Liberalism,Autonomy and Conjugal Love

Res Publica - This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage...     

Marriage, Autonomy, and the State: Reply to Christopher Bennett

Christopher Bennett has argued that state support of conjugal relationships can be founded on the unique contribution such relationships make to the autonomy of their participants by providing them with various forms of recognition and support unavailable elsewhere. I argue that, in part because a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to their participants. To the extent that intimate relationships can provide a unique form of reciprocal support, Bennett fails to show that couples have an advantage over multiple-partner arrangements in doing so.     

Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer

I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer's recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace.     

Alleviating love’s rage: Hegel on shame and sexual recognition

ABSTRACT

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s account of shame as a fundamental (‘existential’) affect. Qua spiritual, the human individual strives for self-determination; hence she is ashamed of the fact that, qua bodily or natural, she is weak, vulnerable, and needy – namely, externally determined. Hegel approves of two typical responses to shame: (1) Reduction – the individual struggles for honour in civil society by disciplining her activity, including hiding potentially shameful features from others. Here, shame is reduced but remains a psychological burden. (2) Within marriage, however, shame is alleviated – the individual reveals shameful features to her lover and is recognized as a bodily, needy and vulnerable creature. I discuss two modes in which such recognition is manifested. First, since love is an ‘immediate unity’ – rather than governed by a rigid normative code – the spouses are implicated in each other’s failures, and, moreover, can creatively modify the significance of features, expressing their ‘infinite uniqueness’ by conferring positive value on what counts (in civil society) as shameful. The second mode is sexual intimacy: lovers affirm each other’s bodies by bodily, habituated – and therefore trustworthy – means.     

Autonomy and the Normativity Question: Framing Considerations

Abstract

An initial interest in the question of whether one can autonomously choose to be non-autonomous has developed into the broader question of whether there are any normative commitments that necessarily attend being autonomous. This paper argues that reflection on this issue has been systematically hampered by a failure to realize that the normativity question does not delineate a single line of inquiry, but rather several different such lines; and that these differences depend on how certain key concepts embedded in the question are understood. The paper concludes by noting several lines of future research suggested by the present work.     

Taking the Love Pill: A Reply to Naar and Nyholm

In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centres on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill is used as a means, and that whether the love pill would fail or not fail to secure the final value we attribute to love, depends on this particular end.     

Perceived Work Competency and Sex Role Conflict: An Empirical Study

The present study examined sex role conflict, perceived work competency, and motivational needs among a broad sample of 298 working women and men (135 men, 163 women) at different hierarchical levels to see what possible gender differences existed in relationships among the variables. Correlation analysis and analysis of variance indicated that the female subjects had significantly higher levels of sex role conflict than the men, but a similar sense of work competency. Sex role conflict and perceived work competency were found to be negatively linked for the women but not for the men. Significant relationships were found between certain motivational needs and both sex role conflict and sense of work competency.     

教师的教学自主权与工作满意度的关系:教学自主性的中介作用

以北京、河北、宁夏、广东等地24所中小学923名中小学教师为被试,采取教学自主权量表、教学自主性量表、教师工作满意度量表,探讨了教师的教学自主权、教学自主性与工作满意度之间的关系。研究结果发现:(1)教学自主权与教学自主性均可显著预测教师工作满意度;(2)教学自主性在教学自主权与教师工作满意度之间起着完全中介作用,即教学自主权通过教师的教学自主性,对教师工作满意度有正向预测作用。     

Autonomy and radical evil: a Kantian challenge to constitutivism

Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to comply with it is to be understood as a deficiency in one’s integrity as an intentional agent. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments to the conclusion that immorality, moral evil, consists in choosing to give one’s unity as an intentional agent supremacy over the moral law, and that one’s being subject to the moral law must be one’s own free choice. And I explain how Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which we cannot be subject to the moral law without actually being morally evil, protects this conclusion from entailing the denial of the unconditionally binding character of moral principles, which character constitutivists correctly identify as the central concern of Kant’s – or any – moral philosophy.     

Ethics Consultation and Autonomy

Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist.     

A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism

Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.     

患者的自主权及困境

在生命伦理学中,尊重自主性原则是指尊重病人或受试者的自主性,可理解为病人自主原则。自主性的实现涉及到自主性的人与自主性的选择,面对复杂的医疗情境,患者自主权的实施面临着重重困境。从自主、病人自主原则、病人自主的实践三个层面讨论了该原则,并尝试用境遇伦理学原理来解决病人自主原则的实践困境。     

Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong

In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.     

