Anticipations of Effort and Accuracy in Multiattribute Choice

Research on multiattribute choice strategies suggests that decision makers adapt to variations in task features by switching decision strategies. One perspective is that strategy selection is determined by a trade-off between the goals of minimizing effort and maximizing accuracy. However, since strategy selection is based on anticipated effort and accuracy, empirical evidence is needed on the nature of these anticipations. An experiment examines how well decision makers anticipate the influence of two particular task features, information display organization and number of alternatives, on effort and accuracy. Subjects chose the best alternative from sets of loan applications described by six relevant attributes. Prior to each choice, they prospectively judged the effort required and the accuracy that would result. Results suggest that anticipated consequences deviate substantially from experienced consequences for both effort and accuracy. Neither task experience nor explicit feedback brought anticipations and experiences closer together. These findings underscore the importance of anticipation judgments in multiattribute choice.     

INFORMATION DISPLAYS AND DECISION PROCESSES

Information displays influence decision processes by facilitating some decision strategies while hindering others. Component characteristics of displays, such as the form, organization, and sequence of information, influence decision processes through an adaptive mechanism whereby a decision maker balances the desire to maximize accuracy against the desire to minimize effort. Variations in the information display lead to changes in the anticipated effort and anticipated accuracy of each available strategy and, therefore, provide an incentive for decision makers to use different decision processes. Research in this area can provide guidance regarding the use of displays and other decision-aiding approaches.     

Factors influencing the use of internal summary evaluations versus external information in choice

Decision makers cope with more demanding tasks by shifting their cognitive strategies, balancing effort expenditure against the desire to produce an accurate response. In choice tasks, one method for reducing effort while simultaneously maintaining accuracy is to shift from a reliance on information obtained from the external environment to that retrieved from memory, particularly summary evaluations (i.e. relatively stable evaluative reactions to the overall attractiveness of individual alternatives) acquired from previous decision-making experience. We examined four factors that should all encourage decision makers to rely to some extent on internal summary evaluations rather than external information search: (1) increased external search costs, (2) greater time pressure, (3) increased incentives to make an accurate choice, and (4) increased levels of prior experience with the choice context. Sixty experimental subjects chose their preferred alternative from a set of women's magazines. Decision processes were inferred from verbal protocols, computer-generated search records, and decision times. Only increased external search costs led to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. Although increased time pressure, increased incentives, and increased experience with the context did lead to changes in search and evaluation processes, contrary to initial expectations decision makers did not shift to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. These results suggest that while decision makers do sometimes use summary evaluations as a substitute for external search, this is only one of several mechanisms available for effort reduction. Understanding when and where decision makers rely upon summary evaluations probably requires a broader conceptualization of knowledge structures, particularly a consideration of the knowledge that decision makers possess about different choice strategies and their effectiveness.     

The effects of predictive ability information,locus of control,and decision maker involvement on decision aid reliance

This study examines several factors that influence decision makers' willingness to rely on mechanical decision aids. The first experiment examined the effects of predictive ability information and locus of control on decision aid reliance. The results indicate that decision makers were more likely to rely on a decision aid when its predictive validity was not disclosed. Further, decision makers with an external locus of control relied more on the decision aid than those with an internal locus of control. The second experiment expanded upon this result to examine the interactive effects of decision maker involvement and locus of control. The results suggest that involving decision makers in the aid's development enhanced reliance. However, decision makers with an internal locus of control were more strongly influenced by this form of involvement (in terms of increasing their reliance on the decision aid) than decision makers with an external locus of control. Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No decision‐maker is an Island: integrating expert advice with information acquisition

The present research examined the social context of information acquisition. The main purpose was to examine how decision‐makers' information acquisition processes changed when they were provided access to expert advice. Results indicated that all decision‐makers opted to acquire advice; however, they typically did so only after completing over 75% of their own information search. Decision‐makers agreed more with the advice as task complexity increased, but, in general, searched information in two stages—i.e., a pre‐advice “hypothesis generation” stage and a post‐advice “hypothesis testing” stage. To behave in an adaptive manner, decision‐makers could have used expert advice either to increase their decision accuracy or to reduce their effort expenditure (or both); they chose the former. Implications and further extensions are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The majority rule in individual decision making

