Mirrors and Misleading Appearances

Although philosophers have often insisted that specular perception is illusory or erroneous in nature, few have stressed the reliability and indispensability of mirrors as optical instruments. The main goal of this paper is to explain how mirrors can contribute to knowledge and at the same time be a source of systematic errors and misleading appearances. To resolve this apparent paradox, I argue that mirrors do not generate perceptual illusions or misperceptions, by defending a view of mirrors as transparent and invisible visual media. I then consider the reasons for which mirrors are said to be misleading. Contrary to the illusory account, I defend a nonperceptual approach to the errors attributable to mirrors, which analyses the kind of errors generated by the use of mirrors in terms of false judgments. I further show that a nonperceptual view of errors extends to all of the cases in which a sensorimotor adaptation is required, such as perception through magnifying or inversing lenses.     

Appearances can be deceiving

Conclusion I began by claiming that I simply wanted to undermine the plausibility of the appeal to appearances in matters of perceptual belief. Most of the arguments I have offered, however, have been more strongly stated, viz., I have apparently tried to eliminate them rather than simply render them less credible. But the notion of appearances is deeply entrenched, so much so that simply undermining their credibility may require overstating the case somewhat. The central theme of the above arguments is that appealing to appearances misleads us. The appeal misleads us into giving the wrong sorts of explanation, both with respect to the psychology of perceptual belief formation and the justification of perceptual beliefs. In short, appearances can be deceiving. And they probably are.A distant (if now unrecognizable) ancestor of this paper was first read at the 12th Annual Louisiana Philosophy Convention in October, 1988. Steve Fuller also offered comments on an intermediate version. I am especially grateful to Norton Nelkin who has read and commented on several versions. He should not be held complicit, however.     

Luminous calibration of oscilloscopic displays

Procedures are described for adjusting the intensity of computer-driven oscilloscopic displays. The adjustment maintains a fixed intensity level on different occasions and equates the brightness of brief stimuli displayed for different durations (i.e., compensates for the effects of time-intensity reciprocity).     

Appearances,antirealism, and Aristotle

Summary Nussbaum misconstrues the difference between Plato and Aristotle over what is real for a debate over a conception of truth. She seems to mistake Aristotle's arguments against Plato' version of realism as an argument against realism per se, though the texts do not permit such a reading. She claims Aristotle is convinced that realism involves a fatal failure of reference, yet she produces not a single text where Aristotle is even remotely concerned about such a failure of reference given the commitments of realism. And nowhere is the crucial question of the relationship between Aristotle's antirealism and his method of appearances explicitly addressed or resolved.Nussbaum offers us a fashionable Aristotle. I have argued that, far from being attractive and obviously right on a deep and recent metaphysuical debate, Nussbaum's Aristotle is confused and inconsistent and thus that it is a good thing the texts do not support such a characterization.     

Luminous enough for a cognitive home

In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.

Shuffling arrays: Appearances may be deceiving

Random permutations of arrays are widely used in experimentation and simulation, and most arrays are shuffled by means of a computer-based algorithm. In this paper, I show that despite theappearance of a random process, a shuffling procedure must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether it actually does produce random shuffles. A general sequence-transformation procedure is developed for evaluating permutation and shuffling schemes. Applying the transformation procedure and using the criteria that all possible sequences must be equally likely and that each object in a shuffled array must be equally likely to occupy each possible position in the shuffled array, we see that one algorithm meets the criteria, while another seemingly adequate algorithm fails to meet the criteria and, in addition, exhibits systematic deviations from randomness.     

Similarity and Numerical Equivalence: Appearances Count

The present study investigated whether preschool children recognize numerical equivalence between sets that vary in similarity. The relation between emergence of accurate numerical equivalence judgments and acquisition of the conventional counting system was also explored. The results of this investigation provide evidence for two main conclusions. First, the ability to recognize numerical equivalence for different sets emerges gradually during the period from 3 to 4 years of age depending on the degree of overall similarity between the sets. Second, conventional counting ability is linked to success on some but not all comparisons, suggesting that acquisition of the labels for various set sizes might aid in abstraction of numerical relations.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances

A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn’t compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.     

