The Relatively Happy Fish

Zhuangzi and Hui Shi's discussion about whether Zhuangzi knows ‘fish’s happiness' is a Daoist staple. The interpretations, however, portray it as humorous miscommunication between a mystic and a logician. I argue for a fine inferential analysis that explains the argument in a way that informs Zhuangzi philosophical lament at Hui Shi's passing. It also reverses the dominant image of the two thinkers. Zhuangzi emerges as the superior dialectician, the clearer, more analytic epistemologist. Hui Shi's arguments betray his tendency (manifest elsewhere) to misstate the conclusions of their shared relativism leading him but not Zhuangzi to intuitive mysticism.     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.     

Yan Hui's Death as a Threat to Confucius’ Expression of Virtue: A Further Look at the Master's Grief

A striking feature of Confucius’ grief at the death of his beloved disciple Yan Hui is its profound intensity, an intensity detectable nowhere else in the Analects. Like his disciples, the reader of the Analects may be puzzled by the depth of Confucius’ grief in this instance. In distinct accounts, Philip Ivanhoe and Amy Olberding bring some measure of intelligibility to the Master's grief. While partially plausible, I think their offerings on the matter fall short of being fully satisfying. Specifically, I argue that Olberding's proposal that Confucius loses certain developmental avenues after Hui's death should be augmented with the claim that the great depth of his grief largely follows from the importance of Confucius’ expression of virtue in the lives of his disciples. It was Yan Hui who best facilitated his Master's expression of virtue, and with Hui's passing, Confucius loses an avenue to a robust expression of virtue, a loss he laments deeply.     

Imagination in the Zhuangzi: the madman of Chu’s alternative to Confucian cultivation

This paper examines the role of the imagination in the Zhuangzi. There are many avenues through which the various types of imaginations in the Zhuangzi could be investigated, but this paper will concentrate on only one, namely the use of imagination to criticize Confucius’ way. Specifically, the Zhuangzi finds Confucius’ views on virtuosity, moral cultivation, and social roles to include exceedingly limited imagined restrictions. The Daoist classic thereby creates (in a somewhat paradoxical fashion) stories to inspire the imagination of its readers, with the goal of broadening the ways in which people understand morality, society, and themselves. Accordingly, the Zhuangzi suggests that people can ‘zigzag’ through life, temporarily taking on different perspectives or roles, without cultivating a corresponding sense of self. Imagination is key for promoting this type of existential mode of existence—what the Zhuangzi calls ‘genuine’ (zhen 真).     

Junzi as a Tragic Person: A Self Psychological Interpretation of the Analects

This article explicates self psychological connotations of junzi (君子) in the Analects of Confucius. Junzi is a noble person who attempts to actualize Confucian cardinal virtues in concrete human relationships at any cost. Kohut argues that a tragic person is faithful to the psychologically structured ideals even at the expense of death. Like a tragic person, a junzi follows his or her ideals and values, which are deeply anchored in the nuclear self. In the Analects, a junzi remarkably resembles a tragic person. A junzi in the Analects shows the characteristics of a tragic person: empathy, creativity, humor, and wisdom.     

孔子新诠——对《论语》作为一个哲学解释学文本的解读

Communicating with Confucius based on our own hermeneutical context, and reading the Analects as a text of philosophical hermeneutics, it can be concluded that as an epochal thinker, the contribution of Confucius’ thought is that it initiated a humanistic moral ideal with cultural upbringing as its core. Based on this consciousness of humanistic moral ideal, Confucius thought and dealt positively with the human existential plight and social political problems that he faced during his own time, and his thought is more creative than conservative. Translated by Mi Li from Guanzi Xuekan 맜子学刊 (Guanzi Jouranl), 2006, (1): 69–74     

The Taciturn Exemplar

Early Confucian thinkers have an intense interest in the external aspects of moral exemplars. This article explores this interest by unpacking a complicated relation between silence, speech, and moral cultivation in the Analects. Situating Confucius’s desire to be silent in a pedagogical context, this article points out a tension between speaking of moral knowledge and personalizing it. It argues that silence is considered a desirable pedagogical practice because it fosters a more intimate relation between people and the moral knowledge they receive. This article then offers a detailed analysis of several difficult pedagogical moments between Confucius and two of his most eloquent students, Zigong and Zai Wo. Their problematic ways of speaking provide cases in point that flesh out the arguments sketched above. This article concludes by reflecting on how silence can also be alienating in moral cultivation, and on how people’s styles of speech may shape who they are.     

