Elkind on egocentrism

The purpose of this paper is to respond to D. Elkind's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 218–226) reply to D. Lapsley and M. Murphy's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) critique of the adolescent egocentrism theory. After a reprise of the issues in contention, we address the problem of theoretical consistency and self-other differentiation in Dr. Elkind's (1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034) theory. The role of formal operations in the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) account of the imaginary audience and personal fable is revised, and the empirical support for Elkind's theory is reviewed. We conclude that there are good conceptual and empirical grounds for doubting the major assumptions of the adolescent egocentrism theory, and that the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) framework has promise in suggesting theoretical integration with other approaches to the self.     

Subjective utility,anticipated utility,and the Allais paradox

One of the most notable counterexamples to expected utility theory is the “Allais paradox” (M. Allais, 1953, Econometrica, 31, 503–546). A number of alternative theories have been proposed in an attempt to resolve this paradox, notably including Karmarkar, 1978, Karmarkar, 1979, 24, 67–72). It is shown that SWU theory necessarily involves violations of dominance, but that the theory can be modified to avoid these violations. The result is a special case of J. Quiggin's anticipated utility theory (1982, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 3, 323–343).     

Occupational prestige: Exploration of a theoretical basis

Drawing on the theory and research of psychophysics, a nonlinear model is hypothesized to explain the connection between education and income and occupational prestige. To achieve this, Weber's (R. L. Gregory, 1981, Mind in Science, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 501–503) and Stevens' (S. S. Stevens, 1970, Science170, 1043–1050) laws are brought together in an intrinsically nonlinear model. Guided by the earlier work of R. L. Hamblin (1971, Sociometry, 34, 423–452) and others, the work of O. D. Duncan (1961, in A. J. Reiss, Jr., O. D. Duncan, P. K. Hatt, & C. C. North (Eds.), Occupations and Social Status, New York, Free Press) is reanalyzed testing the possibility that work on the socioeconomic index can be understood as a prestige allocation process which follows psychophysical principles. That is, prestige is assigned to occupations, given specifiable levels of educational and income attainment, in a manner parallel to the way in which individuals respond to changes in the intensity of other stimuli. Using first the data developed by Duncan (1961) to test the model and the 1963 NORC data (R. W. Hodge, P. M. Siegel, & P. H. Rossi, 1964, American Journal of Sociology, 70, 286–302) to replicate it, a measurement model consistent with the theoretical model is evaluated. Comparing the results of the nonlinear model to that of the linear, it is concluded that a model is obtained yielding theoretical confirmation with no loss in predictive accuracy. The resultant nonlinear model yields alternative substantive implications concerning the relative influence of income and education on occupational prestige to those to be inferred from linear models. Perhaps most important, however, is the candidacy given by these results to psychophysics as the explanatory mechanism in the prestige allocation process.     

Brain responses related to semantic meaning

Evoked Potentials from electroencephalogram (EEG) recording were averaged to many visually presented word stimuli whose semantic meanings were specified along Osgood's semantic dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity [Miron &; Osgood, 1966, in R. B. Cattell (Ed.), Handbook of multivariate experimental psychology, Chicago: Rand-McNally; Osgood, 1971, Journal of Social Issues, 27, 5–63; Osgood, May, &; Miron, 1975, Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press]. Multivariate analyses classified the Evoked Potentials to six semantic classes with success rates more than twice chance expectation. The pattern of brain activity related to the six semantic classes was similar for (i) two sets of words, (ii) 10 subjects used to develop the analyses, and (iii) an added, new subject.     

Do birds of a feather flock together? A test of the similarities within and the differences between five occupations

Two sets of samples of 40 women from each of five different occupations were subjected to J. H. Ward's (Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1963, 58, 236–244) hierarchical cluster analysis, using an index of similarity from Kuder, 1977, Kuder, 1980, 40, 1–8). The five-group solution in neither case adequately recaptured the occupational membership of the original groups. This finding was interpreted to mean that there may be important differences in the interests of person in the same occupation, which in turn has implications for occupational scaling on interest inventories and theories of career development and counseling.     

