从海德格尔的形而上学解构略论当代中国哲学的发展方式

根据晚期海德格尔的核心观点,西方形而上学的本质在于存在论—神学的二重性进路,这种进路表明形而上学乃是本真的虚无主义,并且塑造了西方历史的虚无主义形态,即以技术方式组织一切活动领域。而当前的时代作为形而上学的终结阶段,亦即其蕴含的的可能性正在充分实现的时代,也预示着有机会走向存在历史的另一开端。但是,面对我们中国人身处缺乏形而上学之源头但又承受着其当前后果的两难境地,当代中国哲学发展方式在策略选择上既要深入研究形而上学,又要努力从我们自身的典籍文化传统与现实日常生活中提炼、发掘出能够交流和理解而又具有实质内涵的概念、范畴与叙述框架,从而为历史时代和生存命运的转化积蓄力量、准备道路。     

当前分析的形而上学中的核心课题

本文的目的是以分析的形而上学中的核心课题为线索,试图对当前分析的形而上学的研究状况做一个整体的介绍和讨论。文章将围绕存在与物体、可能与必然、时空与因果、心灵与物质、实在论与反实在论等主题来展开。对于每个主题,我在评介各个重要课题的时候,将着重展现不同理论之间的争议以及这些争议向我们提出的问题和挑战。     

“道”的多重形而上学意蕴

黑格尔在《哲学史讲演录》中对中国哲学形而上学特点的理解是不够全面甚至是不准确的。中国哲学形而上学的“道”概念源自“天道”(“天之道”)观念,经过对与其并列的“地道”和“人道”的抽象和概括,才产生了作为“抽象的思想和纯粹的范畴”的“道”概念。因此,“道”概念的形而上学意蕴有多个层次。最上层是“纯粹形而上学”的“常(恒)道”,其次是作为自然哲学形而上学的“天道”和作为“道德形而上学”的“人道”,最后是内在于人和事物的“德”“性”“理”等。中国哲学虽不乏“纯粹形而上学”,但其形而上学的主要形态是“境界形态的形而上学”。此种形态的形而上学近似于作为“理性的感性显现”的“美”,成为中西哲学文化交流的一个接合点。     

现象学视野下的视觉中心主义

视觉是通过视觉器官——眼睛来接受一定波长的外来光波刺激,经过视觉神经和大脑进行编码加工和分析处理后所获得的直观感觉,视觉本身包含了外来光刺激和视觉结构综合两个部分。人所感知的外界信息有百分之九十五来自视觉,视觉在人们的信息获得中占有核心位置,这也是视觉中心主义     

海德格尔与斯特劳森:形而上学的同一种读法?

海德格尔与斯特劳森有着不同的哲学背景,并且表达风格迥异,然而他们在各自的哲学领域中都做出了重要的原创性贡献.他们对西方形而上学的两种解读所提供的图像尽管有着不少裂隙和差异,并且各自对存在问题的具体探究更是有着很多分歧,但总体上看两种图像之间并非没有沟通和比较的可能性.单纯接受斯特劳森的图像而拒绝或完全无视海德格尔的形而上学读法,这一通常的立场是站不住脚的.而二者的哲学研究方式也为今日的哲学活动提供了一种重要示范.     

海德格尔及德里达对形而上学的批判

本文首先简述了形而上学史,探讨了康德对旧形而上学的批判.接着概述和批判了尼采的形而上学批判.海德格尔认为,尼采的错误在于把存在解说为价值,在于在追问存在者的存在根据时遗忘了存在本身.在尼采以强力意志为根据的价值之思中,主体性形而上学忽略与遮蔽了存在.形而上学的秘密是根据律.形而上学通过根据律主宰了现代人的命运.海德格尔对形而上学的克服与超出就是把作为存在者原则的根据律拆解为作为存在原则的存在与根据相互归属的根据律.德里达认为,在阐述此在的存在机制与存在意义的基础存在论中,海德格尔区分了本源与非本源.他把本源理解为本真本己性.在德里达看来,这种理解还是带有传统形而上学亦即在场形而上学的烙印.德里达对亚里士多德时间观的再解读表达了他对形而上学的深刻批判和解构.德里达对海德格尔的批判表明了他自己看到了比作为在场之存在还要古老或晚到的"事情".这种"事情"乃是对在场—不在场的绝对超出,就是德里达以踪迹之名所思考的东西.     

普兰丁格论“必然性的本性”——从偶态形而上学的角度看

本文旨在梳理和分析当代美国著名哲学家普兰丁格在《必然性的本性》一书所提出的“偶态形而上学”的基本观点.普氏首先将“必然性”界定为“广义的逻辑必然性”,指出从言偶态和从物偶态是一致的;继而又指出,我们需要以“可能世界为基础来谈论现实世界”,故现实世界只是一种“已得的”可能世界;他的这一观点完全改变了人们对于“本质”和“同一性”概念的传统认识,但是却为宗教哲学的经典问题(如神正论)找到了一条相当具有说服力的阐释之路.故他的这种偶态分析应当引起思想界足够的重视.     

