Semantic Information and the Syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs

Propositional attitude verbs, such as think and want, have long held interest for both theoretical linguists and language acquisitionists because their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties display complex interactions that have proven difficult to fully capture from either perspective. This paper explores the granularity with which these verbs’ semantic and pragmatic properties are recoverable from their syntactic distributions, using three behavioral experiments aimed at explicitly quantifying the relationship between these two sets of properties. Experiment 1 gathers a measure of 30 propositional attitude verbs’ syntactic distributions using an acceptability judgment task. Experiments 2a and 2b gather measures of semantic similarity between those same verbs using a generalized semantic discrimination (triad or “odd man out”) task and an ordinal (Likert) scale task, respectively. Two kinds of analyses are conducted on the data from these experiments. The first compares both the acceptability judgments and the semantic similarity judgments to previous classifications derived from the syntax and semantics literature. The second kind compares the acceptability judgments to the semantic similarity judgments directly. Through these comparisons, we show that there is quite fine‐grained information about propositional attitude verbs’ semantics carried in their syntactic distributions—whether one considers the sorts of discrete qualitative classifications that linguists traditionally work with or the sorts of continuous quantitative classifications that can be derived experimentally.     

Online interpretation of scalar quantifiers: insight into the semantics-pragmatics interface

Scalar implicature has served as a test case for exploring the relations between semantic and pragmatic processes during language comprehension. Most studies have used reaction time methods and the results have been variable. In these studies, we use the visual-world paradigm to investigate implicature. We recorded participants’ eye movements during commands like “Point to the girl that has some of the socks” in the presence of a display in which one girl had two of four socks and another had three of three soccer balls. These utterances contained an initial period of ambiguity in which the semantics of some was compatible with both characters. This ambiguity could be immediately resolved by a pragmatic implicature which would restrict some to a proper subset. Instead in Experiments 1 and 2, we found that participants were substantially delayed, suggesting a lag between semantic and pragmatic processing. In Experiment 3, we examined interpretations of some when competitors were inconsistent with the semantics (girl with socks vs. girl with no socks). We found quick resolution of the target, suggesting that previous delays were specifically linked to pragmatic analysis.     

Multi-Agent neurocognitive models of semantics of spatial localization of events

The purpose of the study is to develop a learning system for internal representation of the events localization space to realize orientation and navigation of autonomous mobile systems. The task of the research is the development of simulation models of the semantics of the event localization space based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures. The paper proves that the multi-agent neurocognitive architecture is an effective formalism for describing the semantics of the spatial localization of events. Main theoretical foundations have been developed for the simulation of spatial relations using the so-called multi-agent facts, consisting of software agents-concepts, reflecting semantic categories corresponding to parts of speech. It is shown that locative software agents that describe the spatial location of objects and events, forming homogeneous connections, compose the so-called field locations. The latter describes a holistic view of the intellectual agent about the environment. The paper defines conceptual foundations of multi-agent modeling of the semantics of subjective reflexive mapping of the interaction between real objects, space and time.     

The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics

According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon.     

Knowledge and implicatures

In recent work on the semantics of ‘knowledge’-attributions, a variety of accounts have been proposed that aim to explain the data about speaker intuitions in familiar cases such as DeRose’s Bank Case or Cohen’s Airport Case by means of pragmatic mechanisms, notably Gricean implicatures. This paper argues that pragmatic explanations of the data regarding ‘knowledge’-attributions are unsuccessful and concludes that in explaining those data we have to resort to accounts that (a) take those data at their semantic face value (Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism or Epistemic Relativism), or (b) reject them on psychological grounds (Moderate Insensitive Invariantism). To establish this conclusion, the paper relies solely upon widely accepted assumptions about pragmatic theory, broadly construed, and on the Stalnakerian insight that linguistic communication takes place against the backdrop of a set of mutually accepted propositions: a conversation’s common ground.     

Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality: Temporality,Truth, Modality,and Identity

The essay introduces a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal modal semantics based on part-whole, rather than class, theory. Formalizing Edmund Husserl’s theory of inner time consciousness, §3 uses his protention and retention concepts to define a relation of self-awareness on intentional events. §4 introduces a syntax and two-valued semantics for modal first-order predicate object-languages, defines semantic assignments for variables and predicates, and truth for formulae in terms of the axiomatic version of Edmund Husserl’s dependence ontology (viz. the Calculus [CU] of Urelements) introduced by The Ontology of Intentionality I & II. It then uses the §3 results to define the modalities of truth, and §5 extends the semantics to identity claims. §6 defines and contrasts synthetic a priori truths to analytic a priori truths, and §7 compares Brentano School noetic semantic and Leibnizian possible-world semantic perspectives on modality. The essay argues that the modal logics it defines semantically are two-valued, first-order versions of the type of language which Husserl viewed as the language of any ontology of experience (i.e. of any science), and conceived as the logic of intentionality.     

