A test of the overconfidence phenomenon using audio signals

The existence of the overconfidence phenomenon was examined using a signal detection paradigm. Fifty-five participants were asked to decide whether they heard a signal or noise only, and to rate how certain they were of their decisions. The results confirmed the existence of overconfidence as well as the "hard-easy" effect.     

Improving college students’ evaluation of text learning using idea-unit standards

When recalling key definitions from class materials, college students are often overconfident in the quality of their responses. Even with commission errors, they often judge that their response is entirely or partially correct. To further understand this overconfidence, we investigated whether idea-unit judgements would reduce overconfidence (Experiments 1 and 2) and whether students inflated their scores because they believed that they knew answers but just responded incorrectly (Experiment 2). College students studied key-term definitions and later attempted to recall each definition when given the key term (e.g., What is the availability heuristic?). All students judged the quality of their recall, but some were given a full-definition standard to use, whereas other students first judged whether their response included each of the individual ideas within the corresponding correct answer. In Experiment 1, making these idea-unit judgements reduced overconfidence for commission errors. In Experiment 2, some students were given the correct definitions and graded other students’ responses, and some students generated idea units themselves before judging their responses. Students were overconfident even when they graded other students’ responses, and, as important, self-generated idea units for each definition also reduced overconfidence in commission errors. Thus, overconfidence appears to result from difficulties in evaluating the quality of recall responses, and such overconfidence can be reduced by using idea-unit judgements.     

Overconfidence in an objective anticipatory motor task

Overconfidence can place humans in hazardous situations, and yet it has been observed in a variety of cognitive tasks in which participants have to rate their own performance. We demonstrate here that overconfidence can be revealed in a natural and objective visuo-motor task. Participants were asked to press a key in synchrony with a predictable visual event and were rewarded if they succeeded and sometimes penalized if they were too quick or too slow. If they had used their own motor uncertainty in anticipating the timing of the visual stimulus, they would have maximized their gain. However, they instead displayed an overconfidence in the sense that they underestimated the magnitude of their uncertainty and the cost of their error. Therefore, overconfidence is not limited to subjective ratings in cognitive tasks, but rather appears to be a general characteristic of human decision making.     

Overconfidence in interval estimates

Judges were asked to make numerical estimates (e.g., "In what year was the first flight of a hot air balloon?"). Judges provided high and low estimates such that they were X% sure that the correct answer lay between them. They exhibited substantial overconfidence: The correct answer fell inside their intervals much less than X% of the time. This contrasts with choices between 2 possible answers to a question, which showed much less overconfidence. The authors show that overconfidence in interval estimates can result from variability in setting interval widths. However, the main cause is that subjective intervals are systematically too narrow given the accuracy of one's information-sometimes only 40% as large as necessary to be well calibrated. The degree of overconfidence varies greatly depending on how intervals are elicited. There are also substantial differences among domains and between male and female judges. The authors discuss the possible psychological mechanisms underlying this pattern of findings.     

The domain specificity and generality of overconfidence: Individual differences in performance estimation bias

One hundred twenty-three college students performed a knowledge assessment task and a game of motor skill in which they had to predict their performance before each block of trials. There was a bias in the direction of overconfidence on both tasks, even though the latter involved the motor domain, did not require the use of numeric probabilities, and allowed predictions to be made by using an aggregate judgment made in a frequentist mode. An analysis of individual differences indicated that there was considerable domain specificity in confidence judgments. However, participants who persevered in showing overconfidence in the motor task—despite previous feedback revealing their overconfident performance predictions—were significantly more overconfident in the knowledge calibration task than were participants who moderated their motor performance predictions so as to remove their bias toward overconfidence. The latter finding is consistent with explanations of overconfidence effects that implicate mechanisms with some degree of domain generality.     

The naïve intuitive statistician: a naïve sampling model of intuitive confidence intervals

The perspective of the na?ve intuitive statistician is outlined and applied to explain overconfidence when people produce intuitive confidence intervals and why this format leads to more overconfidence than other formally equivalent formats. The na?ve sampling model implies that people accurately describe the sample information they have but are na?ve in the sense that they uncritically take sample properties as estimates of population properties. A review demonstrates that the na?ve sampling model accounts for the robust and important findings in previous research as well as provides novel predictions that are confirmed, including a way to minimize the overconfidence with interval production. The authors discuss the na?ve sampling model as a representative of models inspired by the na?ve intuitive statistician.     

