The effects of justice motivation on memory for self- and other-relevant events

We examined whether people might distort and selectively remember the past in ways that enable them to sustain a belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press). In Study 1, recall of a lottery prize reflected participants’ justice concerns, such that the average lottery amount recalled was lowest when a “bad” versus “good” person won. In Study 2, an unrelated experience of just world threat (versus affirmation) enhanced biased recall of the lottery prize when the winner was undeserving. In Study 3, participants who experienced a fortuitous bad break selectively remembered more bad deeds from their recent past, whereas participants who experienced a good break selectively remembered more good deeds. Study 4 demonstrates that such selective memory biases specifically serve to portray chance outcomes as more fair. Taken together, these findings offer support for the notion that reconstructing and selectively recalling the past can serve to sustain a BJW.     

Good fortune but bad luck? Predictable versus unpredictable gains and losses in risky choice

This study examines the effects of two different types of good and bad experiences on risk‐taking preferences: fortune and luck. We define fortune as a relatively stable positive or negative context within which choices are made and luck as a more unpredictable series of better or worse outcomes. With the use of a lottery‐based paradigm, fortune was operationalized as a preponderance of all‐gain or all‐loss two‐outcome option pairs within a larger set of mixed‐outcome control lotteries. Luck was operationalized as the experienced frequency of better versus worse outcomes when playing the lotteries. We predicted that fortune and luck would lead to opposite risk‐taking tendencies within control lotteries. An assimilation effect of fortune was predicted, with risk‐averse preferences for control lotteries when surrounded by good fortune and risk‐seeking preferences when surrounded by bad fortune. In contrast, we expected that high rates of success with good luck would lead to risk‐seeking preferences, whereas low rates of success with bad luck would yield risk‐averse preferences. Our predictions for fortune were confirmed; however, there was no evidence of any effect on risk taking based on experiencing good versus bad luck. Moreover, we observed a striking disconnect between impressions of the experience and risk‐taking behavior. Both identification and attributions of luck and fortune were highly correlated with the number of gain outcomes that participants experienced but were uncorrelated with risk taking. We review these surprising findings considering several prominent theories of risk‐taking behavior, particularly drawing attention to the differential roles of predecisional and postdecisional information in choice.     

The effects of near wins and near losses on self-perceived personal luck and subsequent gambling behavior

Which person would be most likely to continue gambling? A person who has just experienced a big win or a person who has just experienced a big loss? The answer appears often to be whichever gambler feels personally luckier. Two experiments investigated how perceptions of luck, understood as a personal quality, are affected by near, but unrealized outcomes during a game of chance. In Experiment 1, a near big loss at a gambling game heightened perceptions of personal luck relative to a near big win, even though all participants actually won the same modest amount. In addition, participants who experienced a near big loss generated significantly more downward counterfactuals than did those participants in the near big win condition. Most importantly, differences in self-perceived luck influenced future gambling behavior. Participants who experienced a near big loss on a wheel-of-fortune wagered significantly more on the outcome of a subsequent game of roulette than did those participants who experienced a near big win. Experiment 2 extended these results by testing the possible influence of a different type of near outcome and by including a control group. The discussion focuses on the emerging picture of how people understand luck.     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.     

Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making

People disagree about whether “moral facts” are objective facts like mathematical truths (moral realism) or simply products of the human mind (moral antirealism). What is the impact of different meta-ethical views on actual behavior? In Experiment 1, a street canvasser, soliciting donations for a charitable organization dedicated to helping impoverished children, primed passersby with realism or antirealism. Participants primed with realism were twice as likely to be donors, compared to control participants and participants primed with antirealism. In Experiment 2, online participants primed with realism as opposed to antirealism reported being willing to donate more money to a charity of their choice. Considering the existence of non-negotiable moral facts may have raised the stakes and motivated participants to behave better. These results therefore reveal the impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making: priming a belief in moral realism improved moral behavior.     