有限性规定对主体性形而上学的解构及其意义

随着形而上学在自身展开空间中自"上"至"下"的滑落,"有限性"与"无限性"的张力关系成为在"动荡"性趋势中观察哲学研究的重心以重新审视形而上学的新基点。现代哲学的"有限性"在时间与存在的交互规定中对主体性形而上学进行批判与解构,以澄清人的理性的有限性和人的存在的历史性,展现生存实践根基的优先性。"有限性"的推进更细微地印证了对人的本性的差异性理解所引起的形而上学的变化走向。在现实历史的基础上对自然生命的超越性表达进行把握,可以为构建当代形态的形而上学寻找新的可能路径。     

“虚无主义、形而上学与资本逻辑”学术研讨会综述

"虚无主义、形而上学与资本逻辑"研讨会于2011年11月23日在中山大学举行。本次会议由中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所主办,国内学界众多专家和学者出席了本次研讨会。会议发起人刘森林教授(中山大学)首先介绍了本次会议的背景情况,即虚无主义是德国和俄国思想家反     

The Value Question in Metaphysics

Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit—how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these possibilities, attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes.     

胡绳对“科玄论战”所提问题的回答——兼论胡绳历史唯物主义人生观

胡绳是中国现代著名的马克思主义理论家、哲学家和史学家.目前,学术界对胡绳学术思想的研究有两种现象:一是大多数研究都是从史学角度进行的,从哲学角度研究的人很少;二是对胡绳晚年的学术思想进行了大量研究,而研究其早期学术思想的甚少.     

Kierkegaard,Levinas and the Question of Escaping Metaphysics

While Kierkegaard and Levinas may well be thought of as religious or ethical thinkers, I should not like the reader to be misled by this into assuming that this article is primarily about religion or ethics. Rather, my main concern may more properly be described as metaphysical or epistemological, for I am interested in certain styles of thinking that underlie the religious/ethical themes dealt with here. Thus, this article aims to show that in relation to traditional metaphysical styles, and to each other, the thinking of Kierkegaard and Levinas is parallel and divergent in complex ways. Both share a mistrust of modernist metaphysics, which they aim to escape by pointing to the way in which conceptions of metaphysical totalities (or systems) are breached by a destabilising infinity already internal to them. This anticipates later postmodern styles of thinking which challenge modern metaphysics, its resentment against time, and its confidence in human power to represent all that is by means of closed systems of interpretation. To the extent that they offer philosophical alternatives that accommodate the temporal, both have had highly significant contributions to make to a postmodern style of thinking that has implications not limited to religion or ethics. A study of the philosophical strategies of these two thinkers, where they seem to succeed or fall short in relation to each other and to the traditional strategies of metaphysics, should go some way toward clarification of what I believe to be the most viable style of thinking for a postmodern world. As I see it, one is confronted with three options. The first, represented by Kierkegaard’s ‘infinite resignation,’ may be associated with a Derridean style of thinking. Kierkegaard himself abandons this in favour of a style of thinking for which faith and revelation stand as metaphors. Levinas, in contrast, offers an alternative whose leitmotif is ethical responsibility. I shall try to show in the end that the first of these, which best accommodates the ‘undecidability’ of a middle ground, is the most suitable for contemporary thinkers.     

Heidegger,Analytic Metaphysics,and the Being of Beings

This essay begins with an outline of the early Heidegger's distinction between beings and the Being1 of those beings, followed by a discussion of Heideggerian teleology. It then turns to contemporary analytic metaphysics to suggest that analytic metaphysics concerns itself wholly with beings and does not recognize distinct forms of questioning concerning what Heidegger calls Being . This difference having been clarified, studies of identity and individuation in the analytic tradition are examined and it is demonstrated that such inquiries have far more in common with Heidegger than one might initially suspect. Indeed, it turns out that much of what the early Heidegger says about Being is tacitly presupposed by the workings of certain being-centric metaphysical projects in the analytic tradition. The discussion concludes with the suggestion that the central difference between the two projects should be understood as one of emphasis and that Heidegger's discussion of Being and a realist metaphysics in the analytic tradition can complement each other as aspects of a broader, more unified philosophical inquiry.     

Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism

Biologists and philosophers of biology typically regard essentialism about speciesas incompatible with modern Darwinian theory. Analytic metaphysicians such asKripke, Putnam and Wiggins, on the other hand, believe that their essentialist thesesare applicable to biological kinds. I explore this tension. I show that standard anti-essentialist considerations only show that species do not have intrinsic essential properties. I argue that while Putnam and Kripke do make assumptions that contradict received biological opinion, their model of natural kinds, suitably modified, is partially applicable to biological species. However, Wiggins' thesis that organisms belong essentially to their species is untenable, given modern species concepts. I suggest that Putnam's, Kripke's and Wiggins' errors stem from adopting an account of the point of scientific classification which implies that relationally-defined kinds are likely to be of little value, an account which is inapplicable to biology.     

Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience

Abstract

This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.     

Many questions Begs the Question (but questions do not Beg the Question)

The fallacy of many questions or the complex question, popularized by the sophism ‘Have you stopped beating your spouse?’ (when a yes-or-no answer is required), is similar to the fallacy of begging the question orpetitio principii. Douglas N. Walton inBegging the Question has recently argued that the two forms are alike in trying unfairly to elicit an admission from a dialectical opponent without meeting burden of proof, but distinct because of the circularity of question-begging argument and noncircularity of many questions. I offer a reconstruction of the many questions fallacy according to which it is just as circular as begging the question, concluding that many questions begs the question. The same analysis contradicts Walton's claim that questions can beg the question, drawing a distinction between questions as the instruments of question-begging, and as vehicles for categorical noninterrogative presuppositions that beg the question.