先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响

研究考察了先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响。结果发现：(1)先前情绪的主效应显著, 积极情绪比消极情绪的个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求;过度自信的主效应显著, 高过度自信比低过度自信个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求。(2)先前情绪和过度自信水平交互影响灾难事件后继风险决策。高过度自信者在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下更倾向于风险寻求; 消极情绪状态下过度自信水平不同的个体之间没有显著差异。     

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

The status-enhancement theory of overconfidence proposes that overconfidence pervades self-judgment because it helps people attain higher social status. Prior work has found that highly confident individuals attained higher status regardless of whether their confidence was justified by actual ability ( Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). However, those initial findings were observed in contexts where individuals’ actual abilities were unlikely to be discovered by others. What happens to overconfident individuals when others learn how good they truly are at the task? If those individuals are penalized with status demotions, then the status costs might outweigh the status benefits of overconfidence – thereby casting doubt on the benefits of overconfidence. In three studies, we found that group members did not react negatively to individuals revealed as overconfident, and in fact still viewed them positively. Therefore, the status benefits of overconfidence outweighed any possible status costs, lending further support to the status-enhancement theory.     

Individual differences in higher-level cognitive abilities do not predict overconfidence in complex task performance

Even when people perform tasks poorly, they often report unrealistically positive estimates of their own abilities in these situations. To better understand the origins of such overconfidence, we investigated whether it could be predicted by individual differences in working memory, attentional control, and self-reported trait impulsivity. Overconfidence was estimated by contrasting objective and subjective measures of situation awareness (the ability to perceive and understand task-relevant information in the environment), acquired during a challenging air traffic control simulation. We found no significant relationships between overconfidence and either working memory or attentional control. However, increased impulsivity significantly predicted greater overconfidence. In addition, overall levels of overconfidence were lower in our complex task than in previous studies that used less-complex lab-based tasks. Our results suggest that overconfidence may not be linked to high-level cognitive abilities, but that dynamic tasks with frequent opportunities for performance feedback may reduce misconceptions about personal performance.     

True overconfidence: The inability of rational information processing to account for apparent overconfidence

The better-than-average effect describes the tendency of people to perceive their skills and virtues as being above average. We derive a new experimental paradigm to distinguish between two possible explanations for the effect, namely rational information processing and overconfidence. Experiment participants evaluate their relative position within the population by stating their complete belief distribution. This approach sidesteps recent methodology concerns associated with previous research. We find that people hold beliefs about their abilities in different domains and tasks which are inconsistent with rational information processing. Both on an aggregated and an individual level, they show considerable overplacement. We conclude that overconfidence is not only apparent overconfidence but rather the consequence of a psychological bias.     

过分自信的进化模型

过分自信有狭义和广义之分, 狭义的过分自信是指人们对自身绝对水平的高估, 使得对自己的评价优于实际水平, 广义的过分自信是一种非理性的过于优化的估计, 还包括对自身相对水平的高估。基于进化心理学理论和生态理性假设提出的进化模型认为, 过分自信是一种快速启发式认知策略, 在适应和生存中具有优势, 是进化选择的结果。根据对个体知觉偏差的不同假设, 进化模型分为二项式模型和正态模型, 都得出了一致的研究结论。与过分自信的自我提升理论、权重差异理论和信息差异理论相比较, 进化模型具有许多优点, 但也存在一些不足, 需要进一步对其进行探讨和检验。     

Mode Transition and Change in Variable Use in Perceptual Learning

Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) proposed (a) that perceptual learning entails a transition from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension, and (b) that relative confidence—the difference between estimated and actual performance—indicates whether apprehension is inferential or direct. In 3 experiments participants received feedback on judgments of force; the results replicated Runeson et al.'s observed decrease in overconfidence but showed more overconfidence. Relative confidence depended on how performance was defined. An attempt to manipulate confidence failed, but trait confidence affected relative confidence. It was concluded that overconfidence does not necessarily signal inferential functioning and that a decrease in overconfidence might occur in a direct-perceptual mode. A theory of learning within the direct-perceptual mode, in addition to learning through a mode transition, appears necessary.     

Persistent overconfidence despite practice: The role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions

In three experiments, preschoolers’ ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child’s performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers’ overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.     

Improving metacognitive accuracy: How failing to retrieve practice items reduces overconfidence

People often exhibit inaccurate metacognitive monitoring. For example, overconfidence occurs when people judge that they will remember more information on a future test then they actually do. The present experiments examined whether a small number of retrieval practice opportunities would improve participants’ metacognitive accuracy by reducing overconfidence. Participants studied Lithuanian–English paired associates and predicted their performance on an upcoming memory test. Then they attempted to retrieve one or more practice items (or none in the control condition) and made a second prediction. Experiment 1 showed that failing to retrieve a single practice item lead to improved subsequent performance predictions – participants became less overconfident. Experiment 2 directly manipulated retrieval failure and showed that again failure to retrieve a single practice item significantly improved subsequent predictions, relative to when participants successfully retrieved the practice item. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that additional retrieval practice opportunities reduced overconfidence and improved prediction accuracy.     