The New Color Complex: Appearances and Biracial Identity

Ethnic identity research has largely focused on the identity choices of White ethnics (Alba, 1990; Ignatiev, 1995; Waters, 1990). One key factor in these choices is bodily appearance. We extend this research to Black and White Biracial individuals and examine the role that physical appearance plays in their "choices" of racial identity. We test Rockquemore's (1999) taxonomy of Biracial identity using survey data from a sample of 177 Biracial respondents. The results indicate that Biracial individuals do make choices within circumscribed cultural contexts and these understandings are influenced not by skin color, but by an actor's assumption of how others perceive his or her appearance.     

Beyond Appearances: Citizenship Tests in Canada and the UK

Citizenship tests are increasingly used by national governments as part of their naturalization procedures. Several analysts suggest that citizenship tests are indicative of a converging trend toward civic integration, especially in Europe. The reform of the Canadian citizenship test in 2009?C2010 represents an opportunity to examine the mobilization of tests in different national context. Are citizenship tests necessary the central tools of civic integration policies? In order to answer this question, this article first argues that it is crucial to understand citizenship tests as public policy instruments. Using the approach developed by Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick LeGalès, the article compares the emergence and characteristics of the citizenship tests implemented by Canada and the United Kingdom. Stemming from this analysis, this article demonstrates that the two citizenship tests are different instruments despite their similar appearances. The Canadian test remains, despite the reform, an instrument to promote naturalization and integration. In contrast, in addition to promoting civic integration, the British test is also an instrument of immigration control.     

Luminous targets: Visibility fluctuations modified by similar verbal responses

Ss reported visibility fluctuations in a luminous target consisting of small, medium, and large circles. Each S had previously learned a response to each of the three circles. The experimental group learned two words which were free associates of each other and a third unrelated word. The control group learned three unrelated words. Concurrent visibility for the pair of circles associated with related words was greater than for the pairs associated with unrelated words. Thus word associations influence perception of stimuli for which the words are responses.     

Appearances aren't everything: shape classifiers and referential processing in Cantonese

Cantonese shape classifiers encode perceptual information that is characteristic of their associated nouns, although certain nouns are exceptional. For example, the classifier tiu occurs primarily with nouns for long-narrow-flexible objects (e.g., scarves, snakes, and ropes) and also occurs with the noun for a (short, rigid) key. In 3 experiments, we explored how the semantic information encoded in shape classifiers influences language comprehension. When judging the fit between classifiers and depicted objects in an explicit ranking task, Cantonese speakers evaluated classifier-noun pairings solely in terms of grammatical well-formedness and showed no separate sensitivity to the shape features of objects. In an eye-tracking task (Experiment 2), we also found little sensitivity to shape classifier semantics during real-time comprehension. However, in a subsequent experiment in which referent objects lacked the prototypical features for their accompanying classifiers (Experiment 3), an influence of shape semantics was found in participants' incidental fixations to nontarget objects. We conclude that shape classifiers influence referential interpretation primarily through their grammatical constraints, consistent with the agreementlike nature of classifiers in general. The role of shape classifiers' semantics on processing is apparent only in specific circumstances.     

The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves

According to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to the thing in itself that appears as that object. I raise various indiscernibility arguments against that view; because an appearance has different spatiotemporal and modal properties than a thing in itself, no appearance can be identical to a thing in itself. I point out that these arguments are similar to arguments against Monism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to the matter of which they are made. I outline some strategies Monists have developed to respond to these indiscernibility arguments and then develop parallel responses on behalf of the Metaphysical One Object view. However, I then raise another indiscernibility argument, to which, I argue, the Metaphysical One Object view cannot respond, even using the resources I have developed thus far. I develop a modified version of the Metaphysical One Object view that can respond to this new indiscernibility argument, but, I argue, this modified version of the One Object view is only a terminological variant of the Two Object view. When the Metaphysical One Object view is fully thought through it becomes the Two Object view. I conclude that Kantian appearances are not numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear to us.     

Islam and Human Rights: A Case of Deceptive First Appearances

It is a common belief that Islamic-based government, when serving as an ideological foundation for government, facilitates the poor protection of human rights. However, most studies of the relationship between Islam and individual rights have been at the theoretical and anecdotal levels. In this article, I test the relationship between Islam and human rights across a sample of 23 predominately Muslim countries and a control group of non-Muslim developing nations, while controlling for other factors that have been shown to affect human rights practices. I found that the influence of Islamic political culture on government has a statistically insignificant relationship with the protection of human rights.