Does Feeling Empathy Lead to Compassion Fatigue or Compassion Satisfaction? The Role of Time Perspective

Research has shown that feeling empathy sometimes leads to compassion fatigue and sometimes to compassion satisfaction. In three studies, participants recalled an instance when they felt empathy in order to assess the role time perspective plays in how empathizers perceive the consequences of empathy. Study 1 revealed that college students perceive empathy as having more negative consequences in the short term, but more positive consequences in the long term. Study 2 showed that service industry professionals perceive the consequences of feeling empathy for customers who felt bad as less negative, and the consequences of feeling empathy for people who felt good as less positive, in the long as opposed to the short term. Because Studies 1 and 2 confounded time perspective with event specificity a third study was conducted in which event specificity was held constant across time perspectives. The same pattern of results emerged. The results of these studies indicate that perceptions of the effects of feeling empathy, whether positive or negative, become less extreme over time. These findings shed light on the relation between empathy and compassion fatigue and satisfaction by suggesting that situations that initially are experienced as stressful can over time make the empathizer stronger.     

How do we judge our confidence? Differential effects of meta-memory feedback on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

According to the cue–belief model, we assess confidence in our memories using self-credibility cues that reflect beliefs about our memory faculties. We tested the influence of meta-memory feedback on self-credibility cues in the context of eyewitness testimony, when feedback was provided prior to “testifying” via a memory questionnaire (Experiment 1) and after an initial memory questionnaire but before participants had to retake it (Experiment 2). Participants received feedback (good score, bad score, or none) on a fictitious scale purported to predict eyewitness memory ability. Those given good score feedback before testifying were more confident (but no more accurate) than those given bad score feedback. Feedback also affected confidence (good increased and bad decreased) and accuracy (good increased) after testifying but only on leading questions. These differential effects of meta-memory feedback on confidence for normal and leading questions are not explained by the cue–belief model. Implications for our confidence judgments are discussed.     

Methodological and theoretical improvements in the study of superstitious beliefs and behaviour

Via four studies (N = 901), we developed an improved Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) composed of three distinct components (belief in bad luck, belief in good luck, and the belief that luck can be changed), whose structure was supported through exploratory (Study 1) and confirmatory (Studies 2 and 3) factor analyses using divergent samples. We found that among theoretical predictors, higher ‘chance’ locus of control (i.e., the belief that chance/fate controls one's life) best predicted all three BSS subscales (Studies 2–3). In Study 3, we found that BSS subscale scores were reliable, but largely invariant across age and education with a non‐general psychology sample. In Study 4, the BSS subscales best predicted participants’ superstitious attitudes and behaviour in a new lottery drawing paradigm among other commonly used superstition scales. Taken together, our results indicate that the BSS is a valuable addition to the burgeoning research on superstitious attitudes and behaviour.     

Effects of belief in luck on the attractiveness of loyalty programmes

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the perception of belief in luck affects loyalty programmes, causing people making cognitive (affective) choices to feel more (less) attracted. To validate our hypotheses, we conducted 3 related experiments (2 laboratory tests and 1 in the field). We found that the perception of belief in luck (bad or good) affects the relationship between loyalty programmes and attractiveness (Study 1). We study this effect considering the mechanisms of points‐pressure and rewarded behaviour. Thereafter, we established that cognitive (affective) decisions promoted an increase (decrease) in attractiveness when consumers were exposed to continuous loyalty programmes because their belief in luck was lower (Studies 2 and 3). We believe that these changes occur because the consumer's belief in luck masks the uncertainty in the decision‐making process.     

Does feigning amnesia impair subsequent recall?