This research investigates an understudied decision heuristic, the majority rule. By using the rule, decision makers choose the option superior on most of the available cues. Cues are broadly defined, including advisors and attributes. We propose that decision makers are more likely to use the majority rule when encouraged to employ intra-cue comparison as opposed to intra-option integration, and that their choices are influenced by factors that influence which option appears majority superior. We corroborate the two propositions in four studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we explore two factors that moderate use of the majority rule through facilitating intra-cue comparison or intra-option integration—response mode and information display format. In Studies 3 and 4, we explore two factors that influence choice through influencing which option appears majority-superior—cue-unpacking and cue-regrouping.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

直觉和分析在不同信息获取与呈现方式下对多特征目标判断质量的影响

采用多特征目标判断任务,考察了不同信息获取方式与信息呈现方式条件下,直觉和分析思维模式对判断质量的影响。结果发现：（1）在多特征目标判断任务中,直觉思维比分析思维更有效;（2）直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量比感觉型决策者更高;（3）归类组块的信息呈现方式能够有效提升决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量;（4）思维模式、信息获取方式与信息呈现方式对多特征目标的判断质量存在三阶交互作用,归类组块的信息呈现方式使直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量最高,而运用分析思维的判断质量低于感觉型决策者;归类组块排列信息时,直觉型决策者运用分析思维的判断质量低于信息随机排列时的水平。     

The Influence of Decision Aids on Choice Strategies: An Experimental Analysis of the Role of Cognitive Effort

This paper examines the role of computer-based decision aids in reducing cognitive effort and therefore influencing strategy selection. It extends and complements the works reported in the behavioral decision theory literature on the role of effort and accuracy in choice tasks. The central proposition of this paper is that specific features can be incorporated within a set of decision aids that will alter the effort required to implement a particular choice strategy relative to other strategies, and that this will influence strategy selection by the decision maker. In a laboratory experiment, using a repeated measures design, 48 subjects performed a preferential choice task using different decision aids. Subjects were given different levels of support to reduce the cognitive effort associated with different preferential choice strategies. In particular, the decision aids provided varying levels of support for the processing associated with either elimination by aspects or additive difference strategies. The study examined how information processing strategies were influenced by the decision aids. The results show that decision aids which reduce the effort associated with the elimination by aspects strategy induce behaviors associated with elimination by aspects. More importantly, there was an interaction effect caused by the distinct behavior of the group which was provided support for additive difference but not for elimination by aspects. This group processed the information about available choices in a way that is consistent with an additive difference strategy. These findings indicate that a decision aid can induce additive processing by altering the relative effort requirements of different choice strategies.     

Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making

Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

The Effects of Alternative Labels on Decision Behavior: The Case of Corporate Site Selection Decisions

The influence of alternative labels on decision processes and outcomes were examined in a multidimensional decision task with realistic decision information and experienced decision makers. Based on prior research, it was predicted that labels would influence selection and ratings of decision alternatives, as well as the extent of information search and the information search strategies. Subjects (n = 26) experienced in making and/or aiding business relocation decisions completed two computer controlled site selection tasks: one with labeled locations and one with unlabeled locations. Results indicated that labeling influenced both decision processes and location ratings. An interaction between order of task completion and labeling suggested that labeling effects on decision making may be minimized if an unlabeled task is completed prior to a labeled task. Implications and limitations are discussed in terms of labeling effects and decision quality.     

Imperfect Information in Pre-choice Screening of Options

Three experiments examined decision makers′ use of imperfect information in screening of decision options. It was found that: (1) when specific information about options was missing the absence was treated as a violation of the related decision criterion in the manner described by image theory (Beach, 1990; Beach & Mitchell, 1987) - rejection of options was a function of both the number of violations and the amount of missing information; (2) general paucity of information about options prompted rejection over and above the effects of violations, but paucity had about half the impact of violations or of missing information; (3) information about the probability that an option′s outcomes actually will occur were it the final choice was integrated additively with other information in screening, as predicted by image theory, and was integrated multiplicatively with other information in choice, as predicted by expected utility theory. Together with the results of previous research, these results support the image theory view of decision making as a two-stage process, screening followed by choice, and demonstrate once again the pivotal role of screening in this process.     

