Predicting reasoning from memory

In an effort to assess the relations between reasoning and memory, in 8 experiments, the authors examined how well responses on an inductive reasoning task are predicted from responses on a recognition memory task for the same picture stimuli. Across several experimental manipulations, such as varying study time, presentation frequency, and the presence of stimuli from other categories, there was a high correlation between reasoning and memory responses (average r = .87), and these manipulations showed similar effects on the 2 tasks. The results point to common mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning and recognition memory abilities. A mathematical model, GEN-EX (generalization from examples), derived from exemplar models of categorization, is presented, which predicts both reasoning and memory responses from pairwise similarities among the stimuli, allowing for additional influences of subtyping and deterministic responding.     

Time course of item and associative information: implications for global memory models

The time course of availability of associative and item information was examined by using a response signal procedure. Associative information discriminates between a studied pair of words and a pair with words from two different studied pairs. Item information is sufficient to discriminate between a studied pair and a pair not studied. In two experiments, discriminations that require associative information are delayed relative to those based on item information. Two additional experiments discount alternative explanations in terms of the time to encode the test items or task strategies. Examination of the global memory models of Gillund and Shiffrin (1984), Hintzman (1988), and Murdock (1982) shows that the models treat item and associative information inseparably. Modifications to these models which can produce separate contributions for item and associative information do not predict any difference in their availability. Two possible mechanisms for the delayed availability of associative information are considered: the involvement of recall in recognition and the time required to form a compound cue.     

The distinctiveness of emotion concepts: a comparison between emotion, abstract, and concrete words

Are the concepts represented by emotion words different from abstract words in memory? We examined the distinct characteristics of emotion concepts in 3 separate experiments. The first demonstrated that emotion words are better recalled than both concrete and abstract words in a free recall task. In the second experiment, ratings of abstract, concrete, and emotion words were compared on concreteness, imageability, and context availability scales. Results revealed a difference between all 3 word types on each of the 3 scales. The third experiment investigated priming in a lexical decision task for homogeneous (abstract-abstract and emotion-emotion) and heterogeneous (abstract-emotion and emotion-abstract) associated word pairs. Priming occurred only for the homogeneous and heterogeneous abstract-emotion word pair conditions. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed in terms of the circumplex, hierarchical, and semantic activation models. The results are most consistent with the predictions of the semantic activation model.     

Data acquisition dynamics and hypothesis generation

When formulating explanations for the events we witness in the world, temporal dynamics govern the hypotheses we generate. In our view, temporal dynamics influence beliefs over three stages: data acquisition, hypothesis generation, and hypothesis maintenance and updating. This paper presents experimental and computational evidence for the influence of temporal dynamics on hypothesis generation through dynamic working memory processes during data acquisition in a medical diagnosis task. We show that increasing the presentation rate of a sequence of symptoms leads to a primacy effect, which is predicted by the dynamic competition in working memory that dictates the weights allocated to individual data in the generation process. Individual differences observed in hypothesis generation are explained by differences in working memory capacity. Finally, in a simulation experiment we show that activation dynamics at data acquisition also accounts for results from a related task previously held to support capacity-unlimited diagnostic reasoning.     

Working memory and conditional reasoning

Little is known about the role of working memory in conditional reasoning. This paper reports three experiments that examine the contributions of the visuo-spatial scratch pad (VSSP), the articulatory loop, and the central executive components of Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) model of working memory to conditional reasoning. The first experiment employs a spatial memory task that is presented concurrently with two putative spatial interference tasks (tapping and tracking), articulatory suppression, and a verbal memory load. Only the tracking and memory load impaired performance, suggesting that these tap the VSSP and central executive, respectively. Having established the potency of these interference tasks two further experiments examined the effects of tapping and tracking (Experiment 2) and articulation and memory load (Experiment 3) on a conditional reasoning task. Neither tracking nor tapping affected the number of inferences accepted or response latency. Articulation also failed to affect conditional reasoning but memory load selectively reduced acceptance of modus tollens inferences. These results are discussed in terms of both rule-based and mental models theories of reasoning. While these data cannot discriminate between the two perspectives they provide support for one of the central assumptions in each: that some errors in reasoning are attributable directly to working memory demands. Taken together these experiments suggest that conditional reasoning requires an abstract working memory medium for representation; it does not require either the VSSP or the articulatory loop. It is concluded that the central executive provides the necessary substrate.     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

