The Developing Personality as a Joint Function of Convergence and Divergence

Summary

The effect of change in conditions of test administration on self-reported introversion-extraversion and neuroticism was investigated at a North American, Central American, and South American university. Standard conditions, based on standard test norms, were compared with a condition in which S knew that self-report would be compared with reports about him by three well known Ss named by him. Self-reported scores and others' reports agreed with standard test norms on introversion-extraversion, but self-reported neuroticism was significantly higher compared to test norms and others' reports. There were no significant differences between universities. The differential effect on self-reported neuroticism was interpreted in terms of social desirability response set.     

Lay conceptions of personality: Eliciting tiers of a scientific conception of personality

Two studies are reported which examine the availability of scientific propositions of personality in lay conceptions of personality. It is argued from a social constructivist perspective that models of personality must derive from and refer to lay conceptions of persons. Eysenck's trait-type model of introversion-extraversion, containing specific propositions about phenotypic and genotypic differences between extraverts and introverts, was utilized as the scientific model of personality and its availability in lay conceptions of personality was examined in two studies. In the first study, subjects were presented with a genotypic characterization of either an introvert or an extravert target person and asked to infer corresponding phenotypic differences. In the second study, the inference process was reversed with subjects being asked to infer genotypic characteristics of introverts versus extraverts on the basis of phenotypic target person desecrations of the two types. Results from both studies show a high degree of accuracy in subjects' inferences, suggesting that laypersons have well-formed conceptions about personality containing ‘higher-order’ psychogenetic propositions corresponding to Eysenck's trait-type model. The implications of the findings for theory construction are discussed.     

On the biological determination of personality structure

The controversy surrounding two particular problems has stymied the development of a consensus view concerning the structure of personality. First, there has been disagreement concerning the ‘independence’ of introversion-extraversion and measures of neuroticism. The other problem concerns the ‘duality’ of introversion-extraversion and whether it is even useful to retain this concept when it may only represent a ‘shotgun wedding’ of ‘sociability’ and ‘impulsivity’. Recent findings are discussed which relate to the neurophysiological underpinnings of personality. It is suggested that these findings, and the associated model, lie outside the circulus vitiosus of factor analysis and therefore that they provide a basis for resolving the independence and duality issues. It is argued that the tendency for introversion-extraversion to correlate with neuroticism only reflects a degree of coincidence and not equivalence. The psychological coincidence is conceived as resulting from the anatomical linkage of different neurophysiological subsystems which provide the substrata for the two personality dimensions. It is also argued that the ‘sociability’ and ‘impulsivity’ duality relates to distinct ‘sensitivity’ and ‘synergistic’ aspects of thalamocortical arousability. These distinct arousability dimensions nevertheless both contribute to the effectiveness of descending inhibitory projections that act on the brain-stem reticular formation and hence determine introversion-extraversion differences. In this scheme of things the three psychological dimensions are different but again there are anatomical linkage correlations reflecting coincidence rather than equivalence.     

Personality changes with ageing

This paper is concerned with the integration of research on ageing with Eysenck's personality theory and in particular the personality dimension of introversion-extraversion. It is argued that older people behave like extraverts on a number of laboratory tests but like introverts in their behaviour patterns. A solution is offered for these paradoxical tendencies.     

Introversion-Extraversion, Self-Monitoring, and Applicant Performance in a Situational Panel Interview: A Field Study

This study investigated relationships between applicant introversion-extraversion, self-monitoring, and performance in a situational panel interview. Police officers applying for promotion to the rank of sergeant in a metropolitan police department participated in a selection interview and completed a personality questionnaire. Results showed self-monitoring moderated the relation between introversion-extraversion and interview performance. As predicted, the relationship was stronger for low self-monitors than for high self-monitors. Extraverted, high self-monitoring and introverted, low self-monitoring promotion candidates were rated highest by selection interview panelists.     

Individual Differences in Monitoring Failures of Automation

Subjects included 24 non-pilots who performed simulated flight-related tasks of tracking, fuel-management, and system monitoring. Tracking and fuel management were performed manually, whereas system monitoring was automated. Subjects were required to detect system malfunctions not detected by the automation (automation failures). The reliability of the automation remained constant or varied over time. Subjects detected significantly fewer automation failures in the constant-reliability automation condition than in the variable-reliability condition. Inefficiency in monitoring for automation failure was examined in relation to three individual-difference measures: the Complacency Potential Rating Scale, the Eysenck Personality Inventory (introversion-extraversion), and a modified version of Thayer's Activation-Deactivation Adjective Check List (energetic arousal). These measures were not significantly intercorrelated, suggesting their relative independence. For subjects with high-complacency-potential scores, there was a correlation of - .42 between complacency potential and detection rate of automation failures. Introversion-extraversion was unrelated to monitoring performance. Finally, high energetic-arousal subjects had initially higher detection rates in the constant-reliability condition than did low-arousal subjects. The results suggest a modest relationship between individual differences in complacency potential and energetic-arousal and automation-related monitoring inefficiency.     

Birth order and introversion-extraversion

The relationship between birth order and introversion-extraversion was investigated. Subjects were 70 male and 77 female undergraduates, all from three-child families. The measure of introversion employed was the Social Introversion Scale (Scale 0) of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. A two-way analysis of variance indicated that first borns were more introverted than either middle-horns or last-horns, with no difference between the latter two groups. It was suggested that inconsistent results in this area may be due to the use of different measures of introversion.     

