Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Laozi</Emphasis>

Within the literature, Daoist political philosophy has often been linked with anarchism. While some extended arguments have been offered in favor of this conclusion, I take this position to be tenuous and predicated on an assumption that coercive authority cannot be applied through wuwei. Focusing on the Laozi as the fundamental political text of classical Daoism, I lay out a general account of why one ought to be skeptical of classifying it as anarchistic. Keeping this skepticism in mind and recognizing the importance of wuwei in arguments for the anarchist conclusion, I provide a non-anarchistic interpretation of wuwei as a political technique that is consistent with the text of the Laozi. Having presented a plausible alternative to the anarchist understanding of wuwei, I close my discussion with a brief sketch of a positive account of the political theory of the Laozi.     

The Positive Side of Stereotypes: Jewish Anarchists in Early-twentieth-Century Buenos Aires

During the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, anarchism represented the most important faction of the radical left in the Atlantic world. This movement attracted a disproportionately high number of Jews. During the same period Buenos Aires became both an important magnet for Jewish immigration and one of the main centers of anarchist activism in the world. This article shows how the Jewish presence in the anarchist movement of the city became, in an amazingly short time and almost ex nihilo, so visible that it turned into a stereotype. The article then attempts to provide an explanation for this phenomenon that relies on a sociological and comparative perspective and questions notions of Jewish exceptionalism and arguments based on the eschatology and ethics of Judaism. Finally, it explores how stereotypes that function at one level as signifiers of alterity and mechanisms of exclusion, can, at another social level, promote acceptance and check anti-Semitism.     

What an Ideal Is

What I intend to do in the following pages is to focus on what might be termed the most important turn in the very dimension of ideality throughout the history of Western culture: the introduction of the notion of ideal drawn from Plato’s notion of idea, and especially its singular contemporary destiny. In the first part of the article, I am going to analyze Kant’s introduction of the notion of ideal and Hegel’s reading of it, and I am going to argue that the former affirms a dualistic relationship which the latter negates. In the second part of the article, I am going to reason on the actual effects of both the affirmation and the negation of the dualism between the ideal and the real, especially focusing on the forms of totalitarianism and anarchism which characterized the twentieth-century history of Western culture. This will lead me to argue that we should try to avoid both the bad uses of the ideal (namely, the idealization of the real and the debasement of the real through the ideal) and the death of the ideal (namely, forms of epistemological and ethical anarchism) in order to work on a notion of ideal which could be an exceedingly promising tool for us to change and improve the real. This change and improvement can be achieved through the affirmation of the dualistic relationship between the ideal and the real, and more specifically through what I will call an evolutionary notion of ideal versus a revolutionary notion of ideal.     

The Expansion of Epistemology: The Metaphysical vs. the Practical Approach

From the perspective of world philosophy, one phenomenon of the 20th century is quite intriguing. Certain philosophers in China as well as in the West, finding the traditional conception of epistemology too narrow-minded, argued that its scope should be expanded. The Chinese way of expanding epistemology might be called the metaphysical approach, and the Western way the practical approach. In this article, I will first give an outline of both approaches and then try to demonstrate that a substantial dialogue can be created between them. By focusing on the problem of the articulation of what we know, I will make the metaphysical approach and the practical approach engage each other and thus prove to be mutually complementary.     

The Theoretical Reformer: on Husserl’s Plato (Husserl and the Figures of the History of Philosophy)

ABSTRACT

The present research contributes to the elucidation of an important aspect of Husserl’s interpretation of the history of philosophy, that is, his reading of the beginning of Western thought. In particular, it aims to clarify the sense in which Husserl deems Plato the father of the idea itself of philosophy as a science. As will be maintained, Husserl thinks of Socrates and Plato together as providing the first reform of philosophy, whose overall goal is to give reason (Vernunft) a universal method of self-justification against the general skepticism of the sophists. The analysis will be both systematically and historically oriented, for, it will try to both reconstruct Husserl’s interpretation of the background against which Plato first introduces the idea of philosophy as a science, and to show that what is truly at stake for Husserl is the nature of philosophy itself.     

