Situational Familiarity,Efficacy Expectations,and the Process of Credibility Attribution

Four experiments investigated the influence of situational familiarity within a judgmental context on the process of credibility attribution. We predicted that high familiarity with a situation would lead to higher efficacy expectations for, and a more pronounced use of, verbal information when making judgments of credibility. Under low situational familiarity, judges were expected to experience higher efficacy expectations for, and a more pronounced use of, nonverbal information. In Experiments 1 through 4, participants under low or high situational familiarity saw a film in which nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and verbal content cues (low vs. high plausibility) were manipulated. As predicted, when familiarity was low, only the nonverbal cues influenced participants’ judgments of credibility. In contrast, participants in the high familiarity condition used only the verbal cues. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that efficacy expectations regarding verbal and nonverbal information, but not processing motivation, drive this familiarity effect.     

Need for Cognition and the process of lie detection

Four experiments investigated the influence of Need for Cognition on the process of lie detection. According to the basic assumptions of dual process models, only higher Need for Cognition leads to the use of verbal information when making judgments of veracity. People with lower Need for Cognition predominantly use stereotypical nonverbal information for their judgments. In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants saw a film in which nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and verbal cues (low vs. high plausibility) were manipulated. As predicted, when Need for Cognition was lower, only the nonverbal cues influenced participants' judgments of veracity. In contrast, participants with higher Need for Cognition also used the verbal cues. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the hypothesis that higher Need for Cognition leads to better discrimination of truthful from deceptive messages. Both experiments found that participants with higher Need for Cognition achieved higher accuracy at classifying truthful and deceptive messages than participants with lower Need for Cognition.     

The dimensions of deception detection: Self‐reported deception cue use is underpinned by two broad factors

Many perceived cues to deception have been reported in the literature, but little attention has been paid to how they are combined when making deception judgments. The present research used a data‐driven approach to investigate how cues are integrated when evaluating veracity. Two hundred fifteen participants performed a deception detection task before completing a deception cue use questionnaire. A factor analysis of the questionnaire data produced two dimensions, one associated with nonverbal cues to anxiety and the other associated with detail and level of involvement. The present work extends our understanding of deception detection processes and underlines the importance of examining not only the cues that people use but also the way in which they use them.     

Training Lie Detectors to Use Nonverbal Cues Instead of Global Heuristics

Everyday lie detectors lack the necessary knowledge to use nonverbal cues that discriminate lies from truthful communications. Instead, they rely on general heuristics like infreqtuency of reported events or falsifiability. Lie detectors judged the veracity of 40 reports on minor delinquency that were either truthful or not and referred either to falsifiable manifest actions or to nonfalsifiable subjective feelings. In the uninformed condition, detectors were free to use their intuitive strategies. In the informed condition, they were given detailed instructions about valid nonverbal cues. In the informed feedback condition, they received additional outcome feedback. Performance was generally above chance but further improved through cue information and feedback. Falsifiability caused a bias toward reduced veracity judgments. A lens model analysis supports the interpretation that naive lie detectors follow content-related heuristics but can flexibly change their strategy as they learn about authentic nonverbal cues.     

SELF-MONITORING,REHEARSAL, AND DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

This study examined the effects of self-monitoring and rehearsal on the ability of observers to detect deception and on the behavioral correlates of deception. It was hypothesized that observers would be more accurate at detecting deception perpetrated by low self-monitors than by high self-monitors, with the difference particularly pronounced when messages were rehearsed. In addition, low self-monitors communicating spontaneously were expected to display greater rates of verbal and nonverbal responding than high self-monitors who planned their communications. Sixteen high and low self-monitors both lied and told the truth (either spontaneously or after 20-minute rehearsals) regarding their feelings while viewing slides of pleasant landscapes and of disfigured burn victims. Analysis of the responses of the 151 observers who made veracity judgments supported the hypothesis concerning accuracy of deception detection. Coding of 10 verbal and nonverbal behaviors revealed that unrehearsed low self-monitors displayed significantly greater pause and nonfluency rates than rehearsed high self-monitors. Additional findings are reported regarding the effects of self-monitoring, rehearsal, and truthful versus deceptive communication on the behavioral correlates of deception.     

On being sad and mistaken: mood effects on the accuracy of thin-slice judgments

A series of studies explored how sadness impacts the accuracy of social judgments. In Study 1, induced sadness led to reduced accuracy in judgments of teacher effectiveness from brief samples of nonverbal behavior (thin slices). In Study 2, sad participants showed reduced accuracy in judging relationship type from thin slices as well as diminished judgmental efficiency. Study 3 revealed that higher Beck Depression Inventory scores were associated with diminished accuracy on the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity. Finally, Study 4 tested the possibility that sadness impairs accuracy by promoting a more deliberative information-processing style. As expected, accuracy was higher among participants in a sad mood condition who completed the judgment task while simultaneously performing a distracting cognitive load task.     

