Jurors' Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony1

The present research explored the influence of four factors on mock jurors' decisions in a homicide trial involving a battered woman who killed her abusive husband: (a) jurors' preexisting beliefs about wife abuse, (b) the presence of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome, (c) jurors' beliefs in a just world, and (d) gender. Mock jurors listened to a trial involving a woman who had killed her abuser, which either contained expert testimony or did not, and then rendered various judgments about the case. Results indicated that those individuals who were more informed about the dynamics of abuse and those exposed to the expert testimony, compared to their respective counterparts, were more believing of the battered woman's account of what occurred. In general, weak believers in a just world were more lenient in their judgments, with verdicts of not guilty being associated with weaker beliefs in a just world than guilty verdicts. Weak believers in a just world also felt that the expert testimony applied more to the defendant than did strong believers. Finally, women who were weak believers in a just world were less likely to hold the defendant responsible for the events and to be more informed about the dynamics of abuse following the experiment.     

A qualitative analysis of mock jurors' deliberations of linkage analysis evidence

Evidence about a suspect's behavioural similarity across a series of crimes has been presented in legal proceedings in at least three different countries. Its admission as expert evidence, whilst still rare, is becoming more common thus it is important for us to understand how such evidence is received by jurors and legal professionals. This article reports on a qualitative analysis of mock jurors' deliberations about expert linkage analysis evidence. Three groups of mock jurors (N = 20) were presented with the prosecution's linkage analysis evidence from the USA State v. Fortin I murder trial and expert evidence for the defence constructed for the purposes of the study. Each group was asked to deliberate and reach a verdict. Deliberations were video‐recorded and subject to thematic content analysis. The themes that emerged were varied. Analysis suggested that the mock jurors were cautious of the expert evidence of behavioural similarity. In some cases they were sceptical of the expert. They articulated a preference that expert opinion be supported using statistics. Additional themes included jurors having misconceptions concerning what is typical offender behaviour during rape which suggests there is a need for expert linkage analysis evidence regarding behavioural similarities and the relative frequencies of crime scene behaviours. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision‐making in civil litigation: Effects of attorney credibility,evidence strength,and juror cognitive processing

The current study examined the relationship between juror cognitive processing (measured by need for cognition [NFC]), attorney credibility, evidence strength, and civil litigation verdicts (liability, likelihood of causation, and compensatory damages). Participants (N = 446) viewed a videotaped mock civil trial in which the credibility of the attorneys and the strength of the plaintiff's evidence were manipulated. Plaintiff attorney credibility, defense attorney credibility, and strength of evidence interacted with one another for liability verdicts. In the strong evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a non‐credible defense attorney. In the ambiguous evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a credible defense attorney. Plaintiff attorney credibility, however, was found to be more influential on jurors’ decision‐making than case evidence for likelihood of causation and compensatory damage award decisions. Participants’ NFC also interacted with plaintiff attorney credibility. High NFC jurors were more influenced by a credible plaintiff attorney than low NFC jurors. Although these findings are counter to common findings in the NFC literature, they conform to a body of literature that supports the notion that jurors view attorney credibility as a piece of case evidence and not a peripheral cue as is often assumed. Thus, the findings indicate that attorneys do matter to the outcomes of cases. Policy and practice implications for attorneys and the courts are discussed.     

Does jury deliberation really improve jurors' memories?

The courts assume that jury deliberation corrects errors in jurors' memories, so that the verdict is based on accurate memory for the trial. We evaluated the validity of this assumption by examining jurors' memories and verdicts both before and after deliberation. Unlike previous studies, we tracked how event memories changed as a function of how they were discussed in deliberation. Overall, deliberation resulted in only a slight memory improvement. Deliberation corrected errors and did not introduce distortions. Reasons for such slight memory improvement are that jurors did not think they had memory gaps and thus did not use the deliberation process to improve their memory, and jurors who controlled deliberation were not always the most accurate in their memories. Finally, those most likely to change their verdict as a result of deliberation were not those who had the least accurate memories, but rather those who had the least confidence in their memories. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Negative Emotions Felt During Trial: the Effect of Fear,Anger, and Sadness on Juror Decision Making