The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information

The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel’s paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, it fails to provide any novel information. Again, ESI does not give a satisfactory account of the paradox. In this paper I propose a solution based on the distinction between empirical information and analytic information. Declarative sentences are informative due to their meanings. I construe meanings as structured hyperintensions, modelled in Transparent Intensional Logic as so-called constructions. These are abstract, algorithmically structured procedures whose constituents are sub-procedures. My main thesis is that constructions are the vehicles of information. Hence, although analytically true sentences provide no empirical information about the state of the world, they convey analytic information, in the shape of constructions prescribing how to arrive at the truths in question. Moreover, even though analytically equivalent sentences have equal empirical content, their analytic content may be different. Finally, though the empirical content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, its analytic content may be different from the analytic content of the premises and thus convey a new piece of information.     

A visual embedding for the unsupervised extraction of abstract semantics

Vector-space word representations obtained from neural network models have been shown to enable semantic operations based on vector arithmetic. In this paper, we explore the existence of similar information on vector representations of images. For that purpose we define a methodology to obtain large, sparse vector representations of image classes, and generate vectors through the state-of-the-art deep learning architecture GoogLeNet for 20 K images obtained from ImageNet. We first evaluate the resultant vector-space semantics through its correlation with WordNet distances, and find vector distances to be strongly correlated with linguistic semantics. We then explore the location of images within the vector space, finding elements close in WordNet to be clustered together, regardless of significant visual variances (e.g., 118 dog types). More surprisingly, we find that the space unsupervisedly separates complex classes without prior knowledge (e.g., living things). Afterwards, we consider vector arithmetics. Although we are unable to obtain meaningful results on this regard, we discuss the various problem we encountered, and how we consider to solve them. Finally, we discuss the impact of our research for cognitive systems, focusing on the role of the architecture being used.     

Uncertainty and Persistence: a Bayesian Update Semantics for Probabilistic Expressions

This paper presents a general-purpose update semantics for expressions of subjective uncertainty in natural language. First, a set of desiderata are established for how expressions of subjective uncertainty should behave in dynamic, update-based semantic systems; then extant implementations of expressions of subjective uncertainty in such models are evaluated and found wanting; finally, a new update semantics is proposed. The desiderata at the heart of this paper center around the contention that expressions of subjective uncertainty express beliefs which are not persistent (i.e. beliefs that won’t necessarily survive the addition of new information that is compatible with all previous information), whereas propositions express beliefs that are persistent. I argue that if we make the move of treating updates in a dynamic semantics as Bayesian updates, i.e. as conditionalization, then expressions of subjective uncertainty will behave the way we want them to without altering the way propositions behave.     

Temporal alethic–deontic logic and semantic tableaux

The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of temporal alethic–deontic systems, i.e. systems that include temporal, alethic and deontic operators. All in all we will consider 2,147,483,648 systems. All systems are described both semantically and proof theoretically. We use a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T × W semantics, to characterize our systems semantically and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.     

Local pragmatics and structured contents

There is a long-standing and rarely contested view that Gricean conversational reasoning—the kind of reasoning that supports the identification of conversational implicatures—cannot produce pragmatically generated modification of the contents of embedded clauses. The goal of this paper is to argue against this view: to argue that embedded pragmatic effects can be seen as continuous with ordinary, utterance-level, conversational implicature. I will further suggest, though, that embedded pragmatic effects do force on us a particular conception of semantics. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate account of the data requires a semantic framework that posits structured contents.     

Monsters in Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift.     

Quantified modal logic: Non-normal worlds and propositional attitudes

One way to obtain a comprehensive semantics for various systems of modal logic is to use a general notion of non-normal world. In the present article, a general notion of modal system is considered together with a semantic framework provided by such a general notion of non-normal world. Methodologically, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a logical framework for the study of various modalities, notably prepositional attitudes. Some specific systems are studied together with semantics using non-normal worlds of different kinds.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

A Dynamic-Logical Perspective on Quantum Behavior

In this paper we show how recent concepts from Dynamic Logic, and in particular from Dynamic Epistemic logic, can be used to model and interpret quantum behavior. Our main thesis is that all the non-classical properties of quantum systems are explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. We give a logical analysis of quantum measurements (formalized using modal operators) as triggers for quantum information flow, and we compare them with other logical operators previously used to model various forms of classical information flow: the “test” operator from Dynamic Logic, the “announcement” operator from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the “revision” operator from Belief Revision theory. The main points stressed in our investigation are the following: (1) The perspective and the techniques of “logical dynamics” are useful for understanding quantum information flow. (2) Quantum mechanics does not require any modification of the classical laws of “static” propositional logic, but only a non-classical dynamics of information. (3) The main such non-classical feature is that, in a quantum world, all information-gathering actions have some ontic side-effects. (4) This ontic impact can affect in its turn the flow of information, leading to non-classical epistemic side-effects (e.g. a type of non-monotonicity) and to states of “objectively imperfect information”. (5) Moreover, the ontic impact is non-local: an information-gathering action on one part of a quantum system can have ontic side-effects on other, far-away parts of the system.     