The Early Marital Roots of Conjugal Distress and Divorce

This article summarizes research that challenges conventional wisdom about the early roots of marital distress and divorce. We abstract results from a 13-year study that focused on the extent to which long-term marital satisfaction and stability could be forecast from newlywed and early marital data. We explore the usefulness of three models emergent distress, enduring dynamics, and disillusionment designed to explain why some marriages thrive and others fail. The dominant paradigm, the emergent-distress model, sees newlyweds as homogeneously blissful and posits that distress develops as disagreements and negativity escalate, ultimately leading some couples to divorce. The results we summarize run counter to this model and suggest instead that (a) newlyweds differ considerably in the intensity of both their romance and the negativity of their behavior toward one another and, for those who remain married, these early dynamics persist over time; and (b) for couples who divorce, romance seems to deteriorate differently depending on how long the marriage lasts. Soon after their wedding, "early exiters" seem to lose hope of improving an unpromising relationship; "delayed-action divorcers" begin marriage on a particularly high note, yet quickly show signs of disillusionment. These delayed-action divorcers reluctantly give up on the marriage long after the romance has faded.     

Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent

Honoring a living will typically involves treating an incompetent patient in accord with preferences she once had, but whose objects she can no longer understand. How do we respect her “precedent autonomy” by giving her what she used to want? There is a similar problem with “subsequent consent”: How can we justify interfering with someone's autonomy on the grounds that she will later consent to the interference, if she refuses now? Both problems arise on the assumption that, to respect someone's autonomy, any preferences we respect must be among that person's current preferences. I argue that this is not always true. Just as we can celebrate an event long after it happens, so can we respect someone's wishes long before or after she has that wish. In the contexts of precedent autonomy and subsequent consent, the wishes are often preferences about which of two other, conflicting preferences to satisfy. When someone has two conflicting preferences, and a third preference on how to resolve that conflict, to respect his autonomy we must respect that third preference. People with declining competence may have a resolution preference earlier, favoring the earlier conflicting preference (precedent autonomy), whereas those with rising competence may have it later, favoring the later conflicting preference (subsequent consent). To respect autonomy in such cases we must respect not a current, but a former or later preference.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

Autonomy and reactions to health-risk information

It has been suggested that autonomy promotes enhanced reflection on novel information and reduces defensive or biased information processing. This study investigated how autonomy affected people's reactions to known versus novel health-risk information in relation to three behaviours: sun exposure, alcohol consumption and salt intake. Participants (N = 321) completed a measure of autonomy, read either known or novel health-risk information and reported their relative autonomous motivation, attitudes, perceived behavioural control, subjective norm and intentions towards reducing the health-risk behaviour concerned. In line with our hypotheses, the results showed that higher autonomy participants reported greater relative autonomous motivation towards reducing health-risk behaviours than did lower autonomy participants; this effect was mediated by perceptions of the information as less freedom-threatening. The expected interaction between Autonomy and Information Type was not observed. The results indicate that autonomy is associated with greater relative autonomous motivation to engage in health behaviours, and that autonomous motivation may subsequently influence intentions to reduce health-risk behaviour following exposure to health-risk information.     

Ignorance,Information and Autonomy

People have a powerful interest in geneticprivacy and its associated claim to ignorance,and some equally powerful desires to beshielded from disturbing information are oftenvoiced. We argue, however, that there is nosuch thing as a right to remain in ignorance,where a right is understood as an entitlementthat trumps competing claims. This doesnot of course mean that information must alwaysbe forced upon unwilling recipients, only thatthere is no prima facie entitlement to beprotected from true or honest information aboutoneself. Any claims to be shielded frominformation about the self must compete onequal terms with claims based in the rights andinterests of others. In balancing the weightand importance of rival considerations aboutgiving or withholding information, if rightsclaims have any place, rights are more likelyto be defensible on the side of honestcommunication of information rather than indefence of ignorance. The right to free speechand the right to decline to acceptresponsibility to take decisions for othersimposed by those others seem to us moreplausible candidates for fully fledged rightsin this field than any purported right toignorance. Finally, and most importantly, ifthe right to autonomy is invoked, a properunderstanding of the distinction between claimsto liberty and claims to autonomy show that theprinciple of autonomy, as it is understood incontemporary social ethics and English law,supports the giving rather than the withholdingof information in most circumstances.