The effect of explanation in simple binary decision tasks

Many studies of explanation have focused on higher level tasks and on how explanations draw upon relevant prior knowledge, which then helps in understanding some event or observation. However, explanations may also affect performance in simple tasks even when they include no task-relevant information. In three experiments, we show that explanations adding no task-relevant information alter performance in a sequential binary decision task. Whereas people with no explanation for why two events occurred at different rates tended to predict each outcome in proportion to their probability of occurrence (to "probability match"), people with an explanation tended to predict the more likely event more often (to "overmatch," a better strategy). These results suggest a broader view of explanation, which includes a role in shaping simple tasks outside of higher level reasoning.     

Always look on the broad side of life: happiness increases the breadth of sensory memory

Research has shown that positive affect increases the breadth of information processing at several higher stages of information processing, such as attentional selection or knowledge activation. In the present study, we examined whether these affective influences are already present at the level of transiently storing incoming information in sensory memory, before attentional selection takes place. After inducing neutral, happy, or sad affect, participants performed an iconic memory task which measures visual sensory memory. In all conditions, iconic memory performance rapidly decreased with increasing delay between stimulus presentation and test, indicating that affect did not influence the decay of iconic memory. However, positive affect increased the amount of incoming information stored in iconic memory. In particular, our results showed that this occurs due to an elimination of the spatial bias typically observed in iconic memory. Whereas performance did not differ at positions where observers in the neutral and negative conditions showed the highest performance, positive affect enhanced performance at all positions where observers in the neutral and negative conditions were relatively "blind." These findings demonstrate that affect influences the breadth of information processing already at earliest processing stages, suggesting that affect may produce an even more fundamental shift in information processing than previously believed.     

Using the memory activation capture (MAC) procedure to investigate the temporal dynamics of hypothesis generation

Research investigating top-down capture has demonstrated a coupling of working memory content with attention and eye movements. By capitalizing on this relationship, we have developed a novel methodology, called the memory activation capture (MAC) procedure, for measuring the dynamics of working memory content supporting complex cognitive tasks (e.g., decision making, problem solving). The MAC procedure employs briefly presented visual arrays containing task-relevant information at critical points in a task. By observing which items are preferentially fixated, we gain a measure of working memory content as the task evolves through time. The efficacy of the MAC procedure was demonstrated in a dynamic hypothesis generation task in which some of its advantages over existing methods for measuring changes in the contents of working memory over time are highlighted. In two experiments, the MAC procedure was able to detect the hypothesis that was retrieved and placed into working memory. Moreover, the results from Experiment 2 suggest a two-stage process following hypothesis retrieval, whereby the hypothesis undergoes a brief period of heightened activation before entering a lower activation state in which it is maintained for output. The results of both experiments are of additional general interest, as they represent the first demonstrations of top-down capture driven by participant-established WM content retrieved from long-term memory.     

Small Change Makes a Big Splash: The Role of Working Self-Concept in the Effects of Stereotype Threat on Memory

Assuming that the principle of an active-self account holds true in real life, priming certain constructs could selectively activate a working self-concept, which in turn guides behavior. The current study involved two experiments that examined the relationships between stereotypic identity, working self-concept, and memory performance in older adults. Specifically, Study 1 tested whether a stereotype threat can affect older adults' working self-concept and memory performance. A modified Stroop color naming task and a separate recognition task showed that a stereotype threat prime altered the activation of the working self-concept and deteriorated the older adults' memory performance. Additionally, the working self-concept mediated the effect of stereotype threat on memory performance. Accordingly, we designed Study 2 to assess whether priming different identities can alter the working self-concept of the elderly and buffer the stereotype threat effect on memory performance. The results not only were the same as Study 1 but also revealed that activating multiple identities could mitigate the stereotype threat. These results support an active-self account and the efficacy of stereotype threat intervention. This intervention strategy may be able to be used in real situations to help the elderly alleviate stereotype threats and memory impairment.     

