Single-Letter Retrieval Cues for Anagram Solution

Anagram solution, as related to single-letter retrieval cues and first letter of the solution word (consonant or vowel), was examined. In Experiment 1, college-aged solvers were presented both types of 5-letter words and either the first letter of the solution word as a cue, or no cue. In Experiment 2, the effects of four types of retrieval cues (first, middle, or last letter or no cue) upon solving consonant-beginning words was examined. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the solution of both types of solution words as related to the preceding four types of retrieval cues. The results of all 3 experiments showed that a single letter can be an effective cue. For consonant-beginning words, the middle and last letters were as effective as the first letter. For vowel-beginning words, the first letter was more effective than either the middle or last letter. It was concluded that solvers select one letter of the anagram, typically a consonant, to serve as the first letter of the solution word, and then rearrange the remaining letters.     

Evidence for a Multiple-process Account of the Generation Effect

In a naturalistic study, we aimed to uncover the relationship between thinking about and remembering intentions. Electronic badges allowed us to track the activities of subjects within their work environment. Over two weeks, subjects were asked to respond using a button on their badges (1) every two hours (Time task); (2) whenever they were in a particular room (Place task). In addition, whenever they thought about the task, they were asked to indicate this with their badges. Although subjects thought about the Time task more, they forgot to respond more often than in the Place task. In the Time task, there was a marked absence of thoughts about the task following successful remembering. When subjects remembered the Place task, thoughts increased with proximity to the target location. In both tasks, thoughts about intentions occurred more in places such as stairwells than in locations where people tended to settle. On the basis of these findings, possible mechanisms for prospective memory are discussed.     

动作操作与怪异性对联结记忆的影响

被试操作任务（SPT）编码后的记忆成绩通常优于语词任务（VT）编码后的记忆成绩,此类现象被称为SPT效应。本研究考察动作与物体之间已有的联结程度对联结再认的SPT效应的影响。学习阶段,被试使用SPT与VT编码识记日常动作短语（动作与物体配对,如“切西瓜”）和怪异动作短语（如“种锤子”）;测试阶段,要求被试区分“旧”、“重组合”和“新”短语。结果发现,当识记日常动作短语时,SPT条件的联结再认成绩显著高于VT条件的成绩,但是,当识记怪异动作短语时,SPT条件与VT条件的联结再认成绩无显著差异。此外,仅在VT而非SPT条件,怪异动作短语的联结再认成绩显著高于日常动作短语的成绩。研究结果表明,动作操作和刺激材料的怪异性均可促进动作与物体的联结记忆,但是两者不能对联结记忆产生叠加的促进作用。     

人格测验的参照情境效应

人格测验的参照情境效应是指,在一般人格测验的基础上,设置某种特定的参照情境,进而使测验的效标关联效度得以提高的现象。在过去十余年里,参照情境效应的考察重心从早期的效度证据搜集逐渐转向内部机理的探讨。研究者试图通过参照情境与效标的逻辑关联、参照情境的被试间变异及被试内变异来解释现象背后的测量学原理。在构念层面则提出“人格和角色认同层级模型”,以此说明参照情境效应的人格机制问题。然而,该主题的探索尚处于初始阶段,未来研究可从参照情境的操作范式、参照情境效应的调节机制等方面继续寻求突破。     

Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.     

Toward a Perceptual Account of Mindreading

A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA). The paper starts by exploring the merits and limits of the main strategies that have been employed to defend PA. The second aim is to present and defend a version of PA, according to which some mental properties can be observational properties. Providing support for this thesis includes a shift of focus to properties presented in perceptual experience and a systematic examination of a body of recent empirical material on animacy perception and visual aftereffects.     

Toward a Metacognitive Account of Cognitive Offloading

Individuals frequently make use of the body and environment when engaged in a cognitive task. For example, individuals will often spontaneously physically rotate when faced with rotated objects, such as an array of words, to putatively offload the performance costs associated with stimulus rotation. We looked to further examine this idea by independently manipulating the costs associated with both word rotation and array frame rotation. Surprisingly, we found that individuals’ patterns of spontaneous physical rotations did not follow patterns of performance costs or benefits associated with being physically rotated, findings difficult to reconcile with existing theories of strategy selection involving external resources. Individuals’ subjective ratings of perceived benefits, rather, provided an excellent match to the patterns of physical rotations, suggesting that the critical variable when deciding on‐the‐fly whether to incorporate an external resource is the participant's metacognitive beliefs regarding expected performance or the effort required for each approach (i.e., internal vs. internal + external). Implications for metacognition's future in theories of cognitive offloading are discussed.     

Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals

One very popular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals is aclosest-worlds account along the lines of theories given by David Lewisand Robert Stalnaker. If we could give the same sort of semantics forindicative conditionals, we would have a more unified account of themeaning of ``if ... then ...' statements, one with manyadvantages for explaining the behaviour of conditional sentences. Such atreatment of indicative conditionals, however, has faced a battery ofobjections. This paper outlines a closest-worlds account of indicativeconditionals that does better than some of its cousins in explaining thebehaviour of such conditionals. The paper then discusses objectionsoffered by Dorothy Edgington and Frank Jackson to closest-worldsaccounts of indicative conditionals, and shows that these objections canbe met by the account outlined.     

Tests of a cognitive-resource-allocation account of the bizarreness effect

The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common information by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizarre information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relationship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehend and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable predictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyses of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness effects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the influence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.     

Coherence Theory of Knowledge: a Gradational Account

A satisfactory theory of knowledge in which the shortcomings of a pure externalist account are avoided and in which the Gettier problem is solved should consist in a combination of externalist and internalist components. The internalist component should guarantee that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifying grounds of her belief. And the externalist component should guarantee that the justification of her belief does not depend on any false statement. Keith Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification is an example of such an internalist-externalist analysis of knowledge. But nevertheless, Lehrer's account leads to unintended results. Therefore, it is argued that a satisfactory coherence theory of knowledge must also be based on a gradual notion of systematic coherence.     

An Account of the Psychotherapeutic Process from the Perspective of a Client with a Disability

No abstract available for this article.     

The Effect of Exhaust Gas on the Performance in Certain Psychological Tests

The effects of imagery on immediate and long term recall and organization (i.e., clustering) were studied with regard to high and low imagery concrete stimulus nouns from the same generic categories, imagery and no imagery instructions, number of recall trials, and two presentation rates. Three major aspects were involved: (a) establishment of imagery norms for 80 categorically related nouns, (b) behavioral analysis of these norms, and (c) a verbal free recall experiment conducted with 960 sixth and eighth grade boys and girls to compare the verbal and imaginal symbolic processes. Recall and organization were found to be facilitated by imagery nouns or instructions. Eighth graders not only recalled and organized better than sixth graders, but also used imagery more effectively. Four written trials were better than one, and a five second presentation rate was better than 2.5 seconds. These trends held in immediate and long term recall. Results were discussed in terms of the code availability hypothesis of Paivio's two-process theory. It was concluded that imagery is an important factor in free recall and organization and functions analogously to verbal processes.     

加工水平对不同类型内隐记忆测试的影响

许多内隐记忆研究表明 ,加工水平影响外显记忆而不影响内隐记忆 ,这样的实验结果被一些研究者认为是外显记忆与内隐记忆系统分离的重要依据之一。实际上 ,内隐记忆研究中的加工水平问题一直存在争议 ,加工水平效应作为两类记忆系统分离的依据是不充分的。在我们的这项实验中 ,结果表明 ,加工水平影响概念样例生成这种内隐记忆测试而不影响知觉辨认测试。     

Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint.     

On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness

This paper presents a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of screens. In a world and an epoch where screens pervade a great many aspects of human experience, we submit that phenomenology, much in a traditional methodological form, can provide an interesting and novel basis for our understanding of screens. We ground our analysis in the ontology of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time [1927/1962], claiming that screens will only show themselves as they are if taken as screens-in-the-world. Thus, the phenomenon of screen is not investigated in its empirical form or conceptually. It is rather taken as a grounding intentional orientation that conditions our engagement with certain surfaces as we comport ourselves towards them “as screens.” In doing this we claim to have opened up the phenomenon of screen in a new and meaningful way.