Functional constraints on sentence processing: A cross-linguistic study

English and Italian provide some interesting contrasts that are relevant to a controversial problem in psycholinguistics: the boundary between grammatical and extra-grammatical knowledge in sentence processing. Although both are SVO word order languages without case inflections to indicate basic grammatical relations, Italian permits far more variation in word order for pragmatic purposes. Hence Italians must rely more than English listeners on factors other than word order. In this experiment, Italian and English adults were asked to interpret 81 simple sentences varying word order, animacy contrasts between the two nouns, topicalization and contrastive stress. Italians relied primarily on semantic strategies while the English listeners relied on word order—including a tendency to interpret the second noun as subject in non-canonical word orders (corresponding to word order variations in informal English production). Italians also made greater use of topic and stress information. Finally, Italians were much slower and less consistent in the application of word order strategies even for reversible NVN sentences where there was no conflict between order and semantics. This suggests that Italian is ‘less’ of an SVO language than English. Semantic strategies apparently stand at the ‘core’ of Italian to the same extent that word order stands at the ‘core’ of English. It is suggested that these results pose problems for claims about a ‘universal’ separation between semantics and syntax, and for theories that postulate a ‘universal’ priority of one type of information over another. Results are discussed in the light of the competition model, a functionalist approach to grammar that accounts in a principled way for probabilistic outcomes and differential ‘weights’ among competing and converging sources of information in sentence processing.     

Nelson's Negation on the Base of Weaker Versions of Intuitionistic Negation

Constructive logic with Nelson negation is an extension of the intuitionistic logic with a special type of negation expressing some features of constructive falsity and refutation by counterexample. In this paper we generalize this logic weakening maximally the underlying intuitionistic negation. The resulting system, called subminimal logic with Nelson negation, is studied by means of a kind of algebras called generalized N-lattices. We show that generalized N-lattices admit representation formalizing the intuitive idea of refutation by means of counterexamples giving in this way a counterexample semantics of the logic in question and some of its natural extensions. Among the extensions which are near to the intuitionistic logic are the minimal logic with Nelson negation which is an extension of the Johansson's minimal logic with Nelson negation and its in a sense dual version — the co-minimal logic with Nelson negation. Among the extensions near to the classical logic are the well known 3-valued logic of Lukasiewicz, two 12-valued logics and one 48-valued logic. Standard questions for all these logics — decidability, Kripke-style semantics, complete axiomatizability, conservativeness are studied. At the end of the paper extensions based on a new connective of self-dual conjunction and an analog of the Lukasiewicz middle value ½ have also been considered.     

The semantic origins of word order

Where do the different sentence orders in the languages of the world come from? Recently, it has been suggested that there is a basic sentence order, SOV (Subject–Object–Verb), which was the starting point for other sentence orders. Backup for this claim was found in newly emerging languages, as well as in experiments where people are asked to convey simple meanings in improvised gesture production. In both cases, researchers found that the predominant word order is SOV. Recent literature has shown that the pragmatic rule ‘Agent first’ drives the preference for S initial word order, but this rule does not decide between SOV and SVO. This paper presents experimental evidence for grounding the word order that emerges in gesture production in semantic properties of the message to be conveyed. We focus on the role of the verb, and argue that the preference for SOV word order reported in earlier experiments is due to the use of extensional verbs (e.g. throw). With intensional verbs like think, the object is dependent on the agent’s thought, and our experiment confirms that such verbs lead to a preference for SVO instead. We conclude that the meaning of the verb plays a crucial role in the sequencing of utterances in emerging language systems. This finding is relevant for the debate on language evolution, because it suggests that semantics underlies the early formation of syntactic rules.     

组合原则

组合原则是逻辑语义学的基本原则,表现为函项的思想和句法与语义的对应。就构造逻辑系统而言,组合原则是一种方法论。作为延伸到自然语言形式语义学的产物,组合原则起到一种核心灵魂的作用。组合原则在理论层面和应用领域皆获得一些有价值的结果。自然语言违反组合原则的实例主要表现为歧义现象、语用因素和句法与语义不对应的情况,这正是调整组合原则的适用条件从而促进形式语义学发展的契机。