Elaborative processing and conjunction errors in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted in order to examine the influence of elaborative processing at encoding on recognition memory conjunction lure errors. In these experiments, participants generated cues for compound words as wholes (e.g., haywire) or as separate entities (e.g., hay, wire). Studied words were re-presented in exact form (old) or recombined to form conjunction lures on the recognition test. Participants were asked to make old-new judgments and to indicate whether they had rejected items judged to be new because of recall of a studied item or because of lack of familiarity with an item. The results suggested that recall-to-reject processing and conjunction lure familiarity increased with both types of generation, although generation of cues for compound words as a whole did not influence conjunction lure error rates. An emphasis on processing each constituent of a compound word during encoding increased the familiarity of those constituents more than generation of a compound word as a whole, resulting in an increase in conjunction lure errors. These results suggest that both familiarity and recollection-based monitoring processes influence conjunction lure errors, and therefore support dual-process theories of recognition memory.     

On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: positive and negative effects on learning

Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments.     

Social curiosity and interpersonal perception: a judge x trait interaction

The present study examined the impact of social curiosity on the utilization of social information and the accuracy of personality judgments. In total, 182 individuals who never met each other before were asked to interact for 10 minutes and afterwards to evaluate the personality (Big Five) of their interaction partner. High socially curious judges were more accurate in evaluating the degree of Extraversion and Openness of their interaction partners. Interestingly, high and low curious judges differed significantly in the utilization of verbal and nonverbal cues displayed by their interaction partner. Specifically, high socially curious judges more often used valid cues for inferring Extraversion and Openness. No differences in interpersonal accuracy and cue utilization were found for Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. The results suggest that high socially curious individuals are more accurate in judging visible traits and that this higher accuracy is grounded in a more comprehensive utilization of valid cues.     

Investigating the subjective reports of rejection processes in the word frequency mirror effect

We sought to systematically investigate how participants subjectively classify the basis of their recognition memory judgments for low and high word frequency items. We found that participants more often reported rejection processes related to the increased perceived memorability for unstudied low word frequency items (relative to high word frequency items), rather than classifying their decision on a lack of familiarity. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern and demonstrated context variability and word frequency independently influenced the subjective classifications for correct rejections. Results of Experiment 3 revealed that these differences are dependent upon having experience with both low and high frequency items. Overall, these data suggest participants’ rejection of low frequency items is more strongly related to judgments of perceived memorability, but only when they are presented in the context of high frequency items. The results are discussed in relation to distinctiveness and expected memorability.     

Similarity-based restoration of metrical information: different listening experiences result in different perceptual inferences

How do perceivers apply knowledge to instances they have never experienced before? On one hand, listeners might use idealized representations that do not contain specific details. On the other, they might recognize and process information based on more detailed memory representations. The current study examined the latter possibility with respect to musical meter perception, previously thought to be computed based on highly-idealized (isochronous) internal representations. In six experiments, listeners heard sets of metrically-ambiguous melodies. Each melody was played in a simultaneous musical context with unambiguous metrical cues (3/4 or 6/8). Cross-melody similarity was manipulated by pairing certain cues-timbre (musical instrument) and motif content (2-6-note patterns)-with each meter, or distributing cues across meters. After multiple exposures, listeners heard each melody without context, and judged metrical continuations (all Experiments) or familiarity (Experiments 5-6). Responses were assessed for "metrical restoration"-the tendency to make metrical judgments that fit the melody's previously-heard metrical context. Cross-melody similarity affected the presence and degree of metrical restoration, and timbre affected familiarity. Results suggest that metrical processing may be calculated based on fairly detailed representations rather than idealized isochronous pulses, and is dissociated somewhat from familiarity judgments. Implications for theories of meter perception are discussed.     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

“COME TO THINK OF IT…”

In Phase 1 of this study, communicators responded truthfully or deceptively to positive or negative interrogative probes. In Phase 2, the interviews were shown, at four levels of probe exposure, to observers who rated the communicators' eracity. In Phase 3, verbal and nonverbal cues were correlated with actual and perceived deception. Although exposure level had no effect on detection accuracy, liars and trulhtellers exposed to negative interrogative probes were judged more truthful than those exposed to positive probes. Analysis of the verbal and nonverbal cues revealed that none of the nonverbal cues relied on as indicators of deception were related to actual deception, and only one of the verbal cues (verbal content) was related to actual message veracity. Implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are offered.     