Defendants who are accused of serious crimes sometimes feign amnesia to evade criminal responsibility. Previous research has suggested that feigning amnesia might impair subsequent recall. In two experiments, participants read and heard a story about a central character, described as “you,” who was responsible for the death of either a puppy (Experiment 1) or a friend (Experiment 2). On free and cued recall tests immediately after the story, participants who had feigned amnesia recalled less than did participants who had recalled accurately. One week later, when all participants recalled accurately, participants who had previously feigned amnesia still performed worse than did participants who had recalled accurately both times. However, the participants who had formerly feigned amnesia did not perform worse than did a control group who had received only the delayed recall tests. Our results suggest that a “feigned amnesia effect” may reflect nothing more than differential practice at recall. Feigning amnesia for a crime need not impair memory for that crime when a person later seeks to remember accurately.     

Good luck and bad luck: how to tell the difference

Good luck implies comparison with a worse counterfactual outcome, whereas bad luck implies upward comparisons. People will accordingly describe themselves as particularly lucky after recollecting situations where they avoided something negative, and as particularly unlucky after recollecting episodes in which they missed something positive (Study 1). Upward and downward comparisons can be created by the way a situation develops, and are accentuated by the way a story is told. Good luck stories typically change for the better only in the last stage, whereas bad luck stories show a more steady downward progression (Study 2). This is also reflected in phrases believed to be characteristic of good luck versus bad luck stories, with good luck stories involving surprise and reference to close counterfactuals, whereas bad luck stories focus on initial normal events (Study 3). Good and bad luck imply different orders of events (negative–positive versus positive–negative), so by rearranging the narrative sequence, the same set of outcomes can form the basis for a good luck story as well as a bad luck story (Study 4). The final experiment (Study 5) shows that negative outcome expectations are typical for chance‐determined and uncontrolled situations. Under such circumstances, factual outcomes do not have to be exceptionally good to be considered as lucky. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

The effect of superstitious thinking on psychosocial stress responses and perceived task performance

Previous research on superstitious belief, a subset of paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993 ), has suggested that people tend to invoke luck‐related superstitions in stressful situations as an attempt to gain an illusion of control over outcomes. Based on this, the current study examined whether luck‐related superstition, in the form of a “lucky” pen, could influence the psychological response to a psychosocial stressor. Participants (N = 114), aged between 17 and 59 years (M = 22.98, SD = 4.57) from James Cook University Singapore, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (a) no‐stress with no lucky pen; (b) no‐stress with a lucky pen; (c) stress with no lucky pen or; (d) stress with a lucky pen. The results revealed that participants provided with a lucky pen experienced lower state anxiety when exposed to the stressor. Further, participants provided with a lucky pen perceived their performance to be better than those without it. However, superstitious belief did not significantly change following exposure to stress. Taken together, the present findings add some support to the suggestion that belief in transferable luck may facilitate coping with a stressor. However, further research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms behind the potential benefits of superstitious belief.     

Cold and lonely: does social exclusion literally feel cold?

Metaphors such as icy stare depict social exclusion using cold-related concepts; they are not to be taken literally and certainly do not imply reduced temperature. Two experiments, however, revealed that social exclusion literally feels cold. Experiment 1 found that participants who recalled a social exclusion experience gave lower estimates of room temperature than did participants who recalled an inclusion experience. In Experiment 2, social exclusion was directly induced through an on-line virtual interaction, and participants who were excluded reported greater desire for warm food and drink than did participants who were included. These findings are consistent with the embodied view of cognition and support the notion that social perception involves physical and perceptual content. The psychological experience of coldness not only aids understanding of social interaction, but also is an integral part of the experience of social exclusion.     

Moral spillovers: The effect of moral violations on deviant behavior

Two experiments investigated whether outcomes that violate people’s moral standards increase their deviant behavior (the moral spillover effect). In Study 1, participants with and without a moral mandate (i.e., a strong attitude rooted in moral conviction) read about a legal trial in which the outcome supported, opposed or was unrelated to their moral mandate. Relative to when outcomes supported moral mandates, when outcomes opposed moral mandates people judged the outcome to be less fair, were more angry, were less willing to accept the outcome, and were more likely to take a borrowed pen. In Study 2, participants who recalled another person’s moral violation were more likely to cheat on an experimental task relative to angry or neutral condition participants. Taken together, results provide evidence for moral spillover: outcomes that violate moral standards increase deviant behavior.     