The Influence of Einstein on Wittgenstein's Philosophy

On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that (i) after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, (ii) the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase (more closely connected with Schlick's work), but also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following.     

The Oedipus complex: A confrontation at the central cross‐roads of psychoanalysis

The theory of the Oedipus complex as Freud formulated it rests on the following pillars: the child's characteristic sexual and aggressive impulses concerning the parents, phallic monism, and the castration complex. This paper reviews the context in which Freud discovered the Oedipus complex, as well as Freud's theory. It then examines the proposals of later authors whose general Oedipal theories differ from Freud's in an attempt to point out both their possible correlations and confrontations with Freud. It includes Klein's pre‐genital Oedipal theory, Lacan's structuralist reinterpretation, Bion's reconception of the complex under the knowledge vertex, Green's generalized triangulation theory, Meltzer's notions of the aesthetic object and sexual mental states, and Chasseguet‐Smirgel's archaic Oedipal matrix     

Marx and Cohen on Exploitation and the labor theory of value

Gerald A. Cohen, in ‘The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation’, argues that, contrary to the traditional assumption, Marx's charge of exploitation against capitalism does not require the labor theory of value. However, there is a related but simpler basis for the charge. Hence Marx's criticism can stand even if the labor theory of value falls. Furthermore, he argues that the labor theory of value is false. It is argued here that Cohen is mistaken; the charge Marx makes against capitalism does require the labor theory of value. Cohen's conception of exploitation is weaker than Marx's both theoretically and morally. It is also argued that Cohen's criticisms of the labor theory of value rest on misunderstandings of the theory and Marx's methodology.     

On Kantians and Pragmatists: Kenneth Baynes's Habermas

In this article I lay out Kenneth Baynes's interpretation of Habermas's social and political philosophy, and develop three lines of criticism. The first concerns the question of whether, and if so in what respect, Habermas's political theory counts as a critical social theory. I argue that it is not clear in what sense Habermas's political theory is a ‘critical’ social theory, and that Baynes's interpretation throws little light on this issue. The second related issue is to what extent it can be fairly claimed that on Habermas's account of democracy, political legitimacy rests on a “core morality”. While there is a possible reconstruction of Habermas along these lines, I argue that it conflicts with the central tenets of Habemras's political theory. Finally, I question whether Baynes is right to align Habermas's ideal of public reason so closely with Rawls's.     

Discovering the Inner Life of a Child

Abstract

Using Winnicott's concept of transitional space, joint attention, theory of mind, and a case vignette, the author describes techniques in elucidating and elaborating a child's play space, hence, psychic life. Explicating the child's theory of mind uncovers the dynamics, motives, conflicts, and unconscious material used by the analyst to form interpretations and encourage the child's self-reflective function (Fonagy & Target, 1996). Finally, a case vignette illustrates the enhancement of play space by elucidating the child's theory of mind.     

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’‐Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.     

Impossible objects∗

This paper deals with the Meinong‐Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinonj;'s theory of nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter‐objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well‐known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects.     

The problem of real trauma and the future of psychoanalysis

Abstract

Contemporary psychoanalysis emphasizes the role of “real” trauma, as it is well shown by recent sociological and theoretical developments (such as Kohut's Self psychology, object relation theory, renewed interest in Ferenczi's and Sullivan's contributions, etc.). To understand more clearly these developments, the author traces again the steps laid down by Freud in building the psychoanalytic edifice. The renewed interest in the environment, in real traumas, and in the vicissitudes of object relations could be a “paradigm change” in psychoanalysis: a return to Freud's original seduction theory. This development is seen as related to the difficulties of Freud's drive theory.     

Hegel on Space: A Critique of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

This paper considers Hegel's views on space and his account of Kant's theory of space. I show that Hegel's discussions of space exhibit a deep understanding of Kant's apriority argument in the first Critique , commit him to the central premise of that argument, and separate his concerns from the familiar problem of the neglected alternative. Nevertheless, Hegel makes two objections to Kant's theory of space. First, he argues that the theory is internally inconsistent insofar as Kant's identification of space with an a priori intuition is incompatible with the doctrine of productive imagination in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Second, Hegel argues that the apriority argument is insufficiently critical insofar as it relies upon an unexamined theory of subjectivity as a set of representational capacities. I conclude by outlining Hegel's strategy for undermining the assumptions concerning subjectivity that give form to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Because Hegel's positive views on space depend upon his articulation of an alternate notion of subjectivity, the account of Hegel's position on space offered here remains incomplete. On the other hand, considering Hegel's discussions of space demonstrates both the nature and the importance of his examination of subjectivity in the Phenomenology.     

A Theory of Tragic Experience According to Hegel

Abstract: Hegel's theory of tragedy is often considered to be primarily a theory of the objective powers involved in tragic conflicts—for Hegel, these are paradigmatically competing ethical notions—and of the rationality which underlies and drives such conflicts. Such a view follows naturally from a close reading of Hegel's discussion of classical Greek tragedy in his Lectures on Aesthetics. However, this view gives rise to the question of whether Hegel's theory of tragedy can account for the significance of tragic experience, in particular the experience of tragic suffering; it has been argued repeatedly that it cannot. In contrast, I want to suggest in this paper that a theory of tragic experience can be derived from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. This Hegelian theory of tragic experience, I argue, should be understood as complementing rather than challenging Hegel's theory of objective tragic conflict.