A Minimalist Theory of Truth

This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is “minimal” or “deflationary” in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be.     

A Minimalist Theory of Appropriation

The Journal of Ethics - This paper offers a conditional defence of a minimalist theory of appropriation. The conclusion of its main argument is that, if people do enjoy a natural right to...     

Minimalist semantics in meta-ethical expressivism

James Dreier (Philos Perspect 18:23–44, 2004) states what he calls the “Problem of Creeping Minimalism”: that metaethical Expressivists can accept a series of claims about meaning, under which all of the sentences that Realists can accept are consistent with Expressivism. This would allow Expressivists to accept all of the Realist’s sentences, and as Dreier points out, make it difficult to say what the difference between the two views is. That Expressivists can accept these claims about meaning has been suggested by Simon Blackburn on behalf of his “quasi-realist”. I argue against the assumption that there is a way to interpret the Realist’s sentences in a way that renders them consistent with Expressivism.     

Religious Naturalism and the Religion-Science Dialogue: A Minimalist View

Although its roots go back at least to Spinoza, religious naturalism is once again becoming a self–conscious option in religious thinking. This article seeks to (1) provide a generic notion of religious naturalism, (2) sketch my own "minimalist" variety of religious naturalism, and (3) view the science–religion dialogue from both of these perspectives. This last will include reflection on the nature of scientific practices, the contributions of religious traditions to moral reflection, and Ursula Goodenough's "religiopoiesis."     

I—Must a Semantic Minimalist be a Semantic Internalist?

I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection from §I and argues for a way to meet it which does not depend on giving up semantic externalism.     

Against a Minimalist Reading of Bell's Theorem: Lessons from Fine

Since the validity of Bell's inequalities implies the existence of joint probabilities for non-commuting observables, there is no universal consensus as to what the violation of these inequalities signifies. While the majority view is that the violation teaches us an important lesson about the possibility of explanations, if not about metaphysical issues, there is also a minimalist position claiming that the violation is to be expected from simple facts about probability theory. This minimalist position is backed by theorems due to A. Fine and I. Pitowsky.Our paper shows that the minimalist position cannot be sustained. To this end,we give a formally rigorous interpretation of joint probabilities in thecombined modal and spatiotemporal framework of `stochastic outcomes inbranching space-time' (SOBST) (Kowalski and Placek, 1999; Placek, 2000). We show in this framework that the claim that there can be no joint probabilities fornon-commuting observables is incorrect. The lesson from Fine's theorem is notthat Bell's inequalities will be violated anyhow, but that an adequate modelfor the Bell/Aspect experiment must not define global joint probabilities. Thus we investigate the class of stochastic hidden variable models, whichprima facie do not define such joint probabilities. The reasonwhy these models fail supports the majority view: Bell's inequalities are notjust a mathematical artifact.     

Probability matching

The class of symmetric path-independent models with experimenter-controlled events is considered in conjunction with two-choice probability learning experiments. Various refinements of the notion of probability matching are defined, and the incidence of these properties within this class is studied. It is shown that the linear models are the only models of this class that predict a certain phenomenon that we call stationary probability matching. It is also shown that models within this class that possess an additional property called marginal constancy predict approximate probability matching.This research grew out of questions posed by William K. Estes. We are also indebted to Professor Estes for his encouragement and assistance at all stages of this research. During the course of this research J. I. Y. received support from the U. S. Public Health Service (N. I. M. H.). M. F. N.'s present address is the University of Pennsylvania. J. I. Y.'s present address is the University of Minnesota.     

The matching law

The matching law may be viewed either as an empirical generalization, and therby subject to disproof, or as part of a system of equations used to define the utility (“value”) of a reinforcer. In the latter case it is tautologous, and not subject to disproof within the defining context. A failure to obtain matching will most often be a signal that the independent variables have not been properly scaled. If, however, the proper transformations have been made on the independent variables, and matching is not obtained, the experimental paradigm may be outside the purview of the matching law. At that point, reinterpretations or revisions of the law are called for. The theoretical matching law is but one of many possible ways to define utility, and it may eventually be rejected in favor of a more useful definition.     