Informational cues and attributions based on role behavior

A recent experiment by Messick and Reeder (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 18, 482–491) attempted to extend Jones, Davis, and Gergen's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 302–310) classic finding that out-of-role behavior.is more informative for person perception than in-role behavior. It is argued, however, that this study confounded two variables, role performance and occupation. Evidence is presented that the occupation variable alone could have produced Messick and Reeder's results. Both variables seem to affect attributions. The importance of these findings for relating attribution theory and role theory is discussed.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

Efficient sets,decision heuristics,and single-peaked preferences

The origins of single-peaked preferences in multiattribute choice behavior are analyzed. The starting point is (a), (b), 16, 261–266) theory which explains single-peakedness as the joint effect of task and behavior characteristics. Whereas the task conditions—so-called efficient sets—are retained, and their importance is even more stressed, it is argued that Coombs and Avrunin's behavioral assumptions—classical marginally decreasing preference functions—may not be representative of actually displayed choice behavior. Rather, the information processing approach to decision research has shown that multiattribute choices are often based on simplifying heuristic rules which, due to their possible intransitivity, are inconsistent with Coombs and Avrunin's behavioral requirements. Tversky's (Psychological Review, 1969, 76, 31–48) additive difference model is used as an algebraic framework for analyzing such so-called attribute-based choice rules. Sufficient (and in the continuous case also necessary) conditions are presented which guarantee that the additive difference model will also be single-peaked on efficient sets. These conditions show that the behavioral principles yielding single-peaked preferences are far more general than Coombs and Avrunin assumed and include most of the empirically substantiated forms of attribute-based choice rules. Further, a necessary and sufficient condition is derived which insures that elimination rules, like the conjunctive rule, for instance, and generalizations thereof are single-peaked. Finally, making use of a result by Edgeworth, (Mathematical Psychics, London, Paul, 1881), it is shown that efficient sets per se may originate in quite different ways. It is concluded that the phenomenon of single-peakedness is mainly a function of the task rather than of some specific behavior.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

How a thing is called—A study of mothers' and children's naming

Mothers' selections of category names in object-naming tasks were examined using the levels of categorization defined by Eleanor Rosch (E. Rosch. In T. Moore (Ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of language, New York: Academic Press, 1973. E. Rosch. In E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1978. E. Rosch, C. Mervis, W. Gray, D. Johnson, & P. Boyes-Braem. Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 382–439). The effect of three variables—Presentation Context, Taxonomy, and Age (of person for whom mother was naming the items)—on mothers' choice of category names, was also investigated. The stimuli were 36 photographs of common concrete objects representative of four taxonomies. Forty mothers named the stimulus items for their 2-year-olds (N = 20), for their 4-year-olds (N = 20), and for the Experimenter. The category labels that children of both ages used when naming the same items, and mothers' independent predictions of the names their children would use in the naming task, were recorded. Contextual factors were found to have a primary role in determining mothers' selections of category names and the three independent variables had a complex and dynamic effect on mothers' naming practices.     

Fairness and preference

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.     

On resolving conflicting views of cognitive conflict

F. B. Murray's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 54–61) conclusion that a theoretically ambiguous relationship exists between cognitive conflict and Piaget's notion of equilibration was considered. It was suggested that theoretical clarity can be achieved if a distinction is drawn between conflict induction (disequilibrium) and conflict resolution (equilibration). Murray's suggestion that in Piaget's theory internal (cognitive) conflict can be mentally created was disputed. G. N. Cantor's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 39–53) concerns about the adequacy of the measures of internal conflict in B. J. Zimmerman & D. E. Blom's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) study due to their independence from external conflict manipulations was discussed. We agreed with Cantor that such findings obviate direct disconfirmation of an internal conflict construct; however, we suggested that evidence of conservation learning in the absence of either external or internal conflict renders Piaget's account less tenable.     

