Depression and processing information about others

We investigated differences between mildly depressed subjects and normal controls in their memory for, and judgments of, another person. All subjects read a story (containing either predominately positive or predominately negative items) under instructions to form an impression of the story target. Subjects later made several judgments about the target and attempted to recall the story. For both the positive and the negative story, depressed subjects produced significantly more negative intrusions (i.e., recalled nonpresented negative items) than did the normal subjects, but they did not recall more negative items correctly than did the normal subjects. Depressed subjects also perceived themselves as more similar to the negative story target than did the normal controls and indicated greater liking for the negative story target than did the normal controls.     

Guilt in response to blame from others

In three studies, participants rated appraisals and emotions experienced when someone else blamed them for something that was not their fault. Several participants spontaneously reported experiencing guilt in each study. Using event-contingent diaries, Study 1 found only weak correlations between rated self-blame and reported guilt when participants were blamed unreasonably. Using directed retrospective recall, Studies 2 and 3 found that guilt was higher in blamed than unblamed conditions when self-blame was low, and that the desire to apologise remained a significant predictor of guilt after controlling for all relevant appraisal dimensions. Taken together, these findings suggest that self-blame-related appraisals are not necessary conditions for the experience of guilt, and support an interpersonal analysis that sees this emotion as a strategy for repairing relationships after perceived (but not always genuine) slights.     

Depression and pessimism for the future: biased use of statistically relevant information in predictions for self versus others

The cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of pessimism about the future in the etiology and maintenance of depression. The present research was designed for two reasons: to provide a clear demonstration that depressed individuals' predictions of the likelihood of future outcomes are more pessimistic than those of nondepressed individuals given identical information with which to make forecasts and identical conditions for forecasting, and to test two additional hypotheses regarding possible mechanisms underlying depressives' relative pessimism in forecasting: a social-comparison and a differential attributional-style hypothesis. We used a modification of the cue-use paradigm developed by Ajzen (1977, Experiment 1) and examined depressed and nondepressed people's predictions of the likelihood of future positive and negative outcomes for themselves and for others. The results provided strong support for pessimism on the part of depressed individuals relative to nondepressed individuals in forecasts for both self and others. In addition, whereas nondepressives exhibited a self-enhancing bias in which they overestimated their probability of success and underestimated their probability of failure relative to that of similar others, depressives did not succumb to either positive or negative social comparison biases in prediction. Finally, in line with the attributional-style hypothesis, depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects' cue-use patterns were obtained, especially in forecasts for self. The findings are discussed with respect to the mechanisms underlying predictive optimism and pessimism and the possible functions and implications of these predictive biases.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

Self-concept and attraction for similar and dissimilar others.

The present study investigated the role of self-concept as a moderator of the similarity-attraction relationship described by Byrne. Subjects conducted face-to-face interviews with confederates who played roles as job applicants. Similarity-dissimilarity was manipulated by the confederate roles as well as by the information given the subjects in accordance with the procedures described by Byrne. The hypothesis was tested and confirmed that persons with favorable self-concepts would be more attracted to others with similar attitudes than to others with dissimilar attitudes. Persons with negative self-concepts did not show a preference for similar others. It was suggested that earlier studies in this area suffered from methodological flaws and did not constitute an adequate test of the hypothesis. Suggestions for future work in the area were given.     

Kantian constructivism and the authority of others

I argue that Christine Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism cannot accommodate our obligations to others. Because she holds that all of our obligations are grounded in our obligating ourselves, she is committed to the view that our obligations to others are grounded in corresponding obligations to ourselves. Yet this conclusion is objectionable on substantive moral grounds. The problem is that she embraces an egocentric conception of authority, on which we originally have the authority to obligate ourselves whereas others only have the authority to obligate us because we grant it to them. The solution is to adopt a more thoroughly social conception of authority and autonomy.     

The Beck Depression Inventory: item order and the impact of response sets

The lack of subtle content in the item groups of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the consistency in the ordering of the items from least to most pathological make this instrument unduly susceptible to either defensive or malingering response sets. Two experimental forms were developed for the BDI: a backwards version (a simple reversal of the order of items within each group) and a random-order version. These forms, together with the original item order, were given to college undergraduate women along with the Depression scale from the MMPI and the Burks-Martin Questionnaire covering recent life changes and current stressful situations. The random order BDI results in a significantly higher depression score than did either the original or backwards version. Correlations with the other instruments were comparable for all three forms. The random order of items within each set appears to break up a response set to endorse either the first or last item and is, therefore, recommended.     

