Weighing Risks and Benefits

It is almost universally acknowledged that risks have to be weighed against benefits, but there are different ways to perform the weighing. In conventional risk analysis, collectivist risk-weighing is the standard. This means that an option is accepted if the sum of all individual benefits outweighs the sum of all individual risks. In practices originating in clinical medicine, such as ethical appraisals of clinical trials, individualist risk-weighing is the standard. This implies a much stricter criterion for risk acceptance, namely that the risk to which each individual is exposed should be outweighed by benefits for that same individual. The different choices of risk-weighing methods in different policy areas seem to have emerged from traditional thought patterns and social relations, rather than from explicit deliberations on possible justifications for the alternative ways to weigh risks against benefits. It is not obvious how the prevalent differences in risk-weighing practices can be reconstructed in terms of consistent underlying principles of preventive health or social priority-setting.     

Weighing the aim of belief

The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim.     

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason. I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia.     

Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief

Philosophical Studies - This paper is about how epistemic and practical reasons for belief can be compared against one another when they conflict. It provides a model for determining what one ought...     

Weighing the past and the future in decision making

Prior irreversible investments of money, time, or effort referred to as sunk costs frequently lead to decisions to continue a chosen course of action despite that this is irrational. With the aim of demonstrating that such escalation of commitment is a special case of a more general phenomenon, two experiments were carried out employing undergraduates as participants. Experiment 1 showed for fictitious personal and business investment scenarios that both prior losses and gains (sunk outcomes) affected choices to continue or discontinue the investment. In Experiment 2 the effect of sunk outcomes was reduced although not eliminated by a monetary bonus that in one condition depended on the future outcomes of the second gamble in two-stage gambles, in another condition on the future returns in personal investment scenarios. In support of a more inclusive theory subsuming escalation of commitment, the decisions were affected by both past and future outcomes and both gains and losses.     

Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails.     

Weighing science and politics in local decision making about hazards

As a step towards understanding how local environemntal hazards policy is made, this article explores how Canadian local elected officials gained and assimilated scientific and technical information about the environmental hazards facing their communities. Consistent with previous work in the hazards field, three of Weiss’s (1979) meanings of research utilization were found to be directly applicable. The elected officials expressed the view that reconciling conflicting expert opinion and competing concerns was more difficult and more rightly their responsibility than gathering information. This research demonstrates the utility of focus groups for interviewing elite populations making community scale decisions. Her current research interest in knowledge utilization is the adoption of innovative approaches to environmental policy implementation among regional authorities.     

有一种人生智慧叫权变——孟子经权之辨的生存哲学阐释

孟子的经权之辨包括两种权变智慧:一是"激进权智",一是"温和权慧".对不符合人之常情的礼仪规定行使否定性的做法,这种权变就是"激进"的;当他人不遵守礼仪规定,而自己却对礼经行使肯定性的做法,这种权变就是"温和"的.发人深思的是,行使"激进权智"所支付的成本有时可能是较"温和"的,而行使"温和权慧"所付出的代价有时可能是很"激进"的.对这一经权之辨进行生存哲学阐释,可以为现代人生提供某种智慧的支援.     

Antidepressants,Psychotherapy or their Combination: Weighing Options for Depression Treatments

Psychotherapy and antidepressant medications are the two preeminent treatment choices for depression. This article puts each of these treatments into perspective by presenting an overview of what is currently known about their effectiveness either singly or in combination. Discussion of placebos, common factors among therapies, relapse rates, depression severity, patient treatment preferences and exaggerations in pharmaceutical advertising provide guidance for clinicians in deciding on the best course of treatment. Overall, research reveals the importance of psychosocial factors, no matter what the mode of treatment, and the need for fostering a collaborative bond between clinicians and their patients. We argue that empirical evidence points to making psychotherapy the initial treatment choice for most cases of depression.     

Weighing the evidence for a dorsal processing bias under continuous flash suppression

With the introduction of continuous flash suppression (CFS) as a method to render stimuli invisible and study unconscious visual processing, a novel hypothesis has gained popularity. It states that processes typically ascribed to the dorsal visual stream can escape CFS and remain functional, while ventral stream processes are suppressed when stimuli are invisible under CFS. This notion of a CFS-specific “dorsal processing bias” has been argued to be in line with core characteristics of the influential dual-stream hypothesis of visual processing which proposes a dissociation between dorsally mediated vision-for-action and ventrally mediated vision-for-perception. Here, we provide an overview of neuroimaging and behavioral studies that either examine this dorsal processing bias or base their conclusions on it. We show that both evidence for preserved ventral processing as well as lack of dorsal processing can be found in studies using CFS. To reconcile the diverging results, differences in the paradigms and their effects are worthy of future research. We conclude that given the current level of information a dorsal processing bias under CFS cannot be universally assumed.     

Weighing the Evidence: Empirical Assessment and Ethical Implications of Conversion Therapy

The American Psychological Association's (APA's) as well as other professional organizations' (e.g., American Psychiatric Association) removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder represented a paradigmatic shift in thinking about exual orientation. Since then, APA (2000) American Psychiatric Association. 2000. Position statement on attempts to change sexual orientation (conversion and reparative therapies).. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157: 1719–1721. [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] disseminated guidelines for working with lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) clients, and a variety of scholars and researchers alike have advocated affirmative therapeutic interventions with LGB individuals. Despite these efforts, the controversy over treating individuals with LGB orientations using nonaffirmative techniques continues. In this discussion, the limited evidence regarding the efficacy and effects of conversion therapy is surveyed, particularly in the context of empirically supported treatment criteria summarized by Division 12 (clinical psychology) of the APA. Authors then consider the resulting ethical considerations in performing conversion therapy and propose alternative uses of affirmative therapy on the basis of ethical standards defined by APA. Finally, options for treating LGB individuals who are coming to terms with their sexual orientations are discussed.     

Weighing Weight: Trends in Body Weight Evaluation Among Young Adults, 1990 and 2005

Given the rising prevalence of overweight and sociocultural portrayal of increasingly thin female body ideals and muscular/lean male body ideals, we examined trends in body weight evaluation using two cross-sectional surveys of US undergraduates in 1990 (n?=?794) and 2005 (n?=?794). Trends in body weight evaluation variables were examined and compared to respondents’ current body mass index. Results suggest men are increasingly evaluating their weight in a manner reflective of heavier, more muscular societal body ideals. Women are becoming increasingly accurate in evaluating their weight and perception of being overweight is declining. However, the high, stable prevalence of potentially inappropriate weight management behavior among both genders suggests the influence of societal body ideals on behavior remains strong.     

Risk

In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti‐risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti‐luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.