Equity judgments in hypothetical,four-person partnerships

Subjects' ratings of the fairness of a set of suggested allocations in hypothetical, four-person partnerships demonstrated that an ordinal relationship between inputs and outcomes is not a sufficient definition of equity. Subjects' suggestions for fair distributions of outcomes failed to conform to G. W. Walster's (Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65–67) increasing-profits and profit-sign criteria, and were better fit by R. J. Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear formula than by any other formula thus far proposed.     

On mediation

The mediation-nonmediation dichotomy proposed by the Kendlers (Psychological Review, 1962, 69, 1–16) and subscribed to by Cole and Medin (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1973, 15, 352–355) is reviewed and critiqued. It is proposed that the appropriate question for research is how children mediate, not when they mediate.     

Genetic mediation of sex differences in horizontality: A rejoinder

Neither M. G. McGee (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 289–295) nor M. J. Allen, M. A. Wittig, and K. Butler (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 284–288) suggest any alternative explanation for our finding that water-level performance appears to have an X-linked genetic basis. The power calculations of Allen et al. are found to be faulty, and McGee confuses the hypothesis we tested with a weaker hypothesis. Although the X-linked genetic model is not an adequate model of water-level performance the water-level data fit the X-linked model far better than color blindness and HCN data McGee presents as exemplars of X-linked characteristics.     

The impact of gender schematic processing on the Self Directed Search responses of gifted and talented female adolescents

According to gender schema theory (S. L. Bem, Gender schema theory: A cognitive account of sex typing. Psychological Review, 1981, 88, 354–364), gender schematic processing not only restricts assimilation of information into the self-concept to that which is congruent with the gender schema but also restricts the individual's response patterns in that responses are based on gender schema congruence or incongruence rather than upon a complete memory search. As a result of such gender schematic processing, the response patterns of gifted and talented female adolescents on Holland's (1977) Self Directed Search (SDS) should vary as a function of their gender schema. Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance were conducted on the SDS responses of 284 gifted and talented female adolescents to test whether sex-typed female adolescents would score significantly higher on the gender congruent Social, Artistic, and Conventional dimensions while scoring significantly lower on the gender incongruent Investigative, Enterprising, and Realistic dimensions than did their cross sex-typed counterparts. The results indicated that while SDS total scores did vary significantly as a function of gender group, the direction of noted group differences failed to provide consistent support for predictions derived from gender schema theory. An alternative interpretation based on a generalization of Gottfredson's theory is discussed.     

Classes,collections, and distinctive features: Alternative strategies for solving inclusion problems

This study analyzed the strategies that children ages 5 through 8 years used on two modified versions of Inhelder and Piaget's (The early growth of logic in the child. New York: Norton, 1964) class inclusion task. In two experiments, children were tested on Wilkinson's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 64–85) “percept” inclusion task in which distinctive features marked both supraordinate and subclasses. It was hypothesized that children who fail standard Piagetian inclusion tasks succeed on the “percept” task by counting and comparing mutually exclusive features rather than using features as markers for classes and subclasses. The hypothesis was supported by children's performances on “percept” tasks in which solutions based on feature counting conflicted with solutions based on consideration of class inclusion relations. In two other experiments, children answered part-whole and part-part comparison questions in which both terms were described as classes and/or subclasses, or in which one of the two terms was described as a collection (e.g., a bunch of grapes). These experiments contrasted Markman and Seibert's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 561–577) “organization” hypothesis that the greater psychological integrity of collections facilitates reasoning on part-whole comparison problems with the hypothesis that the faciltative effect results from the “large number” connotation of collective nouns. Results on collection problems in which parts were described as collections supported the “large number” hypothesis. Results were discussed in terms of their implications for Piaget's theory.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.