笛卡尔的想象理论研究

我们面临着一个笛卡尔哲学的理论困难:一方面他在形而上学的沉思中对思维和广延做出区分;另一方面,又在现实当中坚持人的灵魂和身体的不可分。而恰恰是在这种困境当中,想象具有了不可替代的重要性。没有想象,思维就不能通向物体性事物,物体性事物就是不可衡量的,作为思维根本性才能的理智就不能完成一个对物体性事物的基本认识,我们的激情就难以产生,我们的意志就难以发挥作用。想象是思维转向物体性广延的重要中介。     

On hating to hate

Hate may be the most dangerous of all emotions for the survival of the planet. The author addresses two questions: What obscures hate when it is actually present? and What masquerades as hate but isn't? Using illustrations from a wide range of fields, the author contends that discerning hate is both essential and far trickier than we think. She concludes by asserting that overcoming hate requires imagination. We must learn to imagine a world without hate and unimagine a world with hate.     

以身化梦：意象体现的理论、方法与技术探析

“意象体现”是由罗伯特·伯尼克依据分析心理学的理论创立的一种“梦的工作”方法,主张在介于意识与无意识之间的阈限状态中采用积极想象的方式对梦中意象进行再体验,通过对不同身体感受的觉知使无意识内容意识化来达到相应的治疗效果。意象体现理论主张,梦具有真实性,应当以主客体一致性的隐喻视角来看待梦,并且对梦的工作具有治疗的意义;对梦的工作应当遵循非解析工作与体验科学、阈限状态、共验交流、心理自居与发生转换四个关键原则。其具体技术过程包括工作状态的准备、进入阈限状态、对梦进行持续性体验、心理自居与发生转换、感觉融合与离开梦境五步。其方法沿革于催眠术、自由联想与积极想象。作为分析心理学中有关梦的一套前沿的思想理论以及临床心理治疗中一种创新性的梦的工作方式,意象体现具有广阔的学术研究及实际应用前景。     

论休谟想象学说的内在张力

该文通过对休谟的“想象”概念的含义、特征和功能等三个方面的分析,论述了他的想象学说的内在张力及其深刻意图——对长期以来极力贬低想象的西方理性主义提出尖锐的批判。     

The ecological imagination

This paper offers a psychoanalytic exploration of meaning within the concept of ecology. From a starting point in the experience of primal anxiety, originating in the work of Freud, Jung and Klein, links are made to cultural themes through a developing comparison of case studies in literature, mythology, the public sphere and clinical practice. It is argued that the application of psychoanalytic ideas to environmental concern has validity. The idea emerges that individual and public attitudes to our environment might be open to positive change through an appreciation of the concept of early anxiety, currently available to us in work of the imagination.     

If I imagine it,then it happened: The Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.     

Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination*

A phenomenological model (labeled ‘EC’) is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings (EIs & CIs) phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.     

Imagination and immortality: thinking of me

Recent work in developmental psychology indicates that children naturally think that psychological states continue after death. One important candidate explanation for why this belief is natural appeals to the idea that we believe in immortality because we can’t imagine our own nonexistence. This paper explores this old idea. To begin, I present a qualified statement of the thesis that we can’t imagine our own nonexistence. I argue that the most prominent explanation for this obstacle, Freud’s, is problematic. I go on to describe some central features of contemporary cognitive accounts of the imagination, and I argue that these accounts provide an independently motivated explanation for the imaginative obstacle. While the imaginative obstacle does not dictate a belief in immortality, it does, I maintain, facilitate such a belief.