The Feeling of Not Knowing It All

How do consumers assess their mastery of knowledge they have learned? We explore this question by investigating a common knowledge consumption situation: encountering opportunities for further learning. We argue and show that such opportunities can trigger a feeling‐of‐not‐knowing‐it‐all (FONKIA), which lowers consumers’ confidence in their mastery of the knowledge they already possess. Specifically, listing optional follow‐up readings at the conclusion of a course lowered students’ confidence in their mastery of the course material they had already learned (Study 1). Encountering an optional learning opportunity increased the FONKIA, which mediated the decreased confidence (Studies 2 and 3). We also document two moderators consistent with our conceptualization. First, participants primed with mastery (vs. instrumental) motivation were more negatively impacted when they encountered optional learning opportunities. Second, the more related the optional opportunities were to the target topic, the lower participants’ confidence in their mastery of what they had already learned. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings, such as encouraging further learning or harming teaching evaluations.     

FOK产生机制的实验研究

采用Hart提出的RJR(回忆-FOK判断-再认)研究范式,通过两个实验对FOK产生机制的两种假说--线索熟悉性假说和靶项目提取可能性假说进行验证.实验一采用单因素被试内设计,即通过中、英文词对不同组合形成四种材料类型(中-中、英-中、中-英、英-英);实验二采用二因素被试内设计,即控制实验材料和呈现方式两个变量(2×2).结果表明,被试所做的FOK判断既不完全取决于线索熟悉.也不完全取决于靶项目的可提取性,而是取决于线索与靶子之间的联结强度.     

The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (“noetic feeling”) occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action.     

知晓感和学习判断产生机制的实验研究

以汉语配对词为实验材料,在已有实验研究的基础上,采用干扰模式进一步探讨了关于知晓感(Feeling of knowing)和学习判断(Judgment of learning)产生机制的四种理论假说,即线索熟悉性假说、目标提取假说、可接近性假说和竞争性假说。实验结果表明:在干扰条件下,知晓感和学习判断符合竞争性假说。     

Measuring Feeling of Knowing: Comment on Schraw (1995)

Schraw compares two coefficients for the 2×2 contingency tables resulting from many feeling of knowing (FOK) studies: Hamann's coefficient and Goodman and Kruskal's γ. He favours Hamann's coefficient and gives examples where Hamann's coefficient produces what might be considered the more intuitive result. Further scrutiny reveals that these examples are not as convincing as Schraw makes them out to be. Because Hamann's coefficient depends on the row and column marginals, it does not map onto FOK ability as well as Goodman and Kruskal's γ, which is a direct measure of the diagnostic worth of FOK ratings.     

The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper

In Koriat's paper “The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,” he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal.     

Predictive Feeling of Knowing Judgements and Postdictive Confidence Judgements in Eyewitness Memory and General Knowledge

Recent accounts of feeling of knowing (FOK) judgements assume that they arise from an assessment of cue familiarity, whilst retrospective confidence judgements arise from an assessment of the retrieval process. An experiment was conducted to extend this laboratory work to the area of eyewitness memory, in order to examine whether subjects are able to make accurate feeling of knowing judgements and retrospective confidence judgements for eyewitness memory (EM), in contrast to general knowledge (GK). For confidence judgements there was a reliable within-subject assessment of confidence for both GK and EM, but reliable between-subjects confidence—accuracy correlations for general knowledge only. For FOK a different pattern emerged, with no evidence of FOK accuracy for eyewitness memory at all. The theoretical implications of this pattern are discussed.     

知道感与不知道感：两种不同的认知加工过程——一项来自行为实验的证据

脑成像研究表明,准确的知晓感（FOK）可以分为知道感和不知道感,两者可能依赖不同的大脑机制实现。该研究通过两个实验,检验了线索和靶子的频率对FOK判断准确性的影响,并在行为水平上考察了“知道感和不知道感可能通过不同的认知过程来实现”的假设。实验一表明：靶子字的频率对FOK判断的准确性有影响,即靶子为低频字时,FOK判断的准确性降低;同时,线索和靶子的字频对知道感和不知道感判断的等级没有影响。实验二显示：线索熟悉性只影响准确的不知道感判断等级,而靶项目强度只影响准确的知道感判断等级,即产生了非交叉的双重分离。综上,我们发现了靶子的字频对FOK判断准确性的影响,并从行为实验的角度证实,知道感和不知道感依赖不同的认知加工过程。     

强迫倾向、内心体验的信心水平与知道感缺乏的关系

为探讨强迫倾向、内心体验的信心水平与知道感缺乏的关系,采用虚假生物反馈为内在状态的外部线索,以指导语操控被试内心体验的信心水平,考察高、低强迫倾向（high/low obsessive-compulsive tendencies, HOC/LOC）组在不同信心水平下依赖外部线索评价内在状态的情况。结果：(1)HOC组的知道感存在缺陷,表现为比LOC组更依赖外部线索评价内在状态;(2)HOC组的知道感缺乏受其信心水平的影响,低信心会加剧HOC组的知道感缺乏。本研究结果能为缓解HOC个体的怀疑及相关强迫症状提供帮助,并或许能为OCD认知和元认知治疗提供思路。     

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.     

Beliefless Knowing

Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.