage cohabitation, which could potentially inflate baseline levels of well-being. The original data (plus four additional waves) are reanalyzed to address these concerns. Results confirm that individuals do not get a lasting boost in life satisfaction following marriage.The data used in this paper were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). This research was supported by a grant from the Anthony Marchionne Foundation.