An Other State of Mind is Possible: Anarchism and Psychology

When order is presumed to rely upon centralised authority, anarchy is assumed to mean violent chaos. However, anarchists have long argued, and demonstrated, that other forms of order are both possible and beneficial: ecologically, socially and psychologically. While anarchism has been influential in the development of psychology and is currently being taken up in related disciplines, with the exception of Dennis Fox's body of work, anarchism has yet to be taken seriously in contemporary psychology. Drawing on anarchist, poststructuralist and feminist theory as well as personal experience, this paper offers an introduction to anarchism as not only a public social practice but also an inner state of mind. This is offered in contrast to the state of mind which underpins the state as institution. The statist state of mind is characterised by representation over and above direct experience, an attraction to domination and control, and a continual reliance on fear. An other state of mind, necessary for and produced by anarchist(ic) social relations, is characterised by vitality (freedom–equality), non‐attachment to memory, and love. Such a state of mind, I argue, is cultivated through (spiritual) practice internally and through free, equal and loving relations with others. Such nano‐ and micro‐level processes networked together potentially result in macro‐level anarchist social relations more commonly associated with anarchist thought.     

Will the Popperian Feyerabend please step forward: Pluralistic,Popperian themes in the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend

John Preston has claimed that we must understand Paul Feyerabend's later, post-1970, philosophy in terms of a disappointed Popperianism: that Feyerabend became a sceptical, relativistic, literal anarchist because of his perception of the failure of Popper's philosophy. I argue that this claim cannot be supported and trace the development of Feyerabend's philosophy in terms of a commitment to the central Popperian themes of criticism and critical explanatory progress. This commitment led Feyerabend to reject Popper's specific methodology in favour of a pluralistic methodology, but the commitment to the central values of criticism and critical explanatory progress remained . Moreover, methodological pluralism does not imply scepticism, relativism, or literal anarchism. Feyerabend was not a disappointed Popperian, but, in many respects, a die-hard pluralistic Popperian.     

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.     

About Teleological Behaviorism

Misconceptions abound about teleological behaviorism (TB). Because very few people other than the author publicly call themselves teleological behaviorists, the fault must be mine. The present article is an attempt to clear up those misconceptions. First I will try to indicate what teleological behaviorism is not. Then, in the form of six fables (loosely connected stories, allegories, analogies, fairy tales, and arguments), I will try to give the reader an understanding of what teleological behaviorism actually is.     

Gleaning the social contract theory from African communitarian philosophy

The social contract is one of the most influential political theories in Western philosophy. Although the social contract theory is mainly associated with a number of thinkers in the broad history of social and political philosophy, I am particularly focused on the social contract theory proffered by two British philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. While the social contract theory has mainly been influenced by these British philosophers, little has been done in terms of appraising its key normative ideas from non-Western philosophical traditions. In this article, I examine how the social contract theory might be understood differently from a non-Western perspective, if values salient in African communitarian philosophy are properly understood. As I attempt to establish how the African social contract theory can be gleaned from African communitarian philosophy, I make comparisons and contrasts between the social contract theory in the African tradition and the traditional social contract theory in Western philosophy. I intend to make a novel interpretation of the ideals of the former that are implicit in the African communitarian structure. I seek to provide reasons why the African communitarian structure could be taken as the normative basis for a plausible social contract theory in the African social and political context.     

Doing African political philosophy from a universalist perspective

There has been a strong impetus to set the definitional parameters of study in African political philosophy and theory. Many scholars advance the idea of a discipline intended to provide lessons that stem from “original” African moral, ideological, and political traditions. Often, these traditions and their ideas are presented as holding categorical moral substance in so far as they are seen to be specific to a culturally essentialist understanding of “Africa.” In turn, an influential part of the literature estimates the normative value of the intellectual ideas and arguments afforded by a varied historical, socio-cultural and economic African geography by the degree to which, in being tethered to a seemingly homogenous, “culturally African” influence, these ideas can be opposed to a “Western” equivalent. In this article, I argue that the effects on the discipline of attending to, and being defined by, this cultural essentialism are at best unclear, at worst detrimental. I aim to contribute to the side of those who advocate a universalist perspective to the study of African political philosophy and thought, and who argue for jettisoning an unhelpful dichotomy between “West” and “African,” in favour of a methodological, conceptual and historical specificity that allows the discipline to be truly useful to itself and to others.     

The Political Philosophy of Science and the Problem of Rationality

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality.     

The ethics of my counterpart: public service ethics in Chinese philosophy

China is rising. As China ascends in power, it is likely that ‘Western’ administrators – American and European, in particular – will find that they must interact with Chinese administrators more and more. In this article, I offer readers a brief glimpse into Chinese administrative ethics through an investigation of two forms of Chinese philosophy – Confucianism and Taoism. In addition to reviewing these philosophies, I derive some consequences for a public service ethic that lies between the East and the West. In particular, this article includes some recommendations for the managerial implications of these two philosophies in the context of increased political and administrative connections between the West and China.     

