Habla Ingles? The Effects of Language Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions1

Two studies were conducted in which college students, acting as simulated jurors, heard the testimony of a defendant in an assault case. The testimony was presented in English or in another language (Spanish in Study 1 and Thai in Study 2) which was translated into English by an interpreter. In Study 1, non-Hispanics judged the defendant to be more guilty than did Hispanics when the defendant's testimony was presented in Spanish than when it was presented in English. This bias was offset when the judge's instructions admonished the jurors to ignore the fact that the defendant's testimony was translated. Similarly, in Study 2, subjects (all non-Thai) judged the defendent more guilty when his testimony was presented in Thai than when it was presented in English. Again, this bias was eliminated by the judge's instructions to the jurors to ignore the fact that the testimony was translated. The increased guilty verdicts for defendants who did not testify in English appeared to be due to prejudice and language ethnocentrism, the belief that defendants in U.S. courts should speak English.     

Polygraph Testimony and Juror Judgments: A Comparison of the Guilty Knowledge Test and the Control Question Test1

The present experiment investigated the impact of the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) on the verdicts of mock jurors. Although studies have indicated that polygraph evidence has little influence on jurors' verdicts (Cavoukian & Heselgrave, 1980; Spanos, Myers, Dubreuil, & Pawlak, 1992–1993), no research has previously distinguished between the different types of polygraph tests and their impact on juror verdicts. In the present study, jurors were shown a videotape of a simulated rape-murder trial that contained either CQT polygraph evidence, GKT polygraph evidence, or no polygraph evidence. No differences were found among the 3 conditions for either jury verdicts or individual juror verdicts, and jurors tended to rate both forms of polygraph testimony below other forms of equally suspect evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, in its influence on their decision-making process.     

The Influence of Eyewitness Nonidentifications on Mock-Jurors' Judgments of a Court Case1

Two experiments examined the effect of an eyewitness nonidentificution on mock-jurors' verdicts in robbery cases, as well as the effects of number of identifying eyewitnesses and status of the identifying witness (victim or bystander). Subjects read court case summaries that included variable eyewitness evidence and constant alibi, circumstantial, and character evidence. In Experiment 1, frequency of guilty verdicts was significantly less when an eyewitness testified in court that the defendant was not the perpetrator, even when this nonidentification opposed two positive identifications. In Experiment 2, a low guilty rate was again associated with the presence of a nonidentifier, but only when the nonidentifier actually testified in court and stipulated that the defendant is “not the man.” On the average, 70% of the jurors delivered guilty verdicts when both the victim and bystander gave identifying testimony, whereas 12.5% delivered guilty verdicts when the bystander gave opposing nonidentifying testimony. Guilty rates were unaffected by the identifying eyewitness' status and (in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1) were higher when there were two (vs. one) identifying eyewitnesses.     

The Timing of the Defense Opening Statement: Don't Wait Until the Evidence Is in1

Defense attorneys often reserve their opening statements until after presentation of evidence by the prosecution, a practice advocated by some experts. The current study, involving 291 subjects, varied the timing of the defense attorney's opening statement so that it preceded the prosecutor's opening statement, immediately followed the prosecutor's opening statement, or was reserved until after the prosecutor's case presentation. The type of opening statement (content vs. noncontent) and the testimony (altered vs. unaltered) were varied for purposes of increasing generalization. Materials were based on an actual case of auto theft and were presented in written form complete with judge's instructions. The results showed that subjects perceived eyewitness testimony, the prosecutor's opening statement, the prosecutor's closing statement, the defense attorney's closing statement, and the effectiveness of the attorneys differently depending on the timing of the opening statement. Each of these items favored the defense more than the prosecution if the defense opening statement was earlier rather than later. These effects did not interact with type of opening statement or the testimony alteration variable. Individual verdicts, when weighted by the subjects' confidence in their verdicts, were also affected by the timing variable with verdicts more favorable to the defense when the defense opening statement was given earlier rather than later. The consistency with which the timing variable affected subjects' impressions suggests that defense attorneys who take their first opportunity to make an opening statement, rather than delay, end up with a stronger case for their client. Possible exceptions to this conclusion are discussed.     

Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting the Child Witness Jeopardize Due Process?1

Videotaping depositions may protect a child witness from the stress of testifying in court but also may influence jurors’ perceptions of the child and the defendant, and jurors’ verdicts in systematic ways. The present study examines several psychological hypotheses that emerge from the controversy over the use of videotaped depositions of child witnesses in child sexual abuse trials. We predicted that student jurors viewing a videotaped deposition would be more proprosecution and less prodefense than those who did not receive testimony in such a form. Thus, it was predicted that jurors viewing a videotaped deposition would perceive the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies more favorably, the defense witnesses and their testimonies less favorably, and give more guilty verdicts than jurors who viewed identical testimony during the course of a trial. We also predicted that females would be more proprosecution and less prodefense than males and that this gender difference would be accentuated by the medium of presentation. The medium of presentation had only a few effects on jurors’ responses. However, when differences emerged, they generally provided support for the predicted main effects. The implications of these findings for the use of videotaped depositions of child sexual abuse victims are discussed.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: Much ado about nothing

The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984(IDRA), passed in the wake of Hinckley (1981) and after two years of Senate and House testimony and debate, removed the “volitional” prong of the ALI test, leaving only the “cognitive” prong. Prior empirical research and speculation suggested that this corrective would not serve its intended purpose. In this experiment, 54 mock jurors received one of four insanity test instructions: IDRA, ALI, a wild beast/mens rea test, or no instructions. Results showed that the test instructions did not produce significantly different verdict patterns, or effect in any other way the relevant and determinative constructs that jurors used in four different insanity cases.     

Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors

Predecisional distortion is jurors' biased interpretation of new evidence to support whichever verdict is tentatively favored as a trial progresses. In 2 experiments, students and prospective jurors distorted evidence from a mock trial. Further, the magnitude of prospective jurors' distortion was twice that of students. Consistent with previous research, distortion increased with juror confidence in whichever verdict was currently leading. In spite of clear instructions to ignore prior beliefs, general proplaintiff or prodefendant attitudes influenced the verdicts of prospective jurors, but not of students. These findings suggest that jury instructions should warn against not only premature decisions but also any tentative judgments, lest such opinions influence jurors' evaluations of subsequent evidence. Predecisional distortion in jury trials may lead to biased outcomes resulting from evidence order effects.     

How effective are the cross-examination and expert testimony safeguards? Jurors' perceptions of the suggestiveness and fairness of biased lineup procedures

Mock jurors (N = 800) viewed a videotaped trial that included information about a lineup identification procedure. Suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure varied in terms of foil, instruction, and presentation biases. Expert testimony regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness was also manipulated. Criteria included juror ratings of lineup suggestiveness and fairness, ratings of defendant culpability, and verdicts. Jurors were sensitive to foil bias but only minimally sensitive to instruction and presentation biases. Expert testimony enhanced juror sensitivity only to instruction bias. These results have implications for the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identifications.     

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty‐one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high‐quality or low‐quality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question‐order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Integration Theory,Juror Bias,and Sentence Recommendations Captured Over Time in a Capital Trial

Initial juror verdicts have been shown to predict final verdicts, leading researchers to conclude that jurors seek confirmatory information during trial (confirmation bias) or distort information to fit pre‐existing biases (pre‐decisional distortion). However, Information Integration Theory suggests that individuals are not distorting/ignoring this information, and instead, information influences judgments in the direction of the message. The current study sought to test these competing theories in a juror setting. Mock jurors were presented with the sentencing phase of a capital trial and were asked to give sentence recommendations at eight different time points. Additionally, they were grouped by their pretrial bias as being pro‐defense, neutral, or pro‐prosecution. Results showed support for Information Integration Theory; although jurors' pretrial bias predicted final sentence, sentence recommendations were affected in the direction of the testimony presented throughout the trial (e.g., pro‐defense testimony lowered death penalty decisions across all groups). Implications and future directions are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonadversarial Methods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence

Tested the effects, on juror decision making, of court-appointed expert testimony and judge's instructions designed to sensitize jurors to eyewitness evidence. Subjects ( N = 144) viewed a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence was the testimony of and identification by an eyewitness. Three levels of expert advice (court-appointed expert, judge's instructions, no expert advice) were crossed with two levels of witnessing and identification conditions and two levels of witness confidence The court-appointed expert produced skepticism toward the identification but did not improve juror sensitivity to the eyewitness evidence. The judge's instructions produced neither skepticism or sensitization effects.     