Measuring superstitious belief: why lucky charms matter

A large body of research has attempted to develop theories about the function and origin of superstitious beliefs on the basis of the psychological correlates of such beliefs. Most of this work has measured superstitious belief using the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS). However, this scale refers solely to negative superstitions (e.g., breaking a mirror will cause bad luck) and omits items referring to positive superstitions (e.g., carrying a lucky charm will bring good luck). The two studies reported here found significant interactions between belief in negative and positive superstitions, and several individual difference measures. These findings have important implications for theory development, demonstrate that the PBS is an incomplete measure of superstitious belief, and highlight the need for future measures to include items referring to positive superstitions.     

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

The Belief in Good Luck Scale

The construction and properties of the Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) Scale are described. Three studies provide evidence that reliable individual differences exist with respect to beliefs about luck. Some individuals maintain an irrational view of luck as a somewhat stable force that tends to influence events in their own favor, while others seem to hold the more rational belief that luck is random and unreliable. Further, these beliefs showed a considerable amount of stability over time. The BIGL was significantly related to locus of control (primarily to a chance subscale), but other evidence suggested these constructs were distinct. Belief in good luck was not related to general optimism, academic pessimism, self-esteem, desire for control, or achievement motivation. There was also evidence that belief in good luck was distinct from feeling fortunate or generally satisfied with one's life. Ethnic group differences were observed for the BIGL scale, showing that Asian-Americans were more likely to endorse superstitious beliefs about luck than non-Asians. Finally, the BIGL scale was shown to predict positive expectations for the outcome of everyday situations that are typically associated with luck. This is generally in agreement with previous findings suggesting that people who believe in personal good luck react to lucky events by becoming more positive about the likelihood of future success (Darke & Freedman, 1997). In general, it is suggested that irrational beliefs about luck can serve as a source of positive expectations for the outcome of future events.     

The role of potential loss in the influence of affect on risk-taking behavior

In three experiments the influence of positive affect on risk-taking behavior was examined. In Experiment 1 subjects who received a free gift of candy, compared to those in a control group, were willing to pay increasingly more for lottery tickets as the prize rose from $10 to $90 and as the probability of winning rose from .10 to .90. In Experiment 2 subjects who received a free gift of candy, compared to those in a control group, were willing to pay more to buy insurance against loss, and were particularly more likely to do so when the potential loss was large. A third study, which found that subjects who received a free gift of candy were not willing to pay more for an item than were control subjects, led us to conclude that the results of the first two experiments are not best interpreted as merely due to a general increase in the willingness to spend as a consequence of having received a gift. Instead it was concluded that positive feelings can foster both risk-prone behavior (Experiment 1) and risk-averse behavior (Experiment 2). When a positive-affect subject faces a risk situation in which the potential loss is emphasized, the subject demonstrates risk aversion; when the potential loss is minimized, then risk proneness is observed.     

Illusory tip-of-the-tongue states.

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a target word is on the verge of being recalled. An illusory TOT occurs when a person experiences a TOT, but the actual target is either unavailable, forgotten, or never learned. Illusory TOTs were induced by asking participants to answer questions that did not have correct answers. In Experiment 1, an episodic-memory paradigm, participants were shown fictional animals, some of which were accompanied by the animal's name (identified targets) and some of which were not (unidentified targets). Some participants experienced TOTs for unidentified targets. In Experiment 2, a semantic-memory paradigm, participants were asked general-information questions, some of which were questions with no correct answer. Every one of the 31 participants experienced at least one illusory TOT. The characteristics of illusory TOTs are discussed in light of inferential and direct-access views of TOTS.