The Enjoyment of the Sage and the Common People: A New Perspective on the Cosmology of the Laozi

The Laozi laughs at the joy of those who violate the Dao and praises the suffering of those who attain it,yet this does not mean that the political philosophy of the Laozi does not encompass a notion of happiness,a notion that is grounded in the "enjoyment of something together" (gong le共樂) by the sag and the common people.The philosophical foundation of the Laozi's view of happiness is its cosmology,of which there are two sequences:one is generation and the other is growth.With the influences of Wei/Jin-era metaphysics and Western philosophy,Chinese scholars used to overemphasize generation,tracing only the origin.But in the cosmology of the Laozi,both generation and growth are indispensable,and this is part of the reason why the Dao and the De are equally important in the Laozi.The happiness of the common people does not come from a psychological dependence on or attachment to certain form of domination,but from the full development of each individual's initiative and action affected by Mysterious De.     

Yin and Yang,and the Hot and the Cold

Yin and Yang are important concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy.Western scholars have become more familiar with these two concepts recently,but for a long time almost no one considered comparing them with their own tradition such as the ancient Greek philosophy,and especially with the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Presocratic philosophy.In this paper,I make an attempt to do exactly that,and especially make a detailed comparison between the thoughts of two ancient thinkers:Laozi and Anaximander.I discuss the thought of Yin and Yang in Laozi-who was the earliest philosopher making use of the concepts Yin and Yang-to express his cosmological thought in ancient Chinese philosophy.Comparatively,I discuss the ideas of the Hot and the Cold in Anaximander,the earlier among Presocratic philosophers referring to the Hot and the Cold as fundamental concepts used to establish his cosmological system.Through this comparison,I indicate that the similarity between ancient Chinese and Western traditions is far more significant than what people are used to imagining.     

The Archimedean point and eccentricity: Hannah Arendt's philosophy of Science and technology

In this contribution I discuss Hannah Arendt's philosophy of culture in three rounds. First I give an account of my view on Hannah Arendt's main work The Human Condition. In this frame of reference I distance myself from the importance attached to Hannah Arendt as a political philosopher and hold a warm plea for her as a philosopher of culture (I and II). Second I pay attention to her view on science and technology in their cultural meaning, expressed in the last chapter of The Human Condition. This part consists in a summary of her thoughts as I read them (III, IV, and V). After these two rounds I make some critical remarks on Hannah Arendt's interpretation of science and technology. The viewpoint of ‘eccentricity’ will be discussed as a frame of reference for her philosophy of culture (VI).     

Richard Popkin – A Personal Memoir

This article is an introduction to an ancient Egyptian text called The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant and an argument that it ought to be seen as a classic of political philosophy. After contextualizing the tale as part of a tradition of moral and political philosophy in ancient Egypt, I explore the methods by which the text defines the proper roles of political authority and contrast its approach to justifying political authority with the argument from the state of nature so common in modern Western political philosophy. I claim that the tale's argument from dysfunction anticipates the move in contemporary Western political philosophy towards privileging non-ideal over ideal theory. I discuss challenges in translating the key term in the tale – ma'at – in light of the fact that it can be taken to mean ‘justice’ and/or ‘truth’. Finally, I discuss how the irony at the heart of its narrative can lead us to interpret the tale as having either conservative or revolutionary implications for the political system it depicts.     

Representing the Structure of a Debate

In this article I aim to use the 1948 Russell-Copleston debate to highlight some recent problems I have experienced teaching argument analysis in my philosophy courses. First, I will use argument diagramming to represent the arguments in the debate while reflecting on the use of this approach use to teach argument analysis skills. Then, I will discuss the tools and methods scholars have proposed to represent debates, rather than just individual arguments. Finally, I will argue that there is not, but needs to be, a good way to represent argumentative debates in a way that neither obscures the essential details of the exchange nor becomes too unwieldy to extract a sense of the overall debate.

     

On Kantians and Pragmatists: Kenneth Baynes's Habermas

In this article I lay out Kenneth Baynes's interpretation of Habermas's social and political philosophy, and develop three lines of criticism. The first concerns the question of whether, and if so in what respect, Habermas's political theory counts as a critical social theory. I argue that it is not clear in what sense Habermas's political theory is a ‘critical’ social theory, and that Baynes's interpretation throws little light on this issue. The second related issue is to what extent it can be fairly claimed that on Habermas's account of democracy, political legitimacy rests on a “core morality”. While there is a possible reconstruction of Habermas along these lines, I argue that it conflicts with the central tenets of Habemras's political theory. Finally, I question whether Baynes is right to align Habermas's ideal of public reason so closely with Rawls's.     

Kant's Conception of Inner Value

Abstract: This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant's moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.