Formal reasoning in late adulthood: The role of semantic content and metacognitive strategy

Two experiments explored the availability of deductive or formal reasoning in late adulthood. In Experiment 1, fifty young (M=19.0 years) and 50 elderly adults (M=81.0 years) were assessed using adaptations of Wason's selection task and rated task content for familiarity, affect, and agreement. In Experiment 2, 100 young (M=21.0 years) and 100 elderly adults (M=81.0 years) were similarly assessed, with half of the subjects in each age group receiving a metacognitive strategy to facilitate reasoning. Results from Experiment 1 indicated equivalent reasoning among the groups on problems employed in earlier developmental research. In contrast, problems constructed to entail affect resulted in poorer performance by older adults. In Experiment 2, both young and older adults who used the metacognitive strategy reasoned equally acrossall problems. In both experiments, familiarity and agreement did not play a role in deductive reasoning performance, but affect seemed to be an interfering factor. Results are discussed in terms of competence-procedure and stability-decrement models of adult cognitive development.     

Falsifying mental models: Testing the predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning

Four experiments are reported that tested the claim, drawn from mental models theory, that reasoners attempt to construct alternative representations of problems that might falsify preliminary conclusions they have drawn. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate which alternative conclusion(s) they had considered in a syllogistic reasoning task. In Experiments 2-4, participants were asked to draw diagrams consistent with the premises, on the assumption that these diagrams would provide insights into the mental representation being used. In none of the experiments was there any evidence that people constructed more models for multiple-model than for single-model syllogisms, nor was there any correlation between number of models constructed and overall accuracy. The results are interpreted as showing that falsification of the kind proposed by mental models theory may not routinely occur in reasoning.     

Propositional reasoning and working memory: the role of prior training and pragmatic content

Working memory involvement in propositional reasoning was explored after different kinds of training. The training conditions aimed to reduce the impact of non-analytic heuristics and to enhance analytic inference processes according to mental logic theories, the mental model theory, and the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemata. Following an initial training phase, secondary task interference was investigated using concurrent spatial tapping (Experiment 1), random number generation (Experiment 2), and articulatory suppression (Experiment 3). A training condition practicing the construction and use of mental models via a truth table task increased the disruption of reasoning performance by random number generation and articulatory suppression, whereas the other training conditions did not affect susceptibility to secondary task interference. The results corroborate implications of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

Information processing and reasoning with premises that are empirically false: Interference,working memory,and processing speed

In this study, we looked at the contributions of individual differences in susceptibility to interference and working memory to logical reasoning with premises that were empirically false (i.e., not necessarily true). A total of 97 university students were given a sentence completion task for which a subset of stimuli was designed to generate inappropriate semantic activation that interfered with the correct response, a measure of working memory capacity, and a series of logical reasoning tasks with premises that were not always true. The results indicate that susceptibility to interference, as measured by the error rate on the relevant subset of the sentence completion task, and working memory independently account for variation in reasoning performance. The participants who made more errors in the relevant portion of the sentence completion task also showed more empirical intrusions in the deductive reasoning task, even when the effects of working memory were partialed out. Working memory capacity was more clearly related to processes involved in generating uncertainty responses to inferences for which there was no certain conclusion. A comparison of the results of this study with studies of children's reasoning suggests that adults are capable of more selective executive processes than are children. An analysis of latency measures on the sentence completion task indicated that high working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task used a strategy that involved slower processing speed, as compared with participants with similar levels of working memory who did make errors. In contrast, low working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task had relatively shorter reaction times than did comparable participants who did make errors.     

