Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability

In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option.     

The Future of the New World that Was Supposed to Be

Abstract :  "North‐South" divides usually overlook the fact that Latin America was also part of the New World. It was only after WW II that these countries were lumped together in a large bunch called "third world." For the sake of simplicity, this paper restricts itself to the period when Liberation Theology made its appearance until now. Even though the seventies devised an autonomous Christianity, with its own traits and purposes, nowadays the churches are back in the mainstream. Issues that engage Christians there are not unlike their counterparts in "the North," thanks to globalization. Demographic changes are still more important than cultural ones, and economic prospects are more likely to interfere in the shape of Christianity than the will and emotions of leaders and the faithful alike.     

Mothers and Independent Citizens: Making Sense of Wollstonecraft's Supposed Essentialism

Abstract

Mary Wollstonecraft argues that women must be independent citizens, but that they cannot be that unless they fulfill certain duties as mothers. This is problematic in a number of ways, as argued by Laura Brace in a 2000 article. However, I argue that if we understand Wollstonecraft's concept of independence in a republican, rather than a liberal context, and at the same time pay close attention to her discussion of motherhood, a feminist reading of Wollstonecraft is not only possible but enriching. I will attempt to show, in particular, that the seeds of a feminist argument for co-parenting are to be found in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman.     

Why Assessment Centers Do Not Work the Way They Are Supposed To

Assessment centers (ACs) are often designed with the intent of measuring a number of dimensions as they are assessed in various exercises, but after 25 years of research, it is now clear that AC ratings that are completed at the end of each exercise (commonly known as postexercise dimension ratings) substantially reflect the effects of the exercises in which they were completed and not the dimensions they were designed to reflect. This is the crux of the long-standing "construct validity problem" for AC ratings. I review the existing research on AC construct validity and conclude that (a) contrary to previous notions, AC candidate behavior is inherently cross-situationally (i.e., cross-exercise) specific, not cross-situationally consistent as was once thought, (b) assessors rather accurately assess candidate behavior, and (c) these facts should be recognized in the redesign of ACs toward task- or role-based ACs and away from traditional dimension-based ACs.     

The Supposed Effect of Interactive Imagery in Paired Associate Learning

Previous experiments designed to investigate the effects of interactive imagery in paired associate learning have included the confounded variable of intralist similarity: Images of objects interacting have corresponded to pairs with different connectives, and images of independent objects have corresponded to pairs with the same connective (the conjunction 'and'). For the 'different' group of our first experiment, the members of the different pairs were linked by different connectives, most of which denoted an action. For the 'same' group, the members were linked by the same connective, usually one denoting an action. For the 'and' group, the members were linked by the connective 'and'. Cued recall by the 'different' group was superior to that of the other two groups. Recall by the 'same' and 'and' groups did not differ. Within the 'different' group, recall of 'and' pairs did not differ from the recall of 'action' pairs with which they had been mixed. In a second experiment, subjects were required to match the members of a pair. Analogous results were obtained. Overall, the findings imply that recall effects that have previously been interpreted as being a result of interactive imagery may be the result merely of variations in intralist similarity.     

On a Supposed Solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title ‘Objection R/S’ and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S.     

Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All

In this article I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claim face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllister's ‘aesthetic induction’ model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic but are in fact ‘masked’ epistemic assessments.     

Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer

A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by showing that this learning is, under another aspect, the incision of language, namely the infliction of cuts upon certain natural-primitive unities between the inner and the outer. These cuts, driven by powerful forces, eventually harden into an entrenched division between the inner and the outer, thereby providing a constant soil for the dualism. That this dualism is rooted in the very learning of a language is cause for ambivalence about language.     

Peter McHugh and Analysis: The One and the Many, the Universal and the Particular, the Whole and the Part

This paper takes the passing of Peter McHugh as an occasion to examine the intellectual development of his work. The paper is mainly focused on the product of his collaboration with his colleague and friend, Alan Blum. As such, it addresses the tradition of social inquiry, Analysis, which they cofounded. It traces the influence of Harold Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology on McHugh and on the beginning of Analysis. The collaboration with Blum is examined through a variety of coauthored works but most especially in the two books On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (1974) and Self Reflection in the Arts and Sciences (1984). It also examines the relation of his independent writing before 1974, and since 1984 to the expression of the tradition of inquiry as exemplified in those two texts. The paper builds on some interview material with Peter McHugh and reflects on the influence of Peter the teacher as well as the theorist McHugh. Most especially, through its engagement with this material, it seeks to exemplify the dialectic and living nature of the program called Analysis.     

Yin and Yang,and the Hot and the Cold

Yin and Yang are important concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy.Western scholars have become more familiar with these two concepts recently,but for a long time almost no one considered comparing them with their own tradition such as the ancient Greek philosophy,and especially with the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Presocratic philosophy.In this paper,I make an attempt to do exactly that,and especially make a detailed comparison between the thoughts of two ancient thinkers:Laozi and Anaximander.I discuss the thought of Yin and Yang in Laozi-who was the earliest philosopher making use of the concepts Yin and Yang-to express his cosmological thought in ancient Chinese philosophy.Comparatively,I discuss the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Anaximander,the earlier among Presocratic philosophers referring to the Hot and the Cold as fundamental concepts used to establish his cosmological system.Through this comparison,I indicate that the similarity between ancient Chinese and Western traditions is far more significant than what people are used to imagining.     

经济全球化与东西方宗教

本文认为,由于科技的高度发展,信息网络技术的普及,经济全球化已成为不可逆转的发展趋势;而经济全球化必然带来东西方宗教的种种变化。作者从传统宗教的复兴、民族宗教的冲突、宗教与政治的结缘。宗教的普世化与本色化、新兴宗教的异军突起及东西方宗教的交流与融合等６个方面分析了当前东西方宗教的这种发展趋势。     

Glossolalia and the psychology of the self and narcissism

A survey of the religious and psychological literature on glossolalia (speaking in tongues) reviews the various ways that have been used to try to understand this fascinating practice. At the present time an impasse has been reached: glossolalists can no longer be viewed as suffering from psychopathological disorders or from sociological deprivation. Insights derived from the psychology of the self and narcissism, as presented in the works of Heinz Kohut and D.W. Winnicott, are used to suggest new approaches to understand glossolalia.     

Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens

While self-contained, this paper is a sequel to my Belief and the Will (1984); see theBibliographical Note at the end of this paper for a survey of the relevant literature since then and supplementary references. I have meanwhile benefitted greatly from Brad Armendt's commentary and Richard Foley's How should future opinion affect current opinion?, both presented at a symposium at the APA Central Division, April 1993.     

Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in the Groundwork and the B-Critique

ABSTRACT

According to some influential readings of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and the significance of such self-consciousness is irremediably at odds with the Critical theory, and thus roundly and rightly rejected in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the Groundwork can be read as articulating for the first time the account of self-consciousness and spontaneity that Kant goes on to develop in the B-Critique, especially the B-Transcendental Deduction.