The Infallibility of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium: A Critique of Some Recent Observations

This teaching of Vatican II raises the problem of how to know when the ordinary universal magisterium has proposed some doctrine as definitive. Fr. Francis A. Sullivan has put forth some principles that he claims are important for establishing that a doctrine has been definitively taught. Key to Sullivan's principles is the claim that the constant consensus of theologians is a sign and a necessary condition for establishing whether the ordinary universal magisterium has taught a particular doctrine as definitive. This essay argues against this claim. It maintains that while the consensus of theologians may be sign of definitive teachings, it is not a necessary condition for those teachings. Lastly, the essay suggests that the current discussion about the definitive, infallible teachings of the ordinary universal magisterium would be greatly aided if it took place in the context of the quest for catholicity in time and if it firmly kept in mind the nature of church as a communion.     

On the Consistency of Q-Matrix Estimation: A Rejoinder

This rejoinder responds to the commentary by Liu (Psychometrika, 2015) entitled “On the consistency of Q-matrix estimation: A commentary” on the paper “A general method of empirical Q-matrix validation” by de la Torre and Chiu (Psychometrika, 2015). It discusses and addresses three concerns raised in the commentary, namely the estimation accuracy when a provisional Q-matrix is used, the consistency of the Q-matrix estimator, and the computational efficiency of the proposed method.     

Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.     

方以智的三教融通论

从学科范畴、思想发展历程和思维方式等方面都能看出方以智哲学的融通特性;方以智"参自己本分禅"的禅心观认为,大道本来无常,无需劳神外求,唯心为三教融通的根本;他提倡的三教融通思想,主要指"体无内外,道无彼此"与一二合一的本体融通和"三即一,一即三"与"随"、"泯"、"统"的方法融通;其思想源于儒佛道三家相互融合的悠久历史、家学渊源和"归异于同"的方法等.     

More on the Power of God: A Rejoinder to William Hasker

In ‘The Power of God’ (Gleeson 2010) I elaborate and defend an argument by the late D.Z. Phillips against definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. In ‘Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew Gleeson’ (Hasker 2010), William Hasker criticizes my defense of Phillips’ argument. Here I contend his criticisms do not succeed. I distinguish three definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. Hasker agrees that the first fails. The second fails because negative properties (like disembodiedment and simplicity) do not amount to a nature that licenses the attribution of causal powers. The third fails because it does not identify actions that can be performed without a body. It cannot be saved by appeal to the idea of purely mental acts.     

On the Ordinary Concept of Death

What is death? The question is of wide‐ranging practical importance because we need to be able to distinguish the living from the dead in order to treat both appropriately; specifically, the permissibility of retrieving vital organs for transplantation depends upon the potential donor's ontological status. There is a well‐established and influential biological definition of death as irreversible breakdown in the functioning of the organism as a whole, but it continues to elicit disquiet and rejoinders. The central claims of this paper are that the best way to address the question as to what death is, is to attend closely to our ordinary concept of death; doing so reveals that, whilst our ordinary understanding accommodates the biological definition, it also includes the thought that, for someone who has died, there will never again be anything it is like to be that person. Support for these claims is provided, and their academic and practical implications traced. The important practical implication is that we are left in quandary as to whether certain potential organ donors — for example, anencephalic babies and the permanently vegetative — are dead, a quandary that has serious implications for the relevance of the dead donor rule in transplant ethics.     

THE UNIVERSALITY OF JEWISH ETHICS: A Rejoinder to Secularist Critics

Jewish ethics like Judaism itself has often been charged with being "particularistic," and in modernity it has been unfavorably compared with the universality of secular ethics. This charge has become acute philosophically when the comparison is made with the ethics of Kant. However, at this level, much of the ethical rejection of Jewish particularism, especially its being beholden to a God who is above the universe to whom this God prescribes moral norms and judges according to them, is also a rejection of Christian (or any other monotheistic) ethics, no matter how otherwise universal. Yet this essay argues that Jewish ethics that prescribes norms for all humans, and that is knowable by all humans, actually constitutes a wider moral universe than does Kantian ethics, because it can include non-rational human objects and even non-human objects altogether. This essay also argues that a totally egalitarian moral universe, encompassing all human relations, becomes an infinite, totalizing universe, which can easily become the ideological justification ( ratio essendi ) of a totalitarian regime.     

Mathematical constraints and the tulving-wiseman law: A Rejoinder

Abstract

Hintzman (1991; 1992) has claimed that the reason data points approximate the recognition failure function discovered by Tulving and Wiseman (1975) is that they are mathematically constrained to do so, and the reason that a few data points do not approximate the function, but are exceptions to it, is that these data points are less subject to mathematical constraints. He has additionally argued that such exceptions are more likely with low levels of recall and strong underlying sources of positive covariance. We provide empirical evidence relevant to this mathematical model using 301 observations from a database of all relevant experimental conditions published between 1973 and 1992 (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993). We conclude that mathematical constraints have only a minor influence on the function, not the causal role assigned to them in Hintzman's (1992) model. By our account, both the function and exceptions to it reflect a single psychological principle, the functional effectiveness of contextual cues.     

Modes of Cleaving to the Letters in the Teachings of Israel Baal Shem Tov: A Sample Analysis

The present study proposes to understand R. Israel Baal Shem Tov’s approach to cleaving as dealing predominantly with the oral dimension of the letters, namely, with their sounds while they are articulated in recitation of prayer or Torah study. This approach implies a more active type of engagement with the letters than has been assumed in earlier hasidic scholarship, which emphasized cleaving to the visual aspect of the letters. Moreover, according to some teachings of the Baal Shem Tov, a variety of modes of cleaving to letters corresponds to the four cosmic worlds in Kabbalah.