Decision Making under Strict Uncertainty: An Experimental Test of Competitive Criteria

In decisions under strict uncertainty individual decision makers have to choose one of a finite number of alternatives with complete information about their outcomes but in the absence of any information about the probabilities of the various states of nature. We report two experiments with multiple decision tasks in which subjects were instructed to rank the alternatives (Experiment 1), or choose the best one (Experiment 2). We test the major decision rules (criteria) which have been proposed for this case in the normative literature with special attention on Hurwicz′s "optimism-pessimism" criterion which is the only one that can accommodate individual differences. Although none of the criteria can account for the results of the majority of the subjects, choices made by a sizable minority of the subjects′ are consistent with Hurwicz′s model. There is no evidence for a systematic relationship between the model′s single "optimism-pessimism" parameter (inferred form choices) and, independently derived, individual measures of optimism (obtained from responses to personality scales). We conclude with a discussion of the difficulty of experimentally implementing strict uncertainty.     

Cueing and Cognitive Conflict in Judge-Advisor Decision Making

The Judge-Advisor paradigm (Sniezek & Buckley, 1989) allows for the study of decision making by groups with differentiated roles. This paper reports a study using this approach to investigate the impact of advice vis-à-vis the judge′s own initial choice. Teams consisting of one judge and two advisors (business students randomly assigned to these roles) were given a choice task (concerning business events) composed of 70 items with two alternatives each. The judges provided final team choices and confidence assessments under one of three conditions: Dependent (judge has no basis for own choice), Cued (judge chooses only after being advised), or Independent (judges makes own tentative choice prior to being advised as well as subsequent final choice). Results showed that this manipulation affected the judge′s final choice accuracy and confidence, leading to the best performance by Independent judges and the poorest by Dependent judges. These data are discussed with respect to theory and data on the cueing effect (Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 1990) for individual choice. In addition, the effects on the decision making process of the judge from (a) advisors′ confidence and (b) conflict between advisors′ recommendations are examined in detail. Finally, issues concerning the potential contribution of the Judge-Advisor paradigm to the understanding of social decision making are addressed.     

Effect of individual thinking styles on item selection during study time allocation

The influence of individual differences on learners' study time allocation has been emphasised in recent studies; however, little is known about the role of individual thinking styles (analytical versus intuitive). In the present study, we explored the influence of individual thinking styles on learners' application of agenda‐based and habitual processes when selecting the first item during a study‐time allocation task. A 3‐item cognitive reflection test (CRT) was used to determine individuals' degree of cognitive reliance on intuitive versus analytical cognitive processing. Significant correlations between CRT scores and the choices of first item selection were observed in both Experiment 1a (study time was 5 seconds per triplet) and Experiment 1b (study time was 20 seconds per triplet). Furthermore, analytical decision makers constructed a value‐based agenda (prioritised high‐reward items), whereas intuitive decision makers relied more upon habitual responding (selected items from the leftmost of the array). The findings of Experiment 1a were replicated in Experiment 2 notwithstanding ruling out the possible effects from individual intelligence and working memory capacity. Overall, the individual thinking style plays an important role on learners' study time allocation and the predictive ability of CRT is reliable in learners' item selection strategy.     

Signed Orders, Choice Probabilities, and Linear Polytopes

Self-reflecting signed orders were proposed as an aid in estimating preference between subsets of items on the basis of limited information. The data of a signed order are preference comparisons that consider the desirability of excluding items from a subset as well as including items in a subset. This paper investigates signed orders within the setting of probabilistic choice and random utility theory. It focuses on linear signed order polytopes and their relationship to binary choice probabilities. The theory applies both to individual choice behavior and to group decision making. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.