Modality effects in the coding reproduction of rhythms

The temporal coding assumption is that time of presentation is coded more accurately for auditory events than for visual events. This assumption has been used to explain the modality effect, in which recall of recent auditory events is superior to recall of recent visual events. We tested the temporal coding assumption by examining the coding and reproduction of quintessentially temporal stimuli-rhythms. The rhythms were produced by sequences of short and long auditory stimuli or short and long visual stimuli; in either case, the task was to reproduce the temporal sequence. The results from four experiments demonstrated reproduction of auditory rhythms superior to that of visual rhythms. We conclude that speech-based explanations of modality effects cannot accommodate these findings, whereas the findings are consistent with explanations based on the temporal coding assumption.     

嵌套范式下视空工作记忆对基于规则类别学习

基于COVIS模型与认知加工阶段假设,通过2个实验探讨嵌套范式下, 视空工作记忆对基于规则类别学习的影响。实验1采用类别学习中嵌套视空工作记忆的范式,结果发现视空工作记忆削弱基于规则类别学习成绩,与COVIS模型预测相一致。实验2则采用视空工作记忆中嵌套类别学习任务的范式,结果却发现视空工作记忆对基于规则类别学习的影响消失。实验结果表明嵌套范式下视空工作记忆的位置影响基于规则类别学习,初步验证了类别学习存在多个认知加工阶段的假设,视空工作记忆主要影响基于规则类别学习中规则的发现和检验阶段。     

分心抑制和关系整合对学前儿童类比推理的影响

为探究分心抑制和关系整合对学前儿童类比推理的影响,实验一先初步探究分心抑制和关系整合对25名3~4岁和26名5~6岁儿童完成含有知觉分心的类比情景任务的影响。其次,揭示知觉分心与关系整合在类比推理中的具体作用模式。实验二先初步探究分心抑制和关系整合对30名3~4岁和28名5~6岁儿童完成含有语义分心的类比情景任务的影响。其次,揭示语义分心与关系整合在类比推理中的具体作用模式。结果表明,抑制控制能显著预测儿童完成各种类型类比推理成绩,工作记忆能显著预测儿童完成含有语义分心的类比推理成绩而不能显著预测含有知觉分心的类比推理成绩。儿童完成类比情景中的分心抑制是在关系整合中完成的,当类比情景中的关系整合没有超过儿童的工作记忆容量时,知觉或语义分心才能造成对儿童类比推理的影响。     

A comparison of recognition memory to numerical decision: How prior probabilities affect cutoff location

In two experiments, a recognition memory task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number had been shown previously, was compared to a numerical decision task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number represented the height of a man or a woman. Subjects were found to shift β (the cutoff point along the decision axis) with changes in prior probabilities in the direction specified by signal detection theory in the numerical decision task but not in the recognition memory task. An explanation of the results, in terms of a difference in ? (discriminability) between the two tasks, was ruled out. In contrast, explanations which cannot be ruled out involve differences between the tasks in the amount of practice required for the subject to learn the manner in which the stimuli are distributed along the decision continuum, and differences in the availability of an alternative basis for response other than the decision continuum.     

Remembered duration: working memory and the reproduction of intervals

On the basis of attention allocation models of time estimation, the role of working memory in prospective duration reproduction is explored. In four experiments, adult participants performed a counting task (duration, 400 sec) that allowed coordinative and sequential demands on working memory to be varied. After completing the counting task, the participants reproduced the time that they had worked on this task It emerged that (1) increased coordinative demands on working memory (but not increased sequential demands) reduced the accuracy of prospective duration reproduction (Experiments 1 and 2), (2) presenting context information during the reproduction phase enhanced the accuracy of the reproduced duration (Experiment 3), and (3) individual differences in coordinative working memory capacity affected duration reproduction in the same direction as the experimental manipulation of coordinative task demands (Experiment 4). The results suggest that attention allocation models of time estimation may benefit from taking a more differentiated view of the types of attentional demands that affect temporal cognition.