Recognition confidence under violated and confirmed memory expectations

Individuals' memory experiences typically covary with those of others' around them, and on average, an item is more likely to be familiar if a companion recommends it as such. Although it would be ideal if observers could use the external recommendations of others' as statistical priors during recognition decisions, it is currently unclear how or if they do so. Furthermore, understanding the sensitivity of recognition judgments to such external cues is critical for understanding memory conformity and eyewitness suggestibility phenomena. To address this we examined recognition accuracy and confidence following cues from an external source (e.g., "Likely Old") that forecast the likely status of upcoming memory probes. Three regularities emerged. First, hit and correct-rejection rates expectedly fell when participants were invalidly versus validly cued. Second, hit confidence was generally higher than correct-rejection confidence, regardless of cue validity. Finally, and most noteworthy, cue validity interacted with judgment confidence such that validity heavily influenced the confidence of correct rejections but had no discernible influence on the confidence of hits. Bootstrap-informed Monte Carlo simulation supported a dual process recognition model under which familiarity and recollection processes counteract to heavily dampen the influence of external cues on average reported confidence. A 3rd experiment tested this model using source memory. As predicted, because source memory is heavily governed by contextual recollection, cue validity again did not affect confidence, although as with recognition it clearly altered accuracy.     

The effects of domain knowledge on metacomprehension accuracy

In the present research, we examined the relationship between readers’ domain knowledge and their ability to judge their comprehension of novel domain-related material. Participants with varying degrees of baseball knowledge read five texts on baseball-related topics and five texts on non-baseball-related topics, predicted their performance, and completed tests for each text. Baseball knowledge was positively related to absolute accuracy within the baseball domain but was unrelated to relative accuracy within the baseball domain. Also, the readers showed a general underconfidence bias, but the bias was less extreme for higher knowledge readers. The results challenge common assumptions that experts’ metacognitive judgments are less accurate than novices’. Results involving topic familiarity ratings and a no-reading control group suggest that higher knowledge readers are not more likely to ignore text-specific cues in favor of a domain familiarity heuristic, but they do appear to make more effective use of domain familiarity in predicting absolute performance levels.     

Inferring Emotions From Multiple Cues: Revealing Age-Related Differences in "How" Without Differences in "Can"

This study examined differences in children's use of social cues to make emotional inferences. Children ages 4, 5, and 8 years were presented with stimuli that depicted another child in affectively congruous and affectively incongruous expression/situation combinations. The intensity of positive and negative facial expressions was varied across situations. Subjects judged the target's feelings and selected among the alternative facial expressions or situations the one they had just seen. No significant age-related differences were found in the extent to which children registered and used both the expressive and situational information when making emotional inferences. The main experimental measure asked children to explain their judgments. In explaining their judgments, subjects' rationales indicated that they: (a) used both the situational and expressive cues; and (b) were sensitive to congruous versus incongruous cues, and even to mild versus strong incongruous cues. Children's rationales also reflected a sensitivity to expressive and situational negativity. For each age group, the rationales were more elaborate when the cues were problematic. Characteristic strategies, however, were also found for each age group. These distinct strategies may reflect social-life changes in children's social "theories" of emotion.     

The contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition and source-memory judgments: a formal dual-process model and an analysis of receiver operating characteristics

A formal dual-process model that assumes that memory judgments can be based on a threshold recollection process and a signal-detection-based familiarity process is proposed to account for both recognition and source-memory performance. The model was tested in 4 experiments by examining recognition and source-memory receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In agreement with the predictions of the model, recognition and source memory dissociated in certain conditions. Recognition ROCs were curvilinear in probability space and relatively linear in z-space, as expected if recollection and familiarity contributed to performance. In contrast, source ROCs typically were linear and exhibited a pronounced U shape in z-space, as expected if performance primarily relied on recollection. However, in conditions in which familiarity was clearly indicative of an item's source, the source ROC became curvilinear, suggesting that participants could use familiarity as a basis for source judgments. Several alternative models, including the unequal-variance signal-detection model, were found to be inconsistent with the ROC data.     

What do you want? How perceivers use cues to make goal inferences about others

Variables influencing inferences about a stranger's goal during an unsolicited social interaction were explored. Experiment 1 developed a procedure for identifying cues. Experiments 2 and 3 assessed the relative importance of various cues (space, time, characteristics of oneself, characteristics of the stranger, and the stranger's behavior) for goal judgments. Results indicated that situational context cues informed goal judgments in ways that were consistent with diagnosticity ratings and typicality ratings of those cues. Stranger characteristics and stranger behaviors affected goal judgments more than would be expected from these quantitative measures of their informativeness. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with a mental model view that assumes perceivers monitor situational cues present during interactions and that goal inferences are guided by the informativeness of these cues.