"Recipe for a Jury" Revisited: A Balance Theory Prediction

This study examined the relationship of three variables to verdict confidence in an experimental simulation of the jury deliberation process. The three variables were: sex of juror, verdict (guilty or innocent), and the similarity or dissimilarity between juror and confederate verdicts (congruence or incongruence). The subjects were 35 male and 37 female college students. They deliberated in groups containing a male confederate who role-played an obnoxious anti-White or anti-Black juror. Results indicated that before deliberation, male and guilt verdict jurors were more confident than females and innocent verdict jurors. After deliberation, however, sex differences in verdict confidence were absent while innocent verdicts jurors were more confident than guilt verdict jurors. Most important, as predicted from Heider's Balance Theory, males who deliberated with a confederate whose verdict was congruent with theirs' became less confident in their verdicts. Unexpectedly, females became more confident. The study's major hypothesis, then, that it may be advantageous for the defense to accept a juror who zealously advocates a guilty verdict, was only supported for males.     

The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Disobey the Law1

The United States judiciary assumes jurors obey the law as it is charged to them in the trial judge's instructions. This paper contends that jurors' comprehension of the law results from an active intelligence which makes available alternative decision rules giving rise to the power of juries to nullify instructions. To study the compliance assumption, we presented to mock jurors pattern jury instructions along with summaries of testimonies from a rape trial. Four times during the trial we administered to participants measures of their attributions of defendant responsibility, judgments about the legal elements of the case, and verdicts. Multiple regressions conducted with data from separate subsamples and with separate questionnaire administrations revealed that a) verdicts were based on attributions independent of the jury instructions, b) individual differences in life experiences predicted the degree to which decision makers used their attributions, and c) the more practiced participants were at applying the jury instructions the more heavily they weighed their own attributions and less heavily the judgments required by the law. We concluded that comprehension alone cannot predict the likelihood that jurors will comply with the law. Therefore, the assumption that jurors follow the law needs to be more carefully considered.     

The effect of jury deliberations on jurors' propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence

The goal of this research was to examine the effect of jury deliberations on juror's propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence. Extant research is inconclusive; some research indicates that jurors do follow judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence, but other research suggests that jurors do not. Two experiments examined whether jurors were affected by inadmissible evidence. The results revealed that although mock jurors were biased by inadmissible evidence prior to deliberations, the bias was tempered following deliberations. In Experiment 1, post deliberation jurors disregarded incriminating evidence that was ruled inadmissible because of due-process concerns. Experiment 2 replicated these results with less incriminating inadmissible evidence and also revealed that jurors did not accurately gauge the impact that the inadmissible evidence had on their verdicts. Theoretical and judicial policy implications are discussed.     

Effects of physical attractiveness on evaluations of a male employee's allegation of sexual harassment by his female employer

College students (N = 324) served as mock jurors in a simulated civil case in which a male plaintiff accused a female defendant of sexual harassment. The authors experimentally manipulated the physical attractiveness of the litigants. The authors asked mock jurors to decide whether the defendant was guilty and to rate their certainty of belief in the defendant's guilt (or lack of guilt). Jurors were more certain of the guilt of the defendant when the plaintiff was attractive than when he was unattractive. Plaintiff attractiveness significantly affected female jurors' individual recommended verdicts when the defendant was unattractive but not when she was attractive. With male jurors, plaintiff attractiveness significantly affected their verdicts when the defendant was attractive but not when she was unattractive. Female jurors were more likely than male jurors to conclude that sexual harassment had taken place but only when the litigants were different in attractiveness.     

Juror Preference for Curative Alternative Verdicts for Veterans With PTSD

Two studies examined mock juror verdicts for veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system. Mock jurors demonstrated a leniency toward treatment bias for veterans with PTSD who committed a violent crime, compared to a nonviolent crime. This leniency toward treatment bias occurred only when alternative verdict options, beyond guilty or not guilty, were available. In fact, a guilt bias was demonstrated by mock jurors when the only verdict options were guilty or not guilty, and a bias toward treatment was demonstrated when curative alternative verdicts were available. Implications for efforts to address the growing national problem of veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system are discussed.     

Well…ah…: Hesitations and Hedges as an Influence on Jurors' Decisions1

Hispanic jurors' verdicts and whether these decisions were related to jurors' judgments of the credibility of the witness were the focus of this experiment. A prosecution witness testified in English or in Spanish with interpretation in English. Witnesses' speaking style systematically included hedges and hesitations or did not. Guilty verdicts were independent of language of testimony. Within Spanish‐interpreted conditions, jurors convicted the defendant 47% of the time in the absence of hedges and hesitations. When he hedged and hesitated, they convicted 34% of the time. This effect was complicated by a reliable Witness Hesitation × Juror Language Dominance interaction. These results are interpreted in the context of the courtroom impact of non‐English‐speaking witnesses and the impact of interpretation.