During trial, jurors may experience a variety of emotions, many of which are negative. The current study examined the effects the negative emotions anger, fear, and sadness had on jurors' sentencing decisions and explored whether the cognitive appraisal theory or the intuitive prosecutor model could explain these effects. Jurors viewed the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial and were asked to sentence the defendant. Results indicated that after viewing the trial, jurors reported increased anger and sadness, but not fear. However, only change in anger affected jurors' sentences. Jurors who reported a greater change in anger were more likely to sentence the defendant to death. This effect was mediated by the level of importance that jurors placed on the prosecution's evidence and argument. Consistent with the intuitive prosecutor model, increased anger led to higher ratings of the importance of the aggravating evidence and an increase in death sentences. Implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Acknowledging Mock Jurors' Feelings on Affective and Cognitive Biases: It Depends on the Sample

An intervention designed to correct affective and cognitive biases was tested in the context of a civil commitment hearing of a sexually violent predator. Potential differences between a college student mock jury sample and a more representative, juror venire sample in reaction to these bias correction interventions were explored. In the first of two experiments, undergraduate mock jurors (n = 130) demonstrated a leniency effect when the sex offender's attorney acknowledged jurors' emotional reactions and motivated them to thoughtfully weigh the evidence. The second experiment failed to replicate these findings with a more ecologically valid sample (n = 300). Several differences between samples were found: representative jurors, as opposed to undergraduates, were sensitive to differences between pure clinical and actuarial expert testimony; and measures of intrinsic cognitive effort predicted verdicts for undergraduates, but not for representative jurors. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity From Physical and Witness Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decision Making1

The effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity (PTP) from physical and witness evidence on decisions made by trained and untrained mock jurors were compared. Mock jurors viewed a videotaped rape trial and participated in jury deliberations. Training consisted of completion of a university course on psychology and law. As expected, physical evidence PTP produced more guilty votes than witness or no PTP. Both types of PTP influenced untrained mock jurors' punishment preferences and perceptions of satisfaction and fairness, whereas trained mock jurors' opinions on these measures were unaffected by PTP. Deliberations of trained mock juries were more task‐oriented and focused on relevant evidence and legal issues than that of their untrained peers. Limitations of this mock jury study were discussed.     

The influence of FMRI lie detection evidence on juror decision-making

In the current study, we report on an experiment examining whether functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection evidence would influence potential jurors' assessment of guilt in a criminal trial. Potential jurors (N = 330) read a vignette summarizing a trial, with some versions of the vignette including lie detection evidence indicating that the defendant was lying about having committed the crime. Lie detector evidence was based on evidence from the polygraph, fMRI (functional brain imaging), or thermal facial imaging. Results showed that fMRI lie detection evidence led to more guilty verdicts than lie detection evidence based on polygraph evidence, thermal facial imaging, or a control condition that did not include lie detection evidence. However, when the validity of the fMRI lie detection evidence was called into question on cross-examination, guilty verdicts were reduced to the level of the control condition. These results provide important information about the influence of lie detection evidence in legal settings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptions of Children's Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases1

Children's testimony often plays a central role in prosecutions of child sexual abuse. Nevertheless, research on jurors' perceptions of the credibility of child sexual assault victims remains limited. In three experiments, we examined mock jurors' reactions to children's testimony about sexual abuse. Participant jurors were exposed to videotaped or written scenarios of child sexual abuse trials and then rated victim credibility and defendant guilt. Analyses indicated that: (a) victim age was either inversely related or unrelated to perceptions of victim credibility, (b) women were more likely than men to find child victims credible, (c) corroborating testimony from a child victim increased the credibility of another child victim, and (d) exposure of participants to past criminal acts and other negative defendant character evidence heightened perceived victim credibility and defendant guilt. Implications for understanding jurors' reactions to child witnesses are discussed.     