The matching problem

Tables of the exact distributions of number of matches are given for small decks having the same number of cards in each suit. Several approximate distributions are considered for use with larger decks, and some indication of the goodness of the approximations is given.The calculations for this paper were done while the writer was working on a project sponsored by funds from the Ford Foundation. The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Frederick Mosteller for his constant help and encouragement during the writing of this paper.     

The matching game: Testing for the generality of the matching law

The matching law suggests that animals will allocate responses as a function of reinforcer availability; that is, if one choice produces more reinforcement, a greater proportion of total responding will be allocated to that choice. Indeed, there tends to be a match between response allocation and proportions of reinforcers delivered, given each of those choices. A computer game that delivers simulated coins of experimenter-selected denominations for responding on either of two keys was developed to test the generality of the matching law. The data suggest that even within a single 10-min session, matching functions may be obtained (although undermatching was the rule in the present results). This program may also be used to test various accounts of the matching law.     

Object-based connectedness facilitates matching

In two matching tasks, participants had to match two images of object pairs. Image-based (IB) connectedness refers to connectedness between the objects in an image. Object-based (OB) connectedness refers to connectedness between the interpreted objects. In Experiment 1, a monocular depth cue (shadow) was used to distinguish different relation types between object pairs. Three relation types were created: IB/OB-connected objects, IB/OB-disconnected objects, and IB-connected/OB-disconnected objects. It was found that IB/OB-connected objects were matched faster than IB/OB-disconnected objects. Objects that were IB-connected/OB-disconnected were matched equally to IB/OB-disconnected objects. In Experiment 2, stereoscopic presentation was used. With relation types comparable to those in Experiment 1, it was again found that OB connectedness determined speed of matching, rather than IB connectedness. We conclude that matching of projections of three-dimensional objects depends more on OB connectedness than on IB connectedness.     

Strategies in cross-modality matching

Subjects were tested on cross-and within-modality matching conditions with either a 5-sec or a 20-sec delay imposed between standard and comparison stimuli. Half the subjects were informed before the trial of what the comparison modality would be, while the others were not. There was a strong effect of instructions on the cross-modality conditions, but little on the within-modality conditions. The informed subjects showed better performance in the haptic-visual condition, while for the uninformed subjects, visual-haptic performance was better. The results suggest the importance of subjects’ processing strategies in cross-modality performance.     

A preferential matching problem

A matching method proposed by Dr. C. E. Stuart is presented in some detail and the essentials for a test of significance are derived. This method differs from the older matching methods in that partial credit is allowed for a near miss. A slight variation of the method permits the matching of one item withM sets ofn traits.     

Reliability of magnitude matching

In each of four experimental sessions, each of 16 subjects gave magnitude estimates of the taste intensities of NaCl and the loudness of noise on a single, common scale--the method of magnitude matching. In all sessions, the intensity levels of the noises were identical; but in two sessions, the concentrations of NaCl were low, and in two they were high. Cross-modality matches (magnitude matches) between NaCl and noise were derived from the judgments, revealing two main findings: First, given constant NaCl concentrations, individual subjects showed reliably different magnitude matches. Second, changing the NaCl concentrations (context) strongly affected the magnitude matches. These findings suggest that magnitude matching may be useful in assessing interindividual as well as intergroup differences, though caution must be taken to minimize effects of context: Context effects are pervasive; they suggest the presence of a complex relativistic process operating when people judge the intensities of qualitatively different stimuli.     

On Happiness: A Minimalist Perspective on a Complex Neural Circuitry and its Psychosocial Constructs

To the human race, Happiness is surely the most coveted of emotions, yet the science behind it is almost as elusive as how to attain and maintain it. An attempt to understand the basis of happiness and its components, in addition to other positive experiences, including mirth and laughter, is a formidable task. Happiness is a separate entity and is not the absence or the opposite of sadness. It deserves its own field of study. It is impermeable to money and transient pleasurable overshoots. This paper is an open invitation to explore the domain of Happiness, review its neuroanatomical and psychosocial constructs and live in its blissful unawareness.