In the World of Persons: The Personhood Debate in the Analects and Zhuangzi

This article is an examination of a debate between Confucians and Zhuangists surrounding the notion of moral personhood as understood in the early Confucian tradition. This debate takes place across texts??most importantly in the Confucian challenge of Analects 18.5-7 and the Zhuangist response of the Renjianshi chapter of the Zhuangzi. In better understanding the disagreement between these two schools, we can come to a clearer picture of the notion of personhood at stake. The Zhuangist reaction to the Confucian position on personhood helps to demonstrate that the Confucians held a conception of the person as communally constructed. Such a view, I argue, can be of great use in contemporary debates surrounding agency, moral responsibility, and moral development. After offering an outline of the Confucian position, I consider various Zhuangist objections both in the Analects and Renjianshi chapter, before considering what I take to be convincing Confucian responses to the Zhuangist objections.     

A critique of Confucius’ philosophy

Throughout the millennia since the composition of the Analects, orthodox scholars have maintained that Confucius faithfully passed down the thought of early eras, particularly those of Yao and Shun: ‘I transmit but do not create ideas.’ This paper shows that Confucius actually subverted the essence of orthodox thought represented mainly by Yao and Shun. His subversion of orthodox thought compels perforce the idea of ‘ren (humanity),’ which concerns itself with the human world, to stand out with the near exclusion of otherworldliness in his teaching. As a result of the misunderstanding of Confucius’ heritage, scholars in the past tended to equate Confucius’ idea of ‘ren’ with specific moral attributes. Again taking exception to the interpretations of bygone eras, this essay demonstrates that humanity in Confucius’ theory signifies a dynamic process rather than a specific attribute or a static rule, changing constantly with different people, different places, and different times.     

Setting the Record Straight: Confucius’ Notion of Ren

Comparative studies involving early Confucian ethics often appear to assume that it is a unified approach to morality. This essay challenges that assumption by arguing that Confucius had a significantly different conception of ren, commonly viewed as central to Confucian ethics, from that of Mencius. It is generally accepted that ren has two senses: in a narrow sense, it is the virtue of benevolence (or compassion); in a broad sense, it is the all-encompassing ethical ideal. Both senses fail to capture Confucius’ conception of ren, for the narrow sense fits only Mencius’ understanding of ren, while the broad sense lacks emphasis and precision. I propose a third sense of ren, that is, ren as an integral, higher-order virtue with respect as its most salient component. This sense of ren is more in keeping with the textual evidence in the Analects. It played a key role in Confucius’ political-moral thinking and made his doctrine diverge considerably from that of Mencius, who understood ren primarily as compassion.     

Confucius's Aesthetic Concept of Noble Man: Beyond Moralism

The prevailing interpretation of ren (humanness) in the Analects is ethical. One consequence of this interpretation is the one-dimensional image of the Confucian junzi (noble man) as a rigid moralist, a fastidious observer of li (ritual). But there are numerous passages in the Analects that resist such a one-sided representation of the junzi, especially Confucius's remarks related to the (Book of) Songs and music. My basic thesis is that Confucius's concept of junji is aesthetic. This is implied by his notion of junji ru (noble scholar) as opposed to xiaoren ru (common scholar). The noble man is one awakened to the beauty of humanness. It is because of this awareness that he ‘sets his mind on the Way, depends on virtue, relies on ren and enjoys the arts.’ Confucius included the Songs and music in his curriculum precisely for the purpose of cultivating in his pupils this aesthetic sensibility.     

Dao and Skepticism

The Zhuangzi raises skeptical problems it does not solve. At best, it asserts that solutions are unnecessary but does not prove it. This is not a fault of the text or its author; it is the logical consequence of the arguments themselves. Philosophically speaking, The Zhuangzi raises doubts, nothing more. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing, and what we are supposed to do about it, is something we are left to decide for ourselves.     

Inquiry into the transcendence of Tang dynasty Confucians to Han dynasty Confucians and the transformation of traditional Confucianism in terms of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Lunyu Bijie</Emphasis>

Neo-Confucianism of the Han and Tang dynasties is an indispensable part of the history of Chinese philosophy. From Han dynasty Confucians to Tang dynasty Confucians, the study of Confucian classics evolved progressively from textual research to conceptual explanation. A significant sign of this transformation is the book Lunyu Bijie 论语笔解 (A Written Explanation of the Analects), co-authored by Han Yu and Li Ao. Making use of the tremendous room for interpretation within the Analects, the book studied and reorganized the relationship between “the study of literature” and “the Dao and principles.” It clearly shows an inevitable development of Confucianism, shifting its focus from phenomena to the nature of the heart-mind in order to comprehend nature and heavenly Dao, both of which “cannot be heard (from Confucius).”     