Reaction of mock jurors to testimony of a court appointed expert

A study was conducted to assess the impact of court appointed experts on the judgments of mock jurors. A civil proceeding was adopted for the experiment. Mock jurors heard testimony about a plaintiff's injury in an automobile accident. In some conditions, medical testimony for the plaintiff and defendant was provided by experts hired by each side. In other conditions, a medical expert appointed by the court testified in addition to the two adversarial experts. In one of these conditions, the court expert sided with the plaintiff; in another, the expert sided with the defendant. The plaintiff in the case was always an individual. The defendant was sometimes a corporation and sometimes an individual. The results showed that mock jurors sided with the court appointed expert in every condition except when the expert favored a corporate defendant. The results were discussed in terms of heuristic processing of persuasive information.     

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

Past research has shown that counterfactual (“If…then…”) thoughts influence causal and responsibility attribution in the judicial context. However, little is known on whether and how the use of counterfactuals in communication affects lay jurors' and judges' evaluations. In two studies, we asked mock lay jurors (Study 1) and actual judges (Study 2) to read a medical malpractice case followed by an expert witness report, which included counterfactuals focused on either the physician, the patient, or external factors. Results showed that counterfactual focus had a strong effect on both lay jurors' and judges' causal and responsibility attributions. Counterfactual focus also moderated the effect of outcome foreseeability on responsibility attribution. Discussion focuses on how counterfactual communication can direct causal and responsibility attribution and reduce the importance of other factors known to influence judicial decision‐making. The potential implications of these findings in training programs and debiasing interventions are also discussed.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

An exploration of psychological and physical injury schemas in civil cases

Civil plaintiffs often seek compensation for their psychological injuries. Yet little is known about jurors' preconceived notions (or schemas) for a prospective plaintiff's pain and suffering. The present studies examined (a) whether jurors have psychological injury schemas (Studies 1 and 2), (b) whether their existence and development vary by the type of civil case (Studies 1 and 2) or its severity (Study 2), and (c) how psychological injury schemas compare with physical injury schemas on a number of theoretically and legally relevant judgments (e.g., injury severity, availability, and plaintiff credibility; Study 2). Study 1 (N = 233) presented undergraduate mock jurors with 2 negligence incidents (car accident and slip and fall) and 2 intentional tort incidents (sexual assault and kidnapping) and asked them to report the typical incident and injuries that would result from the defendant's conduct. Results supported the sparse existence of psychological injury schemas but found that they were more developed in the kidnapping and sexual assault incidents than in the car accident and slip and fall incidents. Study 2 (N = 288) additionally manipulated incident schema severity (mild vs. severe) while having participants separately report and rate their psychological and physical injury schemas on judgments of legal and theoretical interest. Results indicated that although mock jurors' psychological injury schemas contained fewer injuries than their physical injury schemas, the reported psychological injuries were rated as more severe than physical injuries. We discuss how schemas may underlie the disparate treatment of psychological and physical injuries by legal decision‐makers.     

Perceptions of liability for the negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander

This study examines factors that are part of the test for whether a plaintiff may recover damages due to the negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander. Subjects were 96 eligible jurors from two California counties. They were presented with a case vignette which carried one of the three elements for bystander recovery for emotional distress as outlined in the California case of Dillon v. Legg. Participants were more likely to believe a plaintiff had a right to sue for damages in cases in which (1) there is a close relationship between the bystander and a direct victim, and (2) the bystander is within the zone of physical danger. A plaintiff's sensory and contemporaneous perception of an accident did not significantly influence subjects' judgements.     

Effect of viewing the interview and identification process on juror perceptions of eyewitness accuracy

This study examined whether showing jurors a video of the witness's initial attempts to describe and identify the perpetrator would facilitate jurors' ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Mock jurors observed a simulated trial in which the key witness testified under direct examination and cross‐examination. The jurors saw either the witness's testimony or the witness's testimony plus videotape footage of the earlier police interviews in which the witness described and attempted to identify the perpetrator. Results support the hypothesis: Jurors in the examination‐plus‐video condition discriminated between accurate and inaccurate witnesses better than jurors in the examination‐only condition. We discuss various mechanisms to explain the advantage provided by the video. It is recommended that police officers videotape the line‐up procedure and that jurors be shown this video at trial. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.