Prior exposure to extreme pain alters neural response to pain in others

In the extant literature examining the brain mechanisms implicated in pain perception, researchers have theorized that the overlapping responses to pain in the self and in others mark the human capacity for empathy. Here we investigated how prior exposure to extreme pain affects pain perception, by assessing the dynamics of pain processing in veterans who were previously exposed to severe injury. Forty-three participants (28 pain-exposed and 15 controls) underwent whole-head magnetoencephalography (MEG) while viewing photographs of limbs in painful and nonpainful (neutral) conditions. Among controls, an early (0–220 ms) “pain effect” in the posterior cingulate and sensorimotor cortices, and a later (760–900 ms) “pain effect” in the posterior cingulate cortex, superior temporal gyrus/insula, and fusiform gyrus were found, indicated by enhanced alpha suppression to the pain versus nonpain conditions. Importantly, pain-exposed participants exhibited an atypical pain response in the posterior cingulate cortex, indicated by a normative response to pain, but no pain-to-no-pain differentiation. This may suggest that individuals exposed to extreme pain may perceive neutral stimuli as potentially threatening. Our findings demonstrate alterations in pain perception following extreme pain exposure, chart the sequence from automatic to evaluative pain processing, and emphasize the importance of considering past experiences in studying the neural response to others’ states.     

Correlations of Beck Depression Inventory and Reynolds Adolescent Depression Scale.

The scores of 15 adolescents who had a primary diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 21 of Conduct Disorder, and 23 control subjects on the Beck and Reynolds depression scales were correlated .58 over-all, .73 for the Posttraumatic group, .48 for the Conduct Disordered group, but .37 for controls. The Reynolds scale did not identify depression in these adolescents as effectively as did the Beck scale.     

When the victim is one among others: Empathy,awareness of others and motivational ambivalence

Feeling empathy for one person in need while being aware of others may increase the motivational ambivalence between the motive of helping the one and the motive of helping the others, and such motivational ambivalence may reduce the helping directed to the person in need. To test these hypotheses we carried out three studies in which participants were faced with a real case of a child in need. In Study 1, empathy, awareness of others and motivational ambivalence were allowed to occur naturally and subsequently measured. In Study 2, empathy and awareness of others were experimentally manipulated, and motivational ambivalence measured. In Study 3, we tested how empathy and motivational ambivalence influenced an actual helping decision. Taken together, the results supported our two hypotheses. The present research offers insight into processes not previously considered in the research, but which may influence decisions about assistance to others in need.     

Depression and marital interaction.

A family-systems model of depression is presented and discussed. In this model, the intrapsychic concept of cognitive schema and the interpersonal concepts of social stimulation and social reingorcement are integrated within a systems-theory perspective. The effects of positive and negative feedback are delineated, and a concept of depression-triggering and depression-maintaining feedback loops is described. A clinical illustration is utilized to exemplify the theoretical model.     

Narrative imagination and taking the perspective of others

Narrative imagination, as MarthaNussbaum (1996) discusses it, is ``the abilityto be an intelligent reader of another person'sstory', an ability tied to being a democraticand cultivated world citizen, one whounderstands the lives of others. Narrativeimagination does not only need knowledge andlogical reasoning but also love and compassion.This article argues that in order to be agenuine tool for democracy, narrativeimagination and consciously taking theperspective of others has to be based on anunderstanding of humans as basicallypluralistic, as homines aperti. Criticalexamination and reflection should be broughtcloser to the lives we live and confront ourhabits and implicit values in order tocultivate us as humans so that we are genuinelyaffected and touched.     

Adult attachment style and the perception of others: the role of projective mechanisms.

In 3 reported studies the authors examined attachment-style differences in the perception of others and the hypothesis that projective mechanisms underlie these differences. In these studies, participants reported on their attachment style and generated actual-self-traits and unwanted-self-traits. Then, a 2nd session was conducted, in which impression formation about new persons (Study 1), the ease of retrieval of memories about known persons (Study 2), or memory inferences about learned features of fictional persons (Study 3) were assessed. Findings indicate that whereas anxious-ambivalent persons' impression formation, memory retrieval, and inferences about others reflected the projection of their actual-self-traits, avoidant persons' responses reflected the projection of their unwanted-self-traits. Findings are discussed in terms of the regulatory goals and strategies that characterize the mental representations of each attachment style.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.