Determinants of Overconfidence and Miscalibration: The Roles of Random Error and Ecological Structure

Previous authors have attributed findings of overconfidence to psychological bias or to experimental designs unrepresentative of the environment. This paper provides evidence for an alternative explanation. A model is presented in which reported confidence is a function of the validity of information used by the subject, and a random error component. The model predicts greater overconfidence for question sets in which informational cues are less valid. This result corresponds to the well-known hard/easy effect. The model also predicts that unrepresentative design (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) is sufficient but not necessary for overconfidence to occur. These predictions are tested, and results provide support for the model. Subjects are overconfident according to usual measures such as calibration, even though on average they report the diagnosticity of informational cues correctly. Furthermore, overconfidence is greater for harder sets of questions, even when those sets are representative of the environment. A post hoc analysis reveals some intriguing individual differences among subjects. Some people appear to have a true psychological bias toward reporting high levelsof confidence, whereas others have a psychological bias in the direction of underconfidence.     

Cross-Cultural Variations in Probability Judgment Accuracy: Beyond General Knowledge Overconfidence?

Previous studies have revealed surprising and persistent cross-cultural variations in overconfidence, whereby respondents in some Asian cultures (e.g., Chinese) exhibit markedly higher degrees of overconfidence than respondents in other cultures (e.g., in the United States and Japan). Most of those demonstrations have entailed general knowledge tasks (e.g., answering questions such as whether Europe is larger than Australia). The present studies sought to determine whether such cross-cultural variations extend to judgments about the kinds of events that bear upon more common practical decisions and to aspects of accuracy other than overconfidence. Subjects in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States made probabilistic differential diagnoses of fictional diseases in a stochastic artificial ecology. Results revealed that previously observed cross-cultural variations do indeed generalize. The data were also informative about several potential accounts for such variations, e.g., arguing against a proposal that they rest on different emphases on discrimination rather than calibration, but consistent with the influences of culture-specific cognitive customs, including responsiveness to explicitly displayed information, regardless of its presumed validity.     

“过分自信”的研究及其跨文化差异

“过分自信”是一种偏离校准,是指人们关于一般知识问题的概率判断通常以某种方式偏离校准,这种偏离都偏高。跨文化系列研究表明：面对常识和概率判断问题,集体主义文化成员（如中国人）比个体主义文化成员（如美国人）更过分自信。文章在简要回顾“过分自信”研究的基础上,对“过分自信”的跨文化差异及原因进行了比较详细地介绍,并对“过分自信”跨文化差异研究的进一步发展和实际应用进行讨论。冀对以往的研究做初步的归纳和总结,促进决策领域中跨文化比较方面的研究得到进一步发展     

Option fixation: A cognitive contributor to overconfidence

The ASC model of choice and confidence in general knowledge proposes that respondents first Assess the familiarity of presented options, and then use the high-familiarity option as a retrieval cue to Search memory for the purposes of Constructing an explanation about why that high-familiarity option is true. The ASC process implies that overconfidence results in part from a tendency to fixate on the high-familiarity option, to the neglect of the other option. If this implication is true, then judgment tasks requiring respondents to evaluate each option independently should result in reduced overconfidence as compared with standard judgment tasks. Two experiments tested this implication, and found that confidence and overconfidence were reduced when respondents evaluated options independently. The findings support the proposal that option fixation contributes to overconfidence, and also clarify the limitations of random error explanations of overconfidence.     

Overconfidence effects in category learning: a comparison of connectionist and exemplar memory models

Exemplar and connectionist models were compared on their ability to predict overconfidence effects in category learning data. In the standard task, participants learned to classify hypothetical patients with particular symptom patterns into disease categories and reported confidence judgments in the form of probabilities. The connectionist model asserts that classifications and confidence are based on the strength of learned associations between symptoms and diseases. The exemplar retrieval model (ERM) proposes that people learn by storing examples and that their judgments are often based on the first example they happen to retrieve. Experiments 1 and 2 established that overconfidence increases when the classification step of the process is bypassed. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that a direct instruction to retrieve many exemplars reduces overconfidence. Only the ERM predicted the major qualitative phenomena exhibited in these experiments.     

A status-enhancement account of overconfidence

In explaining the prevalence of the overconfident belief that one is better than others, prior work has focused on the motive to maintain high self-esteem, abetted by biases in attention, memory, and cognition. An additional possibility is that overconfidence enhances the person's social status. We tested this status-enhancing account of overconfidence in 6 studies. Studies 1-3 found that overconfidence leads to higher social status in both short- and longer-term groups, using naturalistic and experimental designs. Study 4 applied a Brunswikian lens analysis (Brunswik, 1956) and found that overconfidence leads to a behavioral signature that makes the individual appear competent to others. Studies 5 and 6 measured and experimentally manipulated the desire for status and found that the status motive promotes overconfidence. Together, these studies suggest that people might so often believe they are better than others because it helps them achieve higher social status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).