Beyond sincerity and pretense: role-playing and unstructured self in the Zhuangzi

This article engages with a recent view that the Daoist Classic Zhuangzi advances an alternative to the Confucian role-ethics. According to this view, Zhuangzi opposes the Confucian idea that we should play our social roles with sincerity and instead argues that we should take the liberty to detach ourselves from the roles we play and ‘pretend’ them. It is argued in this article that Zhuangzi’s ideal of role-playing is based neither on sincerity nor on pretense. Instead, it is akin to the excellence of theatre actors when they enact a role: they are able, for a limited time, to restructure their personality into a particular role, but de-structure it again when the performance is over. The prerequisite for this ability is to keep one’s self fundamentally unstructured, or, as Zhuangzi puts it, ‘empty’ (xu 虛). This reading of Zhuangzian role-playing provides a fresh perspectives on ‘playing’ or ‘rambling’ (you 遊) as the central philosophical concept in the Zhuangzi.     

Liezi’s Retirement: A Parody of a Didactic Tale in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Zhuangzi</Emphasis>

The seventh chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子 contains a narrative about Liezi 列子, his teacher Huzi 壺子, and a physiognomist named Jixian 季咸. Traditionally, the story has been read as a didactic tale about how to become a true Daoist sage or as an illustration of attaining spiritual perfection. This essay will argue for an alternative reading of the story as a humorous parody about failed sages, and, at the same time, as an illustration of the benefits of a playful facelessness—or genuine pretending. It thereby turns out to be a counterpart of the following narrative of Hundun 混沌 which completes the Inner Chapters. The story about Liezi’s retirement illustrates how his teacher Huzi remains unharmed (bu shang 傷) by virtue of being a faceless “genuine pretender” whereas Hundun’s demise is due to his failure to maintain his facelessness.     

Hillel and Confucius: The prescriptive formulation of the golden rule in the Jewish and Chinese Confucian ethical traditions

A prospective convert asked Hillel to teach him the entire Torahwhile standing on one foot. Hillel replied, “What is hateful to yourself, do not do to your fellow man. That isthe whole of Torah and the remainder is but commentary. Go and study it.” (Hillel:Shab. 31; emphasis added)Zigong: “Is there asingle word that can serve as a guide to conduct throughout one’s life?” Confucius said: “Perhaps the word ‘shu’, ‘reciprocity’: ‘Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you’.” (Analects: 15.24; see alsoAnalects. 12 andZhongyong. 13.3; emphasis added)¹     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52     

Humour as the Playful Sidekick to Language in the Zhuangzi

Humour in the Zhuangzi is used to question the priority that human beings bestow upon language and thought, revealing both its limitations and its possibilities. Hierarchies and conventions are overturned and both the sense and senselessness of language are celebrated. Humour also opens up a world in which a plethora of perspectives is acknowledged and the purpose of purposelessness is underscored. Encouraging us to take laughter seriously also allows us to view the seeming gravity of the human condition with increased levity.     

On the deification of Confucius

In contrast to Krishna, Gautama, and Jesus, who were deified early by their devotees, the elevation of Confucius came much later in the development of Confucianism. Even here, as Section I of the paper demonstrates, most Confucian philosophers saw him only as a great sage. In their recent book Thinking Through Confucius, Roger Ames and David Hall make the claim that tradition and specific texts demand that Confucius be considered a deity. The two texts, neither from Confucius himself, involve, as I show in Section II, a mistranslation in the first and a misreading of figurative language in the second. Ames and Hall's case is not only weak, but also puzzling, because they argue vigorously for a fully naturalised interpretation of T'ien that makes a traditional concept of God impossible. Section III contains a discussion of the Confucian triad of heaven, humans, and earth, in which humans are not deified and gods are not humanised. I contend that Christian and Indian incarnational theologies upset the balance of this cosmic harmony.     

Continuing education and training

Abstract

For over three quarters of a century Milton H. Erickson made an astonishing impact on all who met him and on all who were his patients. Unlike with many innovators, his recognition by colleagues did not wait for his death in 1980. For decades before people crowded to meet him, to be treated by him, and to learn from him. He was superbly fitted to be a clinician and a healer, thus it was his human and therapeutic qualities that were honored at a recent symposium at the Canterbury Group Family Institute in Great Neck, New York. The proceedings of that occasion are reported here by Laurie Klein Evans, Executive Director of the Institute.

I have already mentioned Erickson's unique position as a master healer. Also, during his lifetime and since his death, his work has inspired a prolific outpouring of theoretical contributions from colleagues and students. Haley has acknowledged his great debt to Erickson; the work of Bandler and Grinder, and of Selvini-Palazzoli, and the recent book by Keeney, Aesthetics of Change, all draw heavily on his practical applications and his natural wisdom in their fashioning of theoretical understandings, which range from paradox to field and system theory and cybernetics. It is small wonder, then, that as these theoretical advances continue, anecdotal and story-telling tributes also appear to bring further substantiation from the source of these exciting hypotheses.

—I.A.