Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws

In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable. I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses.     

价值哲学的存在论基础

20世纪80年代初至90年代初,哲学界大都依循主体-客体模式来处理价值问题。但这一模式在理论和现实中都遇到了一些难以解决的问题。首先,就“价值的工具性定义”而言,也即从“主体的需要”来界定价值看,虽然它较好地说明了物的价值,但却不能全面地说明人的价值,甚至有把人的价值变成纯粹的手段性和工具性价值的危险。其次,就“价值的客观性”问题而言,针对主体-客体模式,为了论证价值的客观性,哲学界所做的一个关键性的努力,就是把“主体”与“主观”、“主体性”与“主观性”区别开来。[1]这一区分的本意是将“主体”与“主观”区别开以解决…     

Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics

Contemporary Neo-Berlinians contend that value pluralism is the best account of the moral universe we inhabit; they also contend that value pluralism provides a powerful case for liberalism. In this paper, I challenge both claims. Specifically, I will examine the arguments offered in support of value pluralism; finding them lacking, I will then offer some reasons for thinking that value pluralism is not an especially promising view of our moral universe.     

价值多元主义审视

今天我们已进入一个价值多元化的时代,然则其理论基础价值多元主义却有着不可避免的内在紧张——一元与多元,与逻辑悖论一普遍与特殊,并有着滑向相对主义的危险。走出多元主义的这种困境,可能的出路在于在反基础主义的视野中,在实践中解决价值的冲突。     

马克思的实践首先是一个价值本体概念

如何理解马克思的实践概念 ?这个问题近来又重新引起人们的关注。跟以往不同的是 :有关探讨正在向着更深的学术史层面掘进。马克思的实践概念包含许多不同的维度 ,对之不存在一种本质主义的标准解释 ,从不同维度可以看到不同的内容 ,得到不同的理解。这些都是正常的。需要探讨的是 :对各个维度的界定和理解是否确切 ?每个维度是否还有发挥的余地 ?现有维度之外是否还存在新的维度 ?不同维度之间究竟是什么关系 ?等等。在本文中 ,我想集中揭示的是马克思的实践概念的价值维度。在我看来 ,马克思所说的实践 (praxis)首先是一个价值概念 ,并且…     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。     

The Challenge of Religious Pluralism: The Association Between Interfaith Contact and Religious Pluralism

This research contributes to increasing understanding of the ways in which Christians think about religious pluralism in the United States. It does so by empirically uncovering the relationship between inter-faith contact and the willingness of white Christians to support tenets of religious pluralism. To that end, this study largely intimates that religious identity reinforces a dualistic world view. For white Christians, it is likely that contact with Jews and not Muslims is salient to their religious pluralist understandings. Nonetheless, more so than other Christians, Evangelicals tend to embrace a theology that views their belief system as being in conflict and competition with non-Christians. To that end, it is plausible that even when Christians have positive contact experiences with Jews and Muslims, Evangelicals are less willing than are other Christians to recognize them as members of the American religious polity.     

Targeting Ontological Security: Information Warfare in the Modern Age

Recent studies have made great strides looking at the implications that the human need for ontological security has for politics and International Relations. However, less attention has been paid to how actors might target this need. While Steele and Mattern both examine the possible manipulation of subjectivity, this article turns to the concept of information warfare (IW) to broaden the view of how, and to what end, this is pursued. Congruently, by elaborating upon how the digitalization of society has increased the potential to influence and manipulate cognition and emotion, OS strengthens current literature on IW. It argues that by covertly perverting the information landscape, IW can alter how events are connected to national narratives, influencing policy by making certain options appear more/less shameful, or it can unravel the bonds of society by polarizing domestic narrative debates, purposely sowing ontological insecurity. This provides a firmer understanding of the strategic implications interference can have generally and of Russia's interference into the 2016 U.S. election specifically. Therefore, by viewing facets of IW as part of a range of tactics employed to manipulate/undermine subjectivity, a more nuanced understanding of interstate relations subsequently emerges.     

The Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures

Abstract: In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes makes a remarkable claim about the ontological status of geometrical figures. He asserts that an object such as a triangle has a 'true and immutable nature' that does not depend on the mind, yet has being even if there are no triangles existing in the world. This statement has led many commentators to assume that Descartes is a Platonist regarding essences and in the philosophy of mathematics. One problem with this seemingly natural reading is that it contradicts the conceptualist account of universals that one finds in the Principles of Philosophy and elsewhere. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the notion of a true and immutable nature which reconciles the Fifth Meditation with the conceptualism of Descartes' other work. Specifically, I argue that Descartes takes natures to be innate ideas considered in terms of their so-called 'objective being'.     

The Logic of the Ontological Square

The Ontological Square is a categorial scheme that combines two metaphysical distinctions: that between types (or universals) and tokens (or particulars) on the one hand, and that between characters (or features) and their substrates (or bearers) on the other hand. The resulting four-fold classification of things comprises particular substrates, called substances, universal substrates, called kinds, particular characters, called modes or moments, and universal characters, called attributes. Things are joined together in facts by primitive ontological ties or nexus. This article describes a logic that is meant to capture the basic intuitions behind the Ontological Square. Given a minimal correspondence between atomic logical form and ontological structure, the commitment to nexus as a distinct ontological category entails a rehabilitation of copulae as ties of predication. Thus, the Logic of the Ontological Square is a copula calculus rather than a predicate calculus; its soundness and completeness can be established with respect to a model akin to a so-called first-order semantics for standard second-